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ABSTRACT
AESTHETICS, AUTHORITY AND JUSTICE IN A
POST-METAPHYSICAL
AGE: NIETZSCHE AND ARENDT

SEPTEMBER 1991

KIMBERLEY

F.

CURTIS, B.A., SAN FRANCISCO STATE
UNIVERSITY

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by: Professor Jean Bethke Elshtain

The aim of my dissertation is to explore the

aesthetic approaches to questions of authority and
justice
in a post-metaphysical age in the works of
Friedrich

Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt.

Both turn from a rationalist

foundation for political order, and suggest that our

aesthetic response to the world is central in forming our
sense of legitimacy and allegiance as well as in orienting
us ethically.

Central to this response is a celebration

of the plurality and relativity of human affairs in the

form of a sense of tragic pleasure which

I

argue is of

great ethical relevance to our post-metaphysical condition.

This "aestheticization" places both Nietzsche and

Arendt 's work in great tension with conceptions of
politics based primarily on concerns about social and economic justice.

I

explore these tensions, and argue that

the line of thinking begun by Nietzsche is brought to real

fruition in Arendt's work.

As such, she offers an

v

important alternative to the nihilistic
and anti-political
tendencies in Nietzsche's work, tendencies
which haunt
post-structuralist thinkers indebted to
Nietzsche. Hence,
this dissertation is situated between
modernist

rationalism and post-structuralist relativism.
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INTRODUCTION

In this study

I

explore what

take to be the aestheti-

I

cally grounded approaches to the problems of authority and
justice in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Hannah
Arendt.

Both thinkers lodged their reflections in the gap

with which they thought their and our times were confronted as the efficacy of the modern rationalist

metaphysical foundations for political and ethical order
waned.

Both Nietzsche and Arendt were driven by the sense

that the remnants of modernity must be critigued in the

effort to usher in, as Arendt put it, a novus ordo

saeclorum

.

And both carried out their critigues of

modernity through a persistent rejection of Western
metaphysics in favor of aesthetic explorations.

Yet both

would have stood critically to the philosophical-political
body of thought that has arisen in what many now call our

condition of postmodernity

:

post-structuralism,

a

set of

works informed by an explicitly aesthetic orientation.
Furthermore, their critical distance

I

believe would have

been of an ethical nature, involving shared concerns about
both authority and justice in this condition of postmodernity.

This dissertation is situated within the on-going

contemporary debates over the relation between modernity
and postmodernity; that is, squarely within our preoccupa-

1

tion - perhaps itself prototypical
ly modern

place and identity.

More specifically,

I

-

with our

am concerned

here to explore and make a case for the ethical
relevance
to our present condition of the works of both
Nietzsche
and Arendt - not only insofar as they reveal the
ethical

corrosion of modernity, but insofar as they help us to

reconceive ethics in a post-metaphysical condition.

The

aesthetic dimension of both of their works has been soundly criticized as amoral and lacking in ethical force,

1

and

it is central to this work to suggest the shortcomings
of

such critiques, while at the same time distancing their

work from much of post-structuralist thought which, on the
whole,

I

find ethically limited.

of these debates that

I

It is to an elaboration

now turn in the effort to more

closely situate this work.
Our times - it is too much to call ours an "age"

-

are increasingly beset by the sense that Western culture
is moving beyond "the modern."

The goals and aspirations,

the founding principles, assumptions and beliefs which in-

augurated a clear sense of the new in the 17th century,
and which, variously, retained effective force in forming
a relatively coherent sense of a cultural identity,

longer possess the same kind of potency.

no

The conglomerate

of claims and dreams with which moderns distinguished

themselves from both the medievals and the ancients: increased rationality, freedom, scientific knowledge and

2

mastery of nature, self -consciousness

,

individuality,

progress, material abundance - to name
but an important
few, have one by one been challenged
and

problematic by

events of the late 19th and

2

0th centuries, and by the in-

tellectual and artistic efforts to come to
grips with the
age within which these events occurred.
Most dramatically
significant in this regard are imperialism, the

totalitarian orders of Nazi Germany and Stalin's
reign in
the Soviet Union, the invention and use of
nuclear
weaponry, and, more recently, the possibly irreversible

alteration of the earth's climate due to ozone depletion,
as well as an industrial system of production
and way of

life which daily destroy the biological and genetic
diver-

sity of life on earth.

Philosophically this sense of moving beyond "the modern"

(and

I

call it a sense to underline the idea that

this is not just another argument but a felt condition

something we are not altogether simply able to choose

f

)

has

been registered in the claim that Western metaphysics has
come to an end, a claim first heralded by Nietzsche,

spread afar by Heidegger, and most persistently and posi-

tively pursued as the beginning for all thought by poststructuralists such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida.

At the heart of this sense lies the idea that we

must relinquish the notion that there is a true reality

which underlies the world of appearances, a true reality

3

with which we have affinity and whose
purported substantiality should and can frame and
inspire our philosophic, scientific and ethical lives.
Truth is

not some-

thing out there, underlying, essential,
waiting to be discovered,
it is, rather, a human product,
something historically contextual rather than transcendental
and universal.
Thus the end of metaphysics is synonymous
with a
crisis in epistemology
At its most general, but also its most
fundamental

level then, this sense of being beyond the
modern consists

philosophically in an inability to sustain faith or trust
in the founding philosophical idea of Western
culture -

of

a reality which is perfect,

harmonious, universally con-

sistent, final and eternal, and which, furthermore, can

provide the guiding ethical principles by which our private and collective lives can be ordered, given meaning
and purpose.

Under these conditions the problems which

loom for political theorists (as well, obviously, though
in different ways for everyone) are those having to do

with how to ground or legitimate political order, on what
foundations to build conceptions and practices of

authority and justice in a world increasingly unable to
sustain any claims to truth or universality towards such
ends.

In the modern age such foundations have taken various
forms:

in the early modern period in such thinkers as

Hobbes and Locke it was the laws of
nature which were
thought to be hidden in the breast of
every human, that
is,

rational being; the 18th century followed,
proclaiming
the inalienable rights of all men; and
the 19th with the
dialectical laws of history in the form of
Geist or class
consciousness whose full realization it was
thought would
put an end to history as such. Jean-Francois
Lyotard has
characterized recourse to such foundations for
legitimation in the modern age as recourse to
"meta-narratives
.

With the term modern itself he designates, "any
science
that legitimizes itself with reference to a
metadiscourse
of this kind making an explicit appeal to some
grand nar-

rative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the
hermeneutics
of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working

subject, or the creation of wealth." 2

This dealing in

meta-narratives has also been called foundational ism or

totalizing theory.

All three terms, as efforts to grasp

the essence of the modern conceptually, imply the guality
of the modern age which

I

would like to highlight here

-

namely a will to master, a drive to order, tame and take
charge of the world.
More pointedly,

I

think we must understand the modern

as driven by a will and a conviction that the human condi-

tion of suffering in both its material, but also substan-

tially in its spiritual dimensions can and should be ex-

purgated from the world.

To master and to heal become in-

5

terwoven in the secular humanism of the
modern age. As
such, modern progress is implacably
pitted against both
the finitude of nature as well as its
mysterious infinity
or wildness.
To become essentially human is understood
as
a developmental and historical
process of increasing
im-

provement in the rational faculty which can
ever more
thoroughly assert itself over and against a
nature - both
within the self and without - which otherwise
leads us

astray into chaos, moral degeneracy, unknowing,
darkness
and helplessness. Modern "man" is guintessentially
homo
faber who will make the tools and create the wealth

through which the harshness of a capricious nature
will be
terminated and the alienation which comes from finding
oneself subject to such forces will be annulled.

Whole-

ness, and healing occur through mastery and domination,

the end goal being not to redeem suffering by finding

something to suffer for, but to believe it possible to
eradicate the phenomenon altogether.

Objection to this reading of modernity will un-

doubtedly be made that this age does indeed tolerate
great deal of suffering

-

a

in its liberal moment wherein

those who cannot achieve the level of mastery and rational

autonomy demanded of them are marginalized, stigmatized
and disciplined; and in its marxist moment wherein those

insufficiently socialized and humanized must be re-

programmed and re-educated.

Thus,

6

it will be objected,

both liberalism and marxism require
perpetual sacrifices,
forms of asceticism and suffering to
gain their ends.
Such points are obviously well taken.
The amount of
human suffering which occurred in the
early capitalist
period in the West was tremendous, and
the expansion of
disciplinary and social control interventions
which have
come to constitute the nature of the
relationship between
the state and citizen/client in liberal
welfare state democracies has brought a rather new kind of suffering
to

liberal polities.

Alternatively, the extraordinary

curtailment of individual and public freedom under
state
socialist regimes has brought arguably even greater
suf-

fering.

Yet this should not obscure what, in my view, is a

deeper driving current of modernity, namely that in both
its liberal and marxists dimensions modernity's fundamen-

tal ethical self -understanding of what it is doing is

framed by a persistent humanism which, in hubristic fashion, takes pity upon the human condition and is motivated

by the effort to mitigate and ameliorate, if not eliminate
the pains which it supposes are not necessary for the rational, self-creating beings it takes humans to be (or be
on the way to becoming)
again,

.

And this drive rests, once

in faith in and access to true knowledge of the na-

ture of humans and the world; on unconditional claims to
the truth that ground their ends and thus too the meaning

7

that infuses their lives.

There is no need here for an

interrogatory posture, though this drive
has always been
accompanied by great anxiety and doubts
about the ends it
seeks to realize.
These are very large claims and

I

would like to

specify them somewhat by briefly looking at
two

preeminently modern political theorists: Locke
and Marx
who will serve as the emblems for the two most
important
intellectual forces in modernity

-

liberalism and marxism.

In the state of nature of Locke's political
and ethi-

cal imagination we find that we are naturally
rational

(though "the guarrelsome and contentious" do fall
short of

their nature), and that it is this nature, the rational
and industrious, which God commands to subdue the earth.
All earthly nature must be subdued which means be trans-

formed out of its "worthless" state and made productive,

wealth-producing; it must be possessed by the rational,
and this is as true for the natural world as it is for the

human "waste" which was the target of Locke's proposed
Poor Law Reform.

3

Both are pitiable and in need of dis-

ciplined subjugation by the industrious hand of the rational man.

Both are in need of rectification, and the

relation the rational man takes to them is fundamentally

structured by the conviction that such rectification is
both necessary and possible, and that the rationality

which legitimizes such relations is pre-social, God-given.

8

If we turn to the theorist who
fundamentally shaped

the other pole of modern political thought Marx - we can
see reason again pre-established, though
this time being
developed through the movement of history understood
as
the dialectical exchange between humans and
nature.
And
again, the final aim, the driving impetus is the
allevia-

tion of suffering in the human condition, this
time in a
twofold sense of material misery but also of that

elementary alienation which the human subject experiences
as a consequence both of private property where the
fruits

of her labor stand over and against her as something
alien, and as a consequence of an alien, unhumanized na-

ture itself.

in this context marxism is an extension and

further intensification of the modern drive to alleviate
suffering.
able,

In both senses the human condition is piti-

in need of rectification.

Hence Marx's ideal of a

fully naturalized man and humanized nature, and the promise of a phenomenal transparency in human affairs.
In both Locke and Marx the drive to rectify a piti-

able condition is underwritten by a meta-narrative about
reason: for Locke it is a reason given us by God prior to

society; for Marx it is a metaphysically grounded concep-

tion of reason in history.

And in both cases this ground

fuels an impulse basic and central to each - to bring

abundance that will alleviate suffering on earth.

Though

certainly not the only ethical impulse in liberalism and

9

marxism, this is,

I

would suggest, one of its strongest

and most durable ones, but also one without
which neither
of these modern forms of thought could
sustain their
identity as such.

While the crisis of nihilism to which this
sense of
being now beyond the modern corresponds is a
complex
tangle of events
orate, what

I

I

do not here presume to thoroughly elab-

do want to suggest is the central ity of this

will to master and rectify to the collapse of the
modern

rationalist metaphysical foundation for ethical and
political order ./Most poignantly in its imperialist stage

capitalism and state socialism, through different means,
rather quickly exposed the raw lust for power and ac-

cumulation which drove the practices of political and cultural life, steadily undermining the ethical foundations
of both political forms: the freedom of the rational

autonomous subject, on the one hand, and the freedom of
socialized man, on the other.

This revelation of naked

power as well as the tremendous human-powered interventions each shook, in their own ways, trust and faith in a

transcendent reason as the foundation for political order,

authority and justice.
2 0th

In the 19th and first half of the

century modernity reached its darkest hour, and with

the tumbling of a rationalist metaphysical foundation so

too teetered notions of a free willing subject, the equa-

tion of self-consciousness with freedom, historical prog-

10

ress...

what was left of the order was a ceaseless,
restless accumulation process and pursuit of
power and mastery
through it, a process to which all "uncongenial"
cultural
formations and traditions are sacrificed: either
destroyed
or assimilated so as to lose their distinctive
form.
The curious aspect of this modernity which
culminates
in so much nihilistic despair in the 20th century
is that

the very will to master both the material and
spiritual

suffering with which the human condition presents itself

actually begins a pursuit of total control and stability
of life experience in which all forms of life, all senti-

ments, impulses and beliefs which threaten that control

must ruthlessly be rooted out, subjugated, destroyed.

The

very will to master and control itself produces the

greatest instability of life forms and cultural formation.
Hence, paradoxically, the essence of modernity is its pro-

cess character, as Arendt put it; an inertia towards form-

lessness which in this century has reached its peak in
such a way that we now, in our despair over modernity's

hopes and dreams, have come to the sense that we are

moving and must move beyond the modern.
It is with the term postmodernism that we grope to

express this sensibility which now intuitively grips much
of the Western world and which self-consciously grips many

Western intellectuals.
sensibility (to whom

I

Those who write from out of this
shall refer as post-structuralists
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for brevity's sake) all do so as
self-consciously post-

metaphysical thinkers, thus striving to
pull out of this
"ending" in Western culture what is
possible in a positive
sense.
For most this generally consists in a
celebration
of difference, multiplicity, plurality
and discontinuity;
a rejection of the search for immutable
forms,

of the

"consoling play of recognitions," of meta-narratives
sue
as historical progress, of the autonomous subject,
and a

concommitant embrace of contingency.
The most persistent and loudest concern that has

emerged regarding post-structuralism has to do with the
ethical relativism that critics charge makes this kind of

thought dangerous; that is, that there is no basis firm
enough upon which some form of authority and practices of
justice would guide and limit human action and human communal life.

The nightmare that haunts critics of post-

structuralism is an abandonment of all limiting, shaping

possibilities in favor of raw power and will alone.
At a theoretical, as at a practical level these con-

cerns must be addressed.

The task, which appears to the

modern mind as the gigantic paradox of constructing a nonfoundational theory of authority and justice clearly must
be confronted.

This confrontation is yet in its infancy

at this point, and it is here, within these youthful efforts, that this dissertation is wedged insofar as, on the

one hand, it participates in critique of modernist concep-
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tions of authority and justice with
a postmodern
sensibility, yet, on the other, retains
a critical distance from what often appears to be
post-structuralist
thinkers' own embrace of this sort of
hypermodern formlessness.
Let me turn briefly to the work of three
poststructuralists by way of illustration.

Michel Foucault's work is an interesting and
compli-

cated example in this regard.

Foucault's most important

contribution is his conception of the specific form of
power modernity has produced: bio-power. Emerging
with
the modern nation-state and its overarching concern

for

its own existence, the target of bio-power is
twofold:

species life and individual life.

This form of power op-

erates by creating a subjectivity, an identity through

which the body can be objectified and subjugated.
basis of this deep subjectivity, this deep truth,

On the
(e.g.

the hysterical female body, the psychiatrization of the

perverse adult, etc.) that which does not fit is ruthlessly pursued in a ceaseless show of force which is never

complete because of what Foucault calls the plebs, or, "a

certain plebian quality" 4 irreducible to this true subjectivity upon which the state relies.

Indeed Foucault

argues that modernity's specific mode of operation, its

ceaseless effort to conquer the irreducible in the name of
the contained or complete, constantly causes the very

being of "man" to change and hence continuously objec-

13

tifies all values it established, making
any morality or
ethical life impossible.

Foucault himself, in his own move beyond
the modern,
distances his thought not only from
subject-oriented
thought which privileges the self -understanding
of the
signifier, but also from thinking which takes
seriously
the signified - the sedimented background
unavailable to
the signifier.

Foucault thus rejects deep meaning in ei-

ther sense in favor of an analysis of human relations
as
"fields of force," and of history as the perpetual discontinuous, discordant movement of "endlessly repeated

plays of domination." 5

what we essentially are are ef-

fects of this power, nothing more nor less.

Thought itself, then, becomes with Foucault, action

both a play of power and an effect of power.
longer theoretical.

Hence,

-

It is no

ironically, Foucault 's own

thought is a rarefied product of modern thought as he himself critically conceived it

- as a

"mode of action."

And

this hperactive, disruptive, elusive offensive, hyperbolic

quality of Foucault 's thought was the strategy least open,
in his view, to peril in an age of bio-power.

So Foucault

offends our desire for value by rejecting notions of

humanity and human dignity through which we seek to unify
human selves, and urges us to comprehend that what is is
discordant, that it exists in and as discord, and this he
does both by meticulous mapping of history's restless

14

plays of domination, but also by a constant
self-conscious
refusal to affirm more than the irreducible
"plebs" which
modern bio-power ceaselessly seeks to subjugate.
it is,

then, through a hyper-movement, through
his own form of

strategic thought-as-action that Foucault thinks
it possible to battle modern formlessness and inability
to
sustain an ethical life insofar as this strategy
destroys
the anchors (namely the forms of subjectivity or
deep

truth about selves) upon which modern bio-power depends
for its own reproduction.

This is very important work.

Yet the thoroughly

deconstructive dimension is, finally, terribly insufficient when it comes to notions of what positivities we

might indeed ethically form ourselves around as we move
out of modernity.

Foucault remains too silent on ques-

tions of authority and justice.

Jean-Francois Lyotard, by contrast, indeed tries to
address these questions in both The Post-Modern Condition
and in Just Gaming

6
.

Lyotard ends The Post-Modern Condi -

tion with the following,
"Let us wage war on totality, let us be witnesses to the unpresentable, let us activate
the differences and save the honor of the
name 1,7

The condition of postmodernity is characterized by Lyotard
as being "dispersed in clouds of narrative elements," each

element with its own "pragmatic valence," each of us

15

living at the "intersection" of many of
these dispersed
clouds. 8 Thus we live in a heterogeneity
of such elements
which are neither necessarily stable nor
commensurable.
"They only," he says, "give rise to institutions
in
patches - local determinism," 9 despite the
efforts of decision makers to coordinate and systematize
them.

Lyotard, like Foucault, embraces as a positive
step

this condition of heterogeneity and dispersal, and
sug-

gests that it is this being witnesses to the
unpresentable

which will reenchant the world.

Indeed that which legiti-

mates or has authority in the postmodern condition is
the

generation of new ideas and new statements, is bringing
forth the new through paralogy which Lyotard distinguishes
from innovation.

Legitimacy resides in paralogy, in those

moves which disturb the order of reason, destabilize the

capacity for explanation and certainty, thereby giving us
a

thrilling brush with the incommensurable and the sub-

lime.

The postmodern attitude is jubilation in a disrup-

tion which inaugurates new rules of the game, and not a

nostalgic disappointment in which the unpresentable is put
forth as "missing contents," 10 a sentiment which characterize, in Lyotard ' s view, the modern.

The very con-

sistency of form in modernist works continues to offer a
solace denied to the witness or spectator by postmodernist
works.

Yet postmodernists take great pleasure in the dis-

16

ruptions and multiplicities that our
condition engenders.
They embody an altogether different
aesthetic.
The question then becomes for Lyotard
what bearing
such reflections on paralogy and witnessing
the unpresentable have outside the realms of knowledge
and aesthetics?
If authority and legitimation lie in paralogy
and the unpresentable or sublime, how are we to re-think
justice in
the condition of postmodernity?
He suggests that we must replace the modern
regula-

tive idea of justice

-

totality, with that of plurality.

Here justice would be placed under a rule of divergence

not convergence. 11

The first step would be the recogni-

tion of the heterogeneity and purity of each language game
and a rejection of "terror" which assumes the isomorphism
of language games. 12

The second step recognizes that con-

sensus on the rules of any game must be local so that

there are a multiplicity of finite arguments about

metaprescriptives, limited in time and space. 13

Justice then, for Lyotard, gets reduced, on the one
hand, to maintaining the purity of incommensurable lan-

guage games, and, on the other, to a restless innovation
at the limits of given rules which have no other value

than joy in the new and intimations of the unpresentable.
The problem, as Sam Weber, using Nietzsche, points out in
the Afterword to Just Gaming is that what is interesting

about language games is not their absolute singularity and
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incommensurability, as Lyotard suggests, but
rather the
tension between unity and disunity.
it is this kind of
agonism and not one of complete rupture
and distance which
more closely captures relations between
language

"

games,

and which is most fascinating when it comes
to question
concerning freedom, authority and justice.
Furthermore,
to build out from Weber's point, it is this
very tension
within which the constitution of a "we" is possible,
a

non-totalizing we in which change and the new occurs not
alone through the monotonous radical disruptions which
characterize Lyotard 's paralogies.

Purposefulness, that

which justifies in this Lyotardian game-world, is disruption for disruption's sake; change of rules for the sake
of delight in the change.

And the question, why? presses

itself forth constantly upon this text.

Lyotard

celebrates the restlessness and the formlessness which

characterizes life in this postmodern condition.

"[The]

most significant effect of language games," he writes, "is

precisely what validates the adoption of rules
for paralogy." 15

- the quest

Here we have it outright: what justifies

are instabilities, disruptions in the order of reason, and
the incommensurability of our games as well as legiti-

mation by paralogy itself keep us from being able to
evaluate such moves save for the very largest of principles

-

heteromorphism which must prevail against the ter-

ror of isomorphism.
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This kind of formless heteromorphism
clearly frightens Richard Rorty, though he too
writes conscientiously

with a postmodern sensibility.

Rorty's "liberal ironist"

cultivates the constitution of a public we
through a
solidarity which comes of pity for pain and
remorse for
16
cruelty.
The human solidarity he wishes to cultivate
depends not on a human essence or core sense
of the

self,

but on "the ability to think of people wildly
different
from ourselves as included in the range of "us"..." 17
and
this through a recognition of our common susceptibility

to

humiliation and pain.
define a moral subject.

This is the extent to which we can
For Rorty, this and not agreement

about a final vocabulary that establishes our ends and

purposes is "the only social bond needed." 18

This bond

then is the solitary basis for public, collective life.
It is private life which the liberal ironist reserves

for ultimate questions about life's meaning and purposes.

The minimal social bond should make it maximally possible
for individuals to pursue such questions as an ironist

would, that is, not with the hope of arriving at any final

truth but with the effort to constantly re-describe themselves and their ends in their experiments with self-

creation and private salvation.

This is done through en-

counters with others - in books and with living persons.
The ironist creatively pursues the doubts and ambiguities
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inevitably lodged in her settled views
and beliefs, seeking to forever re-define them in
light of the new.
What we may appear to have found in
Rorty 's liberal
ironist culture is an answer to modernity's
and postmodernity's formlessness - the former the
result of a will
to master, the latter the result of a
celebration of disruptions, discontinuities, and paralogy.

For the liberal

ironist has rejected the modernist metaphysician's
project
of a final vocabulary, but has also found
a minimal basis
for a social bond which gives a general
principle-based
form to cultural-public life.

There is in a liberal

ironist culture the possibility of a great degree
of social cohesion yet a tremendous space for self-

experimentation or "private salvation" as Rorty sometimes
characterizes it. 19

The formlessness and the wildly

deconstruct ive impulses of much post-structuralist thought
appear to be absent in liberal ironist culture with its

ethically rooted citizen and its rootless ironist.
I

think this judgment too precipitous, for neither

can Rorty address the Nietzschean contention that some
forms of suffering may be creative and ethically fruitful,

nor the Arendtian contention that a pity-based politics
itself leads, if not inevitably to the Terror, then to a

pursuit of comfort which itself knows no limits.

Nor can

Rorty answer Foucault's charge that such a politics has
led and will lead to the constitution of a public culture
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which perpetually seeks to expurgate
pain and cruelty in
the name of some identity (the pederast?
the mad? the

hysterical female body?)

while it is clear Rorty would

not embrace this disciplinary bio-power,
his formulations
of public life and the basis for
solidarity leave his liberal ironist culture no resources with
which to combat
it.

For even the private ironist which Rorty
very undemocratically (and probably naively) sees as being
but a minority
of the population - the vast majority living
from common
sense, is busy describing new forms of cruelty
and

humiliation and pain, and thus is fundamentally bound
up
in the very modern project of expurgating
pain and suffering.
I

turn, then, to both Nietzsche and Arendt for help

in groping towards a post-metaphysical or non-f oundational

approach to the problems of authority and justice in the
wake of the end of modernism and the still dissatisfactory
nature of most postmodern work, three examples of which
have commented on above.

I

The pairing of Nietzsche and

Arendt for such a task is not at all self-evident.

In

some sense Arendt is the heroine of this work for, on the
one hand, she is critical of modernity's effort to al-

leviate suffering through a hyper focus on mastery

- in-

cluding here the project of the autonomous or sovereign
subject as well as the collective self, but also the im-

pulse to master the earth.

Furthermore, she was highly
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suspicious of the emotion of pity and
the passion of compassion with regard to political life,
fearing the unconditional and limitless character of
their force was
destructive of cultural formation. On
the other hand,
Arendt would not have taken much solace
in poststructuralist thought either; she would have
been particularly impatient with its deconstructive
tendencies, unbalanced as they usually are by constructive
ones, and
thus,

as

argue above, doing little to combat the
formlessness
of life in late modernity.
Arendt seems to occupy
I

an im-

portant position: neither nostalgically (or despairingly)
modernist, nor blithely postmodernist.
In this regard Nietzsche seems perhaps ill-chosen
as

someone from whom help also might be sought for sue a
project, particularly as post-structuralist theorists
with

their deconstructive tendencies are probably more influenced by Nietzsche than by any other single philosopher.

Even Arendt herself said of Nietzsche's formula-

tions of our condition that they were sometimes "overly
loud and pathetic," as if, in her view, Nietzsche ex-

aggerated not so much the end of the old world, but
resources for constructing a new one. 20

Nietzsche and Arendt for

a

So why the pair

project that sets out to think

about the possibility of authority and justice, of limits
in a post-metaphysical age?
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Nietzsche and Arendt share an exploration
that in
both thinkers becomes an exemplification
of an alternative
to the aesthetic impulse which underlay
modern rationalist
metaphysics with its roots in Platonism.
Convinced that
the effective force of Western metaphysics
for political
life was at an end, both Nietzsche and
Arendt turn with
anxiety to the problems of form, of authority
and of the

possibility of cultural greatness or excellence.

Reject-

ing the older aesthetic of pleasure in
harmony, perfection
and oneness, the aesthetic sensibility Arendt
and

Nietzsche both exhibit and consciously attempt to
cultivate is pleasure in the tension between harmony
and
discord - what Arendt called "tragic pleasure." 21 it
is

their conviction that experimentation with this aesthetic
was critical to the reconceptualization and re-

establishment of a kind of authority suited to a postmetaphysical age.

And even more strongly, that this

aesthetic sensibility must be the difficult ground of
ethical life in such an age.

The works of both Arendt and

Nietzsche suggest that we must cultivate the ability to
find beautiful the tensions, ambiguities, the

heterogeneity and plurality

-

painful though this may be

-

at the heart of the human condition.

Such a sensibility embraces pain, embraces suffering
at minimum as it arises out of the uncertainty as to basic

questions of meaning.

And insofar as this is true its

basic pulse beats against the
unconditional hopes, the
totalizing projects of mastery which so
mark the modern
age.
We find in both Arendt and Nietzsche
an embrace of a
kind of wild alter itas, an irreducible
and beautiful
strangerliness that plagues and pleasures the
human condition and which, furthermore, both believe
a culture cannot
do without if it is to endure as a living
form.
By

"living"

I

mean a form of life in which the spirit to

which a culture owes its being is continuously
renewed and
reaffirmed through acts which perpetually reunite and
retie a group to shared goals, reshaping its integrity
anew.

It is the failure to have such an aesthetic

sensibility which

I

think for both Nietzsche and Arendt is

the reason modernity lacks what Nietzsche called

gestaltende Kraefte, form-giving forces.

Hence its lapse,

its decay.

It may justly be objected that while this may be a

plausible interpretation of Arendt, it is a strange
Nietzsche indeed.

And in fact the past World War II

scholarship on Nietzsche, diverse though it be, largely
supports such an objection.

There are few Nietzsche

scholars who argue Nietzsche is relevant or interesting

when it comes to political thinking, let alone who find
him insightful with regard to questions of authority and
the ethical limits to action

-

with the very obvious and

disturbing exception of German fascist thought.
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On the

one hand, we find scholars such as
Walter Kaufmann and
more recently Alexander Nehamas who,
for different reasons
suggest Nietzsche was either not concerned
with political
life or is not relevant to political
questions. 22 On the
other, we find that those who decidedly
do think Nietzsche
was concerned with things political and
thus must be taken
seriously by political theorists do so almost
exclusively
out of a sense of danger. Here we can mention
J. P.

stern,

Stanley Rosen, and the latter works of Martin
Heidegger. 23
Finally, a third hand deals to Nietzsche the
role
of

deconstructor, of one who sees life as a play of forces,

nomadic and utterly decentered.

For this line of inter-

pretation we must think primarily of Jacques Derrida,
Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. 24

While this latter

group finds Nietzsche intimately relevant for political

problems they, once again, sorely under-investigate the

problem of authority and order from a constructive angle
in Nietzsche's work and hence Nietzsche tends to become in

some sense the paternal apotheosis of postmodern formless-

ness on their reading.

Central to my own line of interpretation in this work
is the claim that a fundamental political concern informs

Nietzsche's work from his earliest to his final writings:
the concern with a culture's ability to produce formative

agents and to artistically form itself into a living
whole.

It is true that in his early writings Nietzsche

was directly engaged in the effort
to create cultural
regeneration in Germany by articulating
potentialities in
Wagnerian festivals, but that after breaking
with Wagner
he ceased successfully to link his
intellectual work with
any existing political, social or cultural
movements. 25
Yet even and perhaps especially in his
rich post-Wagner
works Nietzsche continues to be propelled by
the essentially political questions: what forms of life
and what

kinds of authority and culture are possible
within the
context of a post-metaphysical condition whose
meaning and
consequences Nietzsche labored both to discern and to
shape
This interpretation of Nietzsche as constructivist
is,

obviously, not the only plausible one, but it is a

neglected one and, more importantly, one of which we are
in great need currently.

Nietzsche has become a site of

tremendous interpretive struggle

I

believe because in the

multiplicity of his voices we experience, we grasp the
numerous directions possible for ethical life in postmodernity.

To read Nietzsche is the be made to feel the

horror of some alternatives (the focus of readers such as

Heidegger and J. P. Stern) but also the seduction of others
(the focus of readers such as Foucault and Derrida)

.

To

reject either path is to domesticate Nietzsche's thought
(the problem with readers such as Kaufmann and Nehamas)

What

I

have tried to do is to feel the horror, resist the
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seduction and still allow the
wildness of Nietzsche's
thought to breathe. This is a
wildness mixed with great
anxiety over the problems of order,
greatness and freedom
in a post-metaphysical condition.
And in the tension of
these forces Nietzsche glimpses
a kind of non-f oundational
form of authority and approach to
justice to which I think
Arendt is the heir. it is this voice
of Nietzsche's we
need so much to hear today.
Yet it is only an incipient voice
in Nietzsche, and
one still posed out of the dilemmas
presented a philosopher in a post-metaphysical age. Arendt
is an original
student of Nietzsche's and simultaneously
a necessary
antidote to him, for Nietzsche's frame of
reference for
his reflections on authority and justice,
and on politics
more generally, remains largely that of a
solitary philosopher: human perfection (works), singularity
and truth,

while Arendt's frame of reference wells fundamentally
and
even relentlessly out of concerns of a political
philosopher: human events, plurality, and meaning.

Nietzsche's

elaboration of political problems are still formulated
from the point of view of the life of the mind, while

Arendt thinks in the tension between the visible and the
invisible worlds, as she sometimes characterizes the dis-

tinction between the life of the mind and that of the
world.
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What

think is so important about thinking
Nietzsche
and Arendt together is not only
that Arendt highlights the
dangers of the one-dimensionality
of the Nietzsche of
post-structuralist works, but also that,
on the one hand,
she helps us pay attention to another
moment in Nietzsche,
and, on the other, Nietzsche
highlights for readers of
Arendt how seriously she took the
philosophical dilemmas
of postmodernity which Nietzsche was
the first to articulate, albeit in overly loud tones.
Scholars of Arendt
have underestimated this dimension of her
work and thus
missed what I think will become an increasingly
crucial
encounter between Arendt 's work and post-structuralism. 26
I

This work consists of six chapters, and a
conclusion.
The first three chapters are devoted to Nietzsche,
the

second three to Arendt, the two parts separated by
an Interlude.

In chapter one

I

lay forth Nietzsche's critique

of modernity, arguing that what drives his critical
stance

towards his age is the sense that modernity lacks the

ability to give itself a distinctive form, a powerful cultural identity to which people can feel allegiance and

through which their lives can be justified.

And that fur-

thermore this is due to the failure to develop a particular aesthetic sensibility.

This critique moves through

Nietzsche's analysis of Wagner, the experimental ism of the
age, the ascetic ideal and modern political forms of which
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I

treat as exemplary the women's
movement for emancipa-

tion.

Chapter two is devoted to developing
the aesthetic
foundations of Nietzsche's reflections
on suffering with
the aim of honing in more precisely
on his conception of
the kind of suffering we must not
attempt to

master.
I
argue that it is a philosophical sense
that has to do with
embracing the suffering which necessarily
accompanies the
loss of Truth, certainty and meaning
which characterizes
late modernity.
In chapter three my aim is first, to
develop the gen-

eral outline for the new basis for authority,
aesthetic in
nature, with which Nietzsche wrestled and
which he hoped
could replace the rationalist metaphysical
grounding of

authority in modernity; and second, to develop
the shared
ethical horizon towards which this new aesthetic
foundation points - what I have called the ethos of the
ex-

emplar.

It is on the basis of this ethos that a

Nietzschean aesthetic approach to justice emerges.
In chapter four which forms an interlude

I

am con-

cerned to consider the insufficiencies of Nietzsche's work
and to allow his other more objectionable voices into the
text, voices which

I

had purposefully held at bay in the

interest of illuminating his more ethically constructive
voice.

This then sets the stage for Arendt as both heir

to this voice and antidote to Nietzsche's other voices.
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In chapter five

develop Arendt's critique of
the
modern age.
(I use her term rather
than Nietzsche's but
they refer substantially to the
same period.)
i argue
that what forms her critical posture
is what she calls the
"process character- of the modern age,
a condition
I

in

which human life appears to be a
function of natural processes which strip individual and
public acts of their
dignity, power and place, and thus the
ability of a culture to actively form and shape itself.
I also argue that
Nietzsche and Arendt share the sense that
what the modern
age lacks is a particular aesthetic
sensibility without
which a culture cannot sustain itself as
a living whole.
I trace these themes through
Arendt's analysis
of

totalitarianism, her effort to elaborate the
major historical and philosophical events of this age
which most significantly contributed to its process character,
and
finally examine her analysis of modern revolutions
which
so interested her precisely as those political
attempts to

thwart this process character of the modern age.
In chapter six I develop the aesthetic sensibility

which lies at the center of Arendt's thought and without
which,

I

argue, we cannot discern the ethical relevance of

her thought.

I

do this through an elaboration of the

ontological foundations of her work which are fundamentally aesthetic in nature, calling hers an "ontology of dis-

play."

Here we begin to see how deeply bound both to the
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ontological condition of plurality
and to an aesthetic appreciation for the contingent,
multiplicitous texture of
human reality her ethical reflections
are.
Arendt calls
this aesthetic appreciation "tragic
pleasure" and it is
the central sensibility which she
herself exemplifies in
her work and which I believe she
wishes to cultivate as
necessary for ethical orientation in a
post-metaphysical
world.
The ontological-aesthetic reflections
of chapter six
lay the groundwork for the conception
of authority and the
approach to the question of justice towards
which Arendt's
work points and which form the subject
matter of chapter
seven.
I develop this conception of
authority by analyzing not only Arendt's explicit reflections
upon the concept itself, but also through her conceptual
work on judging as well as the kind of authority exemplified
in her
own judgments themselves. As examples, I take up
both her

judgments of the kibbutzim movement in Israel and her

judgments of the Judenraete during the Nazi period.

I

argue that when we examine both Arendt's conceptual work
and the kind of authority exemplified in her own judgments

what we find is that what can be authoritative in a post-

metaphysical age is not Truth or God or any such finality,
but rather that authority obtains in the figure of the

judge who perpetually poses the question, who are we?

thereby taking responsibility in the process of judging

31

for the plurality inherent in the
human condition insofar
as this question takes as its
central task that of mediating between the world as it is and
the world as it might
be; between those who have gone
before and those who are
in the process of becoming.
this tension of

m

bility,
finally,

I

argue,

responsi-

is the life of a culture renewed.

And,

it is this primary concern for the
conditions for

such a living "we" which shapes Arendt's
approach to the
question of justice.
In the conclusion

I

summarize my work, and then take

up one issue - the contemporary debate over
"the Western

canon" in the curricula of higher education through

which to argue for the importance of these aesthetically
oriented reflections on authority and justice.
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CHAPTER

I

NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY

A.

Introduction

But there are opposite ages, really
democratic. .where the individual becomes
convinced that he can do just about everything
and can manage almost anv ro1g and everybody experiments with himself, improves,
makes new experiments, enjoys his experiments, and all nature ceases and becomes
art... With this always comes the most interesting and maddest of all ages, when the
"actors," all kinds of actors, become the
real masters."
"How things will become ever more
"artistic" in Europe.-"
The Gay Sciencs 1
.

r

It seems beyond dispute that Nietzsche had
nothing

but contempt for democracy and democratic culture.

And

yet at first glance Nietzsche's work itself seems to
em-

body the experimentalism, artistic play, theatrical pre-

dominance and even madness which to him characterize democratic cultures: Periclean Athens, the United States, and

increasingly the Europe of his day.

work "thought experiments," was

a

He himself called his

master of disguise and

masking, and, as the self-conscious "bad conscience" of

his age,

2

unleashed voices of disquietude into the souls

of his contemporaries in the hopes of de-naturalizing much

of what made their world solid, comprehensible and secure.
It appears that Nietzsche too wanted all nature to cease

and become art.
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Yet Nietzsche was troubled
by the concept of the actor and the theatrical atmosphere
which increasingly enveloped and defined his age.
aphorism #36! in. The Gay
Science, entitled "On the Problem
of the Actor" it is the
similarity between the actor and
the artist which disquiets him. Haunted, he asks,
"...the inner craving for a
role and mask; for appearance; an
excess of the capacity
for all kinds of adaptations that
can no longer be
satisfied in the service of the most
immediate and narrowest utility - all this is perhaps
not only peculiar to
the actor?"

m

There is a distinction between the actor
and the artist which is being eclipsed in the
democratic culture of
modernity which Nietzsche strives to uphold.
It is this
distinction which will constitute the path upon
which I
will explore the critical distance which defines

Nietzsche's relation to modernity.

in this chapter

I

shall argue, contrary to the emphasis of most
contemporary

interpreters of Nietzsche

-

sympathetic post-modernists as

well as unsettled critics - that the most disturbing

aspect of modernity, in Nietzsche's view, is its lack of
form:

its inability to produce the kinds of forces neces-

sary to endow life with a particular shape.

It is the ab-

sence of what Nietzsche called "gestaltende Kraefte,"

form-giving forces,

3

which is the cutting piece he uses in
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constructing the distance between
himself and the theatrical, experimental tenor of
modernity.
This distance, however, is
continuously precarious.
Nietzsche perpetually haunts himself
with the question as
to whether he himself has not
lost the necessary

gestaltende Kraefte; as to whether his
own work has not
succumbed to modernity's endless
theatricality.
This is
all the more a fear since Nietzsche's
concern with form is
defined and bounded by his analysis of
the metaphysical
condition of our times: nihilism. Hence
the defense of
forms of life in which form-giving forces
flourish - be
they the style of an individual or the
shape of a culture
- cannot be substantiated by recourse
to faith in transcendental concepts of any kind - neither god nor
reason
nor nature. Nietzsche will have to make other
defenses
for such forms.

And defenses there will be.

One should

not be beguiled by Nietzsche's rhetorical styles the

multiple and conflicting voices, the complete lack of system, the variegated styles of writing themselves.

Alexander Nehamas puts
a

it,

As

"Though Nietzsche's writing as

whole supports his perspectivism, it does not do so by

being itself beyond interpretation, by failing to have a

determinate structure, form or meaning." 4

Nietzsche's

styles are designed to unhinge us from our faith in transcendentals, and in this, Nietzsche's aim is deconstruction
to be sure.

But his primary interest lies in construc-
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tion,

in formation, that is,

it lias in inspiring into

baing our "gastaltanda Kraafta."

"There are yet many

houses to be built!" 5
In Nietzsche's view this task
is essentially

aesthetic.

Modernity lacks the particular aesthetic
sensibility which forms the basis of
any true

culture,

that is, of any culture capable of
bringing into being a
form of life worthy of existence,
of a culture which is
thus self-justifying. Modernity's
aesthetic is theatrical; it lacks a specifically artistic
sensibility.

Nietzsche refers to this sensibility at times
as honesty,
at other times as nobility, and in "On
the Poets"
in

Zarathustra

,

most interestingly, as "Inbrunst der Toene."

Difficult to translate,

I

will render it, "the inner pas-

sion/suffering brought about by musical tones."

in inter-

preting this we should recall that Nietzsche himself
was

a

composer, that he never entirely broke free of the

Schopenhauerian view that music, unlike any other art
form,

is the voice of the will or life force itself, and

that he unabashedly proclaimed his distaste for some other
art forms, particularly the theatre.

recur throughout Nietzsche's work.

Musical metaphors
Here, I believe, the

musical metaphor stands for any cultural achievement or
any life form worthy of being, so that with "Inbrunst der
Toene" he refers to that particular sensibility which allows us to experience both the freedom and suffering which
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inevitably accompany any
cultural achievement or any
life
form.
it is a particular taste
for living, a tone of
life, a sensation of the
body, a pulse without which
we
cannot "stand before things
in awe,»6 nor revere the
com .
Plicated beauty in everything
given.
Nietzsche uses
Physiological metaphors to refer to
this sensibility, this
pulse, this sensation of the
body.
There are strengths,
forces which modernity has failed
to develop, and it is
Nietzsche's aim to make manifest this
fundamental failure,
for they are forces without
which no form of life can adequately justify itself thereby making
it difficult for a
sustainable notion of justice to be
had.

In the initial section of this
chapter

will turn

I

first to some of Nietzsche's final
works in which Wagner,
the modern actor par excellence, is
criticized in order
to begin to elaborate the distinction
between the actor
and the artist. Next I will turn to some
of Nietzsche's

earliest works to explore the critical distance
he establishes from the experimental science of what
he called

contemporary historical culture.
his productive years

I

By spanning the whole of

hope to establish the centrality

and continuity of Nietzsche's concern with form and
its

absence in modernity.

In the second section

will brief-

I

ly trace the genealogical path to our failure to possess

form-giving forces.

And in the third section

I

will ana-

lyze the way in which Nietzsche thought modern political
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phenomena fail to manifest form-giving
forces.
section effort will be made to

m

each

examine that specific self-

deceit peculiar to modernity's culture
of actors, a selfdeceit born of a subterranean religion
of pity for thisworldly life. It is this deceit which
keeps us from even

experiencing the absence of the aesthetic
sensibility and
particular strengths without which Nietzsche
believes human beings cannot appreciate the terrible
beauty that pervades the human condition and hence bring
into being
a

form of life worthy of being.

B.

Contra Wag ner

"Others may be able to get along without
Wagner; but the philosopher is not free to
do without (him)
He has to be the bad conscience of his time: for that he needs to
understand it best.
But confronted with the
labyrinth of the modern soul, where would he
find a guide more initiated, a more eloquent
prophet of the modern soul, than Wagner?
Through Wagner modernity speaks most in timately (emphasis mine)
concealing neither
its good nor its evil - having forgotten all
sense of shame. And conversely: one has almost completed an account of the value of
what is modern once one_has gained clarity
about what is good and evil in Wagner."
The Case of Wagner. Preface 7
.

,

Somewhere amidst the profusion of Nietzsche's writings he calls himself "the most modern of moderns."

What

intimacies then do we hear when we listen to modernity

speak through Wagner?

They can hardly be whisperings

40

about Nietzsche, for we know from
biography that Nietzsche
broke publicly and privately with
Wagner.
Or can they?
In his final year of lucidity,
Nietzsche wrote two short
books on Wagner. One, Nietzsche
M n ^ r was a CQm _
pilation of earlier aphorisms. The
other. The Case of
Wagner, was a sustained, voraciously
critical attack on
Wagner's aesthetics and their effect,
a work whose main
body is followed by two postscripts
and an epilogue.
Two
books on Wagner in one year, one of which
Nietzsche clearly had trouble bringing to a close,
as if he had not and
could not satisfactorily complete his break
with Wagner.
In the Preface to this same work, Nietzsche
writes of himself, "Perhaps nobody was more dangerously
attached to grown together with - Wagnerizing.
8
that his detachment was nothing less than an act of self -overcoming,
and
that he feels, for this reason, nothing but the
gratitude

^

,

.

of a philosopher towards Wagner.

.

Yet it is precisely

sustaining this feeling of gratitude which troubles him,
as if what he gives thanks for keeps slipping out of

sight, as if what his "Zarathustra eye" sees from its dis-

tance "above things" blurs in and out of focus.

uncertainty and difficulty here.

There is

Nietzsche uses Wagner to

define a distance between himself and his times, but it is
a

precarious one.

In what sense does Nietzsche mean that

he is "the most modern of moderns?"

the evil in modernity?

What is the good and

Let us begin to approach these
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questions by listening as Nietzsche
has modernity speak
through Wagner.
Brutality, artificiality and
innocence.

These are

the stimulants upon which the
modern soul thrives. They
form the culture ripest for its
growth: the culture of
modernity.
it is Wagner's genius that in
his music he has
mastered a mixture of these three
fundamental stimulants
of the modern soul.
Let us look at each in turn as they
pertain to Wagner and hence, in Nietzsche's
view, to
modernity.

Wagner is brutal because he is only after
effect.
His art is "expressivo at any cost," 9 an
"art of display
windows. "10 There is no substance, no thought,
no melody
in his work, only passion, only convulsive
affects

designed to drug the senses and the understanding.

Wagner

hates knowledge, and through an "uncanny access
to every-

thing that seduces, lures, forces, overthrows," he
shocks
the nerves of his audience with the appearance of sublimity, profundity, and the overwhelming.

Nietzsche

likens the effect of this music to the experience of walking into the sea.

"(One) gradually loses one's secure

footing, and finally surrenders oneself to the elements

without reservation: one must swim." 11

By contrast, the

music Nietzsche praises requires that one dance

.

It re-

quires measure and attention to balanced units of time and
force; a sense of rhythm.

It demands "continual wariness"
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on the part of the listener,
and its magic rests on the
interplay between this cautious
wariness and a certain
"warm enthusiasm."
short, it demands taste,
judgment,
cultivation. Wagner's genius and his
brutality lay in
destroying any space for such wariness,
such attentiveness, such thought.
Wagner was, in short, a tyrant. His
art produced a herd.
"Never," Nietzsche remarks, "has

m

obedience been better, never commanding." 12

Wagner is an actor.

His is not so much art as

histrionics, a talent to lie.

His music is artificial.

("Kuenstlich" is sometimes rendered as
"artistic," suggesting a false artistry.)
it exhibits an "excessive
liveliness in the smallest parts," 13 but there
is no
style.
Wagner had, Nietzsche writes, an "incapacity for

giving organic form." 14
totality." 15

He was "unable to create from a

His was a "declining power to organize" 16 so

that he engaged in a "counterfeiting in the imitation
of

great forms." 17

what he called "dramatic style" was,

Nietzsche argues, no style at all, for there is no life in
his music which inhabits the whole, but only "instability

dressed up as principles," 18 a restlessness of convulsive
passion.

This pushing of life's exuberance into even the

smallest of forms, which Nietzsche says has its corollary
in political terms in "freedom of the individual" and

"equal rights for all," is only the semblance of a living

whole; it is composite, calculated, artifact.
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It con-

ceals, Nietzsche seems to suggest,
the diversity and distinction required for any living
thing.

Finally, Wagner's music is innocent,
innocent of its
own "moral mendaciousness."
Nietzsche identifies two
kinds of creative forces. There are
those through which
hunger exhibits its power, and those
through which

abundance and fullness of life exhibit
theirs.
The former
are born of weakness, of resentment
towards everything
given.
Their aim is to negate the life force.
Nietzsche
calls them decadent creative forces, and
they correspond
in the related sphere of morals to slave
morality. Those
forces of abundance by contrast, embrace life,
are part

of

ascending life.
the life force.

Their aim is to give form and shape to
Nietzsche calls them classical, and they

correspond to noble morality.

Wagner's music (and more

broadly, modernity) consists in a simultaneous embrace
and

negation of life.

It is, Nietzsche says, a "physiological

contradiction," for it lies, but with a good conscience;
that is, innocently.

Its mendaciousness lies in its fail-

ure, which Nietzsche at times polemically refers to as its

refusal, to experience these two distinctive creative

forces as distinct, as opposites.

It conflates, and

refuses to distinguish in a paroxysm of good-heartedness
and bright-eyed virtue, for modernity's mendaciousness is,

paradoxically, instinctual.

Hence its "innocence."

Wagner "(made) eyes at master morality, at noble
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Thus

morality... while mouthing the
counterdoctrine, that of the
"gospel of the lowly," of the need
for redemption! "19
it

is the "innocent" conflation
of these opposite values

which defines fully the passively
nihilistic character of
Wagner's art and of modernity.
"Passive

nihilism, a sign

of weakness,... and whatever refreshes,
heals, calms, numbs
emerges into the foreground in various
disguises, religious or moral, or political, or aesthetic. .. "20

Modernity deceives itself (and Wagner is
agent of this deceit) into believing all

a first class

creative forces

are of a piece morally, so theatrically
talented has it
become.
What it is really doing is instinctively
covering
a void - the inability to create out of
a yes! to life - a
void it is not even aware of.
Implicit in Nietzsche's

discussion is that this distinction between types of
creative forces must, at the very least, survive as a
distinc tion in order that a human life worthy of being be
created
and sustained.
Let us focus in more carefully on this state.

It is

not simply, on this reading of modernity via Wagner, that
we are creative out of resentment, out of a no! to life.
This, as we shall see, has,

in Nietzsche's view, been the

predominant aesthetic form since Christianity.
is different,

Modernity

different in the sense that it acts as if it

were creative out of a strong yes! to life, as if it were
beyond the life-eschewing impulses that governed Chris-
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tianity, when in fact what
underlies its creations is,
like those of Christianity,
pity for those of this world.
And thus, what it really offers
is redemption in the form
of the destruction of all felt
differences between us. it
thinks it embraces life (which
Nietzsche understands as
essential heterogeneity, difference,
order of rank) but
instead suffocates and reduces.
Modernity's problem is
that it is self -deceptive.
it is passive nihilism's full
development. Thus Wagner's music
produces effects by
,

overwhelming so that the audience is neither
required nor
able to place any distance between the
music-drama and itself,

it is made to swim in a sea with no
bearings by a

tyranny which appeals to the cheapest, lowest
common
denominator - overweening passion, passion
without wariness.
The spectators become a mass, "the neighbor
reigns." 21

Wagner's music panders to and creates the

herd, the herd which, because of Wagner's
theatrical

genius and its own weakness, believes it has discovered
a
life affirming aesthetic, an aesthetic for the strong;
an

aesthetic for this world. In its innocent and cheerful

self-deception the herd too, unwittingly, becomes

a sea of

actors, adapting itself nimbly to every latest stimulant,

dependent upon a continuous dosage to maintain its selfdeception.

Hence the popular reception of Wagner, the

genius of deception, the consummate actor.
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Wagner's "herdif ication effect"
rests on having the
capacity to create the sense of
the profound, the overwhelming, the sublime. One need
only listen to his music
but a very short time to partake
of this sense, and, under
Nietzsche's tutelage, to see that
it is in fact achieved
by a certain formlessness, or
what Nietzsche calls
"un-

endliche Melodie,

»

unending melody

- a

term which actually

refers to the willful refusal in
so much of Wagner's work
to resolve, make closure, to
limit and form, to make
whole.

Webster's Third New International
Dictionary
defines melody as: a rhythmically
organized and meaningful succession of single musical
notes or tones having a
definite relationship one with the other
and forming
an

aesthetic whole.

Thus,

"unendliche Melodie," as a con-

tradiction in terms, is actually the entire
lack of
melody; the failure to make melodic, whole.
It borders on
the ugly.
Nietzsche's critigue of Wagner's aesthetic as
relying on an invocation of the sublime and producing

nothing of beauty can be traced to Kant's distinction
between the sublime and the beautiful in the Critique of

Judgment

.

The sublime is that which we experience but

have no concept for; it throws us into speechlessness and

borders on the fearful and the ugly.
formlessness.

Its very essence is

By contrast, the beautiful (and here

I

turn

explicitly to Nietzsche, though there are important echoes
of Kant)

is,

it appears,

that which evokes a warm
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enthusiasm which is traversed by
wariness.
it is a sensation that does not collapse
the distance between us, a
distance without which we become
equals
in a swooning,

drugged awe; that is, we become
herd.
it allows that distance to appear in its tragic and
even terrible hue; the
beautiful even requires such distance
for its very being.
It seems to be the specific
distinction
of an art-

ist's power that it can evoke this
state of tension in
spectators, demanding of them an exercise
of judgment.
And it seems to be the specific
distinction of an actor's
power that it suspends this tension,
herding all spectators into the unanimity of a convergence;
tyrannizing by
destroying those things which create and
preserve
a

certain distance, a certain space between us.

The dif-

ference is that Wagner (and by extension,
modernity) lacks
form-giving powers, or, as Nietzsche alternatively
calls
them, melody, a dominant thought.

Wagner creates in the

absence of form, in the absence of a conceptual whole,
and
relies instead on dramatic effects to conceal this
want.
In this, his is an inventive genius.

He,

like modernity,

becomes a consummate actor, finally deceiving himself and
his audience, and thus enjoying this "falseness with a

good conscience; the delight in simulation exploding as a

power that pushes aside one's so-called "character,"
flooding it and at times extinguishing it." 22

Such

delight in simulation and adaptation, such inventive
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genius is modern in the first
degree.
it forms the core
of modernity's taste and
circumscribes its virtues.

And yet Nietzsche feels kinship
with this delight; he
revels in the inventiveness,
agility and dissimulation of
the actor, of Wagner, and of his
age.
These are not unmitigated evils to be dismissed simply.
Nietzsche's very
style, (more accurately, styles)
is born of the embrace
of these virtues.
this sense we can indeed understand
Nietzsche as "the most modern of
moderns." But his is a
careful and tremendously self-conscious
embrace of these
modern virtues. We must remind ourselves
that Nietzsche
is writing as the first self-consciously
post-metaphysical
thinker.
His understanding of the beautiful and
of form
does not rest, as does Kant's, on faith
in a "deeply hidden basis, common to all human beings,
underlying their
agreement in judging the forms under which
objects are
given to them." 23 He does not and cannot counter
the
,

m

moral mendaciousness of modernity by relying on
the putative existence of a "subjective universal ism. "
For this

reason Nietzsche feels a tremendous sense of distress,
in
rare moments of panic, in the face of the irrevocable
loss
of faith, in the face of that murderous act of a heedless

modernity of which he himself is the first herald. 24

And

it is this sense of distress which restrains his embrace.

Nietzsche fears the loss of all authority as he fears the
loss of all excellence which enlivens rather than weakens
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and herdifies.

Wagner's tyrannical and despotic
excellence is, for Nietzsche, exemplary
of the dangers of
the simulative talents of the
modern self. His delight in
them takes a different path.

C.

Experimental sm

Before turning to the distinction found
in
Nietzsche's earlier writings between his

thought experi-

ments and the scientific experimentalism
of our contemporary culture, I would like to say a word
about these
writings.

Nietzsche's early writings (with which

I

am

designating those works written prior to his
break with
Wagner in 1876) were written in the throes of
an

enthusiasm.

He had hopes, with the aid of Wagnerian

opera, of regenerating a distinctively German
culture.

It

was during this period that Nietzsche was concerned
overtly with what was required to effect the rejuvenated
forma-

tion of a people in the cultural sense.

Peter Bergmann

calls this effort one of "cultural politics," 25 arguing
that the political quietism which Bismark's unification

efforts produced had created the opportunity for cultural
blossoming, and that Nietzsche's cultural politics were

explicitly antipolitical

;

that they were aesthetic.

The

distinction Bergmann seeks to make is an important one,
but the semantics are messy.

That is, what is "cultural
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politics" if not political?

Nietzsche's writings, as
Berg-ann argues, were explicitly
in opposition to both the
international politics of Bismark
and to the national
party politics in Germany.
However, his concern with
the
cultural regeneration of a
people was a political concern
of the first order, namely,
what organic forms are necessary for a political-cultural
unit to exist as a living
and hence legitimate entity
instead of as the cold
idol

Nietzsche came to understand the
modern nation-state to
be?
Bergmann unfortunately recognizes
only the
restricted definition of "political"
and thereby contributes to that view, most disseminated
in the United States
by Walter Kaufmann, that Nietzsche
was unconcerned with
things political and is therefore of
no interest to those
of us concerned with the "res
publica."
The importance of my argument with
Bergmann is the
following.
I believe Nietzsche's concern
with the living
essence of a political-cultural unit
remained a constant

preoccupation.

Many Nietzsche scholars argue that

Nietzsche ceased to have political concerns after
his
break with Wagner. There was, after the 1876
break with
Wagner, a change in Nietzsche's thought to be sure.
it

came upon witnessing Wagner's capitulation and assimila-

tion to Christianity and the Prussian state

being

a

-

the later

marriage Nietzsche considered disastrous for a

flourishing cultural life in Germany because it had to
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rely on dramatic and
tyrannical effects to sustain
the illusion of a living whole.
(The kinship with Nietzsche's
analysis of Wagner's aesthetic
should be clear.)
This
capitulation of Wagner's became
for Nietzsche emblematic
of the decadence of his age,
dominated as it was by the
actor's virtue: adaptation,
and by the actor's inability
to be a strong formative agent.
it became emblematic

of
the tremendous difficulty of
regenerating the life of a
people under modern conditions and
under the reign of modern taste.
Nietzsche did, then, chart a new
course, but I
will argue and attempt to show in
the next two chapters
that it was one designed explicitly
to tame precisely that
"virtue" which ruined Wagner and made
cultural regeneration impossible: the madness of our
"really democratic"
age - adaptability.
it was the readiness of moderns to
submit to tyranny and become a herd, and
our incapacity to
endow our common lives with a distinctive
form at which
Nietzsche took aim, and this, without allowing
himself a

nostalgic glance in the direction of metaphysical
authority.

Interpreters such as Bergmann who ignore this con-

tinuity in Nietzsche's fundamental political concern:
the
concern with a culture's ability to produce formative
agents and to artistically form itself into a living
whole, often see instead a thinker whose intellectual

problems lie in two distinct pieces: the public-political
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writings of his early period,
and the privatephilosophical writings of his mature

m

years.
this way
such interpreters allow themselves
the comfort of evading
the force and depth of Nietzsche's
critique of his and
their age. This has been a common
problem for interpreters of Nietzsche. Hence, for
example, Walter Kaufmann, who entirely de-politicizes
Nietzsche, wonders if,
"the tenor of (Nietzsche's) remarks
about democracy and
parliaments" are not of a piece with
his "second hand wisdom about women," suggesting that
both are "time-bounded"
and "dated. "27 In so wondering he
entirely misses
depth of Nietzsche's critique of the
herdifying forces of
modern democratic culture. it would seem
that this too is
emblematic of the modern genius for adaptation.
Kaufmann
himself may indeed be guilty of engaging in
modern selfdeceit under the guise of a rather paternalistic
and
cheery self-assurance in assimilating one of the
most in-

^

sightful and disturbing critics of modernity to his
own

view regarding the superiority of modern democracy.
It seems to me that when we allow ourselves to be

haunted by our modern genius for adaptation and assimilation, we discover terribly good reasons for reading these

early works both as the initial formulation of and as the

foundation for Nietzsche's developed critique of
modernity.

His concern with culture and with form-giving
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forces, on this reading, is
fundamental and constant.
Where in The Gay
he writes,

ScWq,

'

"(We)

And

are no longer material for
society;" 2 8

he does not only mean (and
perhaps not at all) that we
are
too brave, too experimental,
too liberated as individuals
(which, though this probably
frightens us is how most of
us would like to read it)
Perhaps he is more strongly
saying that we no longer have
the power to create anything
definite enough to distinguish
itself individually - be it
person or society; that modern
subjectivity is too feeble
and too disorganized to produce
an outward effect and
endow itself with a form distinctive
enough to be a culture. 29 This I think is one of
Nietzsche's most constant
laments, one which clearly places
a chasm between himself
and his age. with this, to the earlier
writings directly.
"Compare for once the heights of your
capacity for knowledge with the depths of
your
incapacity for action. .. Your manner of
moving, that of climbing upon knowledge,
is
your fatality: the ground sinks away from
you into the unknown; there is no longer
anv
support for your life..." 30
.

The aim of Nietzsche's attack is what he calls
our

"historical culture" whose domain can be demarcated
by the
reign of an unquenchable thirst for knowledge and
truth

that turns all it touches into a desert, sucking dry
the

life-giving juices.

This culture relates to the past as a

"science of universal becoming" in which all ages, including the present, are understood in the context of the
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progressive development and
maturity of truth, or, once
this Hegelian philosophy of
history collapses, in terms
of
change pure and simple. The
aim becomes discerning history's true mechanism, each
individual act or event considered only in terms of its
position within the whole
process.
Driven by this will to truth
and disciplined

by
the professional ethic of
"objectivity" (which Nietzsche
equates with indifference) modern
scholars dig ceaselessly in the panoply of the past
attempting to trace this unfolding procession of truth in
history; dissecting, categorizing, infatuated by the allure
and promise of a "net
of pure insight woven impenetrably
tight." 3 ! And thus are
unearthed a stream of new things, an
amazing procession
,

of

diverse forms of life and ways of being
which press
relentlessly on the modern soul as so many
"indigestible
stones.
The defense against this kaleidoscope
of forms,
colors, tastes, possibilities is to cavort
as lightly as
possible with them. Hence we become a composite
of causal
developing factors, taking refuge in this determinism
and
failing thereby to form anything stable enough by
which to

confront and mold our investigations or ourselves.

The

defense, in short, is to develop the habit of not taking

things seriously, of having no stake in things.

One pro-

tects oneself from the event quality of the world, from

experiencing the new, by subsuming all occurrences under
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the consuming hunger ui.
the hi^oy^.i
y ^ of tne
nistorical process. one becomes insensible
_,
ensibie. 32
(m ...
Nietzsche's
later writings he applies the same critique to
non-Hegelian objectivity,
"On the Land of Educationin Zarathustra, for
examplei he
writes, "With the characters
of the past written all
over
you, and these characters
in turn painted over with
new
characters: thus have you concealed
yourselves perfectly
from all interpreters of
characters. And even if one
could try the reins, who would
be fool enough to believe
that you have reins. You seem
baked out of cclors and
pasted notes " 3 3
,

m

.

Nietzsche's thought experiments are
driven by a different impulse.
He argues that our relationship
to the
past should be fundamentally artistic,
aesthetic.
it
should be "evoked by hunger, regulated
by the extent of
its need, held in bounds by its
inherent plastic
powers.

34

it must,

in short, be driven by the con-

straints of a particular form of life.
But it is the essence of historical
culture's experimental science that it destroys any particular
horizon or
form of life as it subjects all ideals,
all values, all

actions to the blinding exposure of the examining
lamp of
the experimental scientist of the process. So
blinded,

unable to nourish a stable horizon by which to orient

oneself in a common world, or in a stable world for the
self, the modern soul retreats into the refuge of "the
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smallest egoistic enclosure."

This reduction to an ego

what Nietzsche calls our
"Innerlichkeit" (literally
-inwardness," usually translated
"subjectivity") is
celebrated as our virtue.
Modern nan, Nietzsche argues,
is all content and no
form,
s/he rejects and even fears
the "sense of form" and
derisively views it as convention,
disguise, an undesirable
externality which masks our true
inner selves. 35
The result of this retreat
is that the self becomes
unsure, fearful, and loses
the ability to believe in itself,
with no form, no horizon to
organize and hence
strengthen it, the self becomes
characterized by "weariness, tattered memory, incoherent
personal experiences."
Its greatest danger is that its
very content itself actually disappear under the lack of
organizing vision; that
what the self is become a mere
abstractly a shadow of
events
even to itself
Out of this loss of form grows
the modern need for masks; the need
to cover its own void.
Out of such conditions, the singular
virtues of the modern
soul are born - adaptability, assimilation,

-

.

verisimilitude, experimental ism
tor.

-

the virtues of the ac-

It is this self which sits so vulnerably
in Wagner's

audience, prey to the brutal, artificial, but
innocent

stimulus of his genius.
Paradoxically, the culture of the modern actor, demo-

cratic culture, experiences a strong contentment, cheer-
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fulness and optimise about
what it sees as its unique
achievement: the continual
process of the liberation of
the -free personality," of
the individual under
conditions
of equality.
But Nietzsche argues that
this optimism is
the effect of self-deceit,
that what is actually occurring
is that each is being reduced
to a common denominator,
made the same, herdified.
Modernity, he argues, consists
in precisely the lack of
individuals, in -muffled up
identical people.
neoDlp "36 Tn one of^ his more
overtly ideological attacks, Nietzsche argues
that the rush of forms, the
unstable horizon lets in too much
light blinding and
stunting the growth of the modern
self.
This, he suggests, is done by "the present age"
so as to control those
it stunts; so as to prepare
everyone to "labor in the factories of the general good. "37
constantly shifting
horizons function to compel external
conformity, conformity masked as individuality, in which
no one succeeds in
being truthful towards themselves. They
are too immature;
their growth has been effectively stunted.
Deceit

m

,

.

reigns.

What kinds of strength and abilities have
been lost
as a consequence of too much exposure?

What is the nature

of the maturity Nietzsche finds nowhere around
him?

These

questions are critical, for they lead directly to the
heart of that which distinguishes the experimental ism of

Nietzsche's thought experiments from that of his
scientific contemporaries.
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Truthfulness, honesty, a kind
of relation to the self
and the world without which
the very "distress, the
inner
misery of modern man" will
not come to light;38 tnese
abilities are what the modern
soul lacks.
Elsewhere
Nietzsche writes that modernity
has lost its instinct, its
nature; with its instinct it
will recover its honesty.
Truthfulness, he seems to suggest,
requires we have a nature.
Actors have none. Neither has
the herd.
But how
to acquire a nature? How to
become honest? How to artistically craft a new nature in an
age of actors who so
adeptly shield their misery in a
culture of comfort and
self-contentedness? And what kind of
stability could such
a nature acquire in a
post-metaphysical world? Nietzsche
is not exactly the bard of
convention and eternal
stability, yet he objects to the ceaseless
process of
adaptation and chanqe in modernity which
does not allow
individuals to mature.
But what does this mean? What is
the content of that distance Nietzsche
places between himself and modernity?

These questions are questions for the rest
of this
work. However

I

will begin to build a foundation for my

reading of Nietzsche's answers through a discussion
of his
early attempts to define culture.
In his essay,

"On the Uses and Disadvantages of His-

tory For Life," Nietzsche offers a general law regarding
the conditions for the sustenance of any kind of human
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cultural life, conditions
„ hich are artioulated
and regain
the sa,e fro m the beginning
to the end of his work
The
law he offers is,
.

"...a living thing can be healthv c=i->-o™
and fruitful only when
bounled^y'a'SSJon1 " ° f drawin
^ a horizon
around'it^??^
at the Same time to °
self
J ;
self-centred
to enclose its own view
within
that of another, it will pine
away
slowly
r
Y or
hasten to its timely end." 39

r^r

Humans need shelter from the
onslaught of the eternal
return of history; they need
the "unhistorical " that mood
of "pious illusion" which
forms a misty atmosphere without
which life, and in particular, the
future cannot be.
,

Without the "envelope of the
unhistorical (humans) would
never have begun or dared to begin. "40
a very early
formulation, Nietzsche writes that
what culture indeed is,
is "illusion spread over
things;"41it is art.

m

Culture,

born of love, is the artistically
achieved form, which
further seduces us to love, and hence
to dare to begin
anew.

It is that answer to the question,

"wozu?" "to what

end?"

This is true both for the life of a people
as well
as for the cultivation of an individual.
Such love forms
the horizon without which our being would
be a ceaseless

fal-ling away into nothingness.

it gives us a nature, in-

stincts, and the capacity to renew our being.
In 1874, Nietzsche writes that,

"Anything that con-

strains a man to love less than unconditionally has

severed the roots of his strength: he will wither away,
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that is to say become
dishonest "42
.

The nature of QUr

dishonesty lies in not looking
into the depths of life,
and hence not facing the
essential condition of all deeds
- injustice.
This is the knowledge to
which our love, the
for. of life to which we are
bound, makes it possible' for
us to be privy.

This is its tragic fruit.

The unhistori-

cal is "the condition in which
one is the least capable of
being just; narrow-minded,
ungrateful to the past, blind
to dangers, deaf to warnings,
one is a little vortex of
life in a dead sea of darkness
and oblivion: and yet this

condition

unhistorical, and anti-historical through
and
through - is the womb not only of the
unjust but of every
just deed too... "43 This g the insight
Qf
-

^^^

.

culture who takes up the challenge to
live in the face of
this knowledge, acquired only once
gripped by a fierce
love.
Modern self-deceit is the shield used in our
time
to protect us from this knowledge and from
the enormity of
this challenge.
Knowledge for us, by contrast, is what
comes of becoming a mirror, of developing what
Nietzsche
calls in Thus Spoke Zarathustr*

,

"immaculate perception"

whose curse he says in a parody of Christianity, is that
it "shall never give birth," 44 or, as in the quote
above,

that it shall be "incapable of action."
It is important to note that with The Gav Science

which

I

see as marking a distinct development in

Nietzsche's thought, the moralistic language of "in-
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,

justice" is usually replaced,
except for purposes of
parody, by the neutral
"suffering," and rather than
"knowledge," it is a "tone of
life," an aesthetic
sensibility, a specific "taste"
which modernity lacks. As
significant as this is for Nietzsche's
challenge to traditional metaphysics, the nature
of the modern dishonesty
with which we are concerned
here remains unchanged in
Nietzsche's later works. The
aesthetic sensibility
Nietzsche extols, which I earlier
called "Inbrunst der
Toene," is understanding that
anything of beauty, anything
of glory - deed or thing - is
achieved only with great
suffering; that it is the fruit of
stupidity, slavery.
To
possess this taste means to be able
to be awed and humbled
before life, yet still to act. in a
very important passa 9 e in Beyond Good and Evil,
Nietzsche writes,

"Every artist knows (that) .. .what is
essential "in heaven and on earth" seems to
be,
to say it once more, that there should
be'
obedience over a long period of time and in
a single direction: given that something
always develops and has developed, for whose
sake it is worthwhile to live on earth; for
example, virtue, art, music, dance, reason,
spirituality - something transfiguring, subtle, mad and divine." 45

This insight, which Nietzsche calls a physiological

relationship to life, is the honesty of man which we, as
cheerful moderns, must recover to feel our own inner

misery and poverty.

Without this recovery the "instrument

produces no strong sound," we will not be able to "stand
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before thinqs in awe,
awe-»46 the terrible
9
beauty of the world
will escape us and life win
be impoverished> parched
flry
Only in the unity of an
artistically achieved form or
style are we granted the
opportunity to revere and renew
through action this life.
.

_

The greatest temptation which
this tone of life
Nietzsche calls honesty holds for
us is that we will come
to pity the human condition.
Being a steadfast witness to
the fact that suffering is
a necessary precondition
for
bringing anything worthy of being
into appearance is a
dreadful responsibility. The modern
age has borne it
poorly.
fact Nietzsche argues that we
have continued,
as heirs of Christian morality,
to make a religion of this
pity; that we have deeply succumbed
to the essence of our
pity: flight from this world.
We are, in this, part of
that long tradition in the West which
has made a "religion
of pity" the basis of our morality,
a morality in which
revenge on life predominates.

m

Wagner's decadent aesthetics demands nothing
of its
spectators but unmediated passion; it reduces.
Likewise

historical culture continuously destroys all horizons

through which something beautiful might be hard-won,
an
individual forged, and rather attempts to reduce all to
the same under the horizon-destroying principle of

"scientific fairness."

Both of these modern phenomena

have pity for the hardship of the human condition as their
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core.

Both seek to alleviate
suffering and master life
through denial and flight.
Both create homogeneity of
the
herd through a kind of
commitment to formlessness.
Nietzsche writes that the herd-like
uniformity of
modernity constitutes the "exclusion
and negation of every
artistically productive form and
the demand of a true
style... "47 The dissection
characteristic of modernity,
the ceaseless rush after forms,
this disrupting unrest,
produces only deserts in which
withered identical beings,
like tiny grains of sand
(Sandkoernchen) burn blindly, but
blithely under the glare of a
horizon-less sky. Gazing
upon such a society one encounters
only the monotony of a
flat uniformity; the antithesis of
a culture; the impossibilities of cultural creations whose
beauty

justifies.

Nausea haunts.

Yet most remain unaware, so

practiced is this age in the mastering crafts
of the actor.

This then is the predicament of modernity
from which
Nietzsche seeks a distance not a mere reaction.
If the
modern predicament is fear and deceit in the face
of the

suffering which is exposed if one attempts to bear
the

burden of action in the world; if the modern response to
human life is pity, the question presses: why are we so

constitutionally or, as Nietzsche put it, physiologically
unable to bear up under the demands of action in a world
inherently unjust?

Why can we not obey the universal law?
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What happened to our form-giving
forces?
heritances mar our present being?
I

what in-

turn now, with these

questions, to a brief examination
of Nietzsche's
genealogical efforts to construct the
historical constituents of our current malaise.

D.

The As cetic

Tribal

"All honor to the ascetic ideal insofar
as
it is honest so long as it believes
in itself and does not play tricks on us!" 48
!

Nietzsche refers to the ascetic ideal as
the "aweinspiring catastrophe of 2000 years of
training in truthfulness." 49

it is a great Ungeheuer,

tremendous, monstrous.

something

As the foundational ideal of west-

ern culture beginning with Socrates, and as
the origin of
the predominant moral code for post-platonic
Western civilization, it is the ideal through which human
suffering

was endowed with dignity, made profound, interesting.
such, Nietzsche must honor it and feel gratitude.

sheer awesomeness it is so deserving.

This is,

As

In its

for him, a

terrible task, for this ideal embodies a taste for life he
finds repugnant.

The story he tells of this ideal is

filled with deep ambivalences and ironies.

Yet in the

telling, his ambivalences are overcome enough to carefully

distinguish between the pre-modern period when the ascetic
ideal was honest with itself, and our own modern period,
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when the ascetic ideal
beco.es dishonest; when not
only
deceit but self-deceit reign.
We stand, Nietzsche thought,
at the threshold of a
great event: when Christianity
a^norality destroys itself
in a great act of
self-overcoming. with modern
science
and its unconditional belief
in truth, the last stage
of
this great Ungeheuer has been
reached and, as the heirs of
2000 years of intellectual cleanliness
and as "good Europeans," we must finally question
the one unconditional of
science and ask, "What is the
meaning of the will to
50
truth?"

With the mere hint of this
question, the tarantula
stings itself and the ascetic ideal
lies dying.
The convulsive aftershocks from the
self-destruction of this
foundational ideal constitute the acute
illness of contemporary society. Suffering and travail
seem

for naught.

Nihilism appears in its full suit, for the
horizon is
being erased and the beings left in the
dark have no artistic powers, no form-giving forces with
which to construct anew.
Although our inheritances gave us the capacity
to
destroy the horizon by which life was given meaning,

they

also have, over the course of two thousand years,
weakened
us,

reduced our very concept of man until what we have be-

come is essentially domesticated animals, essentially
identical, one to another, essentially herd.
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So ex-

traordinarily long and thoroughly
has this ideal held sway
that we no longer are able
to hold a Gegenmacht or
counterforce to it. 51 So embedded
in the fabric of our

being is the ascetic ideal that
we are, in truth, unable
to imagine or experience
otherwise, though we pride ourselves in being beyond it, in being
modern.
Hardly do we
hear the death thrashings of the
ascetic
ideal,

deny that it is our own.

for we

Only a vague nausea, a sense of

the "involuntary" nature of our
own contentment begins
surreptitiously to undermine life's hold
on us, and we
weak loveless creatures burrow into
the calm seas of
science or the anesthetized euphoria of
romanticism, seeking, in effect, our own oblivion,
though we claim otherwise.

The problem of the absence of Gegenmacht
amidst this
crisis is at the heart of Nietzsche's
genealogical

strategy in constructing the history of the ascetic
ideal
in the West.
His aim is to recreate in his readers
the

pain and ferocity of the battles from which this
great Ungeheuer emerged historically triumphant.
its truth, this

genealogy proclaims, is not eternal.

As all bases of cul-

ture, the will to truth, the kernel of the ascetic ideal,
is illusion.

For millennia it constituted that "misty at-

mosphere" which allowed human beings to "dare to begin,"
to renew their lives.

It was the heart of those "heavy

and pregnant errors contained in the conceptions of
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morality, religion and
metaphysics "52
.

The

wm

spring

^

tQ
was a pregnant error, pregnant
with "a new possibility of
willing, some delight in willing"
at a time when there was
a great collapse and disease
of the will. 53 The ascetic
ideal "(sprang) from the protective
instinct of a

degenerating life. "54
without blood.

But it did

^

it was born in blood.

Nietzsche's aim is

that it die in blood, for "there
is no such thing as a
morality (Sittlichkeit) with an exclusive
monopoly of the
moral, and every morality that affirms
itself alone
destroys too much valuable strength and
is bought too
dear. "55

He hopeSf with his genealogy/ nQt
Qnly

^

the (ugly) origins of the ascetic ideal
and thus to undermine its omnipotence, but also to provoke
in his
readers a surging turmoil strong enough that
might itself
become a Gegenmacht; that might eventually become
a different experiment in being.

Appropriately, Nietzsche both finds and mytho-

poetizes a great battle at the outset of the history of
the ascetic ideal, a battle which remains known
throughout

human history, though modernity, to its detriment, is on
the verge of amnesia.

Nietzsche would rekindle modern

memory.
"The watchwords of the battle, written in
characters which have remained legible
throughout human history read, "Rome vs. Israel, Israel vs. Rome." No battle has been
more momentous than this one. .. Perhaps there
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is today not a single
worth his
salt who is not dividedintellectual
on that issue a
battleground for those opposites 5 6
.

The two opposing forces - Rome
and Israel - correspond to the two primary
physiological responses or
tastes for life. The first,
which when using moral language Nietzsche calls noble morality,
is a healthy
response.

it is the response of the
strong who have an
excess power to form, mold, recuperate
from their own er-

rors and from the wrongs done
them.

They revel in the

challenge of a violent and heedless
world, and in enemies
with whom their strength can be
tested.
Out of exuberance
and gratitude they anoint themselves
good, and, as an

after thought, those who do not measure
up to themselves,
bad.
They create value out of love of, and
honor for
their life.
it is their art, Nietzsche says, their
"realm
of invention" that they know how to honor. 57
Politically,
such honor translates into laws.

The noble are the law-

givers, those who attempt out of a positive
love for life,
to contain the resentful, the weak, the reactive,
those in

whom life is reviled.

The society of the noble rests on a

double reverence - for tradition, and for age.

And in

this double reverence lies the source of its capacity to
organize, to build, "to make plans that encompass the dis-

tant future." 58

Rome is here paradigmatic.

With the establishment of laws and the foundation of
a state,

bad conscience, the active, positive desire not
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to be rid of something
(to be distinguished
from the inability "to have done with
anything" which Niet 2 sche
says
results from a damaged
apparatus of repression) is
created.
under these new conditions
and through cruel and terrible mnemotechnics, the human
being is tamed, made more
uniform, calculable; s/he
becomes a promising being.
The
community within city walls
maintains order through this
hard-won new ability. Towards
transgressors and outside
enemies however, the noble retain
a wild celebration
of a

violent and mutually preying world.

They retain a healthy

beastliness.

Nietzsche calls this noble morality
"die Sittlichkeit
der Sitte," "the morality of customs."
it forms, he
argues, the "prehistoric labor"
whose fruit is historical
man, or, the sovereign individual a new and interesting

phenomenon capable of the proud and new
privilege of responsibility, conscience.
The other primary physiological response
is that of
the weak - what Nietzsche calls "slave
morality."
it is

the response of the impotent, that is, of
those unable to
bear the bitter indifference towards suffering
which the

life force seems to possess and on which the noble
thrives.

The strongest of the sick is the ascetic priest,

that "incarnate desire to be different, to be in a different place." 59

The ascetic priests invent a religion of

pity which reduces each human being to a common
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denominator: sinner.

They create a human herd
led, in
early Christianity (which
historically marks the first
"slave revolt in morals") by
the priestly caste itself.
But the weak always produce
enormous tension within any
society,
Their resentment of the human
condition and of
those who thrive in it is the
impetus for great
creativity. As the basis of a
culture however, the creative force which constitutes the
ascetic ideal in morals
forms a horizon which demarcates
an "other world" of the
"beyond." The unconditional love
which this ideal spawns
is not love for this world.
Life in this world deserves
only our pity.
They anoint both this world and
the strong
"evil." Themselves they call "good,"
and their otherworldly vision, "true world." The ascetic
ideal is the
creative product of the weak, and its
driving force is

redemption from and revenge upon this life.

Their crea-

tive act appears to be a no! to this world.
Yet Nietzsche says that the triumph of the
ascetic
ideal opened up "a new possibility of willing,
some

delight in willing."

The no!

,

Nietzsche says, magically

brought to life an abundance of tender yeses! 60

How then

did the ascetic ideal keep the weak and poor in spirit
on
this life?

Nietzsche's painful answer is that it did so

through the development of delight in a certain kind of
cruelty.

Joy in life was found to reside in the cruelty

of finding oneself eternally guilty before God, guilty for
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the "ineluctable animal
instincts "61

Joy in l ife was
found in "the will of man
to find himself guilty and
reprehensible to a degree that
can never be atoned for."
It is the priest who creates
such "orgies of feeling"
which keep the weak on this life.
The priest, "that artist in guilt feelings"" who
answers y
sufferers
can find someone to blame for
your pitiful condition.
There is meaning in your suffering.
it is your own sin,
you yourself are the cause of
your suffering. with this,
"the invalid has been transformed
into a sinner. »« The
eternal sinner.
Life, Nietzsche says, was made
once again
interesting, for pain and suffering
became again meaning.

^^

ful; one even longed for it; one
broke oneself over the

"cruel wheel of a restless, morbidly
lascivious conscience." 64 so is one, through his own
wounds, kept interested in this life under the horizon of
the ascetic
ideal.

With this interpretation Nietzsche sings a
kind of ode
to impotence.
Paradoxically, with this cruelty a certain
kind of beauty was born

-

God on the Cross; a new affirma-

tion of this-worldly suffering.

A strange new love

sustained by the mystery of the pudenda oriao of the being
of man strapped the will to this life.

The ascetic priest

made of man a perpetual mystery to himself, carving out a
painful cleft between self and self-knowledge which could
be redeemed only through a war of expurgation against
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one's mortal being, a war
led by the high priest,
sick
himself, still the high
priest retained the degree of
health necessary to be both
trusted and_feared by his
flock.
He was, Nietzsche interestingly
says, his flock's
"support, resistance, prop,
compulsion, taskmaster,
tyrant, and^od. » (emphasis mine)
Alone thrQugh
powers of the ascetic priest did
the divine appear to the
flock.
Alone with the aid of the ascetic
priest could the
lowly -stand before things in awe,"
in this case, before
the beauty, the divinity of their
own self-inflicted suff ering.

«

^

Embodied in the pitiful spectacle of
this ascetic
life in the Christian community was
something Nietzsche
could not fail to admire, for in a
certain sense he recognizes in the ascetic priest of early
Christianity the

strength to give life a distinctive shape
and hence the
aesthetic sensibility he thinks modernity has
lost.

The

sensibility with which the ascetic priest renews
the will
is based on an honest look into the depths
of life.
it

faces,

in a certain way, the fact that injustice
is the

essential condition of all deeds, that perfection in
this
life and in the community of believers is impossible.

The

ascetic priest faces this, yet still acts, carving out a

distinctive form of life, renewing the will through finding a terrible beauty in suffering.

The ascetic ideal ap-

preciates that suffering is an ineliminable part of beau-
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ty, of a life worth living.

Through the ascetic ideal a
love for life is achieved,
not by expurgating suffering,
but through it.
However, there is a counter
sensibility by which
Nietzsche is repulsed. The new
beauty and the new affirmation of the ascetic ideal "wants
to become master not
over something in life but over
life itself, over its most
profound, powerful and basic
conditions."^
seeking to
affirm itself alone, in its
unconditional will to truth,
the ascetic ideal seeks to destroy
the conditions of the
life force.
Not only does it seek to expurgate
its own
bloody origins but it continues to
disguise the ceaseless
battle it wages against the strong.
The creative act of
the weak is reactive.
What is reacted to is the harsh
law of life; to anything which has the
strength to love
this world in the face of it.
It conducts not simply a
war, but a war of expurgation against
the strong.
Rome
must be utterly destroyed in favor of the
human herd.

m

Thus the ascetic ideal contained form-giving
forces
for an exhausted world thereby saving the will
itself.

Yet the misty atmosphere of unconditional love
was for

things not of this world.

One loved what one was not;

eternally punishing and wounding one's mortal self.
in this world was worthy only of our pity.

Life

A certain

denial stood at the portal of this horizon, an honest
denial, one which still believes in itself, for this is
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not yet modern self-deceit.

The mist is yet strong
and

thick, still capable of
inspiring deep love and faith.
Luther and the Protestant
Reformation form a key
juncture in the consolidation
of Israel's triumph, for
what was effectively Luther's
attack on the Church (though
he himself meant only to
attack its corruption) was
an attack on "the last construction
of the Romans. "67 It g
Luther as the innocent simpleton
who receives Nietzsche's
wrath as bearer of the responsibility
for almost wholly
eclipsing from the world the
knowledge and experience particular to "Rome." i shall examine
Nietzsche's analysis
of this stage of the battle
with care, for with this almost mortal wound to Rome, a
certain kind of impetus to
mastery is, for the first time, both
fully unleashed and
.

combined with the already strong
Christian pity for the
human condition.
in this, the nihilism latent in
the
morality of the weak comes nearer to
actual fruition.
With Rome's ruin, the mist is about to
be dispersed, man's
form-giving forces dealt a near mortal blow.
The triumph of Israel in the Christian
ascetic ideal,
is also the triumph of the impulse to
the unconditional.

This impulse, the essence of the weak, is for
Nietzsche a
sign of the extreme immoderation of a being who
cannot

bear the kind of complexity and Vieldeutigkeit (literally,
the many meaning-like character of the world; usually

translated as multiplicity which loses the notion of
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"deuten": to point, interpret,
give meaning, illumine)
which a person of good taste
not only experiences in the
world but embraces. This impulse
is embodied at the most
general and fundamental level in
the unconditional faith
in another world which offers
salvation and redemption,
and in an all-knowing, all-seeing
God.
it is also

manifest in the tactics the Christian
ideal uses to keep
the weak on this life, namely, in
the orgy of guilt feelings that locates responsibility
for suffering un-

ambiguously in the self.

And it is manifest in the famil-

iarity with which the Christian relates
to his God.
Nietzsche refers here to the "pawing" and
"nuzzling," to
presuming to involve God in the pettiness
of even one's
smallest worries. 68 Christianity presumes
an access, a
proximity to the deity, or what Nietzsche calls
"das Ansich-der-Dinge" (the in-itself of things) where
other re-

ligions dare not even create a word to name
theirs.
The trajectory of this impulse from early Chris-

tianity to the Lutheran Reformation is upwards.

Luther is

the apotheosis of the immoderation of the Christian
as-

cetic ideal.

When Luther declares that works give us no

special promise of salvation, that faith alone matters,
his rejection of this-worldly action is even more uncondi-

tional than that of early Christianity.

Likewise, when he

defrocks the priest both by declaring "everyone a priest"
and by removing the injunction of abstinence, his effort
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xs to eliminate all
worldly constructions that
might con-

ation and mediate

the individual's relationship
to God.
A similar logic governs
his dismissal of the
inspirational
base of the Church councils.
The unconditional rejection
of all this-worldly life
save the wholly inner life
of the
spirit, assured each believer
alike the possibility of a
kind of access to God hitherto
unheard of in Christian
faith.

While Nietzsche acknowledges
that the Lutheran
Reformation unleashed a certain
restlessness of the
spirit, a yearning for independence,
and a belief in a
right to liberty - all of which
Nietzsche embraces, though
skeptically - he is most concerned to
argue that it coarsened the spirit, made it shallow,
plebeian, simple.
For
in making access to God an
immediate and private affair,

Luther undermined the very things
that both sustained and
brought into appearance the awesome
power of "das An-sich-

der-Dinge," of the holy.

Luther destroyed those forms of

life through which a distance from the
holy was

maintained, a distance without which the
awesome quality
of its presence could not be experienced.
Through the
humility of appearing alone before one's almighty
God,

Nietzsche smells the scent of

a

stronger unconditional

urge to master this relationship through simplification,
purification.

The Protestant spirit lost, in Nietzsche's

view, the depth of early Christianity's insight.
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What stood between early
Christianity and Luther, between, as Nietzsche put it,
multiplicity and simplicity,
was the Roman Church.
it was a Roman insight
based on
Roman experiences which kept
the impulse to the unconditional in bounds.
Enshrined in the Roman Church
was a
certain skepticism and hence
moderation which enlivens the
spirit of the strong. Nietzsche
refers to this spirit
as

southern, recalling the long
debates in the classical
world in matters of faith, and
contrasting it with the

simplistic, unconditional spirit of
the north.
The last
mark left on the world by this
southern Roman spirit which
Nietzsche so admires was the creation
of the Christian
Church as a "structure for ruling. "69
As such/ what
here understood but lost on Luther
was how to sustain
faith and awe before the superhuman,
the divine.
The
Roman Church was no innocent regarding
power.
it instinctively knew how to assure a thick, deep
mist.

^

Paradoxically, Nietzsche appears, in this attack
on
Luther, as a defender of the need for faith,
for he at-

tacks the peasant simplicity responsible for
Luther's
failure to question whether the holy would retain
its

power in human life once its worldly institutional embodiments were destroyed; whether unconditional faith alone
was sufficient to sustain the awe; whether the faithful

might not need a specific form of life and structure of

power in which the magnificence and light of the holy
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could be manifest.

Nietzsche's wrath is directed
against
Luther's innocence about the
means to sustain faith. Yet
his interest in mounting this
attack is not in saving
Christian faith.
In fact, he rails against Luther's
simplistic intervention for failing
to see that it was not
corruption that sat on the Papal throne,
but life itself,
so that in attempting to save the
Church, he not only

crushed the Renaissance and detained
the Enlightenment,
but lastingly impoverished the spirit
itself.
Herein_lies
Nietzsche's interest in this critique. He
wants to point
to the fact that both the experience
of rule and more importantly the knowledge born of it were, with
Luther,
lost: how to create a form of life in
which the beauty and

awesomeness of das An-sich-der-Dinge could appear.

Nietzsche's aim is recovery of this knowledge.
What the Roman Church understood and Luther did
not
was that it was not enough to have a moral ideal
which
gave suffering a meaning.

The import and awesomeness of

any meaning given to earthly suffering needed to be

manifest in sensuous human struggle, to be endowed with
human form, culture; it needed to be institutionalized and
ritualized.

This alone would provide a space for those

who excelled in the human struggle with suffering.

Only

in the drama of the excellent - the saint, the monk, the

priest - could humans behold with awe the beauty to be
found in this "veil of tears" and receive an inspired spur
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to live.

This is

^

kernel Qf Nietzsche , s raggs

Luther.

But Luther's spirit was too
violently unconditional
to tolerate the wisdom of
this southern skepticism. To
allow sensuous human struggle a
space for display risked
honoring the evil life of the flesh.
And so Luther struck
a death blow to the power of
the ascetic ideal by
im-

poverishing the spirit.

Both Luther and this enfeebled

spirit to which the modern age is the
direct heir, were
innocent of the requirements for
sustaining a love of
life,

for neither could tolerate the
necessary ambiguity
of any form of life.
Neither had a "taste" for it. This

innocence regarding one's lack of knowledge
becomes the
origin of modernity's deceit and the
dishonesty of the ascetic ideal, releasing its nihilism.

Freed from Chris-

tianity as dogma and bolstered by the modern
faith in the
"free personality," the secular modern is
compelled
to

ask, why then do we suffer?

necessary?

In what sense can it be

Silence alone responds, and the modern cry

resounds in turn, "Let us then do away with it in the
name
of reason, truth, freedom and equality!"

With this begins

the ascetic ideal's dishonesty; with this, modernity.

longer can Nietzsche give it "all honor!"
In Nietzsche's view,

it is precisely the will to

thoroughly transform this veil of tears which defies

modernity's claim to being this -worldly
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.

Born into the

No

world in this moment is the most
unconditional will to
master the human condition heretofore
found in

the West,

fed by the most thorough outbreak
of pity yet seen.
Nietzsche calls modern science (by
which I encapsulate
these outbreaks) -the most
spiritualized form of the ascetic ideal, "70 fQr its s ngle
unconditiQnal s
_
.

.

.

n

tellectual cleanliness, faith in truth
as objectivity, an
objectivity which Nietzsche says "refuses
not only to affirm but also to deny. "71 with this,
nothing will
prosper.
Israel's nihilism blossoms, for such
a spirit
can bring forth literally nothing
which men might find
worthy of their honor. Life is utterly
degraded.
Lost to
modernity is the knowledge and experience
necessary to

engender a form of life worthy of existence.

Rome has

been vanquished.
Let me now turn to Nietzsche's critique
of

modem

political phenomena to show the way in which
these specifically modern forms embody this inability to
engender a
form of life worthy of being.

E.

Moder n Political Phenomena

In this final section

I

would like to further deepen

and clarify Nietzsche's relation to modernity by exploring

his critique of modern political forms.

Nietzsche never

did a sustained and individual critique of major political
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phenomena.

He did however
ver att^v
attack them continuously
throughout most of his texts,
with the exception of nationalism, he tended to treat
democracy, anarchism,
socialism, the movement to
emancipate women, and what he
simply called industrial
society as phenomena which
cohered together around the
two sustaining impulses
which
in his view constituted
the specifically modern
moral
ideal: the desire to do away
with suffering, and the
desire for equal rights.
Modern political
forms,

in

Nietzsche's view, were embodiments
of that specifically
modern morality: the morality
of pity,
we will recognize
the two major impulses of this
morality of course as the
critical ones in any movement liberal or socialist agitating for social and economic
justice today.
than address each of these
political

Rather

forms in turn,

I

win

examine and draw out Nietzsche's
analysis of one alone:
the women's emancipation movement.
My choice is not random, for
Nietzsche identifies
both of the sustaining impulses of
modern morality with
the feminine. The characteristic which,
according to
Nietzsche, defines our age - the democratic
desire for
equality - is an effeminate one. Likewise
the "inability
to remain spectators, to let someone suffer"
is a feminine
failure.
Moreover, modern morality, as the morality of
pity,

is itself "old woman's morality." 73

By invoking the

necessary sterility incumbent upon old women, Nietzsche
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suggests that modern morality's
impulse
is infertile; it yields
nothing.
where
nurse and everyone an invalid,
there we
reliance, no selves.™ There,
there is
no future.

to help everyone

everyone is a
find no selfno child and hence

it appears then that "the
feminine" is em-

blematic of modernity in Nietzsche's
writings.
But what is the essence of
"the feminine?"
it is a
complex figure. As Derrida put
it, "Nietzsche dealt with
so many women.
As we look more clQsely at
f±
we see that in Nietzsche's view
the feminine has undergone
a de-feminization(Ent-weiblichung)
in modernity; modernity
has experienced the "deprivation
of" the weiblich,

^

^ ^
the

feminine.

Hence, paradoxically, the modern
age, though

emblematically feminine, is less Weib, less
woman.
movement to emancipate women embodies this

The

de-

feminization.

An analysis of this process of Ent-

weiblichung will help further reveal Nietzsche's
relation
to modern political forms and to the shallow
formlessness
of modernity as a whole.

We should remind ourselves that

one of the women in Nietzsche's life was life
itself; that
"woman" is a metaphor for life.

Hence,

if in modernity a

process of de-f eminization has occurred, if there is less
Weib, close attention to this process should illuminate
in

what ways modernity is an impoverished and nihilistic age,
an age unable to endow itself with the contours of a form
by which it itself could be justified.
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Before examining directly
what Nietzsche actually
said about the movement for
women's emancipation, I briefly want to lay out the
historical terrain of the
movement
as it pertains to Nietzsche's
period.
The late 19th
century was a period of
tremendous agitation in Europe
and
the United States for women's
rights.
There were three
general approaches to the question
which were solidifying
during this period in Germany,
with real solidification
and even open breaches occurring
in the early 1890's.
The
most prominent part of the
movement was the moderate wing
of the middle class.
Heavily influenced by German
idealism, this wing argued for
sexual difference rooted in
a glorification of motherhood
and the demand that woman's
distinctiveness should be developed as
a complement to
man's.
The radical wing of the middle class
was less
prominent though important, and stood
for uncompromising
equality between the sexes, and the demand
for participation in political life.
Finally, there was the

proletariat wing of the movement for women's
emancipation
which argued that the question of women was
only a part of
a larger social problem which could
not be addressed
without class conflict that included both men and
women
together. 76
What was Nietzsche's view of this explosive agitation?
"...to dream perhaps of equal rights, equal
education, equal claims and obligations -

84

even more - betrayed, exposed,
probacy 'he
t0
Sh
rt " f ° r a11 fundamental
,°
orobleL ? i
and incapable of obtain-

?nfanrdeptn!»?V--

Nietzsche repeatedly takes aim
at the dream of equal
rights when raging against the
emancipation of women.
Ostensibly aiming at progress,
this dream is the "aspiration to the economic and legal
self-reliance of a
clerk. "78

Nietzsche identifies this dream
as part of the
same economic optimism which
pervades industrial society,
part of that "ungeheuere Prozess,"
that monstrous process
which presumes that the "increasing
expenditure of everybody must necessarily involve the
increasing welfare of
everybody. "79 The real product of
industrial society however is "a certain actually rendering
similar," the clerk.
The demand for equal rights is perhaps
the instance
of the morality of pity in that it
is the demand
for all

to suffer equally, to suffer alike.
"The man of "modern ideas,"

Nietzsche writes,

this proud ape, is im-

measurably dissatisfied with himself: that is
certain.
suffers - and his vanity wants him to suffer
only

He

along

side others, to feel pity (mit-leid)

.

80

The modern im-

pulse to equality is the impulse to sameness.

As such it

is the process of the borification and uglification
of

woman.

It diminishes her.
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It is in this sense
that we should understand

Nietzsche's attack on the
very concept of rights
which underpins the movement to
emancipate women, a right he
argues is acquired through
treaties, it is something
earned through struggle and
strength.
it is not something
that can be demanded, for it
is not a right but the
"fatality of life itself" that
one attack or defend
oneself. 81 Behind this accusation
of semantic confusion
lies something serious.
Modern demands for equal rights
belie a loss of the instinct
for the fatality of life;
they belie the lack of a critical
understanding of life
itself.
once lost, the human being is
diminished, made
ugly.
Her impulses are no longer for
radiance and distinction, but for sameness, equality
in suffering.
The
loss of this instinct for battle,
Nietzsche is suggesting,
entails the loss of an aesthetic
sensibility for beauty.
This gets to the essence of Nietzsche's
animus
towards the emancipators. They are
abortive women, women
who have met with an accident (verunglueckten)
who have
turned out badly (misgeratenen) 82 And what
is it they
abort? That singular power bestowed upon
women alone: the
power of birth, of bringing something new into
,

being.

Along with this power they abort the child which
is "a new
beginning. .a first movement." 83 Emancipatory women,
.

in

their demand for equal rights, have suffered the loss
of
the power of their distinctive feminine instincts.
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"They

lack the stuff for children. "84

They

,

like the

M

woman's morality by which
they are borne, are sterile.
It is critical to wend
our way past the impatient
irritation which surrounds our
initial reading of these

Physiological and naturalistic
arguments against the emancipators.
Nietzsche's critique appears to
be merely another form of that uninteresting
defense of keeping women
in their place so common
among philosophers in the
Western
tradition. More generously, we
are tempted to assimilate
it to the position, sketched
above, of the conservative

wing of the middle class movement
for emancipation.
Yet
this form of emancipation too
has lost its specifically
feminine power.
Bevond r,nnH »„h Evil, aphorism
#232
Nietzsche ridicules the attempt to
define "das Weib an
sich" (woman in itself) as a clumsy
attempt at scientific
self -exposure. His prose is filled
with sarcastic metaphors from the Enlightenment - exposure,
bringing

m

to

light, venturing forth,

"being medically explicit."

This

effort to address the question of women
also diminishes
and erodes the distinctively feminine
power, commandeered
as it is by the will to proximity.

Too close .- If we live together with another
person too closely, what happens is similar
to when we repeatedly handle a good engraving with our bare hands: one day all we have
left is a piece of dirty paper.
The soul of
a human being too can finally become tattered by being handled continually; and that
is how it finally appears to us - we never
see the beauty of its original design again.
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10 3 bY to Miliar
°
association with friends and women;
and
sometimes
what one loses is the pearl
of one's l52!«

w^hT

^

Both the idealist attempt
to define "das Weib an
sich" and the attempt to
attain equal rights

for all are

exemplary of too much handling.

Driven by the impulse of

the unconditional, the impulse
to master, they draw too
near to that they wish to
strengthen - the power and free-

dom of women, impoverishing,
dirtying instead, losing the
beauty of the original design;
that is, losing the fertility Nietzsche attributes to
the feminine instincts.
"To lose the sense for the
ground
one is most certain of victory... on which
to work
with virtuous audacity against
men's faith
in a basically different ideal
that
to be concealed in woman, something he~takes
Eternally-and-Necessarily-Feminine
what
is the meaning of all this if
not a crumfeminine instincts, a defeminization?»86

What then is the ground upon which
women are most
certain of victory? what is the feminine
instinct which
makes women tall enough for "all fundamental
problems of
life," which makes women "deep?" What is
the specifically
feminine form of power, the secret of her
fertility lost
on modernity?

For this we go, with Nietzsche, to the

"world of the eternally feminine" where lives
"the perfect

woman," "the real woman," the truly feminine.
The most tremendous metaphor for this woman and her

power Nietzsche concocts is "the beautiful cat."
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Woman is

brilliantly shrewd, cunning.

Her power and her victory

lie in mastering the art
of pleasing and hence the
art of
simulation.
She is a master in the arts
of the actor.
She adores and adorns herself
with masks. As such, her
true power is the power of
a^n_distans 87 of keeping
herself hidden through a dance
of simulation, while
mimicking the desires man has for
her.
She masters the
art of appearing in his image.
These desires, as
;

Nietzsche sees them, cluster around
the need for repose,
lightness, beauty.
Woman is that subtle creature
who "assists (man's) efforts at idealization
by adorning herself,
walking beautifully, dancing, expressing
delicate
thoughts: in the same way, she
practices
modesty, reserve,

distance - realizing instinctively that
in this way the
idealizing capacity of the man will grow." 88
it is critical here to note that this practice
of modesty, simulation, distance is not the hypocritical
"I shall pretend to
be modest." The essence and power of
"the feminine" is "a

deliberate closin g of one's eves to oneself ," 89
the
"(pushing) aside of one's so-called "character,"
flooding
it and at times extinguishing it." 90

m

this art, which

Derrida calls "the feminine operation," 91 the actio
in

distans becomes naive, utterly instinctual.

The essence

of the art of the beautiful cat is her allure, is
animal,
wild.

"What inspires respect for women, and often
enough even fear is her nature which is
,

89

more "natural" than man's.
The genuine
cunning suppleness of a
beast of P
The
h
aW nder the glOVe the prey
naIvete
of
htffgfis m
uneducab ility and inner
wnaness,
wUdnlss the
th* Tincomprehensibility
scodp an H
movement of her desires and
virtues "§§
The essence of the perfect
woman's power, which at
least twice in his published
works Nietzsche calls the
preponderant power, 93 i ies in the
allure
'

^

'

q£

^

comprehensible, the awesome, the
distant, the everretreating; in what Derrida calls
"the untruth of truth."
Her wild beauty enthralls,
drawing man towards her as
towards some great incomprehensible.
At the same time
however it draws his idealizing
powers forth, and woman,
the simulatress par excellence,
shrewdly and deftly forms
herself to his image, so that what he
approaches

originates only in his idealizing powers
themselves.
in
Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche writes,
"Man created
woman - but what out of? Out of a rib
of his
,

God, his

*

ideal '..."94

woman's artistry is in appearing to be

something, in appearing to possess something
necessarily
and eternally feminine, while in fact she
is evoking his
dreaming capacity, his idealizing capacity. Her
power
lies here, in the capacity to keep, through
a never con-

summated approach, man's interest, his passion, his

enthrallment alive.

"...her art is the lie, her highest

concern is mere appearance and beauty." 95
play of mere appearance.

Woman is the

Hers is the "power of the

90

dream."

„o

M„

always renins alluringly
out of his reach
prompting his creative formative
forces.
The essence of
her power is in creating
in hi* a desire for and
a belief
in the possibility of
proximity which, because of
her
shrewd cunning, can never be
consulted. The child to
which woman gives birth is
the idealizing capacity,
the
capacity, in Nietzsche's view,
which sustains human
entailment with life itself. Thus
Nietzsche could say
that although man wills woman,
creates her, hers is the
preponderant power, for without it
humans do not
--dare to

begin.

1,96

With this reading, the question
remains regarding the
status of this world in Nietzsche
view.
Can he really
mean this defense of the eternally
feminine to be read as
woman's essential identity? as an
argument for keeping
women in their traditional place?
He is, after all, arguing explicitly against the women's
emancipation movement.

With these questions we must turn to
a discussion of
Nietzsche's forms of parody and irony regarding
this
"world of the eternally feminine," for while
he extols it,
it is by no means a simple bow he makes
in its
direction.

To begin with, Nietzsche's very use of the
term

"eternally feminine" is facetious and ironic, as
is his

reference to woman's "nature" in any sense other than
as a
reference to her historical being. Nietzsche's entire
work, born as it was out of the anxiety and joy created
by
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the end of the dominant
moral-metaphysical ideal in the
West, bears unrelenting
witness to this claim.
The most powerful argument
for this reading can be
made through an analysis
of aphorisms #231-239
in the
chapter "Our Virtues" in
Bevondj^^^
This chap .
ter begins with the very
foreboding sigh "Ah if you
knew,
how soon, how very soon - it
will be different!..."
,

Nietzsche is foreseeing the
consummation of nihilism, the
end of "believing in one's
virtues," of therefore, having
a good conscience.

What will life be worth when
we can no
longer believe in anything good
about ourselves? We will
leave this question dangling, as
Nietzsche himself
does,

to move on to the task Nietzsche
sets himself in the face
of this coming event.
That is the task, referred to
above, of the "good European,"
heir of 2000 years of
training in truthfulness. it is the
task of intellectual
cleanliness, for this, or as he calls
it, honesty, is the
single virtue left us.
But Nietzsche warns, let us not
become bores or saints in our task of
perfecting our
virtue.
Let us approach our task with love and
with
malice, that is, with art, parodic art.

Sections 231-239, the last nine aphorisms of
this
chapter, are a case study in this task of perfecting
our
last virtue with love and with malice. His target any

essentializing, and hence dishonest, view of woman.
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His

means - parody.

^

In the opening

honesty begins.

Nie tzsche declares that
the particular
solutions to problems which
initially effect great
belief
in us, we later come to
see as steps to our own
selfknowledge; steps which reveal
in fact our particular
stupidity, what he calls that
unteachable "granite of
spiritual fate.-" steps

^

^

are.

^^

He then goes on to say he
is about to reveal a few
truths about "das Weib an sich,"
his truths, that is, his
stupidities.

Nietzsche's honesty about his
views of women - that
they are a granite part, that
is, a stupid but relentless
part of him - parodies the
mendacious idealism of the
"emancipated women," both those whose
aim is equal rights
and those who speak out about
"das Weib an sich." The
revelation of his "Granit von geistigem
Fatum" is also an
example of the malice of parodic honesty
he turns upon
himself, for this giving up of one's
convictions is painful, cruel, though necessary.
Nietzsche also maliciously
parodies his readers' desires for truth
about woman, and
for a settled Nietzschean position.
if the repeated view
that woman - wild and fragile - must be,
like a bird from
on high, locked in a cage like property
and kept from
singing about herself, is self-parody, we don't
know what
Nietzsche thinks. He makes of his readers, fools.

Nietzsche maliciously dodges himself and us.
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Yet Nietzsche dodges
not because he is at
a loss
here.
„ is ne W sel f - knowledge
is precisely
truth of truth," about
what kinds of artifices
are required to sustain iove
of this life, to be
fertile, and to
develop the requisite form-g
iving forces for creating
seething beautiful and thus
worthy of being. Through
the
traditional relationship of
men and women, of -will
and
willingness" Nietzsche finds
valuable insights into the
fertility of life itself.
Bis writings on women
and out of being direct
arguments against the women's
emancipation movement, and treating
women and women's
power as emblematic of life's
fertility.
The two of
course are intertwined. The
arguments against the former
are made in defense of the
later.

^^

^_

^

^

Nietzsche's insight into the
eternally feminine is
not, however, static.
if he had wanted to retain
the
power of the "feminine operation"
as is, and as the sole
preserve of women, would he so
carefully and enchantingly
have displayed its workings and
have called it the preponderant power? if this had been his
intention, why would
he have made conscious, through
his work, this "instinctual knowledge?"

He is clear to say elsewhere that

once instinctual knowledge becomes
conscious, it loses its
power.
Nietzsche is out to bring something before
the
mind's eye and to transform it. His strategy
is

genealogical
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in elucidating the form
of power critical to
woman' s
"victory," an instinctual
knowledge

without which woman

is

••defeminized,.. what I have
done is outlined the Kernel
of

Nietzsche's inchoate genealogy
of "the eternally feminine." inchoate because
Nietzsche never specifically
wrote such a genealogy - his
writings about women are
sprinkled throughout his texts
with little apparent
coherence.
Nevertheless Nietzsche approaches
the question
of woman genealogically and
constructs thereby a powerful
if not univocal critique of
understanding the history of
women as the progressive freedom
of a heretofore oppressed

and victimized group.

Nietzsche again, as elsewhere,

reconstructs battles, this time in
the area of woman.
However he is also out to redraw the
lines of these
battles.
"Reflect on the whole history of women:
do
they not have to be first of all and
above
all else actresses?" 98
The histrionic instinct and the power
of the
histrion, Nietzsche suggests, were developed
out of the
necessity of struggle of all "somehow dependent
social

strata." 99

in this, Nietzsche singles out the lower

class, Jews, and women.

All of these groups became only

what they were considered to be worth by those
upon whom
they were dependent. Out of this void in self-valuation,
out of this suffering, grew the "slave's craftiness,"
the

specific art of appearance of the histrion.
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Hence a

definite counterforce, and
Nietzsche argues, with ween
hegemonic force, was born.
The weak were fructiferous.
A
child was born.
Herein lies Nietzsche's
interest in the
eternally feminine.
(Reflection upon why Nietzsche
singles out women alone as having
a hegemonic power is
further persuasive evidence that
Nietzsche's treatment of
women should also be read
emblematically, that something
besides a mere reactionary critique
of the women's emancipation movement is taking place.
I am not suggesting
that there is not an element of
reaction in Nietzsche's
writings. He as much as admits
this is so in identifying
his "Granit von geistegem Fatum."

Rather,

orate the deeper, more important
critique

I
I

want to elabthink

Nietzsche is making of the assumption*
underlying the
women's emancipation movement and, by
extension, most
other modern political phenomena.)
We are not then to take Nietzsche's
work on the
eternally feminine as any kind of essentialist
discourse
on women or as an argument to keep women
in a powerless

position.

But is there perhaps not some irony here
which

Nietzsche himself is unable to see in this argument
that
this power specific to women is the preponderant
one?

Hasn't his "granite of spiritual fate" in fact got
faster grip on him than he knows?

more powerful than willfulness?

How can willessness be
And how can the theorist

of the will to power make such an argument?
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a

Lizzie Bor-

den, director and producer
of the film,

"Working Girls"

about women prostitutes offers
an interesting contemporary
comment on this question.
an interview she says,
"Men's bodies are exposed and
therefore vulnerable,
whereas women have this ability to
conceal.
On some
level, women have always dealt
with theater. And their
theatricality is often constructed to
make men believe

m

there's true passion there.

Young girls know the power

that comes from making men excited,
that ability to spin
them out of control. That's what
working girls use in the
bedroom, what keeps them from victimization." 100
This I
think is an example of how Nietzsche's
work might in fact
illuminate a kind of power, even if I think
it is difficult to argue that it is a preponderant
one through this
example.
This is one level on which Nietzsche is operating and through which his work is illuminating,
at least,

in part.

But he,

like the filmmaker herself,

is far from ex-

tolling this power, this child, unequivocally.

The kernel

of the genealogy, the slave's craftiness, is a treasure

Nietzsche has "found" but does not covet.
potence is no simple song.

His ode to im-

The purpose of his genealogy

of women, like his genealogy of morals,

is to resurrect

battles and transform them.
"Women are considered deep - why? because
one can never discover any bottom to them.
Women are not even shallow." 101
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This art of pleasing, the
art of the histrion, is
also the power of the weak
and impotent; it is reactive,
that is, entirely dependent
upon others for its being.
Woman as histrion is wholly
actress, simulating a substance, a self.
The essence of Nietzsche's
anxiety about
the art of the histrion is this
lack of self. Numerous
times he intones that women have
no depth, no clarity
about themselves, no psychological
understanding.
fact, her art depends upon her
"closing her eyes to herself." she has no bottom; she is
not even shallow.
she
renunciates herself; her devotion (to
simulation) is unconditional.
She is a slave to opinions.

m

The eternally feminine is for Nietzsche
an ambiguous
power.
Modernity is overturning it. 102 Nietzsche
WQuld
give it a kick too, though off to a
slightly different
direction than the voices of the equal rights
emancipators, for there is, in his view, a trajectory
from the
self-less woman in the world of the eternally
feminine, to
both the heaving breasts of the Wagneriennes
and the in-

fertility of the abortive women of the emancipation
movement.

None possess the requisite powers to endow them-

selves with a distinctive form.

eternally feminine performs

a

Nietzsche's work on the

warning function.

As a form

of power the eternally feminine stimulates anew our awe

and love of life.

Like the ascetic priest, the eternally

feminine creates the fear of the distant and the desire to
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approach; it creates belief
in divinity which
inspires
love.
it preserves a vital
experience and form of knowledge which Nietzsche thinks
women have unconsciously
possessed.
He would make it conscious,
for the emancipation
movement wants, as Luther wanted,
and as the other modern
political phenomena want, in the
name of equality, sameness in suffering, to expurgate
this kind of power and
knowledge from the world. The
essence of such attempts is
abortiveness, shallowness, nihilism.
They result
in a

herd whose virtue is adaptation.

Nietzsche warns against

such attempts without simply
extolling this other form of
power (the problematic position I
think Derrida's work
helps to suggest)
Just as he does not extol the
ascetic
ideal's unconditional impulse, yet
finds a treasure of
knowledge and experience from which
the modern will to
proximity should learn, so too is his aim
in analyzing the
eternally and necessarily feminine.
in both cases
.

Nietzsche aims, in the face of the shallow
will to
proximity of modernity, to resurrect the battles

and ten-

sions which pervade our settled truths, not
in order to
resurrect those same tensions, but to destroy the
hegemony
of our contented adaptive and theatrical
sensibility, and
to thereby call into being the artistic sensibility

without which humans cannot create a life worthy of their
honor.

Central to this sensibility is the importance of

tension itself, of battle.

it is to an elaboration of

99

this tension-ridden
sensibility
j-j-uy that
tnat
next chapter.

100

T
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u{11
will «-turn in the
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CHAPTER II

CREATING AND THE TRAGI -COMEDY OF
THE GREAT TRAGEDIAN

A.

In chapter one

Intrnrfnrtinn

have argued that what most
disturbs
Nietzsche about modernity is the
inability to manifest the
form-giving forces needed to bring into
being a specific
form of life whose distinctiveness
and beauty could be
self-justifying. There is a curious
paradox to this argument however because, at the same time,
Nietzsche identifies modernity with a ferocious will
to master, a will to
form the world. Most contemporary
thinkers indebted to
Nietzsche for their critical understanding
of modernity
adopt this latter line of thinking, more
or less eclipsing
the former, and argue that getting the
shape of modernity
"right" consists in understanding that its
distinction
I

lies in constant efforts to organize, order,
tame and dominate human selves and the natural world, what
dis-

tinguishes modernity is the effort to stamp out the
world
with a form of man's own making alone. Modernity,
so goes
this analysis, is the continuous effort to impose
form.
Hence, as critics, our aim should be to inhibit or

diminish such projects of mastery, an aim variously char-

acterized as "putting slack in the order," developing a
will

" not -to-will,

"

or "suspending the relation with
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castration,"

aU

^
^
^
.^.^

forms of -letting up'
in some manner or
another.
Th e broad outlines Qf
debate
oscillation between imposing
form an(J nQt
or, imposing it less. 1

^

While

^

agree that modernity is
characterized by a
will to master, it sees
to me that if we, following
Nietzsche, see that the
essential characteristic of
this
will is an unconditional
desire to expurgate all
suffering
from the world, what 1
called in chapter one a
will to
proximity, then we come to see
that it is precisely this
drive which destroys the very
possibility of form and
formation in any enduring or
relatively enduring
I

sense.

On this reading, as

I

have argued in chapter one,
suffer-

ing is an ineliminable and
necessary part of any creative
form-giving, and it is this
sensibility, this aesthetic

understanding of being which is
inimical to the modern
mind.

Of importance in this reading
of the will to master
is the shift it effects both
in the focus of our definition of modernity's problems, and
in our critical
response.
From the problem of mastery and the
strategy of
"letting up" or "relieving, » we move
to a focus on

modernity's process character, its lack of
stability and
inability to create forms of legitimate
authority - what
Nietzsche more polemically referred to as the
inability to
command or obey, and to the strategy of
understanding the
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demands of the creative
act
Z itself
r
u
itself.
brief, Nietzsche
urges us to bear witness
to the
cne suffering any
imposition
of for. demands of us.
He urges us to testify
to this
tension, this limit, for
aione in its presence,
as j will
argue in great detail in
this
s cha
chant.,
Pter, can we create forms
of life which draw our
artistic being forth both
in creative renewal and in
creative guestionina.
Hence, in modernity what
we find is a kind of
power
which
at a once and for all
tyrannical imposition of
form, but whose
s£tssSk ls precisely

m

^

^

^

effect is an endless process
of attempting to impose
form
and shape selves and the
world.
this light Michel
Foucault's work on disciplinary
power is instructive, for
while he argues, I think
persuasively, that modern power
is positive, productive
and formative, its mode of
penetrating and stamping the body
with souls is utterly

m

un-

stable.

The very essence of bio-power
lies in its nomadic
versatility, its chameleonic
brilliance, its adaptability.

Furthermore, in the critique of
humanism, found for examPle in Madness and civilization and
in Disci nlin. „nH
Punish, (most masterfully exemplified
in this later work
in the opening passages, though
haunting the entire work)
Foucault even broaches, albeit obliquely,
the possibility
that this problem of nomadism might
be related to this
very desire to eradicate all suffering. 2
still, Foucault,
to my mind does not explore or articulate
this aspect of
,
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^^

Modern attempts to „ aster
fuiiy
fore, return to some
of the most disturbing
thoughts of
Nietzsche in order to better
understand the inability
in
modernity, despite a for*
of power whose aim
is to tyrannically stamp and for™
the world, to actually
bring into
being the forces necessary
for self-and-cultural
formations whose distinctiveness
and excellence gives
them a
»odicum of stability and
duration, without these
forces
there can be no legitimate
authority and no real justice
nor can there be a taming
of this ordering-mastering

^

im-

pulse itself.
in the foregoing chapter
I have argued that
it is to
Nietzsche's critique of the
modern religion of pity and
his reflections on suffering
that we must turn in our
effort to think through the
shape or shapelessness of

modernity.

More specifically,

I

have argued that modern

attempts to master eschew the
very kernel of understanding
necessary for cultural and
self-formation - the necessity
of embracing suffering.
Yet this formulation obviously
remains far from satisfactory in
its lack of specificity.
Thus far, in this work, Nietzsche
has escaped interrogation aimed at ascertaining whether
in any of his discussions of suffering he distinguishes
between those
forms of

suffering in our time which themselves
contribute to herdification and lack of distinction, and
hence unnecessarily preclude self-and-cultural formation,
on
the one hand,
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^^^

the very heart of our
modern condition
who we are," on the other.
t„ short thus
the general historical
specificity within which
Nietzsche's thought occurs,
his reflections on
suffering
remain at a fairly abstract,
mostly formal level.
Hence
the questions press, does
Nietzsche distinguish between
kinds and contents of
suffering? Does he give us
any general parameters for doing
so? These questions
are critical if „ e are to assess
the importance of a
Nietzschean
inspired critique for conceptions
of justice which aim
primarily at social and economic
amelioration, and to develop and assess Nietzsche's
own approach to the question
of justice.
,

^

^

In attempting to answer the
question of the

specificity of Nietzsche's reflections
on suffering we are
confronted, as we are in all of
his work, with a style
full of polemical reversals
and juxtapositions.

m

modernity, he says, pity for all
suffering on earth and
the totalizing attempt to eradicate
it prevails.
And
Nietzsche seems to counter this with
the simple reverse
image - we must suffer.
This is our basic condition.
Similarly, he seems to employ an operation
of reversal
with respect to the relationship between
suffering and
knowing.
in Christianity suffering was the most

gerneralizable commonly shared and known condition.
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The

co^on origin

of all knowledge was
original sin, me taPhorically represented by the
story of the Garden.
Through this c«o„ condition
of suffering fro m one's
sins, B an knew »a„.
once again, to counter
this Nietzsche
see ms to suggest that
it is precisely suffering
which is
the m ost individualizing
of experiences, and one
which
Must therefore be preserved
and guarded if creative
selfand-cultural formation is to
be achieved. Here too
he
seens to retain the totalizing
quality of the thought
against which he thinks.

Does Nietzsche simply
reproduce this kind of thinking? Are his reversals
only reversals? it is my
aim in
this chapter to argue that
Nietzsche is not simply
reproducing and reversing by filling
out more precisely
the kinds of suffering he
thought it was our historical
lot to have to creatively
transfigure.

will begin by developing the
aesthetic foundations
of Nietzsche's reflections on
suffering since it is with
these foundations that he formulates
the content of our
particular suffering. I will then attempt
more explicitly
to articulate this content by
developing what Nietzsche
sees as "our challenge." Finally,
I will explore the figure of the artist-philosopher who, as
the great tragedian,
represents in figurative form the kind of
thinking activity which succeeds in "[making] beautiful
what is
I

necessary" 3 in our time.

Here we find a fundamentally
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aesthetic mo ve»ent of thought
which is affirmative
which
transfigures and gives for*
to our particular
historical
form of suffering.

B.

Aesthetic Frmnr^f-j ons

^Jjngth (of an individual or of
^ether^and where the judgment

a people)
"beautiful"

deal With if
in the flesh
I - as danger, Lt confronted us
as problem temp?
tation - this determines
alsoeven
our
"
That iS b
(
tif
an

IL ?r

- -*

S£2SoZ!?l
What

have begun to suggest in
chapter' one is that
any reflection on justice we
might undertake with
Nietzsche's aid must be aesthetic
in nature.
Not only is
his critique of the ascetic
ideal levied from the standpoint of the question of the
beautiful, but likewise his
admiration for it wells out of this
question.
similarly
his vituperations against modernity
are aesthetic in
I

origin.

Modernity is not only ugly, it is
unable to appreciate the beautiful; it has no
aesthetic
sensibility

whatsoever.

Without an ability to aesthetically
ap-

propriate or evaluate, Nietzsche suggests,
there can be no
justice.
To elaborate these thoughts we must
explore the meaning of the beautiful, hence of affirmation
in Nietzsche's

view

-

In Twilight of the Tdn1 S
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f

he writes,

"Nothing is so conditional
1^4cumscribed as our
'r""
ffo
1
Anyone who tried to divorce
it
"
Pleasure in man would at
ground give way beneathe once "5find tS"
him
The beautiful is a
judgment about the world
in which the
feeling of pleasure in
ourselves predominates.
But
Nietzsche specifies this
further.
It is pleasure in our
Strength, °ur strength to affirm
that which we can barely
endure. At the most
fundamental level Nietzsche
conceives
°f the barely endurable
as the condition of
suffering from
lack of meaning or purpose,
and from a life force
apparently indifferent to this,
our suffering.
Such, in his
view, is our basic state.
In this sense, it is the
taking
Pleasure in our strength to
affirm "the terrifying and
guestionable character of existence"*
which moves us to
make the judgment, -that is
beautiful." Hence any judgment of the beautiful carries
within it this affirmation
of the basic ontological
condition of existence.

t™*™^"

-

What is most important about this
formulation to my
reading of Nietzsche's aesthetic
approach to questions of
justice is that the aesthetic judgment
and feeling for the
beautiful is, at its most essential
level, an affirmation
and hence at least an implicit
recognition of an
un-

masterable mystery at the heart of being,
a condition
which he finds to be the fount of human
pain, yet also the
source of our pleasure in ourselves as we
attempt
to fash-
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ion a relationship to
this condition.
Hence the pleasure
we take in our strength
is pleasure in a
certain cruelty
towards ourselves; we learn
to feel a certain
delight in
the suffering this condition
causes us. The judgment
"that is beautiful," in
Nietzsche's view, expresses
a love
of tragedy which he calls
"the art of the terrifying
and
questionable.- .7 Thus, in the
aesthetic judgment we are
called forth to a challenge,
the challenge of comporting
affirmatively towards the mystery
at the heart of our
being.

Yet Nietzsche has said that
the beautiful is the most
conditional of all things, hence
this affirmation is not
the affirmation of mystery
and suffering in grand generality.
The specific judgment "that is
beautiful" artistically transfigures this ontological
condition, raising it
up into historical specificity,
calling a people or an individual to their historical or
personal task of affirming
the barely endurable in their time.
in so doing they give
form, make public, their relationship
to being.
The
strength to give form and historical
garb to this
ontological condition, the strength to
bring a particular
figure into being through which life can
be affirmed and

re-affirmed is what we call beautiful.

And it is the

tragic sensibility this strength radiates,
a strength
which is "hard enough to experience suffering
as a

pleasure," 8

that quickens and supports life and hence
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gives a certain historically
authoritative power to the
beautiful.

What so interests
Nietzsche about aesthetic
judgment
precisely this authoritative
power of the beautiful
for in his effort to
overcome nihilism, he
searches for
something which could command,
in Are ndt<s words, »

-

an

obedience in which men retain
their freedom.. .9 Nietzsche
finds in the historical
judgment "that is beautiful"
a
goal or horizon which, in
the power of its tragichistorical challenge as it
transfigures the ontological
condition of suffering, displays
a strength whose
radiance
calls us forth to affirm
and bring forth our
historical
originality.
Forms of life which do not
take up this
tragic historical challenge
eschew, through varying efforts to master being, the
very relationship to the
world
which alone has binding force.
Such a relationship

Nietzsche conceives as essentially
artistic.
in The will to Power Nietzsche
experiments with an
important distinction between a
love of beauty and the
ability to see and create the
beautiful which can aid in
clarifying the distinction between
this artistic relationship and the effort at mastery.
In a fragment found
in The Will to Power we find
that those who try to master
are those who,
,

,

"...have a nihilistic attitude toward life
take refuge in the beauty of fnn, in those
things in which nature has become perfect
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beauUful

3 6
indi
- ,"?

» e rently

the beautiful,
be ^expression of the
very

great and

^LS^beffiSf -VSt,

inabuiti^ao

Here Nietzsche entertains
the idea that we can
conceive of perfect things
in nature - ideas or
things.
But
he contrasts this possibility
with another mode by „hich
the beautiful can make its
appearance, namely our active
ability to make, to see, to
create the beautiful, that
is,
the way in which we
participate in the appearance
of the
beautiful. The warning issued
in this thought seems

to be

that a love of perfect form
as the beautiful can
actually
be or become the very inability
to have form.
Let me unpack this. A form is a structure
in tension.
The simple
structure of a geometric box
retains its for, only by
virtue of a set of conditions we
might call content or
context conditions - gravity, air
pressure, etc. without
such content conditions, the form
cannot sustain
itself;

it is a structure only as
sustained by a field of force,

by tension.

So too, by analogy, a form of
life.

If „ e

take the indifferently perfect things
in nature and attempt to establish a form of life
within their horizon all moral thought in the Christian-Platonic
tradition is
here paradigmatic - we deprive that
form of the very content necessary to create its sustaining
tension, a content
ineliminably bound up in Nietzsche's view with
an embrace
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of hu,a„ suffering.

„ oral thinking

„ an

elevation of man above the
world" wh i ch paradoxically
results in "Baking man
glo omy, small and
inpoverlshed „
cause it deprives man of
the task which most
demands his
strength. 11
t
hence deprives us of the
;
relationship
through which we can
participate in the creation
and discovery in ourselves of
southing, some content, which
we
can admire and be transported
by.
Alone in this

^

activity,

Nietzsche suggests, c an the
being of man bin d itself
to a
form of life, and renew
that life through the
questioning
brought on by the constant
proximity to suffering. Tragedy, he writes, is a tonic;
it renews a nd refreshes,
by
filing forth our strength, our
commitment
to life.

With these reflections on the
beautiful and justice
in mind, it might be useful
to glance back once again
upon
Nietzsche's genealogical work on
morals and the ascetic
ideal for historical examples
of a form of life „ hich both
did and did not embody the tragic
sensibility Nietzsche
finds so critical to the sustenance
of a form of life.
Before doing so, however, I would
like to make a few brief
comments about the relationship between
Nietzsche's perspectivism, the aesthetic foundations
I have adumbrated
above, and genealogy.
the discussion above I have approached these foundations as if they had
metaphysical
status for Nietzsche. Much of Nietzsche's
own discussion
in fact suggests they do.
However Nietzsche subjects even

m
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his reflections on art
and aesthetics to his
perspectivis»; even they, he
sporadically suggests, are
mere
hypotheses.
yet they are hypotheses
which emerge in
response to the specific
historical circumstances of
nihilism, and furthermore,
from a way of living which
Nietzsche himself has learned
to Uys in the effort
to
combat just those circumstances.
Hence they have become
conditions for Nietzsche's own
life and their status
therefore reaches beyond that of
..mere- hypotheses.
They
have become the lenses through
which Nietzsche sees and
experiences the world.
"The Uses and Disadvantages
of
History for Life," we see that
this is true both for his
relationship to the present and to
the past.
Nietzsche

m

writes
"...man should above all learn to
should employ history only in the live, and
service of
tne life he has learned to live ." 1 ^
In short, genealogy, the method
by which Nietzsche

reads the past, derives its relationship
to the past from
the life it has created for itself in
the present.
The

constraints of this life form, guide, and
sculpt its understanding of the past - and it is aware of
itself as
such.

In short, genealogy is an aesthetic
methodology.

Let me now turn once again to Nietzsche's
genealogy
of the ascetic ideal with these thoughts in
mind.

In the

ascetic ideal Nietzsche initially finds both artistic
impulses which take up the historical task of creating
the
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beautiful

th^

. relationship tQ

^

mysterious indifference
of the life force on
the one nana
ana in.rti^ impulses
to master those myster
es through
a love of the beauty
of form on the other.
the figure
of the sinner the "veil
of tears- is artistically
transfigured into a form of life
held together through
the
awesome and beautiful
spectacle of a human drama
in which
on earth man remains a
perpetual mystery to himself.
Forever responsible for the
cleft between self and selfknowledge, yet ever unable
to bridge it, to master

'

.

m

this
discord, the sinner's eternal
self-flagellation and
punishment testifies to the
presence of this mystery.
The
specific "space" in which the
strength required for such
a
life was displayed and the
particular judgment - "perpetual self-punishment and the
ever-guilty is beautiful" was preserved and renewed in
the public drama of the
saint, in the priestly faith,
and in the discipline of the
monk, all held together by
ecclesiastical authority,

m

these dramas the tragic, mysterious
character of thisworldly existence was affirmed and
re-affirmed through the
ever new initiatives of the sinner,
through human striving
to give it form, made because this
particular transfiguration of suffering in the figure of the
sinner struck the
Christian with awe. At a time when the
will was
flagging,

a new and authoritative judgment
about what was beautiful

was born.

And with it, what was most elemental in
the hu-
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man condition, in
Nietzsche's view, was
channeled into a
for, of l ife hose barely
„
endurable quality called
nutans
forth to take up its
challenge.
The ascetic ideal
offered
a tragic beauty which
drew the will forth to
exhibit and
display its own strength.
this, once again, human
life
became worthy of our
r nonor.
honor
i„ t-h=
w.
the beauty of this human
striving, life could be
justified once again.

m

m

This reading of the ascetic
ideal of course remains
silent about the drive which
forms its center, namely
the
will to truth, to true Being
and perfection held to be
possible only in the world of
the Beyond. This "otherrealm constitutes the realm
of the Real in the form
of
what Nietzsche, in the quote
above, referred to
as a

refuge-taking in the beauty of form,
of perfection.
it is
of course crucial to maintaining
the transfiguration of
suffering peculiar to the ascetic
ideal in that its inaccessibility is the fundamental
element in the tragic and
beautiful strength of the sinner.
Vet Nietzsche condemns
the nature of this particular
transfiguration of suffering, this particular kind of
inaccessibility, for,
in the

name of the realm of true Being,

(which gives historical

form to the impulse to master) earthly
life is degraded
and humans are reduced to the common
denominator of sinner.
So long, however, on Nietzsche's reading,
as these
realms were strictly kept apart, the ascetic
ideal
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remained able to give
presenoe tQ
questionable" in existence.
As

^

„

terrifying

^

have argued, it is
Nietzsche's view that
Luther
struck a death blow to
the legitimacy and
hence sustaining
Power of this particuiar
historicai transfiguration
of
suffering. This he achieved
by attacking those ecclesiastics practices which
most sustained the
appearance
iD-ihS-Sorld of that tragedy in
the human condition
which
moves us to excellence and
forms the emotional heart
of
any judgment "that is
beautiful." But further,
and most
importantly, this blow was
dealt ngt amidst the effort
I

at

a different transfiguration
of suffering that would
be

capable of inspiring a new and
beautiful strength in the
being of man - Luther was no
artistic revolutionary in
this sense - but rather in
the effort to gain more
immediate access to the realm of
true Being. The unintended
effect was to unleash the unconditional
urge of the ascetic
ideal more thoroughly into the
world and to deprive this
interpretation of suffering of the
very authority its

tragic beauty commanded.

Access to true Being becomes a

private matter, and the pathos and
beauty of the human
struggle with guilt could find no
place for public display.

The transfiguring beauty of this
struggle lost the
specific place in the world which could
guarantee its
renewal.
Consequently its authority ebbed.
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Again, it is not the
fact that an ebb tide
carries
this particular
transfiguration which is of
concern to
Nietzsche here, but rather
that as the place for
the
heroic struggle moves
.ore thoroughly inward,
the very existential reality of this
basic ontological condition
of
suffering is threatened.
The impulse to the
unconditional, fixed in the ascetic
ideal in the for* of the
realm of
true Being, comes to
predominate.
spiritual matters it
taxes the form of a promise
of heightened access to
this
realm freed now from ecclesiastical
hindrance; and in
practical matters, now increasingly
freed from the tragedy
°f sin, it takes the form
of a hope, fed by a still
very
active religious pity for the
suffering endemic to life,
of humanly rectifying such
conditions themselves in the'
name of truth, justice or reason.
Rather than affirming,
through a new interpretation, the
terrifying and problematic character of existence
and thus bringing into
being a new figuration of beauty
which could justify the
new age, modernity tries to master
suffering of all forms
through an essentially inartistic
impulse.
Modernity abdicates the fundamental, but always
historical task of
life as Nietzsche sees it - to
transfigure the human condition into a form we can call beautiful
while not negating its basic qualities.
It rejects the basic challenge
which, he suggests, stands before the being
of all men and
all times - that of finding a certain
pleasure in suffer-

m
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ing,

in cruelty.

Alone by taking

uf>

^

Nietzsche suggests, can we
bring our creative
strength
into appearance.
It is through the
lenses of this abdication
that
Nietzsche sees the main
modern 19th century
phenomena I
have thus far examined historical culture, the
tyrannical excellence of Wagner,
and the movement to
emancipate
women. All, in the most
3ansrai of

senses

_

^

to face the utter newness
of our condition; namely,
that
"God" and the shadows of
God no longer are "wirklich,"
they no longer are effective,
real.
They no longer quicken our lives in such a way
that southing justifying
and
beautiful tragically calls
forth our creative being.
instead moderns move forward
with a project of mastery
which
aims to gain immediate proximity
on earth to a condition
free from suffering, to the
realm of true Being.
But such
a project at this time,
perhaps at any time, lacks by
its
very definition the kind of
challenge which can draw forth
our awe and honor, and thereby
bind us to it. The result
will be and is, Nietzsche suggests
to us, an inability to
create forms of life whose beauty
calls forth our con-

tinuous creative renewal of them.

Life is reduced to an

empty but continuous "rush after
forms."
The thread by which these modern
phenomena are held
together is that of pretending that this
will to
proximity, to master is sufficiently powerful
to justify

123

our lives.
ourselves,

For thls

beco,

,

^

Nietzsche

actors.

Refusing to facg

^^

^^

newness of our own
metaphysical situation< we
ther dry infertile
conform ng an mais
tyrant ^
the religion of pity
that sustains our
pretense, for it is
the driving for ce behind
the mastery specific
to the actor,
it is our faith in
this religion which
keeps us fro m
Knowing
we as historical beings
±>
sad shadow of God.
.

,

^

.

^

^

,

^ ^

^

^^

in his essay,

"Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,"
Michel
Foucault, one of the ra ost
exemplary and influential
students of Nietzsche, agrees
that our problem is this
lack
cf historical individuality,
distinctiveness.
Following
Nietzsche, he writes that,

"The decadence of (19th)
Europe presents an
immense spectacle, and (he
nature of ?he
scene ls to represent a
theater lackina
monuments of our own making,
which
US WS liVe amon crowded propLly
scenes?
*
But there is more.
Europeans no longer know
themselves; they ignore their
mixed ancestries and seek a proper role.
They
CK
Y lack
"individuality." 13
'

What Europeans ignore is the
fact that the state of having
"mixed ancestries" itself constitutes
the historically
original in our time, and that
without engagement head-on
with this state there can be no
"who" distinctively our
own.
By mixed ancestries Nietzsche
refers both to the
practical state of the breakdown of
nationalities in con-
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temporary Europe as we±i
well as to
t-o the
w
philosophical
state of
a heterogeneity of
values.
n

It is genealogy,

Foucault argues, which
offers a
"transformation of history into
a totally different
form
of time" through the
construction of a "counter-memory,"
and hence creates the
possibility of » a realm where
originality is once again
possible."" Yet Foucault
argues that Nietzsche's
genealogical approach to history,
rather than aesthetic in the
way I have suggested above,
is essentially strategic.
There are three distinct
strategies Foucault argues
Nietzsche offers which together
might build this counter-memory
and thus form the conceptual and practical basis for
an individuality distinctively our own. We must become,
through constantly reappearing masks and an excessive choice
of identities

"parodists of history;" we must commit
ourselves to the
dissociation of identity; and we must
sacrifice the notion
of the subject of knowledge.

Not without a certain irony Foucault
is suggesting
that these strategies, which constitute
the realm for distinctiveness out upon which pur historical
field
opens,

consist in the systematic dissipation of
anything continuous and constant enough to serve as an
identity.

The

condition for the emergence of our "who," for
our
"identity" is laughter in the face of the very
idea of an
identity.
Rather than ignoring our mixed ancestry by
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pretending such an identity
(res ti ng in Truth,
is possible, rather than
becoming mere

^

actors>
Nietzsche, suggests that
we celebrate our
diffusion, our
association, and that „e
make or ourseXves a
carnival
The »em ory Poucault is
out to ..construct" is
a memory of
the utter discontinuity
and .multiplicity of
forces amidst
which the modern came
to he. „ e writes,
"Nothing in ma „ .
not even the body - is
sufficiently stable to serve
as the
basis for self-recognition
or for understanding
other
»en...!5

To claim Qur distinctively
histor cal
s
recognize the possibility
of foxing a who alone in
concerted commitment to
dissolution of identity-as-selfrecognition.
.

.

^

^

..

This is the paradox Poucault
argues Nietzsche offers
us when "as parodists of
history and buffoons of God"
he
beckons us to strategically
claim the historically
original in our times. And
indeed Nietzsche did write
that only by becoming "comedians
of the ascetic ideal"
could we wrestle free of this
great Ungeheuer and come
into our own tasks.
Vet Foucault's failure to
understand
Nietzsche's genealogy in any but
strategic terms results
in the failure to unearth the
real constructive power and
scope of Nietzsche's work. For
if we ask a series of
questions which arise from out of the
basic aesthetic

foundations of Nietzsche's thought which

I

have adumbrated

above, we find Nietzsche engaged
with questions of justice
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and authority crucial to
the very possibility
of having a
distinctively individual identity
in_p^r_ti^, questions
which in his own work
Foucault entirely skirts.
what
today is the challenge which
can stir our will or formgiving powers? What takes
us to the edge of our

M^

capacities, and what, thus, do
we most admire
most beautiful?
what do we. find (meant here
in the
sense of judge) a commanding
beauty so that "that is beautiful" is a command of our
own we will obey? what
can
serve as the principle of our
being? what is the good in
our time?
what cruelty can or must we
find pleasurable?
What shape does tragedy take
for us?

m

in light of these questions
it is not sufficient to

conceptualize Nietzsche's genealogy
merely as a strategy
of dissociation in which the
past is unearthed as a series
of rifts and fissures opposed
to the past as the procession of Truth; nor identity as a
parody of the possibility of identity itself. Rather
than merely a parodic
strategy of dissociation and dispersal,
genealogy should
be understood aesthetically in that
it both embodies and
aims to help bring about that artistic
transfiguration of
suffering which identifies "the barely
endurable in our
time," giving public form to and hence calling
us to the
task which marks our own unique historical
location.
It
itself is understood as integral to the possibility
of the

artistic birth of a new figure, a new form of life, a
new
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horizon whose tragic beauty issues forth

a

challenge, it

is the strength we exhibit in responding
to this challenge

which freely commands our obedience, or,
put another way,
persuades us to find in the challenge our

own originality.

It is the aim of the rest of this chapter
to articulate

the precise character of this challenge.

C.

Our Challeng e

"But to stand in the midst of this whole
rerum concordia discors and of this whole
marvelous uncertainty and rich ambiguity of
existence without questioning without trembling with the craving and rapture of such
16
questioning.
,

.

.

Nietzsche situates his own thinking squarely within
the tradition of the will to truth as the heir to "2000

years of training in intellectual cleanliness," and it
is

paramount to situate his characterization of *the barely
endurable in our time' within this philosophical-moral

tradition as well.

As he gazes back from his modern

vantage point over the form of thinking which sustained
this tradition, the kind of knowledge it bore appears, not
as truth, but as error.

That there are enduring things,

things that are equal, that there are substances, that the
will is free

—

all of these appear now as errors of the

intellect, errors which have however become almost the

basic facts of existence, not because they in any way ex-
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press true Being, but because
they have proven helpful to
our species preservation.
They are, Nietzsche suggests,
"aesthetic anthropomorphisms,"
articles of faith which
have made existence bearable.
It was not until late in
human history, Nietzsche

argues, by contrast, that truth
emerged.

And by truth he

refers to the feeling of mistrust,
skepticism, scrutiny,
honesty.
with this new understanding of
truth, Nietzsche
seems to be consciously offering
up a polemical reinhabitation of that understanding of
truth which comes to
us by way of the ascetic ideal.
Both of these
truths,

Nietzsche continues, have become powers,
that is, they
have helped to sustain life. Having
proven their usefulness, it is our lot to find them
contending in their

first

direct fight in the modern thinker.

That is, this fight

is the stuff of any one who today
attempts to think

profoundly.

Nietzsche puts this situation in slightly

different terms elsewhere: because of the life
preserving
errors which have emerged from centuries of reign
of the

ascetic ideal, we have developed a new need which
remains

with us

- a

need to find in the world purpose, a need for

reverences, for divinity in things.

But at the same time,

the growth of our mistrust and skepticism bred by the very

will to truth itself, has become such that we have come so
to doubt the possibility of truth in this divine sense

that it no longer has the power to win our unconditional
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allegiance, perhaps not even
our conditional allegiance.
Hence we are faced with a
raging discordance between
our
need and desire for the old
reverences which made life
endurable on the one hand, and
the beings we have become,
on the other, namely beings
who, as part of the nature
of
this world, have no intrinsic
purpose, godliness, or
value.
Nietzsche wonders if we are not
confronted with a
terrifying either/or: "Either
abolish your reverences or
yourselves " and then ponders, "The
later would be
nihilism; but would not the former
also be - nihilism?"
Put still differently the question
confronts us, "To what
extent can truth [in his sense]
endure incorporation? "^
!

It seems important to me to
take note of this verb,

incorporation, for Nietzsche's view of
these "errors of
knowledge," including the existence of
eternal things, is
that they are necessary errors - at
least to some extent.
Hence he does not reject the structure
of mind that posit
true Being, but rather transforms the
status of this conception of truth. And it is this he attempts
to do by
positing the will to power. Life's fertility,
he suggests, is advanced through a wily, deceiving,
adept versatility which seeks always those conditions in
which a

particular historical form of life can best preserve and
enhance itself.

This will is an essentially creative

force and hence the fundamental mode of this will to
power, this life force, is art.
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From this point of view,

the ability to t hink
the thought, true Being
or Truth in
the classical sense, is
not evidence of some
.metaphysical
order lying
the WQrld which
tially gl lmp se.
It is not evidence of
a metaphysical capability residing in thought.
It is, rather, evidence
of
the fundamentally creative
and, as I shall argue,
aesthetic nature of thouaht™«
tnougnt.
The very concept of true
Being is itself a creative
act of thought.

^ ^_

^

,

in a late note found in

Th^jmi_to_Ppwer

Nietzsche
gives ironic twist to the
central claim of his earliest
work, The Birth of
both affirming the fundamental
continuity in his thought and
marking a departure from his
early, still metaphysical
work, inspired by Schopenhauer.
In 1888, he writes, quoting
verbatim from The Birth gf
Tragedy,

Tr^

,

,

"art as the real task of life,
art as life's
metaphy sial activity-" 18

There is irony here because it is
clear from Nietzsche's
late work (post-dating his break
with Wagner) that he no
longer believes in "the metaphysical,"
but what remains is
a need to give a different
interpretation to this structure of mind, to transform its status.
The challenge in our times therefore
becomes, in
Nietzsche's view, the honest reckoning with
the fact that
that understanding of truth which grounds
the ascetic
ideal and which forms the basis of our
reverences was it-
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self born of the po
lytropic will to power(

^
^^ ^

some realm of perfection
which reigns in life
an historically varying
set
of

^^
^
^^

,

our capacity to preserve
and enhance ourselves.
The
to which Nietzsche
alludes in numerous
aphorisms- the real challenge>
is no iQnger
true Being and the
question of man's ability
to atone for
his guilt.
But rather, truth as
polytropic error ana the
question of man's § t
I§m th to face the fact that all our
efforts to know are indeed
errors, yet still to be
enraptured, thoroughly taken
up by the questioning
through
which knowledge eme rges.
The cruelty which we must
practice against ourselves is
to find beauty in the
tragic
fact that we now must learn
to revere, be enraptured
by
the question of knowledge
at a time when the very
possibility of truly revering,
having faith in something,
itself is in question.
it is the cruelty of this
terrible
honesty which we must inflict
upon ourselves; which we,
as
heirs to 2000 years of training
in intellectual cleanliness must suffer, and in suffering,
learn to love and
transform.

meztisn^

^

^

Can we learn to revere skepticism,
the question mark
itself, Nietzsche asks? Can such
reverence form the new
horizon within which a form or forms
of life might
flourish? With this, the very structural
sturdiness that
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the notion of truth
connotes has been altered
ly. it wouia see,
Does it remain

become such that it can

^

its nome

such

substantial ropes and
possibilities?-^"
Nietzsche says
the real question
first time... the
ne destiny
de^i-in^ «^
of
,

..

^

^

with tnis

^

pQsed

^^

the soul changes, the
hand

moves forward, the tragedy
begins.. -21
Nietzsche welcomes the
beginning of this new
tragedy
Even though the pain of
our contemporary
condition is such
that our trust in life is
gone, even though life
as "unscrupulous polytropoi" has
become a problem, we must
still
be capable of loving it,
of learning to see as
beautiful
what is necessary in things,
and hence making things
beautiful. 22
it is to this end that
Nietzsche's work
is

dedicated.

He writes,

"Love of life is st in
possible, only one
loves differently.
it is the love for
woman who causes doubts in us. "23
It is now for the first
time within the grasp of
this

doubting, insecure, jealous love
that our delight must
blossom.
We must find "delight in an
x.»

thinkin 9 ^ogs, nor objectifying
"?S registering mechanisms
and
with their innards removed: constantly, we
have to give
birth to o Ur thoughts out of our
like mothers, endow them with all pain and,
we have of
blood, heart, fire, pleasure,
passion,
agony, conscience, fate, and
catastrophe.
Life - that means for us constantly
transforming all that we are into light
and flame
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V^
«*
traL^urat^^?^:..^^

most spiritual
of

rytlme into the

fo^

This challenge of finding
delight and beauty
an
"x,
the trebling craving
for the questioning
»
of this
"whole marvelous uncertainty
and ambiguity of existenceis the 'fSB
Msims& „ to which Niet2sche , s d stress
at nlioil.. gave birth.
is then the daughter
Qf
own pain.
Vet this is a figure
through which Nietzsche
identifies not only the
contours of his own personal
condition, but also that of
his ti.es.
Th e pain of Nietzsche
the philosopher is the
pain of Nietzsche the
individual
and of Nietzsche the citizen
of his age.
For this reason
Nietzsche attests to persuade
us to feel his pain as
our
own, to embrace what he
sees as the form of suffering

^

.

«

,

specific to our historical moment.
It is towards this end that
we can see why the
thought of eternal return was of
such importance to

Nietzsche.

There are three primary dimensions
to this importance, two of which I will
discuss here. The thought
of eternal return was for Nietzsche
the focussing and the
cultivating thought. As such it asks
of its thinkers two
basic questions.
First, if humans are to accept
that
there can be no true world behind this
one, we must in
some way come to grips with all that
is weak,
ugly,

limited, that is, with the "small man."
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We must come to

^

grips with all the ways
in wh ich we as ,
which have heretofore
provoked pity and the
desire to escape our condition. The
thought of eternal return
asks,
can you accept the worst,
the
Lne small
<-/
small man as integral
to
being? can you face
this part of existence with
strength
and honesty instead of
being dwarfed by pity?

^^^

portant to note that this
acceptance does not entail,
as
might be inferred, passivity
for Nietzsche.
Why this is
so will be clear in the
following chapter.,
Can you bear
that, as he put it in
Beyond_GoM_and^yil, man is part
Geshoepf, part creature, that
is, something made,
something not entirely in our
control?"
this sense the
thought of eternal return asks
us to confront the

m

fact
that there is something about
our condition which should
and must suffer.

Second, the thought of eternal
return asks, if not
only this Geshoepf but everything
were to eternally
return, could you bear it? That
is, have you done some-

thing which could make you embrace
such a possibility?
Have you the strength to be what
man also is, Schoepfer,
creator? This is the cultivating
thought in the thought
of eternal return.

Together these two questions which the
thought of
eternal return presses upon us hone in
upon the tension,
the mystery man is in Nietzsche's view,
turning us towards
an understanding of ourselves Nietzsche
wishes to bring
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into focus.

As creature and creato
^

txon, this pain.

And it is the pain

^

^

^

which is instructive, for
it cultivates us by
asking if in
our focus on ourselves
as such a pain-filled
tension, we
cannot expand and heighten
the soul through the
increase
strength we must demand of
ourselves precisely

«

to accept and honor ourselves
as this state of tension,
this
"Spannung der Seele in Unqiuck
»
ungiucK.
Tn the passage
in
in Beyond
Good and Evil to which I
referred above, he writes,
iSC line ° f Suffer ing,
of great suffering - do you not
ferLa
know that onlTthTs has
created all enhancements of
That tension of the soul in man so fir?
unhappiness
which cultivates its strength
granted to it through suffering,* was it nnf
through
9
great suffering?
man creature and
ited: --- do you understand
this
Sp^sffion?»2g
,

^

m

Nietzsche intends the thought of
eternal return to
focus the thinker on the pain
that we are in hopes that it
will be a spur to the cultivation
of strength in the modern soul, a strength whose power
will strike us with awe,
bringing into being a form of life
which we can find beautiful.
(I read Zarathustra as the
story of precisely this
effort to cultivate the strength of
the soul.)
The
thought of eternal return is an effort
to persuade us to
see that, as Nietzsche put it with
epigrammatic power,
"There is no feast without cruelty." 27
If the thought of eternal return attempts
to persuade

the reader to take an artistic relationship
to things, if
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it is a call to display
the strength tQ
fcransfigure suf _
fering and thereby bulla
a home for ourselves,

still

a

building that demands W e
develop a fe el in g of
pleasure in
the uncertainty and
insubstantiality of our
current condition is a difficult task.
And Nietzsche often see»s
to
falter.
Frequently he conceptualizes
our task as having
to develop a strength
which can affirm the
nothing,
si-

lence, Muteness.

In a passage exemplary
of this he calls
the change in the destiny
of the soul which we
face the
latest rung on the ladder
of religious cruelty.
History
is here conceived as a
huge ladder with many
rungs,
ours,
he says, is one of the
three most important. The
first
demanded sacrifice of human
beings to their God; the sec-

ond to their strongest
instincts.

About our rung,

Nietzsche writes,
"Finally - what remained to be
sacrificed?
At long last, did one not
have to sacrifice
for once whatever is comforting,
holy healfaith in hi en ^rmony!
in
In^ulurJ
future blisses and justices?
didn't one
Sacrifice G °d himself, and from
^n!^°
cruelty against oneself, worship
the
stupidity, gravity, fate, the nothing?stone,
To
sacrifice God for the nothing- this
paradoxical mystery of the ultimate
cruelty
reserved for the generation that is was
now coma11 ° f US alread know something
y
of
this?-»28
1

^

^'

It is a paradox indeed to take
pleasure in worshipping

nothing, to find heroism in nihilism.

Nietzsche's fre-

guent characterizations of our challenge
in such terms as
facing the nothing, muteness, silence seem
to capture a
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^
^
^

condition so t ragic tnat
no
art of t ragedy under

fermg

_

^

^

condltions: experiencing
suf _

as a pleasure.

in yet another
despairing moment over
this

******

r^i^_

Nietzsche wonders if the
impossibility of true

up the question mark
itself.

Now
uw that

in the
^
m

great silence, nature - sea,
sky
n
cliff, no longer
^y, cliff
speak to us of
truth, should we too not
fall silent?
"The tremendous muteness
'

™

,

which suddenly

tr utn, it too cannot
it Ir,
too mocks when the mouth
call
something out into this
beauty
it
i
too
7
joys lts

sneak
JPeajt,

,

L

sweet silent malice?
"begin to"
hate speech, to hate even
thinking
for do *t
ea b
WOrd the laSghSr o?
error of ^agination, of
the spirit of
nff
delusion?I Must I not mock
at my pity? Mork
at my mockery? - o sea,
o evening? You IrT
Y ° U teaCh *™
to
oe man!
Shall he surrender to
you?
shall
he become as you now are,
pale, glittering
re nd S reP ° S
Exalted above °i;
exalted
i^
himself?" 29
'

f

T**

•

^Ln^l^V
r

^ ^se

^e^sllf?*'

'

One response to the evil
spirit of the great silence
is indeed muteness, repose
above the self, the end to

questioning about the being of man
and things, about
Being.

But this, as

I

have suggested above, is not the

tragedy to which Nietzsche thinks
the destiny of the soul
of man has been called in our
time.
For in fact, though
there is a great and new silence in
the universe, it
is a
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silence

suth^s^^

the existence of true
Being and
knowledge,
is nc absolute silence!
There are new
sounds in the land and
new spirits in the sea,
and
Nietzsche's writings are
dotted with recurrent
questions
about whether we "have
ears enough to hear."

a

Southing

calls.

Nietzsche endows it with
the divine name of
Dionysus, die Versucher-Gott
- the
experimenter-tempter
god.
it is the music of this
god and his followers
Nietzsche hears and would have
us hear, a music which
cruelly mocks our efforts to
know and tempts us to silence, yet enraptures us
by the allure of the
question
mark just the same. Although
it is only mockery which
emerges when we attempt speech,
this music inspires forth
our form-giving forces just
the same, our naming
voices.

Nietzsche thus only appears here
to falter, to succumb
to the muteness the indifferent
universe seems to offer.
Unable to bear the indifference
to which the will to truth
has led Western civilization,
he insists on thinking,

and
this means he insists on fictioning,
fashioning, giving
voice to and even deifying what is
new.
In this last section

I

would like to develop in

greater detail this thinking qua deification
of the new,
this transfiguration of our particular

form of suffering.

Nietzsche's understanding of the nature of
the thinking
process itself is explicitly aesthetic, and

it is this we

must pursue in our effort to discern whether
and in what
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Philosophical level, with those

,.

^
^^^^

insubstantial

possibilities.. which appear
to be the SQle
our current condition as
Nietzsche defines

it.

Qf

Let me

turn now to a discussion
of the artist-philosopher
the
great tragedian, for in
Nietzsche's conception
of this
figure „e better glimpse
what thinking
deif
entails.

^

"In the Great Silence," the
aphorism quoted above,
is
about what becomes of the
substantiality of thought in
our
times when it is no longer
tied to God's string.
It is an
attempt to conceptualize
thinking-as-an-activity from a
this-worldly point of view.
it tells the paradoxical
story, in the answering voices,
swelling heart, seductions, deception, faith, of a
mysterious artistry at work
in thought.
Now, it suggests, that there
is a great silence with respect to Truth, it
is not necessary for us
to
fall silent - at least not for
long.
Thought is something
essentially creative. As such, it needs
at least one
other voice in order to be, even if
this voice is the
voice of mockery at the very possibility
of thought that
is "true" itself.
Thought, Nietzsche suggests with
the
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example oC his own,
attempts to be . peopie
tion in the effort to
giye

^

^

^

^

even a situation which
itself seems to be i ie
the pos-ibility of real substantiality.
As oreatures unf
bear this new abyssal
silence, we »ust transfigure
it in
so- way, making beautiful
what is necessary.

^

„ e raust
dance, but we must dance
"near" this abyss.
To this end
Nietzsche insists on thinking,
and that means in creating
structure near, perhaps even
a bridge oyer this
abyss all the while keeping
it in view.
But, paradoxically,
Nietzsche be-peoples with a
god.
He deifies the voices he
hears.
His aim in

this deification is to evoke mystery,
the mystery in the dialogue
or
novement of thought which he
wishes both to illuminate
and
to give substantiality to.
And he gives the name Dionysus
to this mystery. „hy Dionysus?
Dionysus is both the god
of creation and of destruction,
the two moments prerequisite for the fertility of life.
if thought is to give
form and make beautiful the new
trembling excitement at
the question mark, it must be
intoxicated, and one of the
central powers of Dionysus, the
god of the vine,
is in-

toxication.

But Dionysus is also the god of
chaos, of the
abyss, one who mocks at eternity,
at Truth in the tradition of the ascetic ideal, a god
without shame. Together
these two Dionysian powers are the
artistic powers which
the dance of thought demands in our
time.
They represent
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the powers which we, as
arj^-philosophers. must possess.
Let me turn first to the
powers of creation in the
aesthetic state through which
humans beautify and give
form to the world.
"Oh my friends, that your
self be in vour
Ur
deed as the mother is in her
chUd!»3X°

With this resonating
metaphorical image Zarathustra
exhorts his friends to
their virtue. Through this image
I
think we can draw out the two
primary aspects of creating,
of form-giving in terms of
the act of thinking which
recur
in Nietzsche's work.
First, a mother brings forth
her
child and thus lives in her through
the exclusive blind
love akin to that an artist must
have to fully inhabit her
own creation.
Both we could say are intoxicated
with

their goal.

Nietzsche refers to this as Rausch

,

variously

translated as intoxication or rapture,
and, with Heidegger, we should understand it as
the primary aesthetic
state in Nietzsche's view. 31 But a
mother alsQ Uves

^

her child through a quite different
force

-

that of long,

meticulous training, what Nietzsche calls
Zucht or
Zuchtung variously translated as discipline,

cultivation,

,

breeding, meanings which all resonate strongly
in both
German words.
Let me now turn to a brief discussion of
some of the more disturbing, but representative
of

Nietzsche's writings on Rausch and Zuchtung.
With the exception of The Birth of Tragedy

,

Nietzsche

published nothing about Rausch until his later works, be-
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ginning with

The_Genealp^

The most extensive

discussion in his published works
appears in Twilight^f
the_Idols.
#8 of "Expeditions of an Untimely
Man," he
says that intoxication, or, as
he alternatively refers to
it, idealizing, is the
indispensable "physiological

m

precondition" for art, for any aesthetic
Tun or Shauen,
any aesthetic doing or seeing.
For the
artist,

cert * in Physiological precondition
is
indispensable: intoxication. .The
essence
intoxication is the feeling of plenitude of
and
increased energy.
From out of this feeling
one gives to things, one compels
them to
take, one violates them.
yz

^

.

.

.

In this condition, man enriches
everything, he gives to
things.
But Nietzsche says this transformation
is an actual "mirroring" of man's power, a
transformation of

things until they are reflections of man's
perfection.
"This compulsion to transform into the perfect is - art.
Even all that which he is
not becomes for him nonetheless part of his
Doy in himself, in art man takes delight in
himself as perfection." 33

Elsewhere Nietzsche says that this delight in
oneself as
perfection is delight in distinct things definitenes*

of

,

tone, nuances,

forms upon which the eye feasts, measure.

And that it is these things which awaken one's energy,
one's rapturous state.
Finally, Nietzsche refers to the highest feeling of

this power of intoxication as "the grand style."

power which,
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This is

requires proving; which is
9
slow ?o
to answer; which is conscious
of no
witnesses about it; which lives
obliviSSs
of
the existence of any
opposition; which
reposes^in itself, fatalistic,
a Taw'among

interestingly, this exposition of
intoxication does
not in the least reflect
opposition to tyranny or mastery
of any kind, nor does it seem
to have anything to do with
sustaining a love of questioning.
fact, in the name of
a raping-taking possession
of things through making them
reflect our own perfection qua
form-making, they seem to
express a most totalizing form of
mastery.
Here seems to
reside a vision of human creativity
in which man is the
absolutely sole measure of all things.
Yet this state of
intoxication is the precondition, the
sine qua non of any
aesthetic act, qua thinking. what of the
other aspect

m

of

creative form-giving, Zuchtung?

Much of Nietzsche's advocacy of Zuchtung
is an assault on an understanding of freedom as
laissez-aller, in
favor too, it would seem, of a kind of tyranny.
in the
form of an appeal to the knowledge possessed
by the artist, Nietzsche discusses the place of
Zuchtung.

"Every artist knows how far from any feeling
of letting himself go his "most natural"
state is - the free ordering, placing, disposing, giving form in the moment of "inspiration" - and how strictly and how subtly
he obeys thousandfold laws ... Slavery is, as
it seems both the indispensable means of
spiritual discipline (Zucht) and cultivation
(Zuchtung) 35
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These two aspects of
the creative act the aesthetic
state of intoxication
and the power of
discipline - must
it seems to me. be
discussed together. Alt
hough a quick
reading of Nietzsche could
easily suggest otherwisej
crxtical in his view that
the latter tether the
former
That is, the state of
intoxication is hounded and
informed
bY long and great spiritual
discipline; it is a beingpossessed, a bei„g-taken-up-by
a strong and deep,
and
therefore guiding passion,
still, the tyrannical
relationship of the intoxicated
artist to her material and
the
terrible compulsion of long
obedience and discipline constitute the axes upon which
Nietzsche's aesthetic reflections are most disturbing,
most anti-democratic in
tone,
and most susceptible to the
kinds of uses made of his
work
by the National Socialists.
Many have argued that
Nietzsche's styles lend themselves
to such appropriation
and that he must, therefore,
be held, at least to some
extent, accountable for history's
paths.

^ ^

I find it

important to reflect on this claim
for it
seems to me there is a subversive
aspect to Nietzsche's
styles, subversive in the favor,
precisely, of questioning.
Yet this aspect comes to view
only through a concerted effort to make sense of the
enigmatic qualities of
these styles, particularly his dodging,
masking, eluding
antics.
Preliminarily let me suggest that it is
through
these antics that Nietzsche creates for
the reader pre-
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cise ly the conditions of
uncertainty and insubstantial
ity
within which we in our
ti.es m^think. Hence
he attempts to demand, through
the means of style, that
in our
thinking we engage directly
with our condition.
if however, we fail to see the
subversive aspect o, Nietzsche's
styles, his is clearly a
very dangerous set of
thoughts.
Vet I think he would respond,
this is a risk that must
be
taken, for failure to
"think what we are doing"
as Hannah
Arendt put this dilemma is at
least as disastrous. Nazi
totalitarianism attests, it seems
to me, to both these
dangers 36

would like to turn now to the
"counter-thoughts"
which I think must press upon
the careful reader of
Nietzsche regarding this apparent
celebration of mastery
in his discussion of Rausch
and Zuchtung.
Failure
I

to at-

tend to them leaves the other
dimension of Dionysian
powers - the destructive, abyss-creating
ones - unexamined, and hence the terrible
tension which pervades
Nietzsche's thought remains unnoticed
and buried, obscuring what I think Nietzsche would
have us face about the
challenge of thought in our time.

These counter-thoughts are the mocking,
doubting
voice of the bad conscience of the
philosopher. As the
other voice of thought, they arrest, disrupt,
tear apart
the ground of our intoxication itself; they
create abysses
and thereby cultivate the guestion mark.
In Nietzsche's
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work they present themselves
in Multiple forms direct
assertions, subtle riddles
whioh cry for interpreters,
and
the conscious deployment
by Nietzsche of stylistic
textual
artifices.
I will briefly
examine Qnly
Most prominently, and
constituting one of the most
difficult challenges facing
readers of Nietzsche, is
his
constant self-contradiction particularly when deployed
amidst his aphoristic style.
In this tiring fluctuation
Nietzsche mocks our desire for
respite from uncertainty,
our desire to be followers.
Nietzsche himself plays the
nocking music of the Versucher-Gott.
He himself seduces
us so thoroughly to his
"truths- that, intoxicated,

^

we are

tempted to find in them reality
itself,
yet constantly
through this self-contradiction
he warns against such
seduction, reminding us of the
tentative, experimental,
insubstantial nature of his thoughts,
even calling them
"regulative fictions," "thought
experiments." We receive,
for example, outright encouragement
by Nietzsche for considering something so central to his
thinking as the will
to power as a mere supposition, mere
interpretation. 37
Such mockery leaves the reader with a
frightening
feeling of insubstantial ity and groundlessness.
As if in
explanation of this constant mockery, Nietzsche
counsels
us that if we wish to protect the profound
and "delicate
things" of thought, we must learn to withdraw,
evade commun ication, love masks. 38 We must not directly
defend our
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thoughts, but mock others
attempts to directly contest
them.
Further confounding the reader,
W e must mock even
S^Eselvss in the attempt to remain
free of our own moral
seriousness.

m °£ aliSt Wh ° comm and ™an
first of
air*nH
and above ? to ai n

^
h^V^
1

control of himself
g
With a P ecu ^ar diseaseln ^ fixed P° s ition with
a
Qestu;;'?hJ
rdS
armed against him2"'
lelf
self, with
SiS «h^
sharp and mistrustful
- the
eternal guardian of his castle, eyes
s?nce he has
turned himself into a castle.
of course he
^is way. Bu? he has
certain^ C e lnsuffer
able for others,
dSficSft ° r linSel
and im P°verished and
cit °
of?
f' beautiful
tne most
fortuities
°f 1Sff frrn° m ,h
A1S ° fr ° m 311 further instruc?Ln For one must be able to lose
tion.
occasionally if one wants to learn oneself
lng
from things different from oneself something
»39

Si.

^

^T

.

irony is still another constant
artifice of mockery
and distancing Nietzsche deploys
to throw himself and his
readers off a totalizing, mastering
form of thought.
in
chapter one I have already discussed
one good example the ironic honesty, which he calls
his Granit von
Geistigem Fatum, his granite of spiritual
fatum with which
he prefaces his "true" remarks about
women.

Amongst such textual artifices

I

would also include

Nietzsche's hyperbolic reversals in which, as

I

have men-

tioned above with regard to the question of
suffering, he
seems simply to take the exact opposite position
from
the

one he apparently wants to reject.

This pattern becomes

quite apparent to the attentive reader and is, like
those
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discussed above, designed not
to stake out a true position, but to open chasms
for the question mark.
Hence if we read both moments
of Dionysian fertility,
the artist and the philosopher,
Nietzsche's deification of
the new voices he hears, that
is, of the new condition
of
thought in our time emerges as
a rather insistent counterforce to a form of thought whose
aim is a totalizing
mastery.

m

fact these two moments of
Dionysian fertility
should be read as attempts by
Nietzsche to directly
counter the nihilistic will to master
whose curse, as I
argued in chapter one, is precisely
the inability to
manifest form-giving forces, is
infertility.
Hence, on
the one hand, Nietzsche's demand
that we see that thought
is and mustjDe_intoxicated is a
response to the formlessness of scientific culture, sustained
as it is by claims
to passionless objectivity. And on
the other, the power
of mockery is developed by Nietzsche
precisely to counter
the tyranny of Wagnerian-type excellence
in that it con-

stitutes a constant questioning, disrupting
effect which
protects the individual from the tyrannical effects
of

Wagnerian excellence.

Nietzsche attempted to make his

readers capable of both of these Dionysian powers,
for to-

gether they combat the nihilism of his age.

Together they compose the creative tension which the
thinker as an artist-philosopher possesses.
hand, as heirs to

2

On the one

000 years of training in intellectual
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cleanliness, we must admit
that our love of honesty
is
nothing more than a passion,
an artist's passion
born of
intoxication, yet one by which
we are nevertheless
thoroughly enraptured. As
artists, we possess the
power
of intoxication.
Yet on the other hand,
despite our intoxication, we mock our honesty
for we know it rests on
error.
As philosophers, we are
critical.
Yet at another, more subtle
level Nietzsche generates
still another paradox, a sort
of meta-ref lection we must
confront which is the true endpoint
for his reflections on
truth in our times. This is the
fact that the truth of
this mockery itself rests on and
gains substantiality from
the truth of a god - from our
god, honesty.
That is to
say, it itself is an integral
part of the complicated tension of our passion and faith in
honesty, and as such is
the product also of our intoxication,
our erring.
it cannot have for Nietzsche, as nothing
can have, an independent status. one of the more fascinating
expressions of
this meta-reflection emerges out of an
interpretation of

aphorism #230 in "Our Virtues" in Beyond Good ,nH
gyi]
Nietzsche begins the aphorism by saying he
wishes to
explain what he has, in the foregoing aphorism
called "the
basic will of the spirit." In that aphorism he
had
claimed that the seeker after knowledge, in his
insistence
on profundity and thoroughness (honesty) acts
out a volup-

tuous tragedy because he attempts to transfigure the
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cruelty involved in this
insistence.
such thoroughness is
cruel because it goes
against "the basic will of
the
spirit" which Nietzsche says
is a will which
"increasingly
strives for the superficial
and the apparent."
this
self-inflicted cruelty Nietzsche
finds a desire to hurt,
an actual taking pleasure
in the suffering.
it is pre-'
cisely this capacity to find
pleasure in suffering which
is artistic.
this the seeker of knowledge
acts

m

m

as a

transfigurer of cruelty, as a
tragic artist.
in #230, Nietzsche expands
on this opposition between

the seeker after knowledge and
the basic will of the
spirit.
The basic will of the spirit,
he says, is a will
to simplicity, a desire for
masks, the surface.
it "wants
to be master in and around its
own house and wants to feel
that it is master. "40 He identifies
several divergent
forms of this will to simplicity
which desires to be
master - the spirit's power to
appropriate the foreign,
sudden decisions in favor of ignorance,
readiness to be
deceived and to deceive. This, he contrasts
with the will
to multiplicity which he finds in the
seeker after knowledge, a will which is a cruelty of the
intellectual conscience.
In light of this opposition Nietzsche's
own
"task" appears cruel.
He reneges on flattering it with
names such as honesty, love of truth, etc.,
saying we must
eschew such festive words as belonging to "the gold
dust
of unconscious human vanity."
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Instead, he says we must

~^ic

retUrn to the Grundtext

we must
back into nature and
become "master over
OV6rly
an<J
interpretations and
tfons that nave so far
been scrawled ana
painted
eternal basic test of
homo
h,» ..41

-n

M

^

translate

many
connota .
over that

The close reader of
Nietzsche will Mediately
suspect the lan guage in
this last statement to translate
»n back into m3w l and finally,
the tip-off, to become
With the use of such
language and concepts

^

so in

contradiction with his basic
thoughts, the reader must
think carefully. Nietzsche's
tone has become heavily
ironic; he uses this irony
to point to a paradox
about
thought and the taste for
intellectual cleanliness peculiar to the seeker after
knowledge: it too seeks to
become
"master in and around its
own house," the house of
the
being of man.
For Nietzsche, this house
in his time is in
the building, and the irony
he points to is that
in

replacing the old house of
"metaphysical piping,.. he too
we too, must simplify.
In our efforts tQ fce
too must err.
The effort to grasp and
transfigure the
world, Nietzsche suggests, to
build the house of being, is
a creative state in which
thought is comEelled to
simplifications.
,

^

If

may draw together Nietzsche's
multiple terminology, the problem we face is
that of giving form to the
will to multiplicity, to the trembling
questioning of this
I
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"hole rSI um_c an c a£ di^is

£2Is

rapture, intoxication,
f^ith.

with the

.

But this itself requires
It requires intoxication

itself, with doubting
itself.

..x»

Henoe, to
avoid dogmatism, to protect
the question mark, we
develop
a mocking voice.
Vet even the attempt to
mock at our intoxication with the question
mark is done in-service
91 our intoxication. i n the attempt to
give voice to what
is new, Nietzsche's very
fictioning of voices, even complex Dionysian intoxicated/mocking
voices, is a making
beautiful, a deification and
hence, a simplification of
our condition. As in the
beauty by which Zarathustra,
convalescing from his confrontation
with his "most abysmal
thought- is struck upon hearing
the words and sounds of
his chattering animals, so the
very act of conceptualizing, language itself, creates
bridges over clefts and
abysses, over things eternally
apart; that is, it requires
intoxication, and therefore simplifies.
"0 my animals," replied Zarathustra,
"chatter on like this and let me listen.
It is
so refreshing for me to hear you
where there is chattering, there chatterinq:
the world
lies before me like a garden.
How lovely it
is that there are words and sounds!
Are not
words and sounds rainbows and illusive
bridges between things which are eternally
'

apart?"^

In a difficult but highly suggestive
aphorism in The

Gay Science

,

Nietzsche hints about this common structure

of all knowledge.

"Appearance is for me that which lives and
is effective and goes so far in its self-
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mockery that it makes me
feel
t hls is
appearance and will-o'-th= Zt that th<.
of spirits and notning
* danCe
more - l h at among
all
these dreamers T
£
ing my danST'th^t t^

T

^

^nower^s Vm*™

*™

1 ™«
uexongs
oelongfro
to tne
the masters of cerpmnnv
«^

e tne highest means
to preserve
the universality of
dreaming and thf^SSal
comprehension of all dreamers
and cnus
thus also
alio
the continuation nf <-v,»
^ rrim .."3
(-!,„

.

The sublime consistency
and interrelatedness of
all knowledge to which Nietzsche
refers is the condition
in which
knowledge must emerge - the
aesthetic state of intoxication.
It is this state which
is indeed the means
for

prolonging the earthly dream and
dance.
And in this
Nietzsche suggests his thought
is no different from any
that has gone on before.
However, though Nietzsche must
go on dreaming, his form of
intoxication is new in that he
is conscious of it as such.
He knows and lets us know his
passion for the question mark is
just that, a passion and
not the truth about the being or
the "should" of
man.

With this in mind, Nietzsche makes
an admission he
would like "those who have ears" to
hear, namely, that he
cannot place his appeal for the question
mark on any
firmer ground than appeal, through
exemplification to our
sense of awe. He hopes, in witnessing
the strength he exhibits in his effort to truly be the heir
to 2000 years of
training in honesty, that we will find in it
a tragicomedy that is beautiful; that we will be moved
by the
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age-old tragedy of striving
for true knowledge,
and
delighted by a new-found
ability to find this
age-old
struggle in whioh now
even the attest to
revere the question mark itself lapses
into intoxication.
We are always
falling into error, wanting
to oarry a goddess
across the
"ver" In the mystery of th s
perpetuai
.

^^^^

^

great striving Nietzsche
would have our tears and
our
laughter - and our awe.
It is the strength to
embrace
both the hero and the
fool which Nietzsche
wishes to exemplify; the strength of
the thinker who, as an
artistphilosopher is a great tragedian
who wantonly parodies
the
tragic in his own strivings.
In a passage in

23^£-M2rals where

^^^^

he expresses a wish that
Wagner's

final work, Parsifal (which
was for Nietzsche Wagner's
ultimate submission to Christianity)
had actually been
intended as a joke, an epilogue
and satyr play, he says
what true greatness is.
,

r^/?

re Peat, would have been
worthy of
like every artist '
V
the Pinnacle of his greatness
onlv
e
Y
meS t0 See hi *self and his
ari beneath him
K° - when
art
he knows how to
laugh at himself." 45
a great tragedian, who,

tL"\
h^
^

It is the strength of this
artist -philosopher with

which Nietzsche tries to overawe
us, to intoxicate us.
He
would cultivate in his readers a
passion for it and wrest
from them the judgment "that is
beautiful," and in
this,

,

call us to our historical originality
insofar as we become
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revelers in the mystery of
intoxication which constitutes
the thinking activity itself.
it is in the service of
this aim that the third
dimension of the thought
of

eternal return, mentioned above,
achieves its importance
in Nietzsche's thought,
for we cannot bear the
eternal
return of things without
re-awakening what Nietzsche
refers to as that "higher art,"
the "art of the festival. "46
Manf Nietzsche argueSf needs
himself as a spec _
tacle.
Not only are we "creature" and
"creator" but we
are "spectator divinity and
seventh day, "47 and it s the
cruelty towards ourselves,
spiritualized and made beautiful, which draws us to ourselves
as spectacles.
The
thought of eternal return cultivates
in us a love of the
spectacle, a love for that which we
can barely
-

endure, a
love of the pleasure we feel at our
own pain which, in our
time, is the ability to take pleasure
in both the hero and
the fool in our passion for knowledge.
The tragi-comedy
of thought in our time, Nietzsche
suggests, is a spectacle
in the oldest and richest of senses.

The great tragedian then, in addition to
knowing her-

self as Geshoepf and Schoepfer, is a Zuschauer,
a spectator, one who Nietzsche calls the "genuine
spectator" 48
in sharp contrast to the "herumwandelnde
Zuschauer" 49 of

our age whose objectivity and disinterestedness keep
him
from affirming anything, keep him in aimless wanderings.
The "genuine spectator" by contrast is stirred by the ten-
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sion of the challenge
of our ti-e.
She is stirred by the
beauty, the tragic beauty
of the strength necessary
for
taking herself as an
aesthetic phenomenon - for
affirming
the mystery of herself
as at once Geschoepf,
schoepfer and
zuschauer; she is stirred
to affirm and give form
te this
spectacle, to create a form
of life on the basis
of the
cruelty she must suffer in
forming herself around
questioning.
y et she is also stirred to the
Olympian vice
of laughter, laughter at
her own strivings, and
in this
she keeps an artistic
distance above things. 50 In
her
laughter she delights in the
play of surfaces, in the
mysterious fertility of the
world which her own tragic
strivings stimulate, she has
a child's fascination
with
and absorption in this new
pain.
In Beyond Go^j
„.

^

M

Nietzsche writes,
"Perhaps everything on which the
eye has exercised its acuteness spirit's
and thoughtfulness was nothing but an occasion
for this
exercise, a playful matter ...
Perhaps the day
will come when the most solemn
concepts
which haye caused the most fights
and suffering, the concepts "god" and
"sin," will
seem no more important to us than
a child's
toy and a child's pain seem to
an old man and perhaps "the old man" will be
in
another toy and another pain - still need of
child
enough, an eternal child. 51
As master in the "art of the festival,"
the figure of
the "genuine spectator" completes the
aesthetic movement
of thought I have been describing,
a movement Nietzsche

wishes to stir with his own.

In the movement of thought
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^

^

from the artist's
intoxication tQ
phUosopher , s
-y to the spectator's awe at the beauty
Qf
to revere the question
mark at a time when
reverenoe no
ionger see»s sustainable,
Nietzsche would have us
experi .
ence the mystery o f the
artistry in our own
thought ana to
develop in his readers
the aesthetic sensibility
„hich , as
I argued in chapter
one, is absent in
modernity. This is
a sense f or the fact
that oniy i n the creative
q£
gre at suffering can we
bring into being a form
of life
whose be aut y enraptures
and hence holds us to
it.
It is
the beauty of the strength
we are cailed forth to
manifest
amxdst this tension which
binds us to this for, of
life.
This aesthetic sensibility
is thus critical for
any possibility of legitimate authority
and for conceptions

^

^

of

justice in our time, for it
.rises out of the challenge
of
thought facing us; out of the
this-worldly tragi-comic
spectacle of ourselves as we
attempt honestly to revere
the question mark. This
spectacle alone has the power
to
»ove us to manifest form-giving
forces.
It is within the
parameters of this understanding
alone that a form of life
which could be self-justifying
could be formed.
In this chapter I have tried
to formulate the general
parameters for specifying Nietzsche's
understanding of our
historical form of suffering. Yet I
have done so with

respect to an articulation of the
situation of thought in
our time in terms of an individual's
thinking activity in
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-elation fro m the world

.

In chapter

^ ^^
z

out from this elahoration
to Cevelop the
social-ethical
-Plications in Nietzsche's
wort of facing up tQ
task
of transfi guring our
historical for » of suffering
as he
defines it. Through the
develop ro ent of "the
exemplary
ethos" I will more fully
alclcu
articulate
±ate an*
and assess Nietzsche's
conception of justice.

^
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CHAPTER III
THE EXEMPLARY ETHOS

A.
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The fundamentally political
nature of Nietzsche's concerns can be seen in his efforts
to gesture towards a new
basis for authority in Western
society.
This basis,
aesthetic in nature, he hoped could
replace the rationalist
metaphysical grounding of authority in
modernity, a grounding which had lost its capacity,
in Nietzsche's
view, to

inform human life.

My aim in this chapter is to
articulate

the general outlines of this new basis
for authority and to
flesh out the ethos or shared ethical
horizon towards which
it points - what I have called the
ethos of the exemplar.
On the basis of this ethos a Nietzschean
aesthetic approach
to justice begins to emerge.

Thus far

I

have argued that Nietzsche's critigue of

modern nihilism hinges on the argument that
modern forms of
thought and practice lack form-giving forces.
I have been
concerned with probing what Nietzsche could have meant
when
he referred to the will to power as gestaltende
Kraefte,
what he thought form-giving entailed
163

,

and even what a form

of life as a living
thing is or requires.
, naye argued
that to do this probing
we must focus on
essentiai
tent of the modern will
to Master as Nietzsche
sees it namely, the unconditional
desire to expurgate
suffering
from the world - a desire
which was, in Nietzsche's
view
the final nihilistic
blossoming of this-worldly
denial of
the ascetic ideal.
„ e referred to his
desire

^

^

^

gion of pity,

^

and his claim is that the
aim of this religion itself undermines the
conditions for form and formation in any enduring or
relatively enduring sense.
That
is, it undermines the
possibility of commitment to
shared
ends and values - even eventually
to those of mastery itself.

This claim rests on Nietzsche's
understanding of the
demands placed upon us if we are
to take a creative relationship to ourselves and the
world around us.
By this I
mean a relationship which retains
the ability to perpetually breathe new life into old
perspectives and established
forms, and to create new ones.
To this end we must be
capable of sustaining within our
culture a wrestling tension between commitment to a form of
life, and questioning
- a tension which, as a perpetual
potential threat to established forms and meaning, involves some
kind of suffering, chasms, distance, disjuncture.
in this sense suffering from what Nietzsche called "the
terrifying and

questionable nature of existence" is an ineliminable
part

164

of any creative form-giving
and form-sustaining.

it is an

appreciation for this fundamentally
aesthetic understanding
of the conditions for human
meaning and community which
is
inimical to the specifically
modern mind.
it is this I
think Nietzsche claims we must
understand if „ e are
to be

capable of reestablishing some
form of authority through
which the threads of a common
life can be held together in
our times
in chapter two

I

have argued that this basic
problem

of suffering from the problem
of meaning always comes to
any people qua problem in
historically specific form and
must necessarily be addressed in
an historically original
way.
That is, in order that a form of
life be established
or renewed it must be able to
house, give particular cultural space and form to this quest
ioning after meaning. We
cannot live in this questioning in its
raw, abstract form,
but we must have the strength to approach
it in some form.

Our horizons must not expel it.

Twice in the history of

the West has this questioning been so
housed in Nietzsche's
view.
Greek culture did so throuqh its tra edies;
Chrisg
tianity through the figure of the sinner who
perpetually
asks,

"Who am

I,

oh my God?"

In both cases the pain of the

basic problem of human meaning was not extinguished,
but
rather perpetually posed and transfigured, given meaning.
In both cases a certain kind of beauty was embodied
in cul-

tural figures (the tragic hero and the sinner respectively)
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^

whose efforts to excel
amidst .
continuous sultuEaii^a^
exposure to the terrifying
an, questionable character
of existence" spoke to
and reaffirm the identity of a whole people.
By posing the problem of waning
a^ugstisn, a culture exposed its people
to a certain painful
unknowing and indeterminacy
and hence
at least theoretically
opened up the possibility
for an
answer other than the one
customarily given. The
retention
of this possibility, the
ability to take such a risk,

^

,.

,

sustain such a tension within
a cultural for™ is the
key to
a culture's capacity to
speak to a whole
people, for a

people's ability to find themselves
in their culture.
Put
another way, it is key to the
ability of a culture to have
and to sustain authority.
It is precisely the inability
to take such a risk

which characterizes modernity in
Nietzsche's view, and
which also is at the heart of the
problem of authority in
modernity.
the figure of the self-interested
rational
bourgeois, the problem of meaning is
never posed. Modern
theorists attempt to secure it so
thoroughly beforehand
that it is entirely removed from human
experience. This is
as true for the social contract
theorists as it is for Kant
or for Marx.
In Nietzsche's view then modernity

m

has lost

the aesthetic sensibility without which
a culture cannot
establish authority. Modern nihilism is a crisis
of

authority, and hence to combat it and to
regenerate culture
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«

the west, on my reading
of Nietzsche; wg
bexng a figure and a
cultural space which gives
voice ana
home to this questioning
after waning as it must
be formulated in our time. It is
towards these ends that
my
elaboration of the exemplar
and the exemplary ethos

aims.
In Nietzsche's view then,
the efforts to establish
authority at the outset of
the modern age were indeed
failures, yet the aspirations
which were expressed and the

problems posed remain in some
fundamental ways unchanged,
in much contemporary thought
the problem of cultural
regeneration and renewal is construed
as the need for our
culture to encompass the capacity
for self-reflection.
What Nietzsche suggests to us
is that while every culture
needs to possess resources for
some form of
reflection,

reflexivity itself, or rational
self-reflection cannot obtain the kind of authoritative
power necessary to create
and sustain a culture. The
tragic-aesthetic dimension of
such an achievement must receive
our acute attention if we
are to capture the challenge of
Nietzsche's thought to modern rationalism and its inability
to create cultural
forces

sufficient to establish authority, to
gain our allegiance.
I shall try to show how Nietzsche
makes the case that what
gives life force to a form of life and hence
critical

authoritative powers is its ability to cultivate
a distinctive relationship to "the terrifying and
questionable

character of existence" in which

a
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certain beauty and ex-

^

cellence are called forth
and affirmed because
they
to a people of their own
situation but within the
contexfc
of the broader human
condition. This distinctive
beauty
then obtains authority by
facing the age-old
questioning
after the waning of existence
but as historically
framed
in this distinctive,
unique form, a culture both
defines
Itself, i.e. receives definition
and authority on the basis
of which the just and the
unjust is determined, and
is
called to itself as a
participant in the greater human
effort to discern and give
form to the nature of the
human
condition.
in my effort to outline
the most interesting ethical

direction Nietzsche's thought
takes it is the figure of the
exemplar who exhibits the strength
to display the peculiarly tragic beauty which our
time demands of us.
The exemplar embodies an unswerving
commitment to keep before the
mind's eye the irrevocable gulf
which has come to stand between us as metaphysically grounded
understandings have
lost their power.
The exemplary ethos, I shall argue,
is

the historically original ethical
form in which we could
house the basic questioning after meaning.
in the figure
of the exemplar a culturally established
beauty is embodied
which, for our times, could become
authoritative.

Before turning directly to the main body
of this chapter I would like to distinguish my approach
from that of

Alexander Nehamas in his very beautiful, very
seductive
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^

recent work on Nietzsche,
MetzschJ^_Mfe_J
in
which Nietzsche's aestheticism
and exemplification figure
centrally. As insightful as
this work is, Nehamas succeeds
in almost entirely ignoring
the political-cultural concerns
which fundamentally propelled
Nietzsche's thought. The
result is a de-radicalized,
individualized and ahistorical
Nietzsche who has little to say with
regard to the possibility of a shared ethical horizon
which might bind a
people together in our times, that
is, little other than
each must find his/her own best
horizon.
This interpretation fails to draw forth the stunning
challenges a postmetaphysical condition presents for political
community by a philosopher who is actually
convinced by Nietzsche's
reading of our metaphysical condition.
in defending
Nietzsche's perspectivism from charges of
relativism,
Nehamas succeeds in emptying Nietzsche's
thought of most of
its political and social relevance and
vitality.
The central and very original argument of
this book is
that, through his writings Nietzsche the author
fashions a

literary product Nietzsche the character thereby creating
a
figure which he hopes will be, like all great literary
fig-

ures, literally unforgettable.

Nietzsche, argues Nehamas,

strives to be the Plato of his own Socrates.

And, as in

the case of Socrates, Nietzsche hopes that what this

character exemplifies will also be unforgettable, that it
will plague us for centuries in the same way the Socratic
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gadfly has plagued us.

Now
"ow wnat
w
what *-hi<=
this character
exemplifies
is an alternative to
the view
v-lcw that
tnat it,
if
in a post-

^

~t.phy.icl age

,

^

we can find

for everyone and for
all ti me

singie standard

.

s

^

then no standard is
good for
anyone anyti me or, the
flip-side, any standard is
good for
anyone anyti»e. Through
our acquaintance with
Nietzsche
the character, we experience
an unforgettable instance
of a
*rnd of affixation of
standards which in not
nihilis*.
Neha maS characterizes this
possibility as Nietzsche's
perspectivis. - „ hich he is careful
tQ argue s
,

,

.

as relativism.

^^

"Perspectivism does not result
in the relaV
hol
that ™Y view is as go^d
as anv SEE
?\h ° ldS that ne ' s own views
°
are the
° r oneself without implying
fJI*.TS
that they need be food for
anyone else!"?
At the center of this
interpretation is what Nehamas calls
Nietzsche's aestheticism, his
reliance on artistic models
for understanding and evaluating
the world. 4 If th e world
is like a text, it is
susceptible to multiple interpretations, though as Nehamas argues,
not infinite ones.
As we
see through the history of texts,
some leave more of an
impress.
Hence, through the creation of the
fascinating
character "Nietzsche," Nietzsche at once
admits his is
only one of many interpretations, yet
simultaneously

SS'V*

demands in this impress to be believed.

5

The central way

Nietzsche does this is by bringing style to
the center of
his thought.
it is critical to understanding Nietzsche's
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Project, Nehamas argues,
that „e see that Nietzsche
does
this by using a plethora
of styles (and he
insightfully
identifies them arguing
persuasively against the
predominant preoccupation with
Nietzsche's use of the
aphorisitc
genre,
Nietzsche does this to make
himself stand out, to
remind us that should we
find him persuasive, it
is the
.

particular person, Nietzsche,
who has particular values,
goals, and idiosyncrasies
that are bound up with a
particular form of living which
persuades us, not Truth.
In so
bringing style to the center
of his thought Nietzsche
seeks to repeat the Greek and
Roman achievement
of the

^^

"grand style" in „ hich the
distinction between
content is undermined. Hence
Nietzsche does not describe
or argue; his means of persuasion
is exemplification.
The
authority of his voice rests on his
success in creating of
himself something so singular yet
so excellent that we
cannot keep him from our thoughts.
Hence, Nehamas argues,
Nietzsche's aestheticism is the flip
side of his perspectivisn.6 and is central to his
effort to escape "the dogmatic tradition" of philosophy.

Nehamas identifies three important consequences
having to do with ethical life which follow
from this reading
of Nietzsche.
I would like to call attention
to
them.

First, Nehamas says that Nietzsche is a
radical formalist.
By this he means that he is more concerned
with the

(aesthetic) organization of the self, with the
"formal
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factor" than with the
intrinsic content of actions.
Nietzsche's ideal is the unity
and coherency of each
self
as an artwork, achieved
by a perpetual process
of Mastering the chaos one is."
Hence actions can be
evaluated
only in terms of the
contribution they make to the
self as
a complete artwork.
Central to Nehamas' argument
is his
interpretation of the thought
of eternal recurrence
which
he argues is an essentially
aesthetic view of the self by
which, through alterations
in one's present narrative,
the
past too can be integrated even the worst of it - and
the coherency of the self
perpetually re-won.
Second, on this reading,
Nietzsche offers no positive
code of conduct.
if we look for one, Nehamas
says, we
will find only banalities and
inconsistencies. Rather,
Nietzsche exemplifies what he wishes
to teach about
morality.
He commends a specific ideal to
us, but in so
doing says it is best alone for him,
and that, true to his
rejection of unconditional morality,
he cannot argue it is
best for everyone. He even must
entertain the possibility
that an unconditional morality itself
might be best for
some

This brings us to the third and final
consequence.

Although Nietzsche's aim was to destroy the
tyranny of unconditional morality and to influence ethical
life by en-

couraging others to find what was best for them
by means
of exemplifying what was best for him, Nehamas
argues that
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Nietzsche's work is ained
at
few
is
phiiQso _
Phers to whom Nietzsche
addresses his demand to
leave t he
fusion of moral judgment beneathe
them.? „ ost he sug .
.ests, Bill need an
unconditional morality.
„e nce Nehamas
concludes that the ethical
consequences of Nietzsche's
work are not nearly so
apocalyptic as many students
of
Nietzsche have claimed. „
ost people , s WQrlds
_

^

,

^^

change much.

Nietzsche, according to
Nehamas, was no social reformer or revolutionary. 8

The central flaw of this
fascinating book is a philosopher's flaw par excellance.
Th at is, Nehamas fails
to
adequately bring forth the
social-historical dimensions of
Nietzsche's work. The most
dramatic example of this is
Section I of the book which,
despite the promising title
"The world," is occupied
exclusively with elaborating
Nietzsche's literary understanding
of the world,
since
"the world" receives very
little further social-historical
specification, the historical
texture of Nietzsche's
thought is lost and we can grasp
only dimly what, for example, Nietzsche might have
meant substantively when he
claimed he was "the bad conscience
of his age." without
seriously integrating this dimension
of Nietzsche's work
Nehamas underplays the urgency with
which Nietzsche
thought nihilism had to be countered
and the depth of his
anxiety about his social world.
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The critical
historical-social dimension
I nave in
-no here is the finance in
Nietzsche's view of the
"region o, pity" in modern ethico-institutional
life a re .
ligion which in his view,
as x have argued

^

was the primary found at
ion of modern nihilism.
Hence
Nietzsche's perspectivism
was not only, and !
would argue
not even primarily,
individualistic, but historical
or
epochal.
The charge of radical
fetalis* - that Nietzsche
is concerned with the
organization.! coherency of
a person's experiences and ac
tions r at her than their
"intrinsic
or moral character,
is formulated in such
a way that the
historical dimension to
Nietzsche's perspectivism is
cut
from view.
Nietzsche did not, it is true,
believe one
could talk ab out the ..intrinsic"
ch ara cter

of things, yet
he was terribly concerned
about the content and effect
of
action resting in particular
on pity.
Only by integrating
Nietzsche's historical perspectivism
can this contradiction be resolved. That is, while
there is nothing intrinsically immoral or objectionable
to actions based on
pity in Nietzsche's view, there
are critical reasons,
rooted in the particularities of
our historical conditions, for rejecting them, reasons
having to be do precisely with their content or, to put
it another way, with
the meaning they accrue in our time.
In this context we
should recall Nietzsche's enigmatic ending
to The Geneal ogy of Morals the import of which is
that though
,
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Nietzsche's primary target
txve forces suited to our

,

as he

age,

^

is the world-rejecting

sentiment of pity, he
acknowledges and at times
even
Praises, affirm and admires
the rescue of the win
the
Christian ascetic ideal
makes precisely through
pity
Thus while Nietzsche finds
that actions based on
pity perpetuate nihilism
m in our »<..
time, «.».
they are not inherently
objectionable. Nehamas sets up
a false equation
between rejection of the possibility
of actions which are
intrinsically moral in content and
the rejection of concern
with
any content whatsoever.
Nietzsche rejected the former,
but not the latter.
If this is the case, and
we,

following Nehamas, un-

derstand Nietzsche's work itself
as exemplification, that
is, as speaking to us of
its content through its form,
can
we find no moral or ethical
content in his act of writing
beyond mere coherency of self
-presentation?
(Which,

though Nehamas is right to point
out is not relativism in
the radical sense, is still
relativistic with regard to
the problem of social norms.)

Surely Nehamas is right to

argue that Nietzsche offers "no
positive code of conduct,"
yet he fails to draw out the ethical
content in

Nietzsche's own actions which, when situated
historically,
I think must be understood
as the beginning of that formation of an ethical goal which Nietzsche
contended our historical period needed.
In this light their meaning is not
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reducible or relevant to the
person of Nietzsche alone
What Nietzsche exemplifies
is not literally
unforgettable
primarily because he makes of
himself a literary f igure
Gf
the first order, but because
what he exemplifies
to
us; we find ourselves
(if not wholly
at
,

profound respects) in him.

^

^

^

He has authority.

Nehamas' mistake is again to
set up a false equation
- this time between a positive
code of conduct and a generally applicable ethical
content or direction. He fails
to distinguish between
ethical thinking that offers
a positive (read universal) code of
conduct and one which indicates a general ethical direction.
This direction emerges
only if we attempt to discern
the meaning of the form
which Nietzsche's effort to persuade
takes - exemplification - within a series of reflections
which pay strict attention to his concern and even
anxiety regarding the
problem of cultural regeneration in
a post-metaphysical
age.
Because Nehamas is inattentive to
this concern, he
loses the tension and hence the
importance and richness of
Nietzsche's reflections on ethical life.
Nietzsche speaks
to his age by way of exemplification,
by way of aesthetic
provocation not because the only alternatives
he sees are
philosophic dogmatism or ethical solipsism, (which
is how
I read Nehamas' reading of
Nietzsche), but because he did
not think that straight-forward argumentation
resting upon

self-reflective rationality contained the resources neces-
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sary for the kind of cultural
regeneration needed in the
West.
This brings me to the third
consequence for ethical
life Nehamas draws from
Nietzsche's aestheticism. He
argues that, consistent with
his rejection of unconditional codes of morality,
Nietzsche does not reject such
codes
unconditionally. Moreover, Nehamas
argues, Nietzsche not
only does not reject them but
thinks most people will
still have to be ruled by them.

On this reading,

it is

only to philosophers that Nietzsche
speaks of an ethical
life beyond good and evil.
To be true to his rejection of
universalis*,,
Nietzsche could not presume to create
an

ethics suited for all.

while this reading makes good

sense of Nietzsche's overt claims
regarding the superiority of the few - of which there
are many - it stifles
another voice of Nietzsche's which is
more open and indeterminate with respect to the effect of
his writings and
with regard to the contingency of history.
Nehamas erroneously concludes that because Nietzsche
rejects a

metaphysical ground for morality which could
legitimately
compel compliance, it therefore follows that
Nietzsche did
not aim for a morality which was generalizable.

But the

force of Nietzsche's critique of universal morality,
on my
reading,

is that it claims to be good for all humans at

all times and consequently does not admit of the pos-

sibility that what is good might be historically con-

177

tingent and thus only
generally but not universally
valid
I think Nietzsche
did ai n for a B orality
that was generalizable.
That is, he sought an
ethical horizon which
could orient and bind
Western culture into a whole,
but
which did not dai*, in
doing so, the ground of
universality.
Though he was certainly
skeptical and cautious
about such a possibility,
still „e should take account
of
this other voice in Nietzsche,
for it is this voice which
nest Urinates the problem,
of authority and culture
in a
post-metaphysical age.
The most obvious and prominent
instance of this voice
is the subtitle to Zarathustra:
"A Book For All and For
None." with these strange
words Nietzsche is saying, my
thoughts are potentially for all,
potentially for none,
depending, as Derrida put it, on
"the ear of the other."*
This is not to say that Nietzsche
was a radical democrat,
but rather to remind ourselves
that the grounds Nietzsche
offered for his claims were not Truth,
but persuasion of a
certain kind. The difference between
the character Plato
created and the one Nietzsche created,
to follow Nehamas'
artful interpretation, is that the
former, as an exemplar
of the moral life he sought to establish,
made universal
claims about the good as the true, while
the latter exemplifies a moral life which makes claims about
the good
as the beautiful.
The difference is compulsion over per-

suasion; absolute certainty over contingency and
dif-
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ference; universality
over potential ge n
erali zability
NehaMS nCe agai the
°
"
usly concludes that
"
because
Nxetzsche re jec t s a
metaphysical
which
universai compliance, it
therefore fol iows that
he did not
for a moral life that
was generali2able
Nehamas eclipses the
breadth and urgency of
Nietzsche's
analysis of nihilism
nxniiism.
He defuses and
domesticates
Nietzsche.

—

^
^^

There is . si g nif ioant
voice in Nietzsone
x
shall argue in what follows,
aims at a generali zab i
e ethical horizon capable cf
-creating" beings with
-sharp
edges- rather than the
-round grains of sand"
modernity
produces. 10 „ er e Nietzsche's
ethical goal aims at enabling individuality,
difference - the true building
blocks
°f anything culturally
great in our tine, when
Nietzsche

^.^ ^

^ote

in the_Gav^cience,

"we are no longer material
for

society," the hope he expressed
was that since, with the
end of metaphysical Truth,
we are no longer material
for
society in the sense of being
"stones in a wall," since
our culture can no longer
build anything in this way, our
cultural building, cultural
excellence must take another
form. 11 Hence Nietzsche does
not give up this aim of
building something excellent together
as a people, and it
is my aim to flesh out the
authority and ethical vision
which one of Nietzsche's voices
adumbrates towards such an
end.
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in the following
section

z

wUl

of the term authority
with which

discuss

^

^

an herg
further articulate the way
Nietzsche characterizes
the
problem of authority with
respect to the modern
"religion
of pity."

B.

x

Authority and the Mod(arn
Reliqj
qion of Pi+y

in her essay,

"What is Authority,"
Hannah Arendt offered a conception of
authority which Nietzsche
would have
mediately acknowledged as his own
though he rarely ever
used the word itself.
Authority, Arendt wrote,
is "an
obedience in which men retain
their freedom. "12 Thought
politically, this meant, in
Arendt's view, that a society
in which authority was
legitimate was one which could
establish institutions in which
its founding principles
were
enshrined. Hence, through
participation in the common
life, one's memory of the
founding principles - principles
which bind a people together
giving them their distinctive
identity - could be renewed and
revitalized.
in this
renewal of shared identity one could
feel freely commanded
anew.
In a particularly poignant passage
in The Genealogy

of_Mora!s, Nietzsche has an observer
peer into the factory
that produces modern ideals.
One among many of the things
heard is that obedience is subjection to
those one
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hates.

This produces nausea

^

^

^

Qbserver
Nietzsche seems to b e
reaching for some other
un<Jerstand _
xng of obedience.
„e get a hint of this
in Hafflan_MI_
Ss2
" here NietZSChe «°"ies
about the loss of belief
in
unconditional authority, a
belief which had been
the foundation for obedience in
the past.
Today, in mercantile
society, he says, we lack
the "proud obedience-which is
the heir of the nobility."
clearly Nietzsche does not
wish to resurrect the
£sm as tiS for this proud obedience
once again, even were it
possible.
fact the unconditionally of the obedience
exhibited by the

SME

'

m

m

--herd--

in

modernity is one of the things
about modern obedience
which disgusts and distresses
him.
Nietzsche is after, at
least in his best moments
I suggests, a -proud
obedienceunderstood as an ability to -obeyexcellence - in oneself
and in others. He is after
the creation of selves capable
both of commanding excellence
in themselves and others,
and of responding to it in
others, that is, capable of
-obeying" the inspiration or spur
of others.

m

"Nietzsche's Political Aesthetic,"
Tracy strong, borrowing
both from Kant and from Emerson,
has characterized this
capacity as "the capacity to find the
judgments of another
in ourselves and the find ourselves
in another"^ and,
as

the ability to be "provoked" by another
which means the
ability "to find myself with you. "16
Authority then, to

draw these understandings together, is an
obedience in

181

which we retain our freedom
because we submit to, find
ourselves in, the excellence

of another, and in the
"sub-

mission" renew our common lives.

Understood as the possibility
of renewal of shared
identity, Western civilization
faces a crisis of
authority, with the growing
extinction of Christian meaning, and the grave challenges
to reason as something we
all possess as a consequence
of being
human, we face a

situation of chaos with regard to
the basic question of
who we are, and what is good,
what is wortny Qf Qur
legiance.
Characteristic of this crisis is that
we have
no basis for judging between
competing claims. A silent
abyss responds to our questioning.
Hence, we are

^

faced,

on the one hand, with a destructive
permissiveness in
which we can give no grounds for choosing
one thing over
another, or with an equally destructive
fleeing of this

dilemma into the relative safety of an
increasingly unsustainable reliance upon reason, on the other.

Modernity's nihilism is defined most prominently
by
this fleeing.

it hence refuses to face that,

in the wake

of God's death, a dark and silent distance
has come to in-

habit the space between man and man, between man
and nature.

This is a distance and a silence in which the radi-

cal and hence terrifying questioning after our meaning

reigns with formless power.

Modern man refuses to hear

the new silence, and in this refusal refuses to lay claim
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^^

to the one p ri „ oiple
which> in Niet2sche , s
still serve as the basis
for a revitalization
o, our com-on life, which could
transfigure the pain of
our condition by housing this
questioning within a fen,
of life
Nietzsche calls this principle
"intellectual honesty," a
principle which "2000 years
tr-a^i* in
of training
intellectual
oleanliness" has wrought. 17
B y this Nietzsche meant
to
evoke not some capacity
for total transparency
towards
ourselves and the world, but
the critical capacity
to be
struck or awed by the new,
or struck anew by the
old.
(Nietzsche's genealogy of morals
was designed to awaken
this kind of honesty so that
we would be terrifyi
•

.

ngl y

struck anew by the problem
of meaning in the world
as we,
with his help, place the
ascetic ideal in the context
of'
the form of life it enabled,
thereby feeling the enormous
distance which now separates us
from it.)
Nietzsche

clearly does not wish then to
attack reason understood as
our capacity to reflect, to
question, to wonder.

But he

does wish to sever our understanding
of reason as the
ability to know true Being from the
capacity to reason
which he understood as an essentially
creative activity in
which the ability both to look at
things anew and to look
at the new, figure centrally.

Hence Nietzsche's efforts to re-establish
authority
begin with an appeal to the deepest
principle of our
shared identity. As a claim to the founding
impulse
of
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Western civil ization

such . kinsh p
.

,

^^
^^^
^

authority we could freely
Qbey because
of our common ends at
this most fundamental
of levels
Alone through such a
renewal, Nietzsche
suggests, can we
begin to establish authority
understood as "an obedience
in which we retain our
freedom." In such a
beginning
freedom is retained in two
ways.
First, in that we are
called to ourselves in being
called to renew the
tradition
of intellectual honesty understood as the wonder
that
sparKs reflection. And
second, in so being called,
we are
called to see what is new
in our time, and hence
to
prepare the way for an original
relationship to being.
Thus this claim to be heirs
ties us back to the founding
impulse of western civilization
and, in so doing, situates
us to our present, a present
in which our freedom must
be
conceptualized anew.

^

,

^

Twilight of the_ldois, Nietzsche
asks,
"For what is freedom? That
one has the will
S lf
eSP0nSibility that one Preserves
H
the distance
that divides us." 18

^

/

'

The authority Nietzsche relies
upon to call us to renewal
of ourselves via "honesty"
brings us face to face with the
fact that our continuing freedom
hinges upon embracing the
new distance left in the wake of God's
death, a distance
in which the terrifying and
open-ended questioning of
meaning is relentlessly heard yet receives
no answer.
Our
continuing freedom rests on embracing as our
fate the
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challenge of forging a
new necessity.

comfflon

^^^^^^

Vet obedience to honesty
which consists in an
obedience in „ hich men
retain the distance that
divides
the™ could hardly be a
sufficient ground to create
the
Kind of authority necessary
to form a co o„ life.
It is
simply too painful and
cannot be sustained.
Is this the
extent to which Nietzsche
succeeds in this project?
I
think not. Rather
*
p»c
Kather, as the first step,
Nietzsche's appeal
to ..honesty gathers us
together in a largely
deconstrucmoment; it aims to create
"active nihilists," those
strong enough to hear the
new silence, to peer into
the
dark distance. And in this
very act of gathering,

M

•

ts

Nietzsche promises a more
constructive foundation for
authority, one arising precisely
out of this embrace of
distance - an aesthetic foundation
I win elaborate
momentarily.
For now, of importance is
Nietzsche's claim
that at least part of the
authority on the basis of which
we could be "compelled" to re-est-ahH.h
° re establish a„ common life must
reside in the claim to being
heirs to "2000 years of

training in intellectual cleanliness."

This claim alone

can bring us face to face with
the new and painful distance which the death of God has
brought into being.
It is this deconstructive moment,
towards which our
efforts to become rightful heirs compel
us, that the modern will to master refuses.
Defined centrally by its sub-
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^ ^.^ ^

Mission to the "religion of
pity „ in which
eradicate suffering governs,
the win to master
targets
preciseiy this distance, making
creative renewal of the
founding principle of Western
civili 2a tion impossible.
Before turning to the
constructive moment of
Nietzsche's
aesthetic foundation for authority
I „ ould like tQ
explore
what I have called "the
operation of pity."
!• The Ope ration of pity
As the heir to Christianity's
rejection of life on
earth (found most dramatically
in the promise of heaven)
the modern "religion of pity"
contains an even more unconditional impulse - it promises
heaven on earth. The discord, the painful wrestling
with one's own meaning heard
in the haunting questioning
of St. Augustine: "who
am I,
oh my God?", a discord relieved
only after death, now
largely ceases to find place in
the world.
In modernity,
Christian pity for this-worldly
suffering is retained.
But to the questions such suffering
provokes, an answer
which promises rectification is
given, an answer, moreover, which ceases properly to
take the form of an answer
since it eclipses the interrogative
mode altogether in favor of "self-evidence." What Nietzsche
means most fundamentally then by a "religion of pity" is
a fervor to

entirely relieve humankind of a kind of
tragic suffering
from the most basic questioning after
human

meaning, pur-

pose and identity.

Philosophically this takes many forms
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- fro* the

assumption of the Kantian
nature nan who should
conduct

^.^ ^

right rule of reason,.,
to sooialist » an
visible nana.
It is this which

^
,

^

to Smith , s

is

responsive for pittin
g
Nietzsche in an interesting
way against such diverse
Political forms and movements
as liberal democracy
socialism, the movement
to emancipate women
and capitalism,
interesting that is, insofar
as they seek to establish an unmoving basis
for social-political
life; to

unconditionally remove from
the forms of lives they
wish
to establish the basic
questioning after human
meaning.
It is this .-removal,.,
possible because of faith
in the rational subject, which is
at the center of the
illegitimacy
experienced in modern culture
and politics, for it
reduces
life to a kind of organized
effort to ameliorate and rectify our condition, stifling
a kind of terrible existential wonder and questioning.
But Nietzsche spends little
effort in showing the
specific ways in which modern
political movements and
political philosophy are rooted
in this extreme form of
pity and hence extinguish such
questioning, what he does
do is to elaborate the bad
effects of what has,
in

modernity, become an ethos of pity,
if you will, an ethos
which has grown out of the cultural
legacy of Christianity
as expressed in these philosophical
positions.
It

receives so much attention by Nietzsche
because he consid-
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ers it to be critical to
keeping us from the wonder
that
sparks reflection and hence
fro, the deconstructive
moment
he would "provoke." It
is to this elaboration
I now turn.
Nietzsche argues that pity
has become the constituent
element in the tissue of modern
social relations and even
in relations within the
self since the French
Revolution.
It is this affect which
disrupts the capacity of selves
and societies from coming to
terms with the historical
form of suffering with which
they are confronted.
Pity is
central in keeping us from
"making beautiful what is
necessary" by which Nietzsche
referred to the cultural
transfiguration of the new and painful
distance which has
arisen, as fact, in the wake
of God's death; a transfiguration through which the basic
questioning after human
meaning could be renewed.

Pity is essentially a world-rejecting
affect.
"The Voluntary Beggar" in Thus Spoke

7^h, 1c +^

In

we find

Zarathustra has come upon a man Nietzsche
would have us
take for Jesus. Or rather, Nietzsche
would have us take
him for the man Jesus has become after long
years of
giving to others out of pity. Exhausted by
these efforts,
he has rejected the human world and is now
reduced to

talking with cows, trying to learn their happiness.

Hav-

ing given everything to the poorest, only to be
rejected,

he now believes his only hope is to learn to "chew
the
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cud," to become a part
of nature.

About JeS us' rejection

Zarathustra says,

ultL^

eSe

^

S Wel1 is an

t0

art aAd the

Nietzsche's critiques of pity
which occupy him from
his break with Wagner to
his last works revolve
around his
claim that pity is no means
by which one can render
others
aid, it is not "right
giving." Importantly, this
is not
at all a rejection by
Nietzsche of compassion or
concern
with the welfare of others.
(Through my development of
the exemplary ethos I shall
articulate the contours of
what Nietzsche might have meant
by "right
giving.")

if
one wishes to be a physician
to mankind "in any way
whatsoever," Nietzsche writes, it is
pity against which one
must guard, for "[it] will paralyze
him at every decisive
moment and apply a ligature to his
knowledge and his subtle helpful hand.- .20 It is in
sense

^

^^^

stitutes one of the greatest injustices,
for it denies
both to the one who pities and to the
pitied that "spaciousness of perspective," 2 ! the precondition
for the
questioning wonder through which knowledge
emerges.

Greatest injustice is done, Nietzsche says,
"...where life has developed at its smallest, narrowest, neediest, most incipient
and yet cannot avoid taking itself as the
goal and measure of things.
"•"
.

.
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Pity is an emotion which
binds perspective making
life and knowledge small,
mean, needy.
it is a ligature
on self-knowledge and on
knowledge of others both for
the
one who pities and for the
pitied.
In taking on another's
burden as her own, the one
who pities is, Nietzsche
argues, distracted from her
own struggles and goals,
and
hence is kept from those things
which could yield a deep
under-standing of the world. Pity
is a form of escape.
The act of pity also deprives
the pitied of selfknowledge, for in assuming that
suffering must be alleviated, the one who pities
presumes to know the meaning
of another's suffering.
this presumption he strips the
pitied of what is and must be, in
Nietzsche's view, distinctly personal, distinctly unique.
There is an economy
of the soul, a "personal necessity
of distress" whose

m

meaning alone the sufferer must come to
know.

Suffering

is an essential part of the growth
of the soul - of its

letting go of "whole periods of the past"
and its breaking
open of "new springs and needs." 23 Hence
to pity is to
show contempt for the deeply personal nature
of distress.
The intrusion of the one who pities into this
economy

causes shame, the response to which, Nietzsche
suggests,
is either submission to the understanding of
the pitier,

or revenge.

Both are means of evading the personal strug-

gle all must constantly engage in in the effort to con-
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tinuously bring their
distinotive selves intQ
beingj
to renew them.
Pity also places a
ligature upon our knowledge
of the
other.
Both the intrusive acoess
the one who pities assumes with regard to the
waning of another's suffering
and the yielding up by
the pitied self ta this
interpretation creates a sooial
in-between whose very existence
is
made possible by the efforts
of both parties to flee
from
those forms of wrestling
with the self and other
which
could yield distinctive
beings.
This is the source of
Nietzsche's virulent
anti-egalitarianism. Thus pity
deprives both the one who
pities and the pitied of the
"spaciousness of perspectivewhich provides the very
resources with which real "helpmight be fashioned;

resources for "right giving,"
that is, for a giving which
feeds our own and others'
capacities for self-formation.
On this analysis something
important about the distance now fundamental and
irremedial which divides us
emerges,
it is Janus-faced.
It is at once something most
difficult to bridge, something which
thus wraps us in our
solitary selves, keeping us fundamentally
mysteriously and
finally unknown to ourselves, and
something without which
we remain absolutely solitary,
absolutely unknown as selfrevealing, distinct beings, without this
distance, a distance which pity destroys, we are lacking
in the capacity
whatsoever to feel the other as other, to feel
the edge
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that dearcates seething
different, to have, as
Nietzsche
puts it, -organizing power"
by which he „eans the
capacity
to ma *e distinctions between
things by separating, ranking, opening chasms. 24

The results relevant for
the problem of establishing
authority are twofold. First
is what I will call the
problem of excellence in our
time.
"industrial culture,"
Nietzsche writes, (and we can
assume inclusion of all modern political forms) " is
submission to unknown and
uninteresting persons. "25 obedience
in modernity is the
same as submission because
dominant modern culture produces nothing which we will freely
obey, nothing with the
power to call us to renew our
shared identity and therein
re-establish authority. For this,
"honesty" is required.
For this, we would have to face
the fatal blows our experiences have dealt "God," a task
the will to master eschews.
(And, Nietzsche would add, the
state also eschews
this task in its attempt to become
our new God. 26
)

This is one side of the problem of
authority in
modernity.
The other, as important, is the inability
to
respond to the kind of excellence upon which
Nietzsche
hopes to re-establish authority. Thoroughly
under the
sway of the "religion of pity," clinging to
the faith that
all suffering can be abolished, moderns seek
revenge

against those who teach and live differently.

Moderns

possess alone the capacity to respond to that type of ex-
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cellence its culture produces:
that which unconditionally
and tyrannically commands,
that which aims to destroy
"the
distance that divides us." Both
Wagner and the only apparently anti-modern phenomenon
of Napoleon are exemplary
of such excellence in
Nietzsche's view. What he calls
"the art of command" eludes
them, and they create and
pander to the "herd" impulse for
unconditional obedience,
for an equality qua conformity
made possible, once again,
by obliterating that distance
between persons without
which their otherness cannot
confront us with the
guest ioning of our own lives.
Thus the "proud obedience" Nietzsche
sought, an
obedience in which men retain their
freedom, is thwarted
by the modern will to master's aim
to eradicate suffering.
On the one hand, because the dominant
ethos of pity does
not produce those who exhibit the kind
of excellence which
could command our esteem by renewing our
sense of our
shared identity in the face of the event of
God's death.
And on the other, because we are able to respond
alone to
those whose excellence is the kind which commands
unconditionally.

Pity keeps us from experiencing the radical way

in which the distance which divides us is now
present; it

keeps us from the deconstructive moment mentioned above,
from a questioning wonder in which we could take stock of

our condition.
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All of this now begs the
question, what is, in
Nietzsche's view worthy of our
esteem? so much so that our
obedience to its command would
not compromise but in fact
constitute our freedom? what
could have the power to
freely compel our obedience,
and how could we practice
commanding as an "art?" To approach
these questions we
must review the historical form
in which the problem of
meaning confronts us as Nietzsche
sees it.

As

have suggested in chapter two,
we are confronted
with the paradox of affirming that
the fundamental principle which rendered our lives
intelligible and gave them
meaning - unchanging metaphysical
Truth to which we, as
rational beings have access in some
form - was in fact
only our own erring.
But how could affirming error
engender rapture, be authoritative? How
could we find
ourselves in this task? How could we be
drawn to such a
task even had we the strength for it?
We cannot, nor is
this the impossible deconstructive task
Nietzsche sets before us, for it is only from a vantage
point still caught
within the frame of true Being that knowledge
could appear
as error.
In "How the *Real World' at Last Became a
FaI

ble," Nietzsche puts it this way,
"But no! with the real world we have also
abolished the apparent world " z
!

Knowledge then is not error.

Rather,

it is always par-

tial, perspectival, the means for preserving and enhancing
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particular beings and forms
of l ife
As such
the artistic foundations
of our being.
As heirs to the tradition
.

,

it reveals

of "honesty" our challenge,

as

have argued, becomes that
of taking ourselves as
aesthetic phenomena and now,
as "genuine" spectators,
learning to take delight in
the tragi-comic spectacle
of
the mysterious artistry at
work in our thinking activity
itself.
so doing we must, like
great tragedians,
I

m

parody the tragic in our own
strivings by admitting that
our intoxication with creative
bringing forth via
questioning is just that - intoxication
with a being

of a

particular kind, that

is,

a

Western being.

No further

foundation, we must admit, is
possible.
with such parody
we celebrate the fertility of
the world our own tragic
strivings to know engender.
remaining true to our task
of intellectual "honesty," we
become that "artistic
Socrates" Nietzsche longed to encounter.

m

But still, why affirm such a task?

Beyond the claim

to be heirs, there is a new promise,
a new hope embedded
in this Nietzschean honesty.
From the promise of true
Being which transfigured the suffering
of the sinner,

making it beautiful, Nietzsche offers the
promise of
"Vieldeutigkeit," multiplicity, fertility, of a
creative

unfolding of the world heretofore impossible.

it is this

promise which he thought could transfigure the
painful

distance that divides us.

And here we approach the con-
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structive Moment Nietzsche
at least often, though
certainly not always, graS ps.
NaMely, the pain of the
distance
is seething „e suffer
not Merely so „e face
our condition, but rather it is
southing we must suffer and
whose
reality we must constantly
re-affirm because it allows
us
to participate in unfolding
the mysterious fertility
of
the world and of ourselves.
That is, ju st as much as
intoxication, this new distance
is a condition of our
own
artistic powers, our form-giving
powers, with this,
the

pain of "the distance that
divides us" can be transfigured, redeemed, and the
full essence of our freedom
can
come into view. This distance,
we now see, is the origin
of a new and promised pleasure
since it is necessary to us
as self- and world-revealing
beings.
What becomes authoritative on
this reading of
Nietzsche's effort to combat nihilism,
in sum,

is a

renewed commitment to intellectual
"honesty," to a
questioning wonder in which we position
ourselves in the
new silence such that we affirm
ourselves as artistic
beings. As such, our capacity to
give form to things and
to renew this form rests on an
essentially tragic and

aesthetic sensibility; a sensibility which
finds beauty in
that wrestling tension between intoxication
and skepticism
which constitutes our efforts to know.
It is a

sensibility which revels in the fact that to
sustain creative forces in any form of life, that form
of life must be
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sustained by a certain
tension

^

by

questioning after waning.

Hence in the tension
between
being heirs and being
newborns, Nietzsche lodges
his own
claim to speak authoritatively,
and hence too his hopes
to
renew the foundations of
Western civilization in an

obedience which is renewal
yet not repetition.
such a
renewal we are called to
ourselves anew and thus
celebrate
the creative fertility of
our own being.
Vet this new basis for
authority Nietzsche claimed
was beyond good and evil,
though not beyond good and
bad.
That is to say, there are indeed
many things of which the
creative unfolding powers of
humans are capable and thus
which, it appears, Nietzsche
had no basis

m

for rejecting.
Does Nietzsche not affirm all
forms of diversity for
diversity's sake? Does he not trade
the formlessness he
found in modernity for a postmodern
nightmare of endless
forms? such a prospect hardly has
compelling power.

Through the development of the exemplary
ethos in
this final section I will argue on
the basis
of

Nietzsche's own understanding of "gestaltende
Kraefte"
that there are ethically limiting
principles embedded in
this aesthetic foundation of authority,
ethically constructive principles which are suggested in
much of
Nietzsche's work.
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C.

The Exemplary

T?+-

nn ~

"Above all, one should not
wish
existence of its rj^h^mbj^uitv: to divest
that i**
dictate of good taste, gent
iemln, the tas?e
The exemplary ethos is one
which celebrates and
engenders the essential plurality
or, as Nietzsche put
it,
Vieldeutigkeit of things, a plurality
we would be unable
to know without the "pathos
of distance," without
the
ability to suffer the painful
cleft that now haunts our
lives in such a way that we are
struck by a new sense for
the beautiful in human life.
the exemplary ethos this
different sensibility, this different
aesthetic is given

'

m

form.

Most interpreters who have wrestled
with the
political and ethical implications
of_Jlietzsche;

reflections on the beautiful have argued
some variant on the
theme that his is an aesthetics of
coherency and/or domination.
Thus, for example, Alexander Nehamas
argues that
Nietzsche has an aesthetics of coherency
which aims only
for a unity of self, and that therefore
it cannot be exS

tended to broader social relations.

Alternatively, Martin

Heidegger argues that Nietzsche's aesthetics
do have social relevance but must be rejected since
they reproduce

what he sees as the dominating impulse in
Western

metaphysics.

Tracy Strong, by contrast, attempts not to

read Nietzsche as a theorist of domination as he
inter-
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Prets Nietzsche's aesthetic
understanding o f authority
Vet Strong approaches
the latter through the
Em ersonian
"instance of transparency"
„ hich he defines as a
m o m e„t of
"lived perfection... when
our intentions and
abilities are
unified in perfected praxis."
This approach to

Nietzsche's reflections on
authority however collapses
the
interesting tension Nietzsche
attests to sustain in his
aesthetic reflections. 29
in my view, Nietzsche's
efforts - in their best mo-

ments

are aimed precisely at
turning us away from an
aesthetics resting on pleasure
in order, coherency,
harmony, and perfection, to
pleasure in the tension between harmony and chaos. 30
Hence the kind of ethical
defense of individuality as
artistic self-formation fundamentally presupposes a form of
ethico-social relations
which aim at preserving "the
distance that divides us" and
the questioning tension its
presence requires.
-

Through the figure of the exemplar

I

will explore the

ethical horizon on the basis of which
this Nietzschean inspired case for an aesthetic understanding
of authority in
our post-metaphysical age is most
compelling.
The exemplar "provokes- us, she calls us forth
to find in her a
new beauty in the pain of the "distance"
which now divides
us.
In the exemplary ethos the form in
which the "terrifying and questionable character of existence"
confronts
us as a question is housed.
It is an artistic ethos in
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which we for, ourselves in
the face of the new
distance
that surrounds us such that
we are seething
beautiful to
behold, but also capable of
beholding.
the metaphor with
which Nietzsche best captures
this ethos is a garden
with
high walls yet a hospitable
gate.

With this tremendous objective
^ re KY e . n0tating
311 the shar P e dges of
life

w5i? 0n

^

s

,

'

h

WaY t0 tUrnin 9 man *ind into
Small '. soft round unending
fSSd
^
hat
Y ° Ur ldea1
y° u heralds of
.^
the sympathetic
affections? the
meantime, the question itself
remains
unanswered whether one is of more_jase
to
another by immediately leapin^To~nTi
side
piping him - which help can in any case and
be
only superficial where it does
not become
tyrannical seizing and transforming or
creating something out of oneself
that
the
other can behold with pleasure:
a beautiful
restful self-enclosed garden
perhaps, with'
high walls but also a hospitable
gate?" 3 !
,

H,

'
'

m

This image recurs in Nietzsche's
work.

it evokes an

artistic way of being whose driving
commitment is to the
idea that "right giving" consists
in making of oneself an
example so that ones effort to influence
makes it possible
for others to receive and in so
receiving form themselves.
The central question it poses is, can you
form yourself
such that you remain able to receive
different others and
inspire their distinctiveness? so that central
to your
self -formation is this twofold capability?
1.

Solitude
It should not be surprising given that
Nietzsche ties

our freedom to an embrace of the new "distance that
di-
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vides us," tha t solitude
s hould be centra!
to the ethos of
the exemplar.
But Nietzsche's praise
of solitude must not
be mistaken for a song
to solipsism as many
interpreters
have suggested.32 Let
us

^

"Thus speaks the fool:
association with
other people corrupts one's
Character " 6S *
pecially if one has none »3 3 chararl-^

The truth of the fool

-

^

the one who speaks foolishly

but honestly about things
most refuse to acknowledge
or
examine - sets the context
within which we should
place
Nietzsche's sometimes bitter,
most often extreme utterances about association
with others. The truth
the
fool tells is that while
association per_^e is not corrupting, in our times most
people possess little character
and less knowledge of how it
is formed, and thus use
association with others either to
find the selves they
lack,

or to hide from themselves
what in themselves they
despise.
Association becomes conformism.

Nietzsche's praise of solitude then
is part of an effort to turn our attention to
a different way of being
with others. But how does he conceive
it, what
are its

effects, and just why, in the moral
interregnum which constitutes our day, does he argue that
one of the four
"sciences" from which the laws of life
and action will
come is solitude? 34

The fulcrum around which the value of
solitude turns
is Nietzsche's claim that thinking
and acting without wit-
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^^

nesses yields a different
kind Qf
reveals the world differently.
To develop this point
it
critical to note that the
primary context against
Nietzsche reacts in his
multifarious reflections on
solitude is cnristian.
mu„
Christ- i^n
The ever-present Christian
God
practiced a surveillance of
the sinful so complete
that
they were unable, finally,
to bear it.
Never left alone,
the pious become so respni-fni +u^4resentful that murder and
overthrow
alone offer relief. This
is
in any case
one

^

-

Qf

,

,

ratives Nietzsche spins to
explain the death of
it is a story from which
Nietzsche wishes us to
it manifests its general
form in modern culture
where politically the state
wishes to take over
veillance God once practiced, 35
and socially

^^

God, and

learn,

for

as well

the sur-

a resentful,

ever-vigilant conformist egalitarianism
drives relations
with others.
It is our new solitude in
the universe then which

Nietzsche thinks offers up

a

possibility of acting out of

something other than resentment and
revenge.
Yet we fear
this new condition and most refuse
to acknowledge it.
We
fear it because when, alone in this

way, we look into our-

selves, we see, Nietzsche says in a
parable, that we are
not galaxies with regular, cyclically
orbiting stars.
In
this new solitude we are led, rather,
into the chaos and

labyrinth of ourselves and existence. 36
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Life appears dif-

ferently to us in solitude
d6
'

great import.

a

niff
dlf ference for Nietzsche
of

He writes,

^K^oud
2°r trtl ^Y^V
fear the hollow echo
S

- th=

'

0 " 0t

f ° r the y

orltl 1"e of the
nymph Echo. And
d all Co?
1CeS
Sound different
37
in solitude.

This solitude saves us
from a Kind of superficiality.
It
brings us face to face
with "critique,., with
uncertainty
skepticism and questioning.
We dare not speak too
loudly
lest the folly of our
emphatic sound return to us

as echo.

Such a need to speak softly,
unemphatically and with a
questioning voice, a voice in
touch with chaos, builds
strength.
the Prologue to Zarathustra,
the saintly
hermit says to Zarathustra
who does not disagree,
that
solitude is as the (salten)
sea where the body is
carried
along, kept from being a drag
on us.
There is almost

m

an

otherworldly status Nietzsche
accords to solitude; it is a
locus for divine powers. Though
a thing rooted in earth,
solitude brings us nearest to the
infinite, an infinite

which, though an infinity of chaos,
Nietzsche sees as a
bulwark of -security-, and "slownessagainst the pressing
hour of the marketplace. Solitude's
pace is slow, making
us capable of distinguishing
"persuasion- from "frenzyand "proving" from "overthrow. "38
it combats the unconditional.
It is one of the preconditions for
deliberation
as it opens us out onto the (frightening)
infinity of in-

terpretations and hence opens up the world to
pos-
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sibilities otherwise ungrasped.

it is a precondition
for

that "spaciousness of
perspective" pity extinguishes.
Hence in terms of social
relations one of the primary
reasons Nietzsche defends
solitude is directed at "protecting our fine neutrality of
conscience" by which he
means nothing l ike objectivity,
but rather a questioning

critical capability.

Hence retreating into solitude
is
the protection Nietzsche counsels
from the obtrusive and
revengeful.
To be drawn into defensive
engagement with
others who may fear our questioning
is to be forced to become dogmatic, "unneutral,"
martyrish ourselves.
this
state we forfeit the chance of
making our own self some-

m

thing distinct and thus of contributing
to the diversity
of the world.
we also forfeit the chance of
experiencing
this diversity through others.
Thus our new state, thought socially,
is the rich
state without which we cannot, through
our own selffashioning, affirm the plurality of the
world.
Nietzsche
therefore, in his reflections on solitude,
presents us

with the challenge of forming ourselves in the
face of our
"new infinite," and of developing an aesthetic
sensibility
for the tragic beauty of so doing.
Yet all of this requires qualification, for the

solitude Nietzsche instructs is a qualified solitude
what he calls "the good solitude."

it is not that of the

hermit, the man of absolute solitude.
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As metaphor for the

life of a mind in
conversation with itself alone,
in
hermetic solitude the mind
falls into its own depths,
Pulled by too terrible a
gravity.
Thus, Nietzsche writes,
this hermit always longs
for the friend, for the
third
person and his height.
39
ync
The
fr-ior^ saves us
me friend
from our own
depths, from the bearingless
infinity of our own
labyrinthine selves, not through
an ever-present surveillance armed with God, Truth or
Reason, but through the
height of her beauty, by her
example.
this exemplary
bearing of the friend we are
provoked to wrestle with our
own possibilities of self-formation;
we are brought back
to our own worldly possibilities
and hence reaffirm our
common essence as form-giving,
world revealing beings.
The solitude Nietzsche affirms
then is a certain
solitude among friends, a solitude
in which "right" giving
is possible.
This is the central point of all

m

Zarathustra's ethical teachings.
a

heart "4°

YOU

^

He says,

friend and his overflowing

In the effort to explore this teaching
and to

demonstrate the textual support for my reading
of the
ethos of the exemplar, I will turn now to
an analysis of
the Prologue and the narrative structure of
Thus Spoke
Zarathustra
The primary dramatic structure of

this test

.

is,

it seems to me, the story of one who,

in the effort to

aid mankind, learns the art of "right giving,"
learns to
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a

2

Zarathustra

friend in this exemplary
sense.
Zarathustra both
teaches this and comes to
exemplify it himself in
the
course of the book.
•

0
r
be haI y ou

y ° Ur haPPiness
whom
y° u shine?"
-VZT*
i
First words
spoken by Zarathustra.

At the outset of the
Prologue we find Zarathustra
high in mountainous solitude,
outside the door of his
cave.
He has come up to this
solitary height ten years
before carrying his own charred
remains. As „en and empty,
having burnt himself out in
the valleys of the world,
Zarathustra rekindles his fire
through his solitude. How
so? By receiving the sun's
overflowing rays, so wise
has
this extended solitude made him
that now he too, like the
great star, is overfull and longs
to return to the valleys
to give them the light of his
wisdom. Hence the first
words we hear Zarathustra speak,
addressed to the sun, are
words which ask if we do not need
others for our own happiness; if our happiness does not
indeed depend upon a
certain kind of virtue Zarathustra
later calls "the giftgiving virtue." That is, if it does
not depend upon

certain relations with others such that
in giving to them,
they in turn are able to bless us, to
receive our gift,
and we theirs.
read Zarathustra as a narrative centrally
about the
problem of "right giving." That is, how can
we persuade
I
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others to

shading

«

the,.,

wisdom

,

how can „ e

.

nfiuenoe them w thout

making then envioug and

.

^

^

one hand, or tyrannizing
over the., on the other?
„o„ can
we, in this act of giving,
help constitute others
so that
they are abls to receive
and in receiving bl ess
our gift
with a gift of their own?
It is this Zarathustra
teaches
and in so doing himself
learns something: how to
relate to
the other as other. Both
teachings fundamentally
depend
upon a capacity for solitude.
should like to look carefully
at the nature of
Zarathustra's first solitude,
the state in which the
reader first encounters him.
The thing we should notice
first is that Zarathustra is
not alone in his solitude.
His animals, courage and
wisdom, are with him, suggesting
that both virtues are at home
here.
But there is another
overwhelming body - the sun.
Everyday the sun climbs to
Zarathustra's cave and shines upon
him, and Zarathustra in
turn receives its light and
blesses the sun in gratitude.
It is this exchange - in
solitude - which has brought
about the change of which the old
saint takes note when
Zarathustra descends: Zarathustra has
no longer any disgust around his mouth; he is awakened,
a dancer
I

in

gratitude to life,

what has transpired?

what is this sun

in which Zarathustra has bathed and
which he has blessed

ten years long?
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First,

it is the earth's sun,
the sun which brings
light to the earth as it
ascends and

descends around it.

It lives and shines for
and with the earth.

represents the kind of

l ight

Hence it

and power available to
humans

in our new solitude.

it is the light of the
^arth, not of
God or heaven or Truth.
this sense it must also be
understood as a symbol for the sun
Zarathustra (and indeed
all of us) now must create/receive
for himself.
still, we

m

must plumb this metaphor further
with Zarathustra s question in mind, for it is not
nearly so solipsistic as appears at first glance. We must
listen to the social
'

es-

sence of Zarathustra's question.

That is, without "those

for whom (it) shines," and
therefore those who bless it,
could the sun continue to shine,
or to be at all? i' m
suggesting that even when we, in the
most materialist of
terms, read this sun as the law
Zarathustra gives to himself as lawgiver and avenger of that
law, even when we see
it as the god Zarathustra has
created for himself, as the
star he has thrown out into icy solitude,
Zarathustra's

Grundfrage

,

asked both at the very beginning and at
the

very end of the book, suggests that a
profoundly social
web of exchange is the condition for anything
to radiate be it the sociality of the self or of man
with man. With
the metaphor of a celestial body, Nietzsche
captures
the

astonishing, miraculous and mysterious quality to this
radiance.

Between humans something godly can come to be.
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in Plato's imagery the
cave is the place of the
many
where there is no radiance,
only deceptive reflection.
By

contrast, Nietzsche's cave
is the place for solitude,
the
Place from whence one receives
radiance and grows
courageous and wise. Here one
develops a pressing need
oneself to radiate, to give to
others, and the need to be
received, the urge to sociality
of a certain kind.
For
Nietzsche, the cave and sun
imagery do not represent irreconcilable images of the
illusion-filled world of the
many and the radiating world
of Truth of the few.
Rather,
they are images for a kind of
strengthening solitude (the
cave) and a continuous circular
movement down towards and
back away from others (the movement
of the sun) without
which this strength can neither
sustain itself nor
radiate, have worldly significance.

Thus in the ten years of Zarathustra
' s
solitude he
has filled himself with a brilliance,
a rich goal which,
if it is to shine, needs others
who can receive it - lest
it perish on high.
But the problem is, how to communicate
it to others? How to give?
it is commonly argued that
the lesson Zarathustra learns in the Prologue
which he
later refers to as "the hermit's folly" 41
is that it is
not indiscriminantly to everyone he should
speak, moreover
it is only the philosophers to whom
Zarathustra can and

wishes to speak.

And at the end of the Prologue

Zarathustra indeed says,
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foHLT
?
laSt
1

dead?»?2

While

ha11

1

Speak to

t
tlme hav * I spoken

people:

tothS

do not wish to argue
entirely against such a
view, it needs careful
elaboration and qualification.
The
lesson Zarathustra learns,
it seems to xne, has little
to
do with the question of who
can and cannot receive, for
some mysterious writ large in
the order of things,
I

Zarathustra's wisdom.

That is, it has little to do
with

the distinction between
philosophers and the rabble.
Rather, it concerns the problem
of how Zarathustra can
give so that in giving he honors
"the distance that divides us" and hence helps constitute
others as able to
receive his ethical teachings, a
reception which itself
must honor that selfsame "pathos
of distance." What
Zarathustra learns in the Prologue is
that it is a
hermit's folly to think that by merely
telling the world
one's wisdom, one can expect to mold
and shape it; that
only a hermit could imagine the world
so malleable.
In distinct contrast to Socrates and
Jesus, the other

two great exemplars and teachers in Western
civilization
whose stories Nietzsche keeps close to this
text,

Zarathustra leaves the marketplace, the public space
to
which all have most equal access. Unlike Socrates
and

Jesus who do not learn from the world and hence remain
hermits of the marketplace, Zarathustra joins the world
and seeks to learn how to be a prophet of it.
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Hence he

leaves the marketplace
and his hermitage
simultaneously
for, as the jester „
arns if he stays he risks
death
what would for Zarathustra
constitute death? ciearly
extinguishing that which makes
him happy that iS( cutt
ng
off the life of his sun
which I have argued now
needs
others to continue to radiate,
to have life.
An d

^

,

.

,

how,

if

Zarathustra stayed and continued
to seek reception by the
people could this occur?
The most obvious way of
course would be actual death
by collective hands on the
order of both Socrates and
Jesus.
Why, as the "Plato of his
own Socrates," why in
this literary construction of
a prophet, does Nietzsche
have Ms prophet, who, like
Socrates and Jesus, leaves no
written, worldly trace of his
teachings, not punctuate his
teachings by such a collective drama?
To avoid the reactive, world-negating relations
such guilt induces of which
the chroniclers of both other
prophets made use. As the
chronicler of this prophet's life and
teachings Nietzsche
wishes to offer a corrective to the
dogmatic shrillness of
the chroniclers Plato and Paul.
Zarathustra's life should
remain able to teach by example, by
provocation, not by a
coercive Reason or Truth.
On a more subtle level Zarathustra risks
death by the

temptation of becoming shrill, dogmatic.

Zarathustra ex-

presses such temptation when he says of the people,
"Must one smash their ears before they learn
to listen with their eyes?... Must one clat-
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ter like kettledrums and
preachers of
repentance?" 43
Death,

in this sense,

for Zarathustra would entail
not

remaining "loyal to the earth,"
true to what alone his
eyes thus far have witnessed the death of God, and a
new-found ability to bless and have
gratitude for this
world.
For the sake of being able to be
true to his teachings then Zarathustra leaves the
marketplace. And where
does he go? These are not exclusively
private places and
private audiences, nor are they as
public as the market,
in Part I where he is most intent
upon gathering those who
would and can listen he is in the (democratic)
town of the
Motley Cow at an ostensibly public gathering
around
a

sage, he is with youth high on a mountainside,
alone with

ascetics who despise the body, with brothers
in war...
But he is also travelling in many lands and
many places,
talking, observing.

Zarathustra is in multiple sites,

theoretically available "to all."

There is then, an open-

ness regarding potential followers that most do not
emphasize. 44

But there is additional reason to question the elite

interpretation of the book.

In "On the Higher Men,"

Zarathustra interprets for us the folly of his initial effort to give his gift to men.

His hermit's folly was a

folly apparently of not knowing the rabble.
ized it thusly:
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He character-

"And as

I

spoke to all,

I

spoke to none. "45

The logical inference here,
and one which is ostensibly
bolstered by the change in
Zarathustra ' s attempts at
"gift-giving," is that Zarathustra
learned only to give to
a selected few.
Yet surely Nietzsche is
playing with us
in some way for we are
reading a book whose subtitle,
once
again, ironically reads,
ABooK_Fo^l^n0^one. Does
Nietzsche, at lea^t not pose
a question to us regarding

this elite interpretation as
he, in giving this subtitle
to his book, commits the very
folly he was supposed to
have overcome in the Prologue,
the pre-logic to his book?
I think that this is
one important way this must
be
read.
Yet we might also read this
as a proclamation by
Nietzsche of the tragedy of his own
efforts to instruct.
That is, as long as he is unable
to find those who have
ears for his instruction, he must
commit the folly of the
hermit and write indiscriminately to
all, he must address
his work as only hermits, who know
nothing of the world,
must address theirs. Yet this is only
partially true. As
I have suggested in chapter
two, through the subversive
aspect of his styles, Nietzsche aims
strategically to constitute others, to provoke others so they are
able to hear
him.
He is aware that simple proclamation, simple
appeals
to rational self-reflection will fail.
in the overwhelming contradictory verbosity of his voice he
makes us expe-

rience, he exemplifies the insubstantial ity of our
present
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age.

m

this way he calls us forth
to engage with h im in
thought about what is to be
done,
with this form of
aesthetic provocation he attempts
to make others able to
hear, to receive, to be equal
to the task of facing our
condition.
It seems to me that what
Zarathustra learns in the
Prologue is something similar.
That is, that it is a
hermit's folly to think that
merely by telling the world

one's wisdom, one can expect to
mold and shape it; that
the world is so malleable.
the Prologue Zarathustra
begins to learn what he later will
tell Jesus - that
"right giving" is an art, and that
he must live with
others, must learn about the world,
and through that
living teach through exemplification.
As part of this
lesson, Zarathustra ceases to
proclaim and instead attempts to befriend. To do this however
he must withstand
the trial of pity (the main topic of
Book IV) and gain the
"good solitude," the solitude among friends.

m

Hence the fundamental movement in the
solitude narrative in Zarathustra is from Zarathustra as
hermit in
solitude to Zarathustra as friend in solitude;
that is, it
is the development of the capacity to
maintain the wisdom
and strength of gratitude towards the earth, won
in

solitude, among men.

It is this capacity

I

shall argue

which is central to "right giving;" to a being with others
which neither tyrannizes nor assimilates.
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in the course of the book,

times to his solitude on high.

Zarathustra returns three
There he receives the

sun's riches and blesses her
in return.
There he becomes
wise like the serpent and
courageous like the eagle. Upon
the third return Zarathustra
learns something so fundamental that the relationship of
his solitude to the social
world has perhaps been utterly
altered - if not his
solitude itself. Upon his third
return he is visited by
the soothsayer who is there to
try Zarathustra.
The trial
is nothing less than to see
whether he is strong enough to
maintain his own form, his own goal of
love and gratitude
for the earth, to exemplify in his
own life the import of
his basic teaching of eternal return.
In this trial
Zarathustra is tempted to pity the most
saddening, disgusting, needy humans - namely all that
is left of his
"higher men." They are suffering terribly in part from
pains Zarathustra himself has inflicted.
with momentary
slipping, Zarathustra withstands his trial
and therewith

receives the sign promised earlier in the book:
the sign
of his going under.
With this sign, Zarathustra emerges
from his cave "glowing and strong as a morning sun
that

comes out of dark mountains." 46
In not pitying,

in withstanding the temptation to

succor in such a way that he debilitates and debases,
Zarathustra has learned how to shine, to give as a friend,
to be an exemplar.

No longer need he hide in his cave
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away from the hands of the
vengeful for, much to his
surprise, such giving has had
tne effect Qf strengthen
ing
afflicted, of giving them
the strength for gratitude.
"The Ass Festival," after
Zarathustra has withstood this
trial of pity, he is surprised
by a new roguish inventiveness, a new independence in
the higher men.
He addresses
them thusly,

^
m

"0 my new friends, .. .you
strange higher men
how well I like you now since
you
hive bee
*
come gay again." 47

Hence Zarathustra has learned
how to give so that
others can receive, and in receiving
give in return. Although these men are not yet his
"proper companions," the
gratitude he has received in the form
of a new strangeness, a new gayness, a new strength
for friendship
in the

higher men has made him radiate most
brilliantly.
Zarathustra has learned to give out of
gratitude and to
reap the fruits of this giving.
The art of right giving then we learn
from

Zarathustra is an art in which Herrschsucht
rule,

finds particular expression.

,

the lust to

it is a way of

responding to others that is not a tyrannical
commanding
nor a spineless adaptation to them - both of
which ex-

tinguish the possibility of diversity (Vieldeutigkeit)
Yet it is a giving gua ruling of something, a
giving
which, as an effort to constitute others as capable
of

friendship, has a distinctive ethical content.
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Nietzsche

purposefully assimilates gift-giving
and ruling
which we tend to oppositionally
juxtapose

-

concepts

to one another.

should like now to return directly
to Zarathustra
teaching of the "friend and his
overflowing
I

'

heart" to show

the contours of the very particular
ethical life Nietzsche
gestures towards in this gift-giving
gua ruling which I
have called the exemplary ethos.
3.

The Friend

The obvious contrast Nietzsche wishes
to draw is with
Christian-based ethics - to love thy neighbor
as thyself which he sees as an assimilative, pitying,
leveling kind
of love.
in so contrasting, Nietzsche
emphasizes the

"strangerliness" of friends.

As the first intimate rela-

tionship outside the family, friends are
drawn to one another by an admiring fascination with this
strangerliness
amidst similarity. Bound by a different
authority or bond
than that found in the family or in the neighborly
relation, both of which have strong dimensions of
coercion be-

cause they are not freely chosen relationships,
the

friendship is held together by mutual admiration in
which
a

kind of mutual aesthetic provocation constantly occurs.

This is a provocation in which each attempts to provoke
the other to find himself in the excellence of the other,

but a provocation whose end cannot be assimilation lest
the very strangerliness upon which the relationship is

premised be destroyed.

As a model for ethical life,
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Nietzsche finds in friendship
that relationship which
requires and thrives upon the
distance that divides us,
a
relationship in which each is
quickened by the difference
of the other, in which
the strange quality of
this difference constitutes the
authoritative bond. The overflowing love of the friend is
a love
this strangerliness.
In contrast to neighborly
love, the love of the

friend is a creating love in
Nietzsche's view. All great
love, he says, wants to
create the beloved."8 But how
oan
we create the friend as someone
whose beauty recalls us
from the labyrinth of ourselves?
what can creating the
friend as the beloved mean?
What can this ruling qua
giving be? It is a paradoxical
ruling whose aim is to influence the other to gather the
strength necessary for
creative self-formation, for giving
herself her own appropriate style, "yet for a self-formation
which remains
"ruled by- the painful "distance
that divides us." That
is, which remains within the
ethical horizon of the exemplary ethos, a horizon constituted by
love for this
strangerliness, this distance.
To that end we must continuously engender
this

strangerliness in our efforts at self-formation.

The

friend accomplishes this through exhibiting
a kind of passionate restraint. Nietzsche says we must have
a hot

heart and

a

cold spirit.

We must be intoxicated with the

possibility each being possesses of making of themselves
a
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beautiful garden.

^

This must be . blinding

we must retain a cold
spirit for the ability to
carry out
this passion for others'
self-formation. We must be
capable of withstanding, as
Zarathustra withstood, the
trial of pity for the suffering
others must undergo in
their efforts at self -format
ion.
Thus the "good solitudeis a being-with-others
in which we retain the
strength to
honor the abyss which yawns
between friend and friend as
a
beautiful agony.
"On the Friend" in Zarathustra,
Nietzsche warns earnestly against
going naked before the
friend.
"You cannot groom yourself
too beautifully for
the friend. "50 To this end we
must retain a sweet and
delicate, but almost hidden
compassion, hidden,

m

as

Zarathustra counsels, under a hard
shell. 51
close to the friend, but not oyer
52
to
him,

must respond, but with hardness.

m

We must go

that is# we

a powerful few words

Nietzsche captures the essence of this
overflowing love
whose spirit is hard.
"But if you have a suffering friend,
be a
resting place for his suffering, but
a hard
bed at the same time, a field cot.
Thus
will you profit him best. "53

The delicate compassion of the overflowing
love of
the friend is a compassion for the creative
potential in
each of us.
in learning to be guided by a creating
love
which attentively exhibits the self, we learn
to shine for
others, even for those we may despise.
We learn,
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Nietzsche says, to feel
better joys ,54 for we foregQ
directly trying to influence
which always to some
relies on shaming, shaming
is a response to another's
difference or perceived weakness
which dwells upon it in
Pity or in moral admonition.
it is a "love,

or "concern"

which actually disables the
other by constituting them
through their apparent inadequacy.
Thus, as a form of

ruling which aims at influence
by example, the exemplary
ethos embodies the awareness
that our particular vision
must be partial, perspectival
and hence we comport
towards others so that they are
not swallowed by revenge
against our active shaming of
them.
Because it is not a
preaching or a boring stare into
another's strength of
soul born of Truth or Reason,
it "creates" the possibility
for the other to behold the
beauty and excellence of the
exemplar with pleasure, to be
constructively inspired.
The central aspect of this beauty
and hence the essence of
what proves authoritative about it
for ethical life is the
strength precisely to form around the
awareness of this
perspectival nature of ones own vision.
It is the exemplification of this strength which makes
it possible for
others to receive or, as Nietzsche
polemically put it, to
"obey" the new distance that divides us,"
and in
,

so doing,

to receive from our example inspiration
for their own

self-formation, their own self-shining.

220

Thus as the art if
commanding, right giving
as embodied in the exemplary
friend is a giving which
possible for the receiver
to receive, and it is
a creating
love in that it helps
enable the other to forherself.
Vet there is a further
sense in which this love
is creating, for it makes
possible a life that "cuts
into itself
with its own agony [and
thereby] increases knowledge. -55

^

^

The social-ethical relations
the exemplar constitutes
through this creating love
increase knowledge.
Recall
that the metaphor for the
exemplar is a garden with
high
walls, but_also with a
hospitable gate, a portal to
the
world the exemplar must retain
not only so that others
may
pass through to behold the
beauty of the garden, but also
that the exemplar may behold
different others, other gardens.
The creating love of the exemplar
depends upon encounters with different others
whose distinctiveness,

whose strangerliness places our
own selves in question in
such a way that they "cut into
the self." without this
ability to encounter the -sharp edges"
of another, knowledge itself, as the capacity to
creatively reveal
and

renew ourselves and the world by attaining
different perspectives, is not possible.
In this final sense then, the
ethos of the exemplar is an ethos in which
the questioning
wonder which is the foundation of our
civilization
is

renewed, for in the effort to transfigure
"the distance
that divides us," we come to see that it is
precisely this

221

wonder which is the source
o f our abili ty to
establish
selves as creative, world
revealing beings.
The exemplary ethos is
an ethos which celebrates
and
even aims to engender the
cleft between man and man
because it is the
of our abil ty tQ encounfcer
different others and to take
genuine pleasure in ourselves
as creative beings.
being so engendere(J an<J
displayed
in the tissue of human
relations the agony of the
cleft is
transfigured, made beautiful,
for we are, in the exemplary
friend struck with awe at the
strength required

si^^^

.

m

for

sustaining the tension of this
creating love in which the
"creation" of difference is
essential to ones own
identity,
what binds us together under
the horizon of the
exemplar is admiration for the beauty
displayed in the
strength to give life, to give
life space to this
strangerliness, to this wonder at the
"rich ambiguity of

existence.

It is this beauty which is
authoritative,

which has form-giving force.

Hence in Zarathustra

when
life reveals that her secret is that
"alles lebendiges 1st
ein Gehorchendes," "all that lives
is an obeying, -56 the
obedience we must come to love is the
commanding authority
of this beauty.
It is this Nietzsche thought must constitute our amor fati
,

.

But does this ethos contain any limiting
principles?
Does it affirm all differences as instances
of the crea-
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tive

forgiving powers

of man?

Are there ethically cQn .

structing prinoiples which
could further give shape
to a
life shared in common?
The central constructive
principle embedded in the
ethos of the exemplar which
could form the basis for
discriminating between kinds, of
differences allowable is that
everyone has the right to
creative self-unfolding so
long
as it does not only not
transgress other's ability to
the
same, but that it enable
it.
That is, the ethos of the
exemplar is guided by the
principle that in our imposition
of form, in our "lust to
rule," we impose in such a
way
that we inspire others to their
own creative selfformation, and in so doing help
give form to the plurality
of things which keep our own
creative questioning alive.

Those ways of revealing the world
which attempt to herd
others into a mass (in which category
Nietzsche included
Wagner's music and Napoleon's commanding,
among others,
and we would certainly include
Hitler's totalitarian rule,
but also modern normalizing disciplinary
power which, on
Foucault's persuasive reading, sustains
the productive apparatus in the West, among others), collapse
the tension
which the form-giving forces of human beings
must sustain
if we are to creatively renew, through
questioning after
our own meaning, our forms of life and hence
endow them
with legitimacy and enduring life.
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on this reading of Niet
2 sche< s ethical
thinking a
conception of justice emerges
which would ground rights
not in reason,
transcendental order, or God,
hut in the
creative self-forming world
revealing capacities of
human
beings. The questions
who are we and what is
good we
would fundamentally answer
with the following: we
are
questioning, creating beings
whose excellence, whose
"good" is manifest in our
world revealing capacities.
Vet is this really Nietzsche?
isn't this a sanitized
version? There is so often,
at the very least, a
fierceness to Nietzsche's
characterization of this wonder,
and
in talking about the
friend it is critical that
the friend
also be capable of being our
enemy,
what are we to make
of this? I would like to
anticipate these objections with
the help of an essay by the
naturalist-philosopher Barry
Lopez, and argue that in
Nietzsche's best moments, where
he is most illuminating, this
fierceness must be understood in terms of sustaining
tension, not conquering
collapse.
In "The Passing Wisdom of Birds,"
Lopez reflects on

the deliberate incineration by Cortez
and his men, on June
16, 1520, of the beautiful aviaries of
the Aztecs in Mexico City. 57 He recounts the wonder
at the gardens and
aviaries the Spaniards expressed in entries
in their
diaries carefully made in the months prior
to the con-
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flagration of tne
the city.
r-i-t-w

u~
He suggests that the
nature of
this wonder is the one
we too share.
6 " 06 fr °" predict "
abL'patrerns^huMan^
desl 9 n that draws

us
to them
Tn %hf
bUt related
universe we are abie to
91
ol
farlrv-we^ eC °3"^- With
astonishment,
a new
pattern »5?

^^

t^ST

He goes on to suggest we
must ouitivate this sense
of
nystery as a counter to
incineration and conquest, "to
see
that the possibilities for
expression of life in any environment. .are larger than
we can predict, and that
this
is all right... to encounter
a wild animal is to
know the
defeat of thought, to feel
reason overpowered. -59 We
must
learn, he says, that a return
to a state of awe with
.

na-

ture does not threaten our
intellectual capacity to analyze complex events.
It is something like this
cultivation of the wild, of

mystery, a self-conscious effort
to live in such a way
that we are able to experience
the wild in ourselves and

in each other that Nietzsche in his best
moments attempts
both to exemplify and articulate;
to have his readers ex-

perience in his voice and to hear in the
form of reason.
Through his efforts to discern in what
ways the mystery of
our new metaphysical solitude could be
celebrated,
Nietzsche was led at his best, to appreciate
that to embrace our originality we must paradoxically
cultivate this
wildness within a life shared in common.
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The metaphors he uses
to express this
i-hi« sense of
wildness and mystery are evi-r^^^
Y
extraordinary and extreme,
and often
appear more to form a
seamless continuity with
the incendiary congesting
character of modernity
than to conDure a different ethos.
In interpreting an
instance of
such extremity - an expanded
version of the passage from
whence I drew Nietzsche's
definition of freedom - I
would
like to explore and situate
this fierceness within
the exemplary ethos in terms of
the aesthetic ^conceptualiza-

tions of freedom equality
and justice which, on this
reading, Nietzsche's work
suggests.
These are conceptions
which, though they rely
fundamentally on reason, also
"know the defeat of thought,
feel reason overpowered."

That is to say, they rest on
a cultivation of the
wild.
"For what is freedom? That
one has the will
S lf reSP ° nSibilit
That
ypreserves
;
the H
distance
that divides. .The free mantis
H ° W is freedom ^asured,
in in^JfiF*?*" S" n nations?
B y the resistance
whlch'h^
which
t be
H overcome, by
has to
the
costs tp^Jay_alpft. One would efforts it
have to seek
the highest type of free man
where the
greatest resistance is constantly
overcome: five steps from tyranny, beina
threshold of danger of servitude." 60near the

^

.

In this passage on freedom Nietzsche
suggests we must

preserve the distance that divides so
that we can contend
with others in such a way that we make
something of ourselves - a possibility he suggests only
arises under conditions of danger of some sort. This danger
is that presented by strong others in whose presence we
are "five
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steps fro* tyranny, very
near the threshold of
servitude »
If we thin, these two
thoughts together: to
maintain the
distance that divides, and
to place ourselves on
the
threshold of tyranny and
servitude - it beccnes
evident
that in order that „e ma
intain our freedom i„
NietZ sche's
vre„, we ourselves mU st
not beco me tyrants or
m a.ce servants of others, for in so
doing we would "incinerate"
the
distance that divides. But
what to raake of the language
of Uebe^indung, of
overling? if we eltamine the
Nietzsche uses to illustrate
this
cms state of freedom I think
it becomes clear that
overcoming also must not be
understood as tyrannical destruction
or domination.
The example he gives is from psychology,
where he says the highest type exercises maximum
authority and discipline when
contending with tyrannical instincts.
Finest type <=

Julius Caesar.

what is critical about this
example is
that in order to be this "finest
type," the very force
tyrannical instincts present us with
must not be extinguished, but used, channeled.
Our freedom requires
that we not only not neutralize them,
but that we
cultivate these "unruly tyrants."
To extrapolate from the psychological
realm then, it
is in the tension produced by
strong others, strong individuals that our freedom flourishes. The
strength to

maintain this sense for the wild, this distance
that divides, constitutes what is noble in human
beings, for
it
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^ants

a *ind of difficulfc

the basis o£ an
appreciation

^
bofch

^^^^
nnitude

ones own perspectivally
confined existence, but
also for
the fact that it is the
very existence of the
„i ld itself
which generates what has
f. force in our experience
A
just society, on this reading,
is one which organi.es
itself around this aesthetic
cultivation o, the wild, this
questioning wonder without which
individual freed™ cannot
flourish.
Its social and political
principles would be
ordered around this excellence,
within this aesthetic understanding of justice material
well-being,

U

adoration

politics would nave
have thpir
their rvi
place, u.
but they would be bounded
and defined by this socially
recognized value of cultivating the wild, of "trembling
with the craving and rapture
of such questioning," and
not by some kind of promise
of
rectification for human existence.
4
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CHAPTER IV

INTERLUDE

Siqh -I caught this insiaht «™
quickly seized the ra^hefpoor
10SeSt t0 hand to
ifc down les?
it
flv%w
aWay ." gain
And now
has
died of
tlL
these arid words and shakes
and flaps in
them - and I hardly know
anymore
when I onv
at it how I could ever
have felt so
3PPY
when I caught this bird. 1
.

WordHh^

-

^

'

i

Melancholy aspiration.

Sorry backward glance
that

tells us Nietzsche knows that
no seizing effort at
identity, no effort to "pin
it down" will keep
the bird's
heart on beat.
Yet Nietzsche knows too
that we, as creating beings, must make effort
with words to give positive
shape to our momentary insights,
that we must form some
kind of particular relationship
to the bird on wing.
The
Aztecs built aviaries.
Cortez incinerated.
I have suggested that in his best moments
Nietzsche urges us, like
Barry Lopez, to "cultivate the
wild," to develop
an

aesthetic sensibility.

That is, he urges us to develop
an

appreciation for the fact that for
living entity

-

thing to endure as

be it a thought, person,

political form of life

-

a

or a cultural-

our relationship to it must be

infused with a certain tension,

wild alteritas.

a

a

certain space for its

Insofar as this tension is sustained,

that which gives a form its endurance,

sustained.
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its vitality can be

done.

And amidst the efforteffort to illuminate the
constructive dimensions ofx Nietzsche
Nietzsrhp'cs thought, we
must admit he
does this damage aqain
ay<nn and ana
in
y
again.
speaking of the
overman, to give
aive but
hnf one
nf10 of
many, many possible
examples,
he writes,
•

-i

-.

m

cne

leveled," a feeling of
distance from
Sta "- S ° n the
he
l^es off teem
™'
mSS
g r arlstocrac y is that of the
future.»2

£2

What are W e to make of
these two discrepant voices
and this backward sighing
insight? I think we approach
an
answer if we become clear
about the essential standpoint
from which Nietzsche's
reflections on culture and
politics
flowed, namely, the standpoint
of the solitary philosopher.
By this I mean that his
fundamental concern was
with preserving the questioning
life of the mind, a life
which in Nietzsche's thinking is
almost entirely devoid of
the need for the presence of
others for its quality and
its sustenance.
In this sense his concern was
not unlike
Plato's.
And his concern, again not unlike
Plato's, was
with the predicament of the life of
the mind at a time
when the very ground of thought, that
which gathers,
directs and gives solidity to the thinking
activity, was
being lost, it is then from within the
dilemmas posed in
a post-metaphysical condition for
thinking

,

traditionally

understood, that Nietzsche approached and
demarcated and
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illuminated the problems
posed by "the death of
God" for
action and practice, for
politics and culture.
The consequences are both
enormously illuminating as
well as enormously limited.
Illuminating because, since
there is some Kind o,
interdependent relationship
between
the world of thought and
that o, practice, Nietzsche's
effort to situate the life
of the mind in the world
of
chacs, flux, and finitude in distinct reaction to
the
tradition in which the life of
the mind is severed from
this confusion, freed for
the contemplation of eternal
essences - opened up space for
critique so extraordinary
that it further threw all
settled opinions
into doubt.

But Nietzsche's thought was
limited by the fact that the
central drama remained for him
that of the solitary philosopher who, in a post-metaphysical
age must learn to em-

brace with parodic honesty and
with gratitude the inevitably imperfect nature of his
thought-products. As a
consequence when he turned to reflect
on politicalcultural life and in particular on
authority and on justice, he encountered the following
dilemma.
It is quite
possible for those concerned with thinking
and artistic
creation to take a parodic and ironic
relationship
to

their own creations, to suffer this pain
of finitude like
a "great tragedian," reveling even
in the spectacle of
their own struggles; to take enormous pleasure
and derive
substantial form-giving force from the insubstantiality
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and unending quality of
this drama.
Vet it is quite another order of difficulty
to found a society, a
politicalcultural order on the
celebration of irony and
parody.
There are two possible
alternatives Nietzsche predominately sees in response to
this dilemma. One can
retain
a nihilistic continuation
of the present in which
the experimental democratic spirit
is bound, and in which
though
there be no horizon, one
pretends to a distanced objectivity from which vantage
point real engagement with
the
world is not possible. The
result is susceptibility to
fakirs and tyrants such as
Wagner in whose drama the self
can be reunited in a seamless
comforting whole. The
result then is an infinitely
adaptable self and tyranny
which together pass for freedom
and community.

This is the insidious form of
tyranny. The other
alternative Nietzsche sees is the
incendiary voice - a
tyranny whose virtue is that it is
at least forthright,
and which therefore Nietzsche seems
to prefer out of a
commitment to honesty,
this alternative, in order that
the few strong enough to take aesthetic
pleasure in great
tra-gedy can do so, it is necessary that
they "stand upon"
the herd who are too weak for this
draught of pleasure.
And here Nietzsche makes a nitch for
himself in that longstanding philosophical tradition which sees
a strict

m

dichotomy between freedom and necessity to which
Nietzsche
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added his own justification in
the form of the strong and
the weak.
This is the division of the world
of possibility under post-metaphysical conditions
which usually occurred
when Nietzsche turned his thoughts
from the predicament of
the solitary activity of thinking
and artistic creation to
the world of politics and culture.
it is the standpoint
of the solitary philosopher as
artistic maker then which I
think accounts for the persistent
disjuncture between,
on

the one hand, Nietzsche's philosophical
radicalism - by
which I mean his effort to think without
the ground of
Truth and enduring essences and his
concomitant philosophical embrace of multiplicity and difference,
and on the
other, his overt political and cultural
reflections which
are fundamentally and f righteningly tyrannical.
However, as

I

have argued through my development of

the exemplary ethos, there are moments when Nietzsche

grasps a conception of authority that is neither insidious

nor overt tyranny.

in moments he has insights into a

cultivation of the wild within the context of interrelations between persons, insights which could and

I

think

should inform our thinking on cultural and political life

under post-metaphysical conditions since they encompass
the condition of contingency and plurality at the heart of
the human world yet do not usher in relativity and lack of
standards.

That is to say Nietzsche gestures towards the
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possibility of an ethical horizon
which could sustain a
thinking between persons
(dialogue)
not a thinking alone
possible in solitude. And it
is this voice that is
Most
insightful and of most interest
to us, as X have argued,
,

in searching for a conception
of authority and justice
in
a post-metaphysical age.

Still, there are serious limitations
to even thi
IIS

constructive voice of Nietzsche's.

Perhaps the most im-

portant one has to do with his lack
of an appreciation for
the tremendous aesthetic pleasure
of being side-by-side
with our fellow humans in the sense
that you are with me;
that we stand together, moved by
the same cultural
or nat-

ural thing; pleasure in finding
ourselves similarly
provoked.
There is a sweet anticipation of concord
as we
think to share the world that moves us
with others; we
take tremendous pleasure in this desire
and in its fulfillment.

Yet such harmonious concord must not, and
here
is Nietzsche's insight, be the only way
we take aesthetic

pleasure in each other.

Nietzsche would have us dis-

cover/cultivate the pleasure of the excitement and fear
that our anticipation of disaccord and difference
generates.

It is this pleasure of aesthetic provocation

Nietzsche almost exclusively explores

- in

contrast and

perhaps in reaction to the philosophical tradition.
It may be that the reactive quality of Nietzsche's

thinking in this regard, that is, his failure to positive-
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ly explore identity
oeing-with aua concord, is
y or a beinn-^jn,
acutely bound up with the
increasing and eventually
ex-

traordinary solitary and lonely

l

ife he himself came

lead.

^

And this Must be thought
in terms of a personal
life in which friends were
precious few and never adequate; in which "home" or
"place" was a perpetual
parade
of inns and boarding houses;
in terms of political
exile;
and in terms of a simultaneous
distancing of his reflections from any specific
cultural and political institutions and practices.
Insofar- as
c -i-k«
insorar
the equivocal dialogue of
the solitary is arrested by
the "third person"
p.

as

Nietzsche himself suqqests
uyyests in the
t-h^ Prologue
d>-~i «
to Zarathusl-.T-*
others restore a certain
wholeness and identity to the
self and a certain necessary
confidence in a world shared
in common, however incomplete
and subject to change
this

may in fact be.

And it may be that though Nietzsche
knew
this enough to articulate it, his
own life had so
at-

tenuated his confidence in such a
world that it entered
only episodically into his philosophical
and political
reflections

However that may be, Nietzsche's neglect
of the
aesthetic pleasure we take in concord, and
of a world
shared in common cannot of course be
understood outside
the context of his analysis of nihilism
and his sense of
talking into a void. Any bases upon which a
common form
of life might be established under these
conditions must
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be utterly different,
new
new.

For this
fhic reason we
tor
find in
the work in which in my
view Nietzsche
,

^thustra,

is

most consistently constructive
with respect to the possibility of a co on ethos
under post-metaphysical
conditions, that the figure
embodying this ethos is a
prophet.
Zarathustra is no normal person;
these no normal times.
He is a person who comes
and goes, who lives high
on a
mountain in a cave with semi-wild
animals for companions.
He is a solitary, not a
political being. He is fundamentally outside the city. still,
he goes into the city and
there tries, through his example,
to constitute

M

a "we" of

a certain kind; to constitute,

by example, a particular

kind of power or capability in
others such that they are
able to bear up to their times.
Politically this means
that they have the strength to
speak to a we that is always not yet a we; that is never
entirely constituted
since under post-metaphysical conditions
there can be no
ground for so being. Politically this
means not treating
"the settled" as True, not seeking to
ground it in this
way.
Politically this means searching to ground
order not
in Truth but in a different kind of
authority.

Zarathustra is a prophet who tries to teach with
truth,
yet the truth he teaches is that there can
be
no Truth.

He is a different kind of prophet; one whose
truth allows

him to learn, to be surprised by the world, to
be filled,

despite his wisdom, with wonder.
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And this precisely is

the source of Zarathustra
' s
authority, that, having withstood the trial of pity, he
can treat his fellow humans
as
equals, suffering the pathos
of distance that allows
him
to let them cut into him with
the sharp edge of their difference, their otherness.
And it is this ability to
celebrate the difference of others
and the diversity of
being which forms the radiating
quality of life and which
Nietzsche gestures towards as the
new foundation for
authority and authoritative action in
a post-metaphysical
condition.
Politically Nietzsche suggests to us
that we
must have, under these new conditions,
a prophetic, inspirational dimension to political
discourse and action in
order that the norms, standards,
traditions we develop
endure as living things; in order that
they maintain the
ability to speak to a we that is in perpetual
potential

re-constitution
What we find in Nietzsche then in the way of
positive
limitations and commitments is not only the
imposition the
artist must experience as s/he limits and shapes,
through
long discipline, the multiplicity of her being.
Not only
do we explore with Nietzsche the necessity of such
imposi-

tion on the individual as artist in order to create some-

thing worthy.

We also find in the exemplar a form of

power that imposes, not through tyranny but through

provocation and display of excellence, provocation pos-
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sible only through resolute
refusal to pity and to as
simi late others to ourselves.
Still, we must consider whether
this kind of tragedy
lived by the exemplar exhausts
the nature of imposition
necessary for political community.
The most persistent
and problematic omission in
all of Nietzsche's thought
as
it pertains to political-cultural
life is a failure to
turn his thought directly to
what positive institutional

affirmations

broadly understood to include
laws, constitutional arrangements, practices
and beliefs - might
bind a culture together forming
shared horizons and constituting traditions.
this sense too Nietzsche's
thought is "reactive" for, though
he proclaimed the death
of God, he also foresaw this death
taking place for some
200 years, and he was preoccupied with
hastening it.
-

m

in

his view this meant bringing nihilism
to its full conclusion, a preoccupation which must
engage active nihilists
for decades to come.
This meant that while, as I have
claimed in chapter one, his primary and
ultimate aims were
formative and constructive, there was yet a
lot of undermining to be done. To paraphrase Arendt,
Nietzsche, in

choosing this strategy, is enormously illuminating,
but

insufficiently constructive; capable of great radicalization but not a new beginning; still bound to though
(or

perhaps because) rebelling against the conceptual categories of the philosophical tradition.
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3

think it is evident that
this is S o if we consider
that
Nietzsche's most interesting
and politically insightful writing
offers us nothing faintly
aKin to
a meditation on
political institutions.
Egually to the
Point are Nietzsche's critiques
of modern political
I

Mm-m^,

in-

stitutions which, as

have argued, cohere around
the contention that they all desire
to eradicate suffering
and
that they all demand equal
rights which Nietzsche
equates
with a leveling demand for
sameness. As such, they all
embody the quintessential^
modern spirit: the morality
of
Pity, a morality whose basic
impulse runs directly
counter, once again, to the
aesthetic sensibility
Nietzsche sought to cultivate.
In my discussion of
Nietzsche's critique of the women's
movement for emancipation, emblematic in his view
of modern political forms,
we
see Nietzsche display an enormous
capacity for ironic play
which cleverly deconstructs the
notion of the eternally
feminine while simultaneously deriding
as clerks and
borifiers those who argue strictly for
equal rights - in
both their bourgeois and socialist
forms.
Certainly it is
clear that Nietzsche is suggesting an
end to the bourgeois
state, yet, though through his constant
dodging he challenges the comfortable and usual contours
of the debate
and in so doing is not un-illuminating,
the extent to
I

which he both caricatures and hence simplifies
the aspirations behind the movement for emancipation,
and fails to
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wrestle with the question
what should we struggle
for,
leads to a certain sterility
amidst much parodic and
ironic fun. why didn't,
one is pressed to ask
of this
serious thinker, he actively
engage in sustained debate
with the women's movement
over the notion of equality
they
were arguing for? Likewise
for democrats and socialists.
Why did he not more carefully
study the philosophical
'

dimensions of these movements?

Why did he not bring his

thought about the friend,
equality and the importance of
the "distance that divides"
to bear explicitly and in
terms of political philosophy
and political action on
these contemporary political
movements?
We have reached in Nietzsche's
thought an impasse.
It haunts his work, particularly
if one wishes to read him
as a political philosopher and
claim him as part of that
tradition.
One can try to explain this impasse
by pointing out, as Bergman has, that
Nietzsche was an aristocrat
who feared the Paris Commune, who
hardly seriously read a
socialist in his life, etc. so that his
radicalism was
caught within the confines of an aristocratic
sensibility

making him an aristocratic radical.

And one can argue, as

have, that Nietzsche's singular failure
in his sole effort to really practice politics in any sense Wagnerian
I

culture-politics

-

turned his concerns away from direct

practice to epistemological

,

metaphysical, and ontological

problems that made most contemporary political practice
in

244

Nietzsche's view futile

.

^^^

And

^

forts to p arodio irony
and deconstructive
evas ons
shake up furtherurther, as an active
nihilist, the already
crumbling roots of modern
society
ty
Or
ono can argue
r one
°
as I did
above, following in part
Arendt's lead
au that
t-nat the
th. impasse
also has »re fundamental
roots.
That is, that

^

.

'

'

I

it is

rooted in a preoocupation
with the life of the mind,
traditionally understood, and
that this central concern
defines and structures the
options Nietzsche perceives
in
the world of political
practice.
this sense we would
see Nietzsche as a
transitiona! figure with
regard to the
tradition of political philosophy on the one hand

m

re-

jecting the world of eternal
truth as the home of the
life
of the mind, on the other,
viewing the world of politics
and action solely from the
vantage point of the contemplative life

believe all three efforts at
explanation are in
different ways illuminating. More
important with regard
I

to my concerns however than
developing a convincing explanation for this impasse is to
point to the fact that while
we must reject the perhaps
dominant voice in Nietzsche
with regard to an aesthetic conception
of justice, there
is another conception still
firmly within the critique of

the morality of pity.

The first conception goes something

like - since the herd are not strong
enough to live in a
world with no Truth in any way worthy of
life, the strong
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who are able to thrive
ana have, even in this
tragic
state, gratitude for life,
should stand on the backs
of
the weak, enslave them
that at least so»e may
answer well
the -hammer blows of
necessity." This would
be just.

This is clearly a strong
voice in Nietzsche.
Yet the
other conception of justice
to which I have alluded
in
chapter three is, it seems to
me, by far the more interesting and fertile ground for
thought about authority and
justice in our times.
It is with the aim of
further developing this other
conception of justice which also
is aesthetic in nature

that

will turn momentarily to the
work of Hannah Arendt,
for Arendt must be understood,
on my reading, as the heir
to this voice of Nietzsche's.
Arendt takes Nietzsche's
tragic aesthetic insight that in
order for things to
endure as living things they need
to be infused with tension born of questioning, and tries
to situate it in terms
of institutions, practices, and
worldliness more persistently than Nietzsche was able. Arendt
asked the questions Nietzsche failed to and thus
avoided his impasse.
This I believe leads her to confront
more interestingly
than Nietzsche the problems for an
essentially aesthetic
approach to politics, to the problem of authority
and to
I

justice.

And she does so as a preeminently and self-

consciously political philosopher by which

I

mean,

follow-

ing her formulations, one concerned about the
world in its
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plurality and relativity
viry, and not
„„t alone
al
as it concerns the
solitary philosopher.
If Nietzsche's efforts
to elaborate an ethical
horizon and an understanding
of authority on the
basis of
which political life in a
post-metaphysical age could be

ordered lapse either into
tyranny, on the one hand,
or a
very interesting elaboration
of the nature of such
relations as they might exist
between two persons, but an
elaboration which nevertheless
fails to rigorously address
itself to sustained political
concerns, on the
other,

Arendt both articulates this
aesthetic sensibility and
subjects it in a sustained
manner to political

concerns.

The second half of this
dissertation, assuming a vast
terrain of shared sensibilities
between Arendt and Nietzsche,
seeks to explore how Arendt
fares in the effort to
"cultivate the wild," to sustain
this bird in flight which
Nietzsche, with such melancholy,
in his most luminous moments knows he largely fails.
In chapter four

I

will be concerned with elaborating

Arendt 's critique of modernity which
centers around its
process character and the lament, similar
to Nietzsche's,
that it is distinguished by its inability
to give specific
form and stability to cultural-political
life.
in chapter
five I will be concerned with articulating
the aesthetic
foundations of Arendt 's thought which I will
tie closely
to her ontology, and in chapter six with
developing
the

247

conceptions of authority
authoritv and
=.«^ of
* j
justice which emerge from
her work.
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CHAPTER V
ARENDT'S CRITIQUE OF THE
MODERN

A.

in

Introdunt

j

r>

n

C^volution, Arendt conjectured

that to the

backward glance of those in the
future it may become apparent that "what we call
revolution is precisely the
which brings abQut the

^msitpj^^

Qf a

secular real,. »1 (emphasis mine)

And in

^

B^twe^st^nd

Future, she writes, "it could
be that only now will
the
past open up to us with unexpected
freshness and tell us
things no one has yet had ears
to hear.»2 The WQrldly
reference points for both thoughts
were the events and experiences of totalitarianism and the
first atomic explosions which in her view marked the
real and absolute break
with tradition and the advent
politically of the modern
world.
This Arendt distinguishes from the
onset of the
modern age beginning in the 17th century
and lasting up
until that absolute break - a time in
which the thread of
tradition was no longer able to provide a
reliable guide
to the past and hence signposts for
the present or for the
future.
This age was consequently marked by
instability

and political experimentation in the effort
to find a new
foundation for political order, for political
authority.
The absolute break with tradition which
marks the ad-

vent of the modern world, forces upon us ever
more urgent250

^

ly in Arendt's view
the task of listenlng
to the past
new ears for clues ana
hints about the foundations
for a
new political order.
Arendt's critics of the
modern a ge

coalesce around her efforts
to he a midwife to
the
aE^aecloruM she thought could, with

^

effort, appear.

The fundamental concern
which guides Arendt in
her
critique is the process
character of the modern age
in
which human life appears to
be a function of natural
inexorable processes which strip
all individual acts and
considerations of their dignity,
power and place. 3 Tnis
notion of process is conceptually
coterminous with what I
have referred to in my
discussion of Nietzsche as the
lack
of form, the inability to
form, despite a driving

win

to

mastery and imposition in modernity.
indeed Nietzsche's
lament that modernity lacks
"gestaltende Kraefte" - forces
which shape, form, and give
structure - finds direct echo
in Arendt <s metaphorical
characterization of the
type of

pemanence the modern age has developed:
that of process
rather than that of stable structure."
Nietzsche, in Arendt too

I

Moreover, as in

think we find a particularly

post-metaphysical aesthetic sensibility at
play as she
works on this task of building the
conceptual foundations
for a stable structure, for a different
kind of permanence
and for a novus ordo saeclorum.
In particular they share
an impulse basic to this sensibility that to achieve

something of beauty whose excellence gives it
"the right"
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to be saved from the
obscurity „*
of time requires
sustaining
some kinds of creative
tensions, tensions which
inevitably
involve suffering
They share
g i
"ill argue, an aesthetic
approach to questions of
justi ce
in a
And they
nie.
see this capacity to
sustain tensions as central
to the
durability of a for, of life
as something with lifa. They
both suggest that the
durability and permanence
(which in
political terms means the
authority) of a political
structure in our post-metaphysical
condition depends in critical ways upon the space
within that form of life for,
in
Nietzsche's case questioning
wonder, and in Arendt's! for
the capacity for initiative
and the capacity to think
from
the standpoint of others.
They share, as I will argue
an
aesthetic approach to the problem
of authority in a noyus
ordo s aeclornm.

^

i,^^.

^ ^^

noyu^a^^^.

^

,

In Arendt's work however,
this sensibility is largely

implicit.

What

I

wish to do in these chapters on
Arendt

is to draw out the aesthetic
sensibility which

I

think is

both the ever present implicit
comportment she takes
towards the world in her reflections,
and which also explicitly informs much of her reflection
on the bios
politikos particularly with respect to
justice and
authority.
,

There are however, important qualitative
differences
in their aesthetic understandings which
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I

want now briefly

~
^

to adumbrate, and
which
CO "in9 ChaPterS

m

-re

win

-

A96 '" that

V ° iCeS

further eiabQrated

fae

«*• * —ition

-

«-

^

,

and the Mod .

three modern thinkers
who

the first to dare to
think

any tradition . Marx

^

^

^

_

^^

overly loud and pathetic
-„i =
P neuc in c1
style,
making it difficult for
us to listen to them.
If this is „ Qt
altogether true z
think Arendt wrote these
words to coax our hearing
to hear
them so - and in some
important sense she was
right to do
so.
With respect to my concern the differences in the
aesthetic dimensions of
Nietzsche and Arendt 's
thought
she is on target for,
as I have suggested
in the Interlude, Nietzsche's thought
was still to a great
extent a
reaction to traditional
metaphysics' rejection of the
mundane, sensuous, disordered
world and its embrace
of the

eternal quietude of Truth.

This reactive quality holds

Nietzsche's critique within the
framework of the terms of
that against which he reacts.
his aesthetics this
manifests itself in his placing
the self as an artist who
is intoxicated with perfection
of his own making at the
center of his conceptualization
of the tragic beauty of
human life. what Nietzsche's
artist must develop

m

the

s trength

or courage for is the cruel
disappointment that
th
"is perfection is an elusive dream,
never attainable, yet
one
e which must be pursued.
And it is this cruelty he must
a ffirm as tragically beautiful.
The terms he uses in this
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light are most significant.

This ia a

^^

s£ml

^

suffer and bear if we are
to embrace life. To
do so, to
be sure, Nietzsche argues
we must become "genuine
spectators," those who can
delight in such cruelty;
but

cruelty - a cruel fate

-

it remains.

mdeed, it is barely

endurable.

think we find a qualitative
movement in Arendt's
aesthetic reflections with
respect to suffering and
cruelty.
Although, in Arendt's view,
there is much in
life that must be born or
suffered by being artistically
transfigured, Nietzsche's understanding
of this transfiguration as "spiritualized cruelty"
remains foreign to
her way of thinking. And this
is not I think because she
is a "softer" more "romantic"
thinker.
it is
I

as if

Nietzsche's, at the time, solitary
and heroic effort to
accept the end to the dream of the
metaphysical world of
true Being remains a sort of endless
Sysphean task in
which he is condemned forever to push
the boulder to the
top of the hill, only to give out
at the last moment.
Hence we see the figure of the artist
striving for perfection, ever disappointed, developing a
laughing but cruelly
tragic perspective on the situation to which
he has been
condemned in order to compensate.
It is this dimension of compensation rustling

eternally in the shadows of Nietzsche's thinking
which is
finally I think stilled in Arendt's work. The figure
at
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the center of

Arenas

aesthetics is the ..Man- o
f action
who, as a subject with
its twofold meaning
of actor
sufferer is first and
foremost a subject
a
political being in the
broadest of

^

t^^^,

senses who experiences
as perhaps the basic
nature of his art the
unpredictable
quality of all action, and
hence the futility of
efforts
to be its sovereign.
Off only a little from
center stage

there are other figures

-

the spectators, those who
alone

can complete the action
begun by the actor by telling
the
story, giving it meaning,
fitting it into a coherent
whole.
It is only with this
completion Arendt argues that
there is reconciliation in
a world fundamentally
inhabited
by many distinct and unique
but essentially related
beings.

Arendt <s frame of reference is
from beginning to
end human events, plurality
and meaning, as Nietzsche's

is

human perfection (works)

singularity and truth.

And in
this light it is important to
note that it is the metaphor
of the theatre which rules Arendt
<s political theory, for
it is only in the theatre as
she says that that art "whose
sole subject is man in his relationship
to others"
,

is

practiced.

5

The aesthetic sensibility Arendt develops
and wishes
to cultivate in her readers is a
pleasure in man in the
plural, what she refers to in her essay on
Lessing as
"tragic pleasure." 6 What is pleasing, what
is beautiful,
and therefore reconciles is to bear witness
to the courage
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of those „ ho "take upon
themselves the naked fact
of our
givenness,- acting into a
world of distinct others
in the
effort to hoth establish
relations and tear apart
others
under conditions of
extraordinary uncertainty
and openness,
in so bearing witness,
in so seeing, we undergo
a
process of recognition of
what has occurred, o,
knowing,
and hence we come to see
a waning available
only where
there are actors and
spectators who share a c«o„
stage.
There is no question here
of mastering the past,
mastering
events or creations. About
events she writes, "The best
that can be achieved is to
know precisely what it was,
and
to endure this knowledge,
and then to wait and see
what
comes of knowing and enduring." 7

The promise, along with coherency
and understanding
in the form of a story
through which we experience a
tragic pleasure, is an "intensified
awareness of
reality. "8 There is a constant
concern in Arendt's work
with what is dead while alive,
with the contrast between
life and mere life.
To give but one of many possible
examplSS in The Origins of
TotaUtarianlsm, she writes that
the logical consequence of "unlimited
expansion," the central principle of the imperialist body
politic, "is the
destruction of all living communities. .. "9
B y this Arendt
points to a loss of a particular kind and
is not to be
read literally. What she points to is the
fact that expansion, as a limitless process which subordinates
all
'

-
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specific and individual
considerations to its own
logic
destroys the conditions
within which individual
deeds nit
only can he d^, but
understood and countenanced
fay
who witness and are
affected by them, where
life, be it
the life of the mind or
of human reality writ
large, appears as a product of forces,
where it appears to be compelled by processes beyond
individual or even collective
control, the human capacity,
not for sovereignty but
for
participating in the forming and
shaping of a specifically
human life, is eclipsed.
When this occurs reality is
deadened, for the appearance
armpay a nn« of a
specifically human sense
of reality depends upon the
presence of distinct others precisely what the process character
of the modern

^

.

.

age

makes superfluous.

m

this sense Eichmann was the
final

product of the modern age for he
was distinguished in
Arendt's view by an inability to
think which she writes is
the same as being able "to think
from the standpoint of
somebody else. "10 Eicnmann was
shielded against
as such which is to say against
the words and presence of
others, the fundamental human
condition of plurality. The
source of his "death" was precisely
this shield.
Hence
the heart of Arendt's critique of the
process character of
the modern age is that it destroys the
conditions
for in-

dividual freedom and for collective, cultural
reflection
which together constitute the sine qua non
both for our
capacity to give specific form to human reality,
as well
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as for our very ability
to experience reality,
to be
alive
.

in this first chapter
my aim is to argue that
it is
the process character of
the modern age, its
inability to

provide a stable structure
within which a distinctive
culture could flourish, which
lies at the heart of Arendt's
critique of the modern age. By
this I mean not simply to
have a coherent form but to
be capable of sustaining
it-

self through the initiatives
of its free citizens, initiatives sparked by questioning,
by wonder and by thought.
It is this concern which
forms the thread which holds

Arendt's opus together in a coherency
noteworthy for its
single-mindedness.ll i begin with a
discussion of The
Origins of Totalitarianism a work
which remained for
Arendt the experiential touchstone
for all of her subsequent theorizing; then proceed to
a discussion of The
Human Condition where she analyzes
historical and philo,

,

sophical events and developments in order
to explain the
predominance of modernity's permanence-as-process;
and,

finally, turn to a discussion of On
Revolution

,

where she

identifies historical moments when this process
character
might have been withstood, yet was not.
In this work we
find Arendt resurrecting possibilities in the
effort to
give credence to her alternative vision for a
novus ordo

saeclorum

.

This is first and foremost a vision designed

to address the difficulties of political order in the
20th
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century where we are, in
her view, absolutely
„ ithout
guide from tradition, re
lig ion or authority,
the old Roman
trinity which has bounded
and stabilized and
given
specific shape to human
affairs in the West
heretofore.

B.

Total ii-^rianism

If there is a single
utterance of Arendt's which
expresses the origin and organizing
pathos of her political
theorizing it is the following.

"The mass manufacture of corrises =
*V the historically and politically
tellxgible preparation of living
i

j
1%°°**

corpses.""

Arendt's fundamental effort in
The Origins
Totalitarianism is to make intelligible
that preparation
by showing the events and
developments which culminated
in
an unprecedented homelessness
and rootlessness that characterized in her view the later
part of the modern age.

^

,

The extremity of modern conditions
has deprived human
beings of some of the most fundamental
preconditions

for

spontaneity, reaching a terrifying
finale in a government
of terror in which humans are
"stabilized" so that the
laws of nature or history (race or
class) can be
liberated. 13 Once liberated, the movement
of history or
nature becomes like a relentless, logically
compelling

process in which individuals resemble cogs,
remarkable for
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their adaptability,
aocinty, and incapacity
y, docilitv
for experience
•

Within the context of
the "creation., of this
kind of
being A re„dt argues that
the widespread support
for Hitler
was a function neither
of brainwashing nor of
lack of
knowledge.
it was rather a function
of - Mss oonsent
The very paradox of such
a concept, a paradox
of which
Arendt was very much aware,
can be resolved only by
the
notion that those ..consenting"
were not in fact in see
fundamental sense "alive," but
were in fact "living
corpses." The degree to
which totalitarian government
extinguished individual spontaneity,
the ground of freedom,
has brought into being a new
and nearly unbearable pain
which now forms the horizon
of radical evil, with
,.

totalitarianism we witness the
beginning of the destruction of the "essence of man." 14
Central to the effectiveness of
this new form of
government is its ability to extinguish
space within which
individuals are both related and within
which they can
move.
"Totalitarianism," she writes, "is like
a band of
iron squeezing people tightly together,"
so that no movement is possible. 15 The e i i]nination
of space fQr related .
ness and movement is historically
rooted in the precarious
modern grounding of law in the nature of
Man gua Man begun
with the proclamation of the Rights of Man
in revolutionary France and the birth of the modern
nation-state.
I
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would like to focus on
Arendt's analysis of the
insufficiency of such a
grounding for law and authority,
for
as we shall see, under
the onslaught of
imperialism, law
changed from an apparently
eternally stable thing
rooted
in man's "nature" to
an ever moving process
which followed
the logic, first, of capital
expansion, then of race.
this chapter of European
history the naivete of the
idea
that from man's "natural"
being certain rights automatically flow is revealed, and
it forms the foundation

m

for

Arendt's insistence that political
order must not be conceived as natural but precisely
in contradistinction to
the natural - another essential
reason for her use of
theatrical metaphors in conceptualizing
the
"nature" of

political life.
The legitimacy of law in the
modern nation-state
rests on the consent of the governed
and is held to express the rights that Man, as a
natural being, should be
granted.
its revolutionary quality was
rooted
in its

emancipation of man from the specific
status and
privileges accorded individuals by virtue
of their place
in the social-political order from
time
immemorial.

The

power and legitimacy of the nation-state
was thus rooted
in the natural law of "Man." The
paradox however, Arendt
argues, is that the Rights of Man qua Man
are really

rights conceived by and suited to a particular
historically defined people who share a national heritage,
tradi-
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tions, language, etc.

The power of the nation _
state real _
lY in fact, she argues,
rested on the nation.
The fallacy
of natural rights theory,
she suggests, was to
think there
was one human nature, to
identify it with history,
and
then to think total domination
was impossible. The fallacy we might say lay in
"naturalizing" man. This she
argues became dreadfully clear
in the 20th century.
To
trace the central dynamic of
this fallacy as it was worked
out in history, we must follow
Arendt's analysis of imperialism, "the first stage in
the political rule of the
bourgeoisie," and of bourgeois
political philosophy which

consequently became dominant.
Following Luxembourg, Arendt argues
that by the late
19th century, domestic expansion
was exhausted and capital
moved abroad to such an extent that
the bourgeoisie turned
to the state to insure and secure
their overseas investments.
Though the bourgeoisie had dominated
economically,
Arendt argues that until this direct
rule there existed a
true "national element" consisting of
statesmen, parliament, an independent press, and civil
servants who
authentically represented the nation writ large.
This national element took as its primary concern
the life of national political institutions resting on the
consent, and
hence on the limiting, shaping capacities of the
governed.

With the political domination of the bourgeoisie
a new
political concept was born

-

imperialism, the central
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principles of which were competition
and expansion.
the effort to protect the
process of accumulation - the
ceaseless economic growth without
which capitalism cannot
survive - the end of the nation-state
had to become the
permanent expansion of power. The
problem, Arendt argues,
is that neither competition
nor expansion, despite liberal
claims, are self-regulating
principles. Hence, as the
founding principles for the imperialist
state, their
limitless nature clashed with and began
to undermine the
stable rule of law grounded in consent
in favor of the
permanent process of power accumulation

m

as an end in it-

self.

Fueled by economic necessity, the
principle of perpetual motion became the paradoxical
foundation of the
polity.
In this context history comes to
appear as an endless

necessary process and man a mere "phantom of
a force." 16
Arendt brilliantly argues that Hobbes, through
"sheer
force of imagination," outlines the main tracts
of this

new man.
"He foresaw. .that he would be flattered at
being called a power-thirsty animal, although actually society would force him to
surrender all his natural forces, his virtue
and his vices, and would make him the poor
meek little fellow. .who, far from striving
against power, submits to any existing
government and does not stir even when his
best friend falls an innocent victim to an
incomprehensible coup d'etat." 17
.

.

The deepest definition of the bourgeois class, Arendt
argues,

is not that of an owning class.
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Rather, anyone

could belong to this
class who was willin,
willing *to conceive of
AA^^-^rocess of perpetual growth of
wealth,
what in
fact then happened was
the automatic nature
of this process actually
political act on
an actiQn
the public arena had become
compelled by the demands of
expansion.
the same time this process
of expansion undermined all individual safety
and stability insofar

ESEM

.

^

_

«

as

property became not the
quintessence of one's stable
and
particular social locatedness,
but itself a never ending
process of property (read capital,
expansion. The point
here is that bourgeois political
philosophy not only

conceives of individuals as
essentially private persons,
but
that the bourgeois polity
actually creates private persons
- in a

negative sense.

That is, under conditions in
which
each person is perpetually
deprived of a stable private
locus in the world privacy becomes
not the stronghold of
autonomy and self-determination as
bourgeois ideology
would have it, but rather an inner
condition, a state of
mind without outward effect. The
result is conformism and
docility of entirely privatized people
which occurs within
the overwhelming movement of history
defined as the endless process of power accumulation.

Here we begin to see the extent to which
Arendt
believes the very capacity for individuality
and for freedom are dependent upon stable structures both
in the sense
of private place in the world, and in the sense
of politi-
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cal structure within
which human relatedness
can occur
individuality is underlined
along with the capacity
for
political action insofar as
the bourgeois polity
destroys
both the basis of co„„
unifying bonds through
which human beings are positively
related in political community,
and insofar as it destroys
the materiality of private
space, reducing the private
as a dimension of the
human
condition to an inner state.

Historically under these conditions,
which meant disintegration for the nation if
not for the state, Arendt
argues that racism became a
substitute for the common
identity that had once been
forged by shared

past, language, territory and principles
of a relatively

homogeneous population.

As a distinctive phenomenon,
the

ideology of racism which claimed
to have the key to history cut across all national
boundaries and denied the

principle underlying the national
organization of peoples:
"the solidarity and equality of all
guaranteed by the

idea

of Mankind. 18

Simultaneously "Europe's best" became
imperialist administrators, bureaucrats. Excited by the
adventures expansionism offered, these men went abroad to
civilize the
savages.
Sharing no common world with those over whom
they ruled by decree, they quickly came to
serve
the force

of history - expansionism.

They became ruthless, non-

descript agents of history.
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These experiences of
imperialist polities laid
the
9r° Und "° rk t0r t0t
»"terie„i 8m
Amidst . fundamental
despair of ail human
responsibility which accompanle(J
.

^integration

of both public and prlvate

^^

^
^

came to be understood as
a m ere function in
a grander
SChe "e ° f "dory's
necessary laws, understood
either as
those governing the struggle
of the races or of the
classes.
Instead of a being whose very
nature should
guarantee certain inalienable
rights; instead of a being
who deliberately acts on
the basis of commonly
established
human principies and who
accepts responsibility for
those
acts, man becomes a plaything
of abstract laws and
forces.

With the experience of massive
numbers of stateless people
after the first World War, the
inability of the Rights of
Man or of any natural guarantees
to secure human dignity
became evident. Arendt argues
that what totalitarian
ex-

periences revealed was the total
inadequacy of "nature- to
secure rights, and to found a pol
1
it ica -legal order.

And

she suggests that we must realize
that our most fundamental right is a right to have
rights which is the same
thing as having a right to live in
an organized political
community, in a specific pjUitically
secured piace in the
world where speech is relevant and deeds
effective.
There
is nothing equal about us by nature.
Equality, she

arques,

is produced throuqh political organization,

such is more "artificial" than "natural."
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and as

The spatial

tension

to hu»a„ existence
must be "artificially.,

secured.

C

The Human Condi -hi on

in The Human Conditi
on, Arendt <s analysis
of the
process-character of the modern
age is deepened.
As j
have suggested above, her
basic critigue

of imperialism is

that it creates entirely
private persons who, as
such, are
deprived of the worldly spaces
for, and experience
of,
freedom and initiative. This
identification of modernity
with private being receives
critical reassessment in
The
Human Conditio n.
Arendt develops the -non
privative

traits of privacy" and associates
the modern age with the
advent of the social realm and
socialized man, developments destructive of both worldly
public spaces and of
private life.
Importantly then, in this work,
Arendt more
fully elaborates the attributes
of both public and private
dimensions of existence and suggests
the kinds of tensions
which must be sustained between them
too in order that human life both attain excellence
and distinction and avoid
the condition of being "dead while
alive" - a phrase which
is perhaps the most succinct
statement of her judgment of
"the social."

Central to the argument of this book is
her claim
that the modern age is best understood
as an

age, not of
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self-alienation as Marx argued,
but of world alienation,
in this context, her
use of the term world
is meant broadly to refer to that
life which concerns us
not as singular
beings, but as beings in
the plural; that is, as
beings
whose sense of reality is
fundamentally dependent upon
the
presence of others and on our
ability to for, a commonly
shared existence through our
capacities for speech and
deed.
The modern age as a whole,
she argues, can be understood as a series of events
and developments which undermine the possibility of
forming a stable, durable
structure within which a truly
human world can
develop.

Set off by three essentially
premodern events - the
Reformation and the massive
expropriation and accumulation
of social wealth that followed,
the discovery of America,
and the invention of the telescope,
the modern age commences with three different sources
of world alienation,
all of which contribute to a turning
away from the essential condition under which human
life was given us in

Arendt's view

-

plurality.

The Reformation unleashed a

ferocious but only apparently world-concerned
activity.
In fact the concern that predominated
was with the self's
welfare and salvation, the world being only
the external
instrument.
For its part, the discovery of America began
a dramatic process of abolishing distance
and spatiality
so that we now are faced with living literally
as mankind.

As such, we are alienated substantially from the
immediacy
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of our earthly and our
worldly surroundings. And
finally,
the invention of the telescope
Arendt argues had the
twofold effect of alienating
"man" from trust in the
senses and of establishing as
the locus for securing true
knowledge about the world a point
utterly outside of our
earthly condition - the Archimedean
point.
Knowledge has
come to depend on our capacity to
survey which requires
that we "disentangle" ourselves
from everything near.
What ties these three disparate
events together is that
they remove us from engagement with
our immediate condi-

tion both with respect to the earth
and to the world, an
engagement which, in Arendt 's view, is
the precondition
for developing a concern with cultivating
a specifically
human sense of reality. Neither our
essential purposes
nor our ability to know are, in the
modern age, thought to
rely upon a commonly shared world, upon
the presence of
others
In a complicated examination of what Arendt
considers

to be the fundamental activities of the active
as con-

trasted with the contemplative life, she traces the
marks
of this world alienation in modern philosophy and
modern

political theory while being careful to note that they are
set off by a series of actual historical events.

She

thereby weaves together the story in philosophy, science
and world events of the originating factors and forces

whose endpoint is a form of domination of humans by laws
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of inexorable process
which, be they laws of
nature or of
history, crush the essentially
human capacity for

spontaneity, initiative, freedom.

narrative

For purposes of my own

^

will discuss Arendt , s notion
Qf
well as the labor philosophies
of Locke and Marx, on
the
one hand, and the introspective
subjectivism of modern
I

^

Philosophy beginning with Cartesian
doubt, on the other.
Probably the single most important
theoretical development in The_ji umail
is Arendt , s conception of
"the social."
it forms the center of her
critique of the
modern age as she proceeds to
consider and critique it
from the standpoint of its ability
to appreciate
plurality, the condition of political

^^

life.

it is from

this point of view that Arendt
considers all three of the
activities of the ylta_actiya - labor,
work and action,
not because she wants to assert the
absolute primacy of
political action, as some have argued, 19
but rather because of the experiences of totalitarianism.
The lesson
she draws from these experiences is that
neither the distinctive virtues and gifts peculiar to both
private and
public life, and hence the richness of lived
experience,

nor our sense of reality itself can be kept
in being

without a healthy political culture, without a healthy
concern for the world.

The conditions of both necessity

and freedom in the modern age have become indistinct,
even

unreal qua experience precisely because of a lack of con-

270

cern with worldliness.

And this lack of concern

^

Qf

course precisely the
character she attributes to
"the social.

The problem and nature of
the social realm cannot
be
understood save against the
background of the other two
primary spatial delineations
Arendt makes - the public
realm and the private. The
private corresponds to that
specific material location where
the individual can live
free from the bright light
of the eyes of others,
free for
love and intimacy, and for
the quiet wanderings of the
mind, but also freed from the
demands of the public

life
for the pressing, even
tyrannical demands of the body,
and
for the reproduction of life.
Here intimacy and necessity
can be attended to by being
respectively protected and
limited.
The public, by contrast,
corresponds to that

commonly established space provided
for citizens to speak
and act together qua humans; to
appear not as beings
caught in the same cycle of life's
needs, but as beings
with distinctive qualities. These two
realms exist in
enormous tension, and must do so, in
Arendt's
view,

in or-

der that the dimensions and virtues of
each be kept in
being.
Concerned as she is with the demise of political
life in the modern age, her effort is spent
largely in developing the distinctive qualities of the political.
Yet
we ignore the critical tension she wishes to
sustain be-
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tween them, and hence the
6 vital
Vltal and intrinsic
importance
of each, at our peril.
•

*.

The obscurity of the
private and the searing
light of
the public, Arendt suggests,
are the two dimensions
of existence which require each
other.
In darkness a meander _
ing purposeless thought
process, the body's repetitious
demands, the strange and
relentless pressure of wants
and
desires, the incomprehensible
violence of bodily existence
- it is as if all these preserve
the raw experiential
resources, bottomless in their
mysterious givenness, for
human freedom understood as
spontaneity, uniqueness and
distinction.
contrast to the exposure of the
public,
the private realm is a release
into a kind of purposelessness of mind and repetitiousness
of body in which one
feels bliss and exuberance in the
sheer fertility of
things.
its essence is "absence of form. "20
Both the
mental wanderings and the subjection
to inexorable bodily
processes provide a kind of respite in
darkness that
refreshes and restores the resources of
each individual.

m

What then is the nature of Arendt's public
realm that
it sucks out of us so forcefully
these resources?
The

public realm is that place where we appear to
others
through speech and deed; where we make the
obscurity of
our private thoughts, desires and wants fit to
appear before others.

The fact that what appears will be seen and

heard by others makes excellence the peculiar demand
and
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capability of the p ublic
realm
nake thing, appear worthy
of

.

^

There

^

^

memory, for the public
realm
through its very publicity
alone is the arena „ here
can hope to save southing
from the endless
destruction of
mortal life. The peouliar
concerns Qf

^

^

then are permanence,
Mortality, and excellence. No
one
can reside in it long,
however, Arendt says, for
the kind
of responsibility it
demands - to strive for a
kind of excellence which preserves and
even strengthens human
Plurality - cannot be sustained.
The essence of the public realm is form, and the
demand it makes on the self
is
that the self make deliberate
choice of how it wishes to
appear to others; that it give
specific shape to its inner
processes, its inner chaos.
implicit here is the promise
to remain, within bounds,
consistent with oneself; that
is, to endure, which is
to say to have character, and
not
to be subject to every inner
urge or every doubting

thought

2

Hence what we see on this reading is
that the public
and private realms, the one for
saving distinctly human
excellence, the other for endless
reproduction, destruction and obscurity, exist in critical
mutually interdependent relation. As private beings we need
the public to
have the reality of our individuality
brought
into being,

confirmed.

As public beings we need private life to
re-

store and renew our resources for spontaneity
and initia-
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tive.

With the modern age

Aren dt argues both
private
and public spheres were
destroyed and with the,
the
preconditions for human freedom
In their place
social real,.
Let me now turn to her
conception of this
specifically modern dimension
of existence,
,

,

^^

its origin,

development and nature.
Arendt conceives of the
social as a hybrid sphere
where we are neither public
nor private selves, but
where
what had heretofore been
the concern of individuals
as
private persons - namely the
reproduction and continuation
of life, became the dominant
concern of individuals
in

their public capacity as citi
Z ens.
And it is this development which unleashes forces
which undermine the
durability and stability of the
human artifice. She
writes,
"The social realm, where the
has established its own publiclife process
let loose an unnatural growth, domain? has
so to speak
p dK
of the natural." 22

'

The publicity of the public realm,
then, which Arendt
argues is what makes it possible
for us to save that which
we esteem and cherish, that which
we find most beautiful
and excellent from the "natural ruin
of time" 23
has,

in

the modern age, weirdly, raised the
perpetual life process
of birth, decay and death itself to
the level of that
which we find most worthy of permanence.
"Life as the
highest good" becomes the fundamental principle
of modern
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society.

With this unnatural
unleashing of the natural
into the public limelight
the fundamental nature
of the
life process remains
unchanged - namely its force,
urgency, its relentless
consumption and its formlessness.
Beginning historically with
the bourgeoisie's effort
to

make the public realm protect
their private accumulation
of property, the public
realm soon became a function
of
what Arendt wants to argue
are essentially private concerns,
making these concerns become
the focus of public life, the predominant
standpoint of the social becomes
the species.
That is, to draw out the
distinction laid
out at the outset of this
chapter, the standpoint of the
social becomes mere life in contrast
to the life in which
we become "born again" by taking
on the responsibilities
of molding and shaping a particular
form of life.
Consequently the public realm was destroyed
as a sphere which
itself could shape, limit, and give
form to a common life,
understood as more than the sum total of
individual
desires and wants. So, too, the rise of
the social realm
destroyed the private realm insofar as the
concerns in-

m

trinsic to it were the only concerns which
remained common.

It is on the ruins of the public and
private spheres

then that the social is built.
It is interesting to note that although Arendt
uses

spatial language to refer to the social, her argument
that
it actually undermines worldly durability and
stability
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implies that, strictly
speaking, the -realB- of
the social
has no spatial ity; no real
spatial dimensionality.
It s
real dimension is temporal
and that itself reduced,
essentially, to the future.
Rather than specific
achievements,
it is progress and
development, rapid forward
movements
which form the dominating
metaphors of the modern age.
The phenomenon of progressing
process perpetually undermines and dissolves all
spatial delineations and substantialities - both in thought,
Arendt argues, and in the
material world.
Hence, when she turns to modern
political thought,
she argues that in the face of
the enormous increase of
wealth and property which marks
the modern age and the

theoretical prospect of substantial
if not total liberation from necessity, modern political
theorists conceptualized this growth as a natural
process, rooting the
accumulation process in the body.
it is this wish to
portray the process of accumulation as
in the nature of
things, and the concomitant rejection
of worldly concerns
which ties theorists of capitalism and
socialism together;
this which forms the deepest continuities
of the modern
age.

Hence while there are obvious differences
between

Locke and Smith, on the one hand, and Marx, on
the other,

Arendt attends largely to their affinities as moderns.
And while her harshest and most sustained polemic
is with
Marx, this is because in her view Marx carries the
logic
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of the modern age to its
farthest extreme, and not
because
he stands on some path
qualitatively different fro,
the
theorists of liberal capitalism.
Neither theorists of
capitalism nor of socialism are
concerned with what Arendt
calls "the worldly character"
of a produced thing its
function, location and length
of stay in the world. 24
in taking up a critique of
the modern labor theories,
Arendt argues that we understand
the modern age most deeply if we see that its essence
lies not in the emancipation
of laborers, though to be
sure this was a world historic

event, but rather that its
essence lies in the emancipation of the laboring activity
itself.
the effort to
account for the enormous upsurge
in productive capacity,
all three labor theorists Arendt
discusses elevate the activity of laboring to the highest
rank - Locke finding in
it the source of all property,
Smith the source of all
wealth, and Marx, the very process
through which the

m

humanity of man comes into being.

Important to Arendt 's

analysis of this emancipation of the
laboring activity is
that despite variation in their specific
interests
and

purposes, all three labor theorists put labor
at the center of human life because it alone as an
experience among
the three activities of the vita activa
approximates the

endless seemingly automatically progressing nature
of the

productive growth that marks the modern age.

Both labor

and the growth of the modern age seemed natural,
beyond,
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as Arendt puts it,

"willful decision or humanly
meaningful
purposes.- .25 As naturally
and compellingly necessary
as
labor has appeared to all
ages, in the modern age
the pursuit of ever-growing
abundance itself appeared
natural.
It was Marx who, Arendt
argues, made the relation
between labor's productivity
and natural abundance explicit,
and in so doing was most true
to phenomenal reality.
Conceiving of labor and begetting
as two modes of the same
life process, Marx rightly
conceptualized labor as "man's
metabolism with nature»26 in which/
endless
cyclical processes of production
and consumption in nature, man too, through his own
effort, produced a surplus.
This modern discovery of man's
ability to produce a surplus promised for the first time
to fulfill the age-old
dream of the poor for wealth and
abundance, and happiness
for the greatest number.
Yet it was the mistaken identification of this dream with the kind of
freedom from

^^

necessity the few alone had wrested from
life by enslaving
the many that lay at the heart of Marx's
errors,
in

Arendt 's view.
Marx turned his effort almost exclusively to
the task
of increasing the productive forces of society.
in so
doing labor became, in his view, the humanizing
activity,
and the two moments of the life process - production
and

consumption
tion.

-

became the central foci of social organiza-

The life process itself became the very essence of
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a life

shared in common.

The tragic irony of this,
in
Arendt's view, is that
laboring, of the three
activities
of the UiUflto, is
the most private, the
least common
experience, ensconced as it
is in the relentless
repetitious needs of the body.
The perpetual producingconsuming processes of
anima^abor^ can be made the
common end, but when raised
to the highest common
purpose,
the devouring, limitless
nature of these processes undermines the very permanence of
the objective world which
Arendt considers to be a
precondition for freedom itself,
^ima^aborans, in the unworldly "realm" of
the social,
has no world-building capacity.
Arendt calls Marx's
socialized man "worldless specimens
of the species
mankind. 1,27

The contention underlying Arendt's
thought in this
context is that without a world of
stable things which
transcend individual mortality, hence a
world in which human relatedness gains stability, the
specific capacity of
humans to distinguish themselves through
word and deed and
thus to build a distinctive common world
is impossible.
The central capacities for distinctive
speech and action
themselves are eroded and undermined in the society
of

animal laborans

.

No less isolated and private for having

made the life process the common end, the
preconditions
for the appearance of freedom are destroyed.

And while it

may be true that we can produce and consume in particular
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'

ways,

ana^Ub^

has llttle

^

abUity to chaiienge
privacy of the llf . process
itself as
dominant
our common lives
a c SUCh
AS
modern "man" has lost the
specifically human abilitiesS to ii m H
t0 llmit sha e and
P
judge, which
to say to make our
appearance explicitly; to be
culture
building.

^

^

'

'

-

Furthermore, Arendt argues,
this is true even should
labor be drastically reduced
or even eliminated as
in
Marx's fully socialized,
fully naturalized beings.
In
this state Marx envisions
Western culture having finally
arrived at the state where
all would be free for the
Kind
of self and mutual cultural
blossoming only the few have
heretofore enjoyed. The problem,
Arendt suggests, is that
it is dubious to assume
that anisUaborans, freed
from
labor, would be capable of
these kinds of humanizing activities. While Arendt thinks
it is characteristic
of hu-

mans that we wish to make our
appearance explicitly, to
deliberately choose no*, to appear,
it is not a necessary
condition of life for our species.
Instead, it is something that must be tended and cultivated,
and for which
space, in the literal and metaphorical
sense, must be provided.
It is precisely this to which
Marx, in Arendt's
view, was wholly inattentive.
She fears that Marx's dream
of a cessation of all alienation between
man and man as
well as between man and nature is not a
dream of freedom
but a nightmarish en-slavement; nightmarish
not because it
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is,

as an experience, more
cruel than the human
institution of slavery (it is
not,, but because in
the worldless
and herd-like existence
of man as the -consummated
oneness

with nature- we really
could reach a state where
our
ability to distinguish between
freedom and necessity
(slavery) had been extinguished
as an active capacity.
Arendt singles out Marx
because his is the most pure
expression of the modern age.
Vet she sees in our society
of jobholders overwhelming
evidence of the inability to
recognize futility despite her
view that man has an -innate repugnance- to it. The
most obvious and predominating evidence is the fact that
ours is now a "waste economy" whose very existence is
predicated upon the ability to
destroy the use value of things
in favor of their consumptive value. All things are of
value insofar as they can
quickly be made to disappear. The
modern age has no true
spatial dimension. Without spatiality
the temporal dimension of existence is also severely
limited; neither the
present nor the past can stay in being.
In this light it seems apt to
characterize Arendt's

critigue of the modern age, and especially
of Marx, as a
Hegelian riposte. The human condition as a
condition es-

sentially in space and time, as an embodied
condition,

demands a perpetual experience of what, in the
most general of terms, we would call alienation: the
necessity to

encounter the thing-character of the world; an encounter
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which is perpetually in part
affirmation of self in continuity but also confrontation
with the recalcitrant qual
ity of the world, with the
fact that a "consummated oneness" is probably not even
possible - and certainly not,
in Arendt 's view, desirable.

There is both

a

moral-aesthetic underpinning to

Arendt's thinking here as well as a
warning.
conceivable that a society of jobholders

While it is

such as our own

could continue to exist, the quality
of life, its specifi
cally human dimension, would be and
is being extinguished
To lead a truly human life is neither
to be wholly freed
from necessity nor to be entirely
absorbed in its endless
ly repetitious productive-consumptive
processes.
it is

rather to sustain the often terrible tension
between the
activities and perspectives peculiar to the three
ac-

tivities of the vita activa

-

labor, work and action.

Without sustaining the tensions, Arendt implicitly
argues
we are unable to reach the heights of human
excellence

conceived by her in aesthetic terms.

And precisely these

heights have something to do with being morally good on
earth 28 for they are tied to our capacity to think and
,

act,

not as single beings, in the image of God, but as hu

man beings in the condition of plurality and a common
world.

And insofar as this is true

(a

line of argument

I

will develop in far greater detail in the following chapter)

Arendt warns that modern life in which the worldless
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aspirations, abilities and
standpoint of 3J1 i ffla i_l b
a 2£ans
predominate win be incapable
of „ specificaUy
celience, that is, one in
which the abilities of
humans
for speech and deed
flourish.

^

^

When Arendt turns explicitly
to capture the essential
predicaments of modern philosophy
she finds that the specifically modern loss of worldly
sensibility has clearly
left its mark upon it as
well.
it is both the recalcitrant thing-quality of the
world and the condition of
Plurality which modern subjectivism
has also eschewed in
its search for the true and
the real.
Hence the biological processes which form the
real for anima^aborans
are,

she argues, analogous to the
processes of the mind which
affirm the real in modern philosophy.
The central modern
metaphor carries the essence of
modern thought as well.
It was, Arendt insists, a
worldly event, the invention of the telescope, which launched
modern thought as
such.
With this invention the reliability
and adequacy of
the human senses to reveal reality
and truth ended, for
somethinq so fundamental as our ability
to know from our
sense data the movement of the sun in
relation to the
earth was irreparably damaqed. Arendt
tracks the twofold

character of the modern response to this occurrence
triumph of the modern man of knowledqe

-

-

the

the scientist, on

the one hand, and the despair of the modern lover
of philosophy, on the other.
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^

The optimism and nope
hone of
t-ho modern
m
or the
scientist stems
trom the realization of
the age-old dream of
Archimedes Qf
reaching a point so far
outside the conditions
on earth
that one could observe
ve earthly
earth lv ii
f„ ,
life
from a truly universal
standpoint and hence, by
implication, "see all." A11
of
the tremendous innovations
and discoveries, the
increases
in human knowledge and
human power have been
possible,
Arendt argues, because of
this new-found ability to
extricate our perspective from
the chains of our earthly
condition,
vet that which fueled these
innovations cannot be
comprehended without investigating
the other modern sentiment par excellance - doubt,
and the related drive
for

certainty born with it.
Modern philosophy registered
the "shock" of Galileo's
discovery with acute accuracy.
Specifically, the loss of
confidence in the world as something
real which the human
sense could be relied upon to
reveal.
That is, the loss
of the self-evidence of things
made the age-old starting
point for philosophy - speechless
wonder at that "which is
as it is" a virtual impossibility.
Beginning with
Des-

cartes, doubt rather than wonder
becomes the specifically

modern impulse to philosophical reflection.

The nature

and end of the activity itself not
surprisingly changes
too.

Instead of the activity in which "what is"
is contemplated, philosophy becomes preoccupied with
epistemology and the problem of certainty. The assault
on the ade-
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quacy of human sense
perception for knowing
reality aid
not reveal a simple
distinction between mere
appearance
and true Being, a distinction
long lived within philosophy, but rather unleashed
the suspicion that Being
itself
was an -active deluder"
of the human effort
to know, a

devil and not just an eternal
order of things largely
kept
from human comprehension.
in the face of this fear
that the essence of things
was delusion, modern philosophy
(which in this sense we
would say comes to an end with
Nietzsche's effort to embrace this deluding evasive
force) begins in earnest
the
search for certainty, which
should be understood as a
search for stability, at times
for comfort and for home in
some sense.
Beginning with

Descartes modern philosophy

turns for its affirmation of
reality to the inner pro
cesses of the mind, of consciousness.
Cooito er„n
The critical part of what occurs
in this move is that consciousness first dissolves all objective
reality into subjective states of mind making the
imaginary object of
thought equivalent in terms of its
realness to the sensed
object.
The sensed object, considered in
introspection,
undergoes a process in which it loses its
worldly otherness and is made over entirely anew as
an "object of consciousness." This preparatory process it was
thought

would assure certainty, for it is the solitary
mind as
maker itself which makes the object something fit

to be
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Known.

Arendt suggests that here,
too, the mind seeks
to
occupy an Archaean
point, a point so distant
from the
sensuaily Known and so
distant from the worldly
condition
of Plurality that a
universality of perspective
can be attained.
For philosophical thinking,
as for scientific
thinking, it is mathematics,
which with modern algebra
has
"succeeded in freeing itself
from the shackles
spatiality,..29 which becQmes

^

and reasoning.

of

^^

Knowing becomes as with Hobbes
(who
remains unparalleled in Arendt's
estimation in his imaginative genius at capturing
the modern age) "reckoning
with consequences."
As a universal being, living
in a system "with no
fixed center" and free to occupy
whatever vantage point he
chooses, "man" has become a
terrestrial being only in the
sense that this is a condition
of being alive, and no
longer a terrestrial being by
essence or nature.
Similarly, while we are sensuous
beings whose most distinctive

condition is that of plurality, this
need have no real impact upon what we know.
in both cases these limitations
can be overcome by assuming a universal
standpoint.
The
trouble with this response to the unreliability
of the

senses to reveal Being is that our sense
of reality, our
"perceptual faith" as Arendt, following Merleau-Ponty

calls it "depends on the objects also appearing
as such to
others and being acknowledged by them." 30 The
trouble, to
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put it another way, is
that reality, the
"that there is »
only brought into being
and confirmed by pth^.
The
loss we suffer is not
only of our sense of
certainty of
the real in terms of a
reassuring identity a
„ irony
(
given Descartes' aim, but
the ability to encounter
-that
which we are not" which is
the other dimension of
the real
and for which identity
through others' confirmation
is the
precondition.
Instead of reality as an
experience of
identity and difference,
science encounters only the
readings of instruments the
human mind itself has designed,

-

and philosophers encounter
only logical patterns of
the
human mind.
both cases human life is
trapped within
the logic and patterns of the
human mind in a manner
analogous to the way animalJLaborans
is trapped within the
logic of the twofold processes
of life - production and
consumption. What is lost in all
cases is what Arendt,
along with ancient philosophy,
calls the capacity for contemplating truth and Being, and what
we might call that
capacity for revealing and finding
meaning within the conditions in which life was given us;
what Arendt herself
calls the capacity "to think what we
are doing. 3 1

m

In some sense, then,

it does not stretch or distort

Arendt to suggest that not only in an
actual totalitarian
state are human beings, in their homeless
and
rootless,

isolated state stabilized within an inexorable
process or
movement, but that the modern age itself has
prepared hu-
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~n

beings in the political,
sociax and phUosophical
dimensions of their lives for
much

^^

purpose.

(un

.

What is lost is the ability
to encounter (read
think and judge and experience)
the new, the eventuality
of the world, the unpredictable,
and to shape such
experiences into humanly coherent
occurrences, the possibility
of which depends upon
worldly relatedness, upon
the existence of a "we... The essence
Qf Ufe s
.

(which is just as

^

" me re»

when it entails unleashing
of the
new without reflection, but
being born again so that
we
are capable of taxing our
bearings in the world which is
not a question of an individual
becoming self-conscious,

but of feeling the full impact
of our utter dependence
upon others for our "unequivocal
sense of reality^ and
our ability to be fully alive
.

D.

On Revo lution

On Revolution is Arendt's most
sustained examination
of modern political experiments in
which this common taking our bearings or what she calls
in "The Crisis in Culture,
"taking aim" is pursued in a hopeful,

constructive

manner.

Of concern in this context is her
highly con-

troversial discussion of the relationship
between the social question and the possibility of founding
a stable
political structure within which culture can
flourish.
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Most commentators of
On^evolution have focussed
critically on Arendt's analysis
of the destructive impact
on political foundation of
the effort based on
compassion
and pity to solve the social
question.
so doing, they
focus on her critique of the
Rousseauean romantic revolutionary tradition as exemplified
in this work by the
French Revolution. what has
gone under-analyzed is her
contrasting critique of the liberal
revolutionary tradi-

m

tion's lack of compassion which
she argues made the American revolutionaries incapable
of fully grasping the
novelty of their experience as
exemplified in "a certain
weightlessness" which characterizes the
political thought
they produced. 33 I will conclude
this chapter with an examination of both the French passion
without reason' and
the American Reason without passion,'
for together they
illuminate Arendt's complicated reflections
on the relationship between politics and the urgent,
compelling
na-

ture of our psychological life which she
calls, "the process of moods in our souls." 34 This
discussion will

therefore form the final link in my analysis of
the modern
age in this chapter.
It is central to my analysis
to

demonstrate that the hope Arendt wishes to articulate
lies
not in a strict bi-furcation between necessity and
free-

dom, the social question and politics, the passionate

heart and the reasoning mind, but in a lived tension whose
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nature

will gesture towards here,
but articulate more
fully in the following
chapter.
I

Throughout On_Revolution

,

Arendt makes the case for a

conceptual and experiential
distinction between liberty
and freedom, the former being
the liberation from tyranny
and oppression and finding
expression in civil rights, the
later being the constitution of
a space for a public life
of debate, persuasion and
common action finding expression
in rule by law in a republican
form of government.
Her
general argument is that only the
American and not
the

French Revolution was successful
in the latter task,
though it, too, failed to fully
constitute the necessary
space for a real political way of
life.
The extremity of
immiseration in the Old World in
contradistinction to
freedom from real want in the New was
in Arendt 's view the
single most significant difference
accounting for the
respective courses of revolution in France
and America.
Let me turn first to the French and then
to the American
Revolution.

Arendt argues that in the first phase of the
French
Revolution the aim was liberation from tyranny and
oppression and the constitution of freedom in a republican
form

of government based on consent.

But once liberation from

tyranny was achieved for all it became clear that freedom

would be only for the few, the few who were the purported
representatives of the people.
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These few could hardly be

legitimate representatives
however, distinguished as
they
were from the immiserated
masses by social status.
Unable
to establish a constitutional
form of government under
these circumstances, the
Girondins were overcome by the
Jacobins who, Arendt argues,
recognized that a great "effort of solidarization-35 was
necessary Qnoe
tie of tyranny could no longer
serve as the binding agent
for the nation.
Furthermore, the impoverished
needed yet
further liberation before there
could be a real constitution of freedom. This time round
Arendt argues

^

though,

they needed to be liberated from
necessity - or so it was
conceived by Robespierre.

With the Jacobins this great "effort
at solidarization" was made by the rich towards
the poor by making compassion the highest virtue. Compassion,
following and
relying on Rousseau, as the ability to
suffer with those
who suffer, is something that seemed to
bespeak a natural
passionate bond between men. Selflessness
hence became
the highest art, and reason, the nemesis of
passion, became synonymous with selfishness. Reason,
as it manifests

itself through debate and dialogue and calculation,
ap-

peared to interfere with the natural feeling of union
available to humans as co-suffering beings.

Ironically,

in Arendt 's view, the so-called "natural goodness"
of the

miserable became not only the foundation of virtue but of
the body politic itself.

The cohesiveness of the body
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politic was to be born out of
the single will to have compassion for suffering. Hence
in the effort to liberate
the nation from the "yoke of
necessity" one had to have a
purity of identification with the
immiserated; one had
to

subject one's own will to that
of the immiserated masses
so that the nation could become
a single force.
French
political life became preoccupied
with a tyrannical scrutiny of the chastity of the heart,
and the result was the
reign of terror in which those
whose compassion appeared
to be mere pretense, those whose
motives were deemed impure, were exposed and destroyed
as traitors to
the na-

tion.

What went wrong, in Arendt's view, in
this effort at
solidarization was letting the feeling for
suffering
humanity, the anguish felt by the heart,
overcome the effort at establishing spaces for public
freedom.
The
French Revolution was overrun by the
unconditional demand
to liberate humanity from necessity, a
demand which had
its roots in the limitless sentiment of pity
which, she

argues, is the degraded form compassion must take
when it

leaves the privacy of the inner life and the realm of
pri-

vate relations, and is made the foundation for political
life.

The center of Arendt's arguments revolves around a

distinction between the passion of compassion and the
sentiment of pity.

There is, in my view, a clear debt to

Nietzsche in her account though it is developed from an
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explicit concern with the
political world and hence
fruitfully builds out fro m
Nietzsche's
own analysis. 36

x

will

now turn to her critique.
Arendt argues that Rousseau

-

understood to be the

revolutionaries' guide in these
matters
oped a feeling for the suffering

-

probably devel-

of others, not by suffer-

ing with them, but out of
indignation at the indifference
to suffering on the part of
the rich.
Rather than preoc-

cupying himself with the actual
suffering, she argues,
Rousseau became fascinated by the
vicissitudes of the
heart.
In the grips of this enchantment
with "the sweet
delight of intimacy, "37 Rousseau
did not feel compassion,
a passion which as such
remains bound to particulars, but
rather became taken up by the
sentiment to which compassion corresponds

-

pity.

The distinction Arendt makes is

critical for she argues that as a
passion, compassion is a
suffering-with which binds us to the world
of particularities, to time and place, specific
people and relationships. As a passion it has no capacity,
like reason,
to generalize.
By contrast, the emotion of pity is a
generalized feeling for the suffering of all which,
however,
does not, like compassion, entail being
"stricken in the
flesh." 3 8 Yet as a sentiment and hence general,
it cannot

comprehend

a

multitude "whose majesty," Arendt writes,

"resides in its very plurality." 39

it is this that makes

pity politically so pernicious, in Arendt's view.
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Senti-

-nts

are boundless, unarrested
by particular considerathey inherently lack
the capacity to distinguish
deliberate, decide. As the
foundation Qf

te;

cal action, this boundless
sentient created what Arendt
calls that "emotion-laden
insensitivity to reality,"
both
to reality in the general
sense and to the reality
of persons in particular. 40
Specifically referring to
Robespierre but implying it is
CQJmQn
revolutionaries
since Robespierre, she writes,

^

^

h
S
e Capacit to establish
and
Y
noid fast
hoid
ra^ to rapports with
persons in their
singularity; the ocean of suffering
around

h

latGr 9 eared to receive and
respond
dr ° Wned a11 s P^ific considerationf the considerations of
friendship
o less than considerations
no
of "atecrait
statecraft
41
and principle."
?i

m

U

t

f

'

With this Arendt reaches the
highpoint of her critique of the danger of a politics
based on the boundless
sentiment of pity. The pity-inspired
selflessness which
the Jacobins held as the highest
virtue was, politically
speaking, evil precisely because it
could know no boundaries, was incapable of accepting,
let alone establishing,
limitations.

And at the heart of this inability was
its

inherent tendency to depersonalize and
generalize all sufferers so that one could be "moved" by a
whole class or
people, moved by a single elemental force
which gathered
power from its reduction of the multitude to a
single

point of outrage.
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Arendt looks at this
spectacle and is appalled at
the
lack of space for thought
as it can occur in
politics,
that is, as deliberation
fro m which can follow
free and
purposeful action
Thi<;
n ^ of
*
in is iri
Kind
aenprai ?ori and
^„
yeneraiized
sentimental outrage is wholly
unequipped to create enduring
political institutions designed
for freedom
Ml positive
laws must, in the face of
the outrage at the misery
of the
many, appear as callous and
invidious insensitivity and
must fall before the just
terror of the good.
.

^

i

It is in her effort to
face up to the danger of
such
a politics of the heart
that Arendt 's work gets both
fas-

cinating and troubling.

she is frank about the
difficulty

of distinguishing in any set
of historical circumstances
between the "mere desire for
liberation, to be free from
oppression," and "the desire for
freedom as the political
way of life.- .42 And she argues
^ precond ._
tion for the latter.
She is equally clear that there
was

^

^

great man-made suffering, suffering
which she says it was
Marx's genius to find a political term
for - exploitation.
Hitherto she argues this kind of violence
by man against
man has been accepted as necessity itself
and she clearly
thinks that the distinction Marx makes is
a conceptual

and

political breakthrough.

Yet her praise of Marx's

originality notwithstanding, it is her view that
this kind
of violence is indeed the most "original and
legitimatesource of rulership.

Her ground for this claim is the in-
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sistence that to the extent
that "we find ourselves
as
organic bodies" we are
subject to -necessary and
irresistible processes" which
cannot and must not be wholly
reduced to political terms. "3
It is this insistence
on the difficult distinction

between necessity imposed
upon us as embodied beings,
on
the one hand, and man-made
violence which makes it possible for some to be, though
temporarily and conditionally, freed from necessity,
on the other, which fundamentally sets Arendt off from
modern political thought in
general and marxist-socialist
political thought in particular.
It is a distinction in her
view which must be made because
of the unconditionally of the
inner life. „ ode rn in his
failure to identify the dangers
of the heart in politics,
Marx's mistake, in Arendt <s view,
was to reduce all compelling necessity to exploitation.
In so doing he entirely destroyed the distinction
she thought it so important
to maintain, and thus he ignored
the fact that embedded in
the human condition itself are grounds
for legitimate manmade compulsion, for injustice, which
we cannot entirely
alter.
The desire to do so is rooted in an
other-worldly
conception of things; a desire to escape the
conditions of
earthly existence. This is not to say that
this is not
injustice, and Arendt calls it thusly.
It is rather to
say that this is an injustice that in some form
must be,
though that form may and should be fought over.
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What must

not be the aim and content
of politics is putting
an end
to necessity itself; of
dreaming that all necessity
can be
reduced to man-made violence.
Once this is done, as she
argues it is for the first
time with Marx, it is easy,
especially under the sway of
Hegelian theoretics, to simply
reverse the relationship and
argue that this man-made

violence is really caused by
necessity itself. And this
is just what the later
"scientific" Marx did in arguing
for necessary (and violent)
economic
laws of history.

m

this move the distinction between
man-made violence and
necessity disappears altogether and
the early political
dimension Marx gave to exploitation
is subsumed under economically necessary laws. The aim
of revolution becomes
neither liberation from man-made
violence nor the foundation of freedom, but abundance.

The Jacobins were the first in the
modern revolutionary tradition to fall victim to a
pity-based unconditional
demand to be freed from necessity altogether,
and hence to
fail to maintain the, in Arendt's view,
critical distinction between necessity and man-made violence.
The emotions of the heart, part of the inner life's
relentless

processes whose essence is absence of form, cannot
sustain
such a distinction, and for this reason we find
Arendt
arguing that compassion is "politically irrelevant," and
that there are "disastrous results [when] emotions are

displayed in public and become a factor in political af-
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fairs.. .44

But as we

shau

^

.

n

^

exam nat on Qf h
.

.

^

analysis of the African
Revolution, this does not Mean
that the heart and compassion
are of no import in political affairs whatsoever.
The main argument Arendt
makes about the American
Revolution is that unlike the
conditions of misery in
which the French Revolution took
place, the American revolutionaries did not have to contend
with mass immiseration.
Poverty there was, but it was
not abject.
This is
the salient difference and
accounts for the success Arendt
accords the American revolutionaries.
Because the New
World really did realize, though
imperfectly, the dream of
abundance, necessity (and hence
neither compassion nor
pity) never pressed itself upon
the revolutionary agenda.
Consequently the American revolutionaries
remained committed to "the foundation of freedom,"
and to "the establishment of lasting institutions,"
remaining undistracted
by the effort to "re-order society." 45

This is the main line.

There is, however, an inter-

esting, apparently contradictory secondary
story line, a
sort of counterpoint to the main theme that
comes in the
form of a reminder. We must recall, she notes,
that this

argument notwithstanding, such abject misery did indeed
exist in the form of black labor and black slavery.

were approximately

4

There

00,000 black slaves as compared to the

1,850,000 whites in mid 18th century America. 46
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Yet she

points out that this did not
inspire either compassion
or
solidarity in Americans. Hence
what the relative
prosperity in America and this
indifference to slavery
meant was that those in the
American revolution were never
tempted by what she calls (in
an echo of Nietzsche)
"the

test of compassion. "47

Consequently they remained, Arendt
argues, realists with strong
common sense, a realism however bought with indifference.
The price paid, though
less than that paid by those who
were successfully tempted
to make compassion the ground
of their revolutionary effort at founding a new political
order, was tragic just
the same.

The general outline of her argument
is that the failure to be tried by this "test of
compassion," by "passion
in its noblest form" meant that,
their own experience and
not infrequent expression of the passion
for public life
notwithstanding, the American revolutionaries
were unable
to break out of the confines of their
inherited liberal
intellectual tradition to see the need both to
more fully

conceptualize their passion for public freedom, and
to institutionalize it by giving constitutional recognition
to

those quintessential spaces for public freedom
town meetings.

-

the local

The American founders remained bound by

the liberal enlightenment equation of thought with reason,
and of reason with rationality, a rationality which was to

rule over passion understood in terms merely of desire.
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Although this reduction of
passion to desire belied
the
depth of their own experience
of public freed™, Ar
endt
suggests that precisely
because they had no profound
experience with compassion for
the iterated, they
were unable to forge new conceptual
ground.
And here we arrive at what
at first glance appears
to
be a curious contradiction
in Arendt's discussion
of the
relationship between compassion
and politics and the social question.
On the one hand, the French
revolutionaries were subjected to the
test of compassion and
failed miserably; their effort
to found a stable political
order was overwhelmed by pity
for the impoverished.

The
Americans, by contrast, lacked
all experience with compassion and consequently failed to
save the "treasure" of

their experiences

-

the spaces where citizens could
find

public happiness and engage their
"passion for distinction." The force of Arendt's
argument is that had the
Americans had to wrestle with the test
of compassion they
could have come to understand at a
deep level
the in-

justice of abject want and of mere
poverty, what Arendt
calls,

"the crippling consequences of obscurity." 48

About

those in darkness John Adams, in an exemplary
but rare expression of such understanding wrote, "...he
is in as much
obscurity as he would be in a garret or a cellar.
He is

not disapproved, censured, or reproached; he
is only not

seen..." 49

Had the founders felt, not indifference but
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^

compassion towards the poQr
have developed a feeling

ensiaved<

^^

of solidarity with
them which

would nave made their
particular political
predicants,
or their "curse" as Arendt
puts it, painfully, even
passionately clear. Such a
feeling of solidarity
would have
reminded the founders themselves
of that passion for distinction which was the source
of their own happiness
during the course of the
revolution and the founding
of the

republic.

it might even have riveted
their sensibilities

enough to their own experiences
so as to move the, towards
a break with their
enlightenment view of the role
of
government as the rule of reason
over passion. Arendt
writes,
P

^
*V

Si ° n

neVer tempted them in its
0mpaSSi0n the * found it
easv to
ea
tn t hink ° f P ass ion in
terms of desire
aniSUr °m 11 any connotation
of its
Ha
original
meaning, which is... to suffer
and
to endure.
This lack of experience givis"
1 r t e °r 1
even if they are sound, an
f f'
air n
off lightheadedness,
a certain
lessness, which may well put into weightjeopardy
their durability. For, humanly
speaking, it
is endurance which enables man
to create
durability and continuity." 50

nob?^, ?n

^

'

1

The social question did have a critical
impact upon
the American founders not, she argues,
in the form of
necessity but in the form of the "fatal
passion for sudden
51
riches."
Never was there nor is there yet, Arendt
argues, a clear-cut resolution in favor of
freedom or

prosperity. 52

Had the founders had compassion for the
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poor and been moved by
this compassion to a
feeling of
solidarity with the*, they
would have been capable,
not of
reducing the multitude to
a single entity as
happened in
the French effort at
solidarization, nor of forgetting
the
predicaments of the poor. Rather,
they would have been
capable of comprehending the
multitude conceptually, that
is, of comprehending
rich and poor alike and of
establishing a community of interest
between them.
so

m

doing,

their gaze would have been
riveted to the peculiar in-'
justice of obscurity, and they
would have more clearly
seen the source of their own
happiness, and tried both to
conceptually grasp it as well as
to provide an institutional home for its appearance.
Both achievements would
have brought this experience
more fully into being, given
it standing, reality and
hence endurance.
In so endowing
this political way of life and
its passion for distinction
with reality they would have offered
an alternative
to the

passion for riches which, Arendt argues,
flooded the American polity in successive waves as
the European poor
crossed the Atlantic. The tragedy of
the American Revolution was that the founders came close
to saving
the repub-

lic from elevating life to the highest
good and from em-

bracing the passion for "conspicuous consumption"
which
has largely come to replace the passion to
excel in public
life in Arendt 's view. 53 Very nearly did the
American
revolutionaries overcome the specifically "modern
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sensiMlity whose distinguishing
characteristic
it "is not touched by
obscurity

.

is that

54

What we find here in these
accounts of the French and
American revolutions is what
appears to be a contradiction,
on the one hand, an
absolute rejection of the
uncompromising "inner processes
of the soul" when it
comes
to the task of giving form
and shape to political
life;

and on the other, an argument
that it was precisely the
absence of such inner stirrings
which had serious negative
consequences for political life.
The problem she wrestles
with is the need for compassion
in order to have

solidarity with the "oppressed
and exploited," on the one
hand, but the political
perniciousness of compassion if it
becomes the foundation of politics taking the
form of

Pity, on the other.

she says compassion is politically

irrelevant because it destroys the
distance between persons,
the intensity of identification
with another's
suffering the compassionate person loses
the capacity for
argumentative speech, for talk about shared

m

interests.

The compassionate cannot stand the
suffering of others and
hence if they are moved to act, eschew
persuasion and ne-

gotiation in favor of violence.

From this Arendt con-

cludes that the heart needs to be hidden in
darkness.
this darkness must not be a void.

Yet

The human heart must

beat - which is another way of saying be torn
and ravaged
by the world.

The accomodation she makes
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I

think is that

the heart must be that
which «oves us to formulate
principles upon which to act,
principles such as solidarity,
hut
it xtself Must not become
the basis upon which we
act
The heart should "arouse"
our sensibilities but
not move
us to action.
(In this sense I think
Leon Botstein
is

quite right when he suggests
that, "Arendt's implicit
psychology (psychology is
consistently absent from her
considerations in a formal sense)
is more akin to Rousseau's (despite her distrust
of compassion as a
political
virtue) than to Locke's." 55
)

Both the darknesses of the
inner life and the light
of the public world must
exist in careful tension, both
protected from each other but not
utterly dirempt.
this sense we must see that
instead of a compassionate
sense for the injustice of social
and economic inequalities as the basis for public
action, our public life
ought to be based on principles
and the fight against the
injustice of obscurity. Yet it must
be noted that while
Arendt rises against the modern
insensitivity to this injustice it is not for utter exposure
that she argues.
if
it is true that it is only politics
which concerns itself
with plurality as such, it is also true
that we require an
active inner life, in Arendt's view, in
order to be

m

capable of encompassing the reality of others;
of "thinking in the place of another" which is the
essence
of

political judgment.

It is in the tension between light
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and dar k

appearance and disappearance,
process and static
for. that a specifically
hu,an reality can occur
and a
specific for, of life develop
over and against the
possibility of sheer happenings,
sheer processes of
Ufe
To
argue this we raust .ore closely
exanine the theatrical
metaphors which reign in Arendt's
political theory, the
ontological foundations of her
wort, and the specific
aesthetic sensibility she would
cultivate. This I will
do
in chapter six.
,
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CHAPTER VI
"THE PASSION FOR SEEING" 1

A.

Introducfinn

in this chapter I will
deV elop the complicated
and interesting sensibility for the
aesthetic dimension of
existence which lies at the center
of Arendt's thought.
The
marks of this sensibility
must be traced if we are
to fully probe the ethical relevance
of her thought for our
time.
This is, surprisingly, not
an argument commonly

made among scholars of Arendt,
and a review of secondary
literature reveals that they either
ignore the aesthetic
dimension of Arendt's work, leave
it vastly underdeveloped, or misunderstand it. 2
Leah Bradshaw, for
example, in her very thoughtful
work on Arendt, argues
that, "the aesthetic dimension
of life is rarely mentioned
[by Arendt].' -3
In the earliest book . length
£tudy
Qf

Arendt's thought, Margaret Canovan
mentions the aesthetic
dimension of life only in the final
chapter amidst a discussion of the importance of Kant's
Critique of t,,^
for Arendt's concept of the political
and of thought itself. 4
But her discussion is brief and wholly
un-

derdeveloped.

In a later article, Canovan does
more deep-

ly explore these initial reflections on
the relationship

between aesthetics and politics by arguing
that Arendt's
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best understood o
y

making explicit an anaiogy
politics and high culture
wh ch is
..

^^^^ ^

.

ings...5

Althoug „ this approaoh

,

s

^

^

w

^s

^t_

fits, the relationship
is far more intimate
a one than
that of analogy - as I
shall

demonstrate.

By contrast, Bhikkhu
Parekh immediately sets
out in
his Preface the claim
that, "Arendt is almost
alone in the
history o, political philosophy
to view politics as an
aesthetic activitv"
ivity which
uhiVh k~
he later defines as
"[making]
the world a beautiful place. -6
Yet
t

x.

^

Philosophical depth in the body
of the book and only cursory notice.
a .ore recent study,
shiraz Dossa makes a
bold and interesting argument
at the outset which places
an aesthetic orientation
at the center of Arendt's
work.
He argues that Arendt's
political theory "is to an unusual
degree literary in many of its
substantive concerns, "7

m

and
that in fact she "makes no
distinction between the
literary and the political. "8 He
defines the literary as
above all concerned with the act
of discovering this world
and its meaning, and situates the
identity between
the

literary and the political "on the
plane of attitudes and
dispositions. "9 Yet while this argument
illuminates
Arendt's conception of the public realm
and political action at a general level, Dossa finds he
must "strip" public citizenship of its "theatrical dressing"
to arrive at
the "substantial core" of Arendt's conception
of the pub-
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lie realm as ne
he fends
f P nHc off
^
the
charge that Arendt's
theatrical conception
of politic, has
fallen prey to
aesthetic, and hence to
amorality.
„e nce, despite initially making aesthetics
central to his interpretion
Dossa, in a disappointing
,ove, largely empties
Arendt's
thought of its aesthetic
foundation, and in so doing
deprives his readers or
of much of the power
and potential
relevance of the work itself.
.

Those scholars of Arendt
who see the central ity
of
the aesthetic dimension
to Arendt's work bu t
misunderstand
it primarily „ iss the
novelty of the relationship
she

draws between aesthetics
and politics. This occurs
sometimes amidst an effort to
defend her work, more often
amidst an effort to dismiss
it.
Thus, for example, Lionel
Abel, in "The Aesthetics
of Evil," argues that
Arendt's
judgments both of the Jewish
councils and of Eichmann are
aesthetic and hence neither moral
nor

political."

m

his

response to Abel, Daniel Bell
sustains the clear-cut
separation between politics and
aesthetics Abel makes, and
argues it is Arendt's adherence
to a single standard of
universal order which gives her a
tone of coldness and
distance, a tone Bell thinks Abel
mistakes for aesthetic
judgment since both justice and
aesthetics "derive from a
singular preoccupation and are also
separate from morality
and also have a formal quality. «"
a tendentious article, Martin Jay also sustains the
separation, arguing

m

that
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Arenas

"aestheticization of politics,"
by which ne means
the disjuncture she makes
between political and "any
rational, utilitarian,
historical and social foundations,"
makes her greatest affinity
to the political existentialists of the pre-war years,
especially the decisionists.
this context, he goes on to
suggest that
Arendt succumbed to the dangers
and charms of

m

fascism."

What these three thinkers have
in common is the convict ion
that aesthetics and politics are
two different dimensi ons
of existence which, as such,
should be strictly kept
apart.
However, it is this conviction
against which
Arendt 's work so uncomfortably chafes,
and which we must
substantially relinquish if we are to
adequately explore
and appreciate her work, and in some
cases even correctly
identify her concerns in the first place.
The dangers here are too well known to
merit great
articulation, yet their general outline should
be developed.

In our post-metaphysical age when neither
the

Divine, nature, nor tradition can provide
the "fixed means
of support" by which we orient ourselves
morally in the

world, the dangers reside chiefly in the possibility
that
a

politics founded and oriented aesthetically, that is, a

politics devoted to great and beautiful action, would be
sorely incapable of placing ethical limits on action.

creating and saving

x

the deed' becomes everything, all

things must be sacrificed to the end of aesthetic ex-
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If

oellence and aesthetic
pleasure. And if in
the
Nietzschean tradition, this
pieasure is pieasure in
one's
own strength or power,
the danger is that
politics and
justice too will beco,e a
function of the win, and
thus
have only subjectivist
foundations. Justice, as
a function of the will becomes
equivalent tQ the exoeUence
pe _
-liar to the strong. Th e
historical experience of
course
which demands that we reckon
with such fears was the
ascendant standard of the
blond-haired, blue-eyed
Teutonic
Aryan of the Nazi period to
whose superior beauty and
excellence all others were
supposed to be sacrificed.
Martin Jay is not alone in
suggesting parallels between Arendt's work and
fascist political thought.
,

m

Politics, conscience, Evil
George Kateb cannot come to a
,
resolution about the parallels.
He identifies them as a
common anti-utilitarianism, a
reliance on mutual pledging
(which he comes close to equating
with oath taking)
and
the aim of interrupting the
automatism of all processes by
asserting the unnatural or artificial
against the natural
or every day." Despite his lack
Qf resolution< Katefa
,

clearly does not believe that Arendt
in the main successfully places sufficient moral limits
on political action. 14

And his objections to Arendt's work
insofar as
her conception of action is at best amoral
and probably
immoral, 15 is closely bound with her
aestheticism. He
lays the blame for the inadequacy of moral
limits at the
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door of what he oalls>
gives to

pontic!

„ the

action.

existential supremacyn
By this he refers to
her view

that poiitica! action
is unique in its
capacity to
nate ana render coherent
the self and the human
condition
The ultimate value of
action, then, lies in
its ability to redeem and
justify existence,
this
respect action is intimately
connected to art and hence
to
an aesthetic sensibility,
for, as Kateb points
out, the
redemptive nature of action
can only be p^festgd
through
art by being artistically
rendered.
In this transfigured
state it can be saved from
time's indifference. So
far so
good.
However, as we explore further,
it becomes clear
that Kateb 's reading of Arendt's
aestheticism

in-

m

is

guietistic, and that he therefore
underemphasizes the active, culture-shaping, reflective
dimension of her political theory.
He characterizes Arendt's basic
orientation
to the human condition as a
composite feeling: first a
(Greek) shocked wonder at that
which is, a feeling which
must be -dwelt in,"" and second/
an(J mQre

^.^^

^

he calls her "doctrine of thereness
as beauty. "18 The
latter feeling he equates with acceptance
and gratitude
for the beauty of the world, but he
suggests hers is a
"non-aesthetic sense of beauty" by which he
means that the
world we find ourselves in, if not itself
beautiful,

should evoke in us those feelings beauty
arouses - the
predominant one being gratitude. On his reading
what
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^

gives action "existential
supremacy," thus
ity to reconcile us,
to provoice our
acceptance and to mak e
us feel at ho m e, a
state Kateb thinks Arendt
conceives of
as lacking in alienation.
,

^

^

The problem with this
reading is that not only
does
xt not mak e sense of
the central place of
natality and initiative in Arendt's thought,
but it cannot ma *e sense
of
statoMents such as the following
which Arendt placed in
the Preface to the first
edition of

Th^rigins^f

Total itarianigm-

denS
of

ehe

i0
I?f

realty

Sin" ? 9

^

in Sh ° rt

means the unpreceUP to ^_resLSSg
it may
'

l^t

l^t
^atever

beTT^^^f

in this statement of her
intentions, which remain constant

throughout Arendt's work, we
find an effort to register
with wondering shock the impact
of the new, and to resist
where resistance is called for.
This is far from
the ac-

ceptance Kateb argues Arendt counsels,
and it suggests
that he sets up an obscuring
dichotomy in her thought between a dominant action for action's
sake in which the existential supremacy of action lies
in aesthetic reconciliation and acceptance, and a lesser
voice of action for
justice' sake in which we actively
orient ourselves ethically.

Mikael Denneny is virtually alone among
scholars of
Arendt in suggesting the ways Arendt's work
positively re-
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lates ethics and
aesthetics

.

^

,

^^

gestive article he argues
that Arendt mak es an
effort to
reintegrate and reestablish
relations between those
two
fields within philosophy
where human values are
at stake ethics and aesthetics
1CS 20 t«
In the modern age
these two
fields became "suddenly.
y...-cwo
.two separate
seMra f 0 and
» *
major fields of
Philosophical inquiry,- .21 with
relatively abysmal results
Denneny suggests that if we
look back upon Arendt's
"

.

last

imaginative work on political
judgment, and then to her
earliest writing, "her last
unwritten work now appears as
the natural unfolding of
the discoveries she made
in her
investigation of totalitarianism. "22
The importance
of

this comment in the context
of this work is that if
Denneny is right, from Arendt's
earliest to her latest works,
we can discern a constant
preoccupation with questions of

justice in the form of how to
ethically limit action. And
this is a discernment I suggest,
with Denneny, only possible if we locate at the center
of Arendt's work her fundamental concern for the political
relevance of the
aesthetic dimension of existence.

My approach to Arendt's work, then, is
informed by
this claim to a unity of purpose from
beginning
to end,

and is thus synthetic in nature. 23

There is a bedrock of

continuity in Arendt's political-ethical-aesthetic
concerns.

From her claim that in the totalitarian system,
in

which all men have become equally superfluous, we
must
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recognize radical evil
evil,-24 to
n her
K«
articulation of "the
right to have ri gh ts"25
which correspQnds
a community „ illing
to guarantee any
to her argument in
Eic ta aJm
Ale that the _
precedented crime of genocide
was -an attack upon
human
diversity as such, that is,
upon a characteristic of
the
"human status" without which
the very words "mankind"
or
"humanity" would be devoid
of meaning; "27 to her
celebrg _
tion of the republican form
of government as that
*.

^

_in^s

ffl ,

^
^^.^
^

^

m

form

most suited to her ethical
framework since it is most
capable of celebrating human
plurality and freedom; to her
final and unfinished
preoccupation with judging which
she

argued was "one of the most
important activities in which
this sharing-the-world-with-others
comes to pass, "28 what
we find is a continuous concern
with what we traditionally
call ethical questions. And
these questions find their
supporting ground in her ontological
and aesthetic reflections which it is my aim in this
chapter to elaborate.
Before turning directly to Arendt's
ontological and
aesthetic reflections, however, we should
take note of her
interpretation of Nietzsche's proclamation
regarding the
end of traditional metaphysics. While
Nietzsche

proclaimed, "God is Dead," Arendt restated
our situation
as being, "the traditional thought of
God is
dead, "(emphasis mine) 29

By this she meant that we no

longer are able to sustain belief in the existence
of an
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other-worldly realm of Truth
iruth and u
Harmony in such a way
that it can be political^
meaningful.
she wrote,

s^?

j ° ined the
WHO for some time now have ranks of those
wnolor
been attemotina
ng
aPhySiCS and Phi^so^y
W?th llTHl

n

'

categories, as we have
thlm
them 2i
from if
their beginning in Greece known
until
today.
such dismantling is
possible olil on
n
h
P
thr d ° f ^aditLn
is broken and
d that
Sha11
not be able to
renew it »38

^r

^

Ours is a position at once
new and a return to a beginning which Arendt captures
by culling the e^^exience
behind the central story of
beginnings in the West, "we
know only "male and female
created he them" - that is,
from the beginning this plurality
poses an enormous prob"31
lem.
Today as once befor ^
stand
,

^

^

^

Plural.

And this of course means not only
that the problem of ultimates is a problem
for philosophers, as it has
always been, but for us all.
it has become a political
problem which means that questions of
authority and of
limits to human action have perhaps
become the central
difficulties.
It is from this utterly unstable
situation forced

upon us, in Arendt 's view, by modern events
that she takes
her bearings. That is, this condition of
naked plurality
becomes for Arendt the beginning for all ethical
reflection.

What is of very much importance to note here
is

that despite the end of faith in a metaphysical
order,

despite our return to the state of being "newborns," as
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Nietzsche put it, it is not
with nothing we are left.
We
are not "groundless." Aren
dt does not use this
metaphor
which by now rises so naturally
to the postmodern lips,
instead she uses the metaphor,
"thinking without a
banister;" in German, "Denken ohne
Gelaender."
she ex-

plains it thusly,
"That is, as you go up and down
the stairs
you can always hold on to the
banister so
U
n,t fal1 dOWn
But we h ^e lost
t°
the banister.
That is the way I tell it to
S
this is indeed what I try to
do "32*

^V°

'

Far from groundless, she is
suggesting that what we indeed
do have is the ground.
And from the beginning, Arendt
ac-

cepts this ground, banisterless though
it be, as the
starting point for reestablishing
bearings, for she
argues,

"plurality is the law of the earth." 33

B.

Ontology of Display

"In this world which we enter, appearing
from a nowhere, and from which we disappear
into a nowhere, Being and Appearing coincide ... Nothing and nobody exists in the
world whose very being does not presuppose a
spectator ... Not Man but men inhabit this
planet.
Plurality is the law of the
earth. 34
In these few lines which constitute the essence
of

the first paragraph of the opening chapter of Thinking
the ethical-aesthetic texture of what

ontology of display are laid forth.
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I

,

will call Arendt 's

Arendt 's basic ap-

preach to the nature of
reality is phenonenal,
and „e
should take note at the
outset that the central
metaphor
wh.ch carries the weight
of her phenonenological
conception of "what is,
» is that of the theater
Like the
reality created on the stage,
things and creatures of
the
world are appearing in nature
such that what appears
is
"Meant to be" perceived seen, heard, touched,
tasted and
smelled - by sentient creatures.
Furthermore, without
this perceptivity, without
sentient "spectators,., nothing
is.
Hence, plurality is the
"law of the earth" in the
sense that for anything to
be at all, the basic unit
of
Plurality: actor-spectator or
thing-sentient creature is
presupposed.
Plurality guarantees and brings
into being
"what is."
.

As creatures who both themselves
appear and who perceive others, who are both in this
sense objects and subjects, all sentient beings are
"fit for" this world in
which Being and Appearing coincide.
Critical to this
sense in which things are fit for
the world is Arendt's
argument that we cannot make sense of
the enormous richness of what is presented to the senses
in functional
terms alone, as, for example, the need
of the organism for

self-preservation or reproduction.

When it comes to ap-

pearance there is a "sheer functional superfluity"
in what
is displayed. 35
Experience intuitively confirms such
claims even at the most simple level of life as
when we
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cast our eye along the
edge
of the
une sea lighting
^
liOH-i
upon the
almost fluorescent orange
of the starfish clinging
to dark
i-

quickly pass over its pale
purple sister, drawn towards
the delicate translucence
of the sea anenome's
emerald
fingers, and still on to
marvel at the blood-red
urchin's
Prickly spines, what can
such colors be for, we
wonder
Arendt suggests we not seek
for an answer to this
question
alone, or even primarily,
in a functional direction.
To
do so is to reduce the
richness of "what is" in the
manner
of a Philistine whose
hallmark is, as she puts it
in an-

other work, "an inability to
think and to judge a thing
apart from its function or
utility. "36 The surface
prQfu _
sion of the world must be
understood at a fundamental
level in terms of display.
We find a more active sense
to this display quality
of the sentient world in higher
animals, reaching its
climax in humans.
In these higher forms of life,
Arendt
argues, we can speak of what she
calls the "urge to selfdisplay. "37 Here Arendt follQWS fche
fascinating work
Qf

Swiss biologist and zoologist Adolf
Portmann in suggesting
that there is a spontaneous impulse to
show or exhibit the
self, a response to "the overwhelming
effect of being
shown. "38 she writeS( " whatever can see want*
to be seen

whatever can hear wants to he he a rd, whatever
can touch
presents itself to h e touched "39
.
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Here toQ Arendt/s

theatrical metaphors carry
her meaning. Just as
tne ac .
tor, on stage before
the eyes of all feels
the thrill of
being seen, and responds
spontaneously to it by excelling
so too higher forms of
life are possessed by an
urge to
self-display - understood not
as the expression of
some
inner authenticity, but as
the urge to make its

p^^

felt; to be recognized and
acknowledged "as an individual." 40 Here Arendt tries
to articulate what she
calls,
"the expressiveness of an
appearance" which is of a different order from the common
sense notion that when we
express something, it is something
inner that is "pressed
out." This urge to display
and self-display, which is
the
very essence of things in an
appearing world, by contrast,
expresses itself, it makes an effort
to shine forth, to
excel in its individuality before
others.
Thus, inasmuch
as things appear, they "demand
recognition and praise." 41
It is in this sense too that we
should understand

Arendt 's claim that plurality is the
law of the earth.
That is, sentient creatures, according
to their complexity, possess an active response to
being perceived in the form of an impulse to distinguish
themselves.
Thus
"what is," is constantly contributing to and
bringing

forth the wild spectacular quality of the world.

Here then, to summarize, we find an ontology of
dis-

play which suggests that "reality" is something born
out
of a highly charged mutual sensuous provocation
between
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actors and spectators
ators.

in
All

Uvmg
ti

creatures are in this
respect linked together
in a continuous though
develo pffl entally differentiated
whole.
Ar endt uses the language
of
"impulse,., -urge,..
..spontaneity" to underline
the

mysterious ..given" guality
to this conception of
the nature of -what is,. „he„
we speak of
of a universe alive with
yearning to sense and be
sensed,
of a universe which
perpetually gives birth to
its own
plurality and profusion.

^

^

^

Vet there is discontinuity
between the natural and
the hu m an as well, for
"purely" natural things
"e.anate"
this profusion; "they (have)
no choice but to show

whatever properties

a

living being possesses. "42

Against
this backdrop of euanation
humans prepare and n,ake this
profusion "fit for" thp
wor-in of appearance.
the world
humans,
the urge to self-display is
manifest in the effort "to
present ourselves in word and deed
and thus indicate how
we wish to appear. "43
this way humans bring forth
the
plurality of the earth in a unique
way, and it is this
which marks the radical discontinuity
of the human species
with the rest of the natural world.
I think we conceive
of this relation best as a continuity
out of which discontinuity arises, as a "difference in
identity," to use a
phrase Arendt coins with reference to the
plurality in-

m

m

herent in the thinking ego.
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This ability to r
E SSSDt ourselves is of
course
Arenas way of sayin nutans
g
alone have the ability
to be
free.
In her political
theory she calls it
natality: the
capacity, as those with
a beginning, to
ourselves begin
act, initiate.
y et
we should be quick
does not »ean that humans
create themselves. Ar
en dt does
not share Hegelian-Marxist
historicism. And the roots
of
her dissent from this
camp lie both in her
insistence on
"the sheer thereness of
ueing, " 4 4 and in the
beina
t
fact of
Plurality itself.
By this latter ! mean
that because we
exist in the plural in an
appearing world, the
anlv mode
through which things can be
acknowledged is in the way
they seem.
Here again, the metaphor
of the theatrical
stage carries her meaning.
That which appears,

^

,

^

•

^^^

.

in its

sheer thereness, is common
to all, yet it is observed
by
spectators, each of whom occupies
a slightly different
"seat." It-seems-to-me,
dokei^noi, as the fundamental
mode of appearance, Arendt
argues, means that everything
which appears, whether it chooses
or not, will acquire a
kind of "disguise" which inevitably
thwarts our ability to
control the effect of our
self-presentation
on others, as

well as our ability to know others
in any definitive
sense.
There is a recalcitrant quality to
our experience
of the world in which plurality
reigns.

This recal-

citrance suggests that in our natural
urge to deliberately
present ourselves as distinct beings through
word
and
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—

.

we nust depend upon

^

^

perceptivity Qf

this means is that
Arendt , s conception
Qf
effQrt
self-presentation (which
she calls H glory „
works,, is not a
unidirectional, megalomaniacal
urge to be
admired by others.
Kather, while clearly
an urge
acknowledged and a hope of
being
praised thi.
y pidisea,
this urge at the
center of the being of
"man"
man is,
is
i„ its very
in
essence
"world open and communicative."
(That this urge might
come distorted is beyond
douht, and a healthy
p ubli c culture and public sphere
are Arendt's answers
to such a possibiUty.) As
reference for the acfcor
a
always a specific audience,
so our efforts at selfpresentation too always
pla y <-„
y "dIav"
to a specific community.
intrinsic to our effort at
self-presentation

_

^

^^

^

^

^

^

.

is a

deliberate responding to and
moving out towards the
plural
world of others in order
that they perceive and
hence hold
the reality of our individuality
in being.
Thus the very
quality and the character of
our individuality emerges
in
the interstices of the human
world and is perpetually
evading transparent knowledge
and control.
her political theory this becomes the
idea that we are non-sovereign
beings, and the essence of
political action in this regard
is unpredictability.

m

The specific reality of human
plurality hence is very
fragile, dependent as it is upon
others willing and able
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to accept the
recalcitrance ana
unpredictability that we
-ch are. mtrinsic to the
a bility fo r such
acceptance is
the existence of a
world shared in common
which offers
humans a "space of
remembrance" < 5 and a

^

^

permanence amidst the
evanescence of a pp earing
and dis .
appearing in a phenomenal
world.
This world shared in
common consists both in
an objective-in-between
(the
materiality of nature and the
durable goods o, the human
wcrld, whose durability
wears down only very slowly
transcending individual use
and thus providing
humans with
tangible worldly interests,
and the subjective-in-between
(words and deeds of "men")
which in the form of stories
concepts, ideas, cultural
norms, etc., constitute
the in-

tangible web of human relatedness. 46
Arendt calls this common world
artificial and unnatural insofar as it is the
product of deliberate acts
which, to be done, require
that we win a certain freedom
from ever-recurring cycles of
the life process.

Hence, we

have the paradoxical idea that
for humans to take our
place as earthly beings on this
planet whose natural law
is plurality, we must build
a common, relatively durable
human world in which our plurality
can be explicitly made
manifest.
This requires that we simultaneously

thwart, to

certain extent, the compelling dimension
of that same
earth's nature, the dimension we must
now briefly elaboa

rate.
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What Arendt calls
"necessity. is the other
aspect Qf
her ontological
reflections which i have
untn no„ held
abeyance in the effort
both to hi gh l ight the
aesthetic
texture o, Arendt's ontology,
and to unfold
of the case she makes
for the ontoloaical
nature of
Plurality. However, "necessity,"
which subjects us all,
is equally important to
Arendt's conception of
"what is."
Fro* this angle, being is
conceived of as a relentless
cycle of compelling, multipliers
needs bounded on one
side by appearing (birth,
and on the other by
disappearing (death,.
Here, the world is one of
intense functional
necessity in which natural beings
are driven by survival
itself; in which the very
beat of life wells out

^

^

,

of the

crush to survive and not out
of the incitements of display.
Nature, on this account, as the
life process,

presses inexorably on all living
things, its mode compulsion and often violence.
it is independent of will
and
neither progresses nor regresses.
It has no temporality;
it is the realm of "being-forever ""7
endlessly turning,
,

ever recurring in its relentless
fertility.

Here, in some

basic sense, everything is the same
insofar as all things
are coerced by a profusion of incoherent
and conflicting
drives and needs in the service of the
life
process.

Arendt's ontological reflections revolve,
thus,
around the paradoxical tension that "what is"
is something
born of the driving coercive cycles of the life
process,
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ana something overflowing
with sensuous profusiQn
diversity which perpetually
brings ltseif
'
that is, brings itsel£
intQ be ng
As x
t
brin9 lnt teing the
°
°* ***n Plurality therefore
we must sustain a
tension with the reality
o f ..nature.-.
tension which in Arendt
ArpnHf'es +-v.
theory appears as that
between
the life process and the
sDecifir
a iiv k
specifically
human world, between
freedom and necessity. And
this tension musfc be
if we are to achieve the
first moment of ail ethical
disoern m ent: that is, simply
being present to „ what

^

^

.

J

in its profusion and its
compulsion.

^^

This means not

colonizing and not erasing
alienation, but rather getting
to know and bringing into
being the full
shape,

fee l,

scent and texture of things.

Arendt '. heightened focus on
this moment arises out
of the experiences of
totalitarian terror in which the
public sphere was wholly eclipsed,
and an eerie sense of
irreality and non-being pervaded
and 'structured' experience.
It was this which led her to
focus on the central ity of both witnessing
spectators (in her ontology of
display) and factuality (in her
reflections
on necessity)

as the two key dimensions of the
real.

Yet,

as

I

shall

argue towards the close of this
chapter, there is a very
important second ethical moment which
consists in speaking
to one's present and claiming it as
one's own.
Both moments are central to what Arendt means by
humanizing the
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world.

In what follows

SenSibUitY

°f

tragiC

the sine aua non

1

wUl

—

aesthet c
.

thin, Arendt suggests
is
for such discernment a sensibility
*

which is i„pii cit in Arendt's
ontology of display.

C.

Tragic Pleasure: The First
Moment

The central and rather large
linkage between Arendt's
ontology of display and the
aesthetic dimension is that
the very mode of appearing
in a universe alive with
an
urge to exhibit, a universe
yearning to be sensed and
acknowledged, is aesthetic provocation.
By excelling, humans
and other higher animals seek
to provoke recognition
and
praise of the very reality of
their individuality. Th ey
rely upon the recognition of
others for full confirmation
of their being.
This provocation is the manner
in which
all living creatures, some more
passively, make their appearance.
Arendt writes,

"...whatever has a shape at all and is
seen
cannot help being either beautiful,
uql
or
v
something inbetween. 48

Arendt here seems to imply that living
creatures cannot help but find things in their
appearance aesthetically
pleasing or displeasing.
Thus an aesthetic response is
natural, almost impulsive, and it is necessary
in order
that the distinct and specific reality of
things
emerge.

Yet Arendt also suggests that humans constantly
fall short
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of the kind of aesthetic
sensibility necessary
for the
Plurality inherent in the
world to unfold. For
this reason, this aesthetic
sensihinty - as a finding
pieasure in
the astivity of being
provoked by
_
»ust he cultivated. It
is this sensihiiity
Arendt refers
to as "tragic pleasure,"
and it is characterized
by the
willingness to accept and feel
gladness in the recalcitrant and plural quality
of the world.
This tragic
Pleasure is very close to the
notion of gratitude Kateb
argues is Arendt's basic
feeling towards the human
condition, and which, therefore
leads to a kind of ethical
immobility on her part. Vet,
as we shall see, it is
only
the first moment of Arendt's
aestheticism, and cannot be
understood without the second,
more actively shaping mo-

^^

merit.

in the effort to elaborate
this tragic pleasure as
well as to tease out the ethical
underpinnings of Arendt's

reflections on it,

would like to turn to her analysis
of
thinking which Arendt, like Nietzsche,
conceives aesthetically, though in importantly
different
I

ways.

in the ac-

tivity of thinking and those who
think, Arendt finds the
most pure expression of the tragic
pleasure upon which the
rich plurality of the world depends.
Instead
of a

Nietzschean artistic fictioning which remains

a

largely

self-contained and self-referential activity,
thinking for
Arendt, is the revelation of plurality through
dialogue -
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with oneself to be c=n*.«
sure, but dialogue
which points outwards to the world of
others.
,

.

^ BilLiif^thg^,

Arendt ts driyen

^

invest ._
gate her suspicion that
our ability to thin,
is connected
to our ability to
distinguish evil f ro » good
.

It is

m-

what makes us think?

Not only does she answer
that it is
this basic and overarching
aesthetic pleasure in praising
and not praising the sheer
profusion of "what is-- that
makes us think, but she also
suggests that this pleasure
is directly related to
our capacity for moral
discernment
as well.

Although Arendt relies on the
-representative function- of Socrates' life for
a description of the
activity
of thinking itself, she
rejects Socrates' answer that
it
is a desirous love of lovable
things

(beauty, wisdom, jus-

tice) which makes us think.

Arendt begins her own effort

to answer the question by
suggesting that in the thinking
activity itself life has deposited
its fundamental plural
beat.

"Nothing perhaps indicates more strongly
that man exists essentially i n the
plural
than that his solitude actualizes his
merely
being conscious of himself ... into a
duality
during the thinking activity itself." 49

Thinking is of the world in that it is the
activity
in which we think about the world, in
which we realize
ourselves as "question-asking" beings by splitting
into
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two and carrying on
a silent dialogue
with ourselves
It
is this ability to
spiit into two, this
-inherent duality"
which Arendt argues
..points to the infinite
piurality
which is the iaw of the
earth.-- This two-in-one
points
to the law of the earth
because what thinking
does is »aotualize differenr-o
a^.4>-s,,
irerence, » activating
consciousness which
without the thinking activity,
can only think
4.

and not

^

it.

•

Thinking thus

unl^^

difference; it
releases or reveals the
plurality of
And it does
so, as clearly both
Plato and Socrates also
reali ze d, in a
dangerous way. Thinking, Arendt
writes, "inevitably

^t^.

has a

destructive, undermining effect"
insofar as it "unfreezes"
what was settled and solid. 51
Things begin tQ
pery when we talk about their
meaning, nothing stays put
anymore, everything begins to
move.""

^^

However, what is in this context
perplexing about
thinking is that though it
"accompanies life" and is an
ever-present ability of everyone, it
is not necessary to
us.
we can go through the life
process quite adequately
without it. The profuse and plural
beat can be frozen
into singularity.
And indeed this is the case much
of the
time for many.
What is it then which makes some think
and
others not?

Arendt approaches an answer by describing
the thinking activity itself through the example
of
Socrates.

The

preconditions for thinking are solitude or absence
from
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the world of appearances,
ana t he ability to
remain on
g ooa terms with our friend „

^

.,

^

^

who awaits us, we
familiarly oall conscience
.
Arendt suggests, who is
not always present to
us but only
" hen " WS *° h
53
And as we learn fro*
the
socratic daimon, it never
tells us what to do but
only
what not to do if „ e wish
to maintain our dialogue
with
him.
Hence, though thinking,
as this friendship with
ourselves which opens up
difference, is always a
possibility
we need not go home; we
need not return to
reflective
,

°-

dialogue in the course of
which -things get slippery."
And what makes some do so
is, Arendt suggests,
the
pleasure in being "fully alive."
"Thinking accompanies life and
is itself the
de-materialized quintessence of being
aliveand since life is a process,
its quintessence can only lie in the
actual Sinking
process and not in any solid
result or
h °U
S
A Ufe without thinking
ifaufie
n
is
quite possible;
it then fails to develop
its essence - it is not merely
meaninglessaningiess,
it is not fully alive." 54

^

-

importantly, over and against the
platonic conception
of thinking as love of lovable
or perfect things, and the
"two-world theory" which follows therefrom,
Arendt places
thinking squarely in the world, despite
its undeniable

characteristic of being "out of order."
argues,

Thinking, Arendt

is something we may do continuously
throughout our

lives; it accompanies life.

It is out of order in the
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sense that it is an
invisi ble activity
concerned with invisible things in a world
of appearances.
But it does not
point to a world of true
Being, nor it is it
activated by
love of such things.
This is one of the
Metaphysical fallacies,
indeed, thinking's
perpetual "non-results- defy
the possibility that such
a world exists.
And this otherworldly dream imagines and
hopes for a day when
thinking
would no longer be necessary.
This, in Arendt's view
would be akin to death. it
is not love of perfect
things,
then, but pleasure in the
sheer activity of -actualizing
difference" which draws some
"home" and others
not.

Arendt notes the curious
emptiness of such an activity from the standpoint of
the actor.
itself it
achieves nothing; it is as endless
or pointless as the
cyclical life process itself.
And it is this empty impractical quality that is at the
heart of the charges of
formalism and immorality Arendt's
critics levy at her.
And, to be sure, there is a
great degree of formalism in
this notion of tragic pleasure
which drives a profitless
thinking activity. Vet there is a very
important connection which Arendt pursues between this
activity and our
ability to distinguish right from wrong.
She suggests
that without a pleasure in the sheer
profusion

m

of things,

without

a

pleasure in plurality and difference, we
cannot

even begin the elementary movement away from
the blunt
presence of things, a movement which is the
precondition
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for our ability to thin*
not what something i,,
but about
it.
And this ability, of
course, is a precondition
for
any specifically
moral-ethical refaction which
concerns
the good or bad nature
of things, as well as
the very content of such categories
themselves.

Arendt gives a very interesting
example which clearly
illustrates the relation between
ethics and aesthetics as
she comments on the prof
itlessness of thinking
from the

standpoint of the actor.

In discussing the way
that

reflective thinking unfreezes
meanings into their multitude, she comments,
this kind of Pondering
n0t Pr ° duce definitions
and
ih^ sense is entirely
in that
without results
S
dy
d the
P ° nd
^ou!e"
nouse might
mTah? make his own look better." 55
We should, I think, read this
"look" in a deep sense.
Reflective thinking, by unleashing
the plurality of the
world, lays the foundation for
a kind of heightened care
for our world that is ethical
and aesthetic in nature.
The aesthetic sensibility of tragic
pleasure that drives
us to think, which allows us to
see, activates our concern
for "what is": that it be good, that
it be beautiful, that
it be worthy - though, and this
is critical, this
3
Itf^l*™^
10n d ° eS
'

^

sensibility itself is not born of

^ing

a love of lovable

things
To underline this last point: it should
be clear that

the sensibility which undergirds this elementary
ability
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to

^

^^

away from the sheer
thergness q£
^
Pleasure in the earths
profusion is not merely
Pleases in an immediate,
gratifying sort Qf
it ple a sure in harmony
as oneness.
Rather, lt is a
Pleasure in the sublime
splendor of the world;
that is i„
the splendor of a world
a i ways pot enti a il
y on the verge of
berng overwhelm by the
dangerous a nd unpredictable,
the
challenging end different,
and perhaps even the ugly
and
horrific.
it is the experience
of this kind of "tragicpleasure which Arendt refers
to as the -home" to
which
those who think are
spelled to return again and again.
Like the actor in Arendt's
political theory, the thinking
spectator too must take sometimes
terrible risks; be willing to see "what is." The
reward is an -intensified
,

^^
^^

^

awareness of reality."
While some have interpreted
Arendt's conception of
this home as one of "harmony
and unity"56 it is narmonious
only insofar as the two friends
to the dialogue share a
commitment to remaining on speaking
terms so that they can
"actualize difference." The distinction
Arendt makes as
she discusses the political
relevance of friendship
in

"Thoughts on Lessing" between fraternity
and friendship in
this context is illustrative.
Fraternity is what we seek
when we seek warmth, safety. To this
end we draw near to
others, avoid disputes.
We reach for a kind of stillness,
singularity, for surcease of conflict which,
in times of
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political persecution.
may be
of our sense o f
identity.

f undamental

fcQ

^

By contrast,

friendship consists of a passionate
openness to the world,
a
to sharing it with
others such that what
each Mee»s true"
can both l ink and separate

cogent

us

_

^

ostabUBhing

tances between men which
together comprise the world "57
Disputation thus is critical,
the relation laced not
with
sentimentalism, but with sobriety
and coolness. 58 Insofar
as there is harmony, it
consists in that shared
passion
Lessing called "gladness"
for the fundamental
relativity
and plurality of the human
world, and for the dispute
inherent in dialogue which keeps
plurality in
being.

It is with this sense of
harmony in mind that Arendt

affirmatively quotes yosal Rogat's
characterization of the
offense to which our century
gave birth:
"...a great crime offends nature,
so that
V
rth ° ri
° Ut f ° r ve "^nce; that
^il v^l»? 3 natural harmony which only
tlttZ
lbu *Jlon can restore; that a
wronged col^
°" eS 3 dUty 0 the m °«l °rder
to
Rl
™n?«h ll
punish
the criminal." 59

r

This is no image of "that which
is" as a single melodious
line, but as a full-part harmony
which reaches its depths
through tensions in which musical
transgression and accord
follow one upon the other - now searingly
painful, now
tender, now sounding both tones.
The pagan spirituality
which fills Arendt's pages is praise for the
painful multiplicity of the natural world and the plurality
of the

human world.

There is much of Nietzsche's spirit here.
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"

we turn now to a
discussron of the other
pole of
Arenas ontological refactions necessity, we win see
Arendt exemplifying this
first moment of the
aestheti c
sensibility of tragic pleasure.
1

•

The Human Conrm-i^ n
"We walk with alien feetwe see „;. h
eyes; we recognize and
greet
people Si^""
alien memory; we live from

alre^'abor!"^"

Arendt's reflections on
necessity are the most
troubling and least understood
aspect
of

Th^uMax^onditlsn.

The prevailing reading by
scholars of Arendt is that
as
ceaseless compulsion, necessity
must be donated so that
we can lead a fully human
life in which we are freed
for a
life of speech and action.
Like Aristotle, to whom
Arendt
is much indebted in this
text, the ontological status
of
necessity, it is argued, is far
lower than the life of
speech and action. The apparent
insensitivity Arendt exhibits towards the life of
anijsa^aborans her failure
,

to

find much specifically human and
thus exalted about it,
and her concomitant celebration
of politics as something
having apparently little to do
with life's necessary and
compelling dimensions, are at the heart
of the moral objections to Arendt's work and the
charges of aestheticism,
formalism and amorality many levy at her
conception of the
political.
I think Arendt's understanding
of this dimension of the human condition is far more
complex.
In what
follows I will illuminate this more complex
reading of
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necessity as well
well as the
aesthetic sensibility
Arendt exhibits in her reflection,
on it.
, will also
shQw
ethical di m ension of this
sensibility which is
intimately
tied to our capacity
to see the
cne real
real ln
ir, its
<compelling
dimension as necessity.

^

If we loox closely
at this text, with
eyes sensitized

by the foregoing discussion
of Arendt >s ontology
of display where we find that
difference arising out of
identity
characterizes her understanding
of the relation between
non-human nature and the
specifically human world,
what we
find is a concerted effort
on her part to search
not only
f°r what is specifically
human, but to argue that
for a
tnlta human life, all dimensions
of the human condition
must exist in great, but
fruitful tension. Arendt
tries
to see and value the human
condition in its "naked
Plurality." And her arguments
for a fully human life are
fundamentally puu
put xn
in tens
term^ of
n f a full sensibility
for "what
is, » for the real
jr

What this naked plurality means
in terms of the need
humans have to orient and make
ourselves fit for ap-

pearance in

a

post-metaphysical world, a world without
a

fixed center is that, with Einstein,
we must deny that "at
any definite present instant all
matter is simultaneously
real. "61 This general re i a tivity
of all things, including
the dimensions of the human condition,
means that it is
the specific quality of the real to be
evasively multi-
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dimensional in a world
without banisters
"dnisters.
t«
in such a world
we need a theatrical
agixity, an ability to
looK at t he
" OCld fr ° B mUltiPle
^an d p oints if „e are to keep
its
reality in being. And
further< as Me lgarn

^

^

^

Pleasure not only in the
harmony but also in the
disaccord
which exists between
dimensions of human existence
as they
reveal themselves to us
from varying standpoints,
our
sense of reality will be
heightened. We will be more
fully present to the world.
Thus,

if Arendt can be said
to have a method in The
it is to inhabit what

H^an^dlt^,

Shiraz Dossa has
aptly enough called the
"sensibilities-62 which goyern
three activities most fundamental
to human life: labor,
work and action. Arendt herself
sometimes referred to'
these sensibilities as "mentalities,"
and she personified
them in the actor, h^mo_^aber,
and

^

anima^abprans

.

m

so

doing she gives her readers something
akin to flesh and
blood so that we may deeply inhabit
their respective

orientations to the world.

it is critical to note,

since

it is the source of much
misunderstanding of this text,

that these figures do not represent
whole persons or
classes of persons, but are competing,
conflicting and interdependent sensibilities or standpoints within
the self
towards the world in general. This of course
is
not to

say that one sensibility may not dominate
a particular

historical period or

a

particular class of persons.
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In

fact the balance of
these sen s i bilities
in our tlme was
the impetus which led
Arendt to write the boo,
at all
(in this context her
work on the Greeks
must be read
heuristically and not somehow
as Arendt <s literal
VieWS.) 63 Yet Ar6ndt
AronHf s aim
inhabiting variously and
somewhat irradically these
personified sensibilities
is
not only to rectify the
imbalance she diagnoses
peculiar
to our time in which the
aims and outlook of animal

m

l^orans have come to dominate.

It is also to cultivate

in her readers that
"tragic pleasure" in the
inevitable

impingement, encroachments and
tensions within the human
condition itself. To achieve
this difficult pleasure
to have the ability to be
confronted ever anew with the
need to orient ourselves
explicitly with respect to what
is, i.e. to distinguish,
to discern, to think, the
capacity for which, as we have
seen, is what Arendt means by
the phrase "to be fully alive." 64

^

Hence, although in The Human mnrt<

clearly concerned as

a

(deep)

Arendt is

"occasional" thinker with

reinvigorating the capacity to act in
speech and deed in
public life because, as the most free
activities, they embody the specifically human ability
to manifest plurality
gua uniqueness, she does not do so at
the expense of the
devaluation of every other activity. Even
in a book where
she explicitly says she is not attempting
"an exhaustive
analysis of the vita activa," but is engaging
in a more
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limited effort-

to determine... their
political significance" (emphasis mine>
mine), 65 „
u=
^
e flnd
lmportant positive
evaluations of the activities
nvities on their own terms,
and assessments of the meaning
and necessity of the
tensions
that exist between them.
Even in this .political"
book
where her primary intent
is to consider the
from the standpoint of
the poiitical actor,
there is a vision of what it means to
be fully human which,
as I have
suggested above, is achieved,
in Arendt's view, not
by
being wholly freed from
necessity for the life of
speech
and action, but rather by
sustaining the reality or
impact
of the conditions under
which life was given, and
hence
too, the enormous tensions
existing between them and
the
activities and sensibilities
fundamental to them.
If we look at the realm
of necessity, the home
of
animal laborans we see that
while it is clearly in conflict with the specifically
human life of speech and action, the relationship is not
a simple one of domination
and subordination. To be fully
human we must be, to some
extent, subject to necessity's
compulsion, feel its impact.
And further, not to be so subject
is to risk the
»+-<~i

m

•

yit^ti^

,

very plurality celebrated in speech
and action.

There is

a multidimensionality to Arendt's
conception of necessity

as there is to each of the conditions
she elaborates - a

multidimensionality we must grasp if we are
to see the
ethical impulse which drives her work
in
this regard.
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The

<*

^

th^iteajl_c and

ls straightforward
Aren dt alternatively
cQnsiders iabor( wQrk
actxon. tho se activities
most fundamental to human
life
because they eaoh correspond
to one of its basic
conditions: labor to life
itself, „ ork to worldliness>
an<J
tion to plurality. Lab or
and life with which we
are here
concerned fall into the realm
of necessity which

eno Ugh

.

_

is

shorthand for the most elemental
life process in which hu-ns 33!3^ni al_l a b 2E an s engage in
an eternally necessary
and repetitious cycle of
production, consumption and
procreation.
the realm of necessity the
human condition of life is reproduced.
Here, life's fertility
ffl

m

is

endlessly born with a force
unmatched by other activities
in the human condition.

Necessity stands, then, for the
force of the life
process which compels all living
creatures insofar as they
are creatures of the earth.
Words of caution, what
Arendt is trying to establish with
this category
is not

that the laboring activities
driven by the life process do
not come to acquire different
historical-social meanings.
In fact, she is careful to say
that all human activities
have the quality of freedom and
initiative to some extent.
Hence, for example, reproductive life
is not a wholly
coercive thing; it bears the marks of our
uniqueness both in the sense of cultural-historical
and individual

distinctness.

And this of course could be traced and ana-
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so.
Arenas primary point
however, is that we must
distinguish between the
three acuities of the
insofar as each partakes
a
neater or lesser degree o f
freedom with the category
of
necessity she delineates
those activities in
which the
force of life makes its
impact most felt through
its priory modes of pain and suffering.
It is of all activities
free.
With the term necessity
then, Arendt insists
that we acknowledge that
despite the tremendous
variations
in cultural meanings
given to the activities
driven by
necessity, and despite the
tremendous achievements of
faber in reducing the
experience of pain and suffering
these activities cause us,
there remains an irreducible
compelling dimension which we
ignore at our peril.
This compelling dimension,
this force of life is
viewed differently by the three
figures in the vita afitiva.
To the sensibility of the
actor the toilsomeness of
life is something to get free
from for a life in the world
of human affairs where speech
and action are at stake,
it
is in this context alone that
Arendt says we must be
"freed from" necessity and the
immediacy of its demands.
Of the actor a certain sense of
alienation is reguired.
From the point of view of homo faber
too, the impact
of life must be kept at bay.
Indeed this is largely the
aim of work: to build a more permanent
artifice within
,

yi^ti^

^

HUt

h^

which the world of human affairs can exist
and attain rel-
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ative durability vis a
vis the relentless
appearing and
disappearing that characterizes
the life process.
To this
end hpinp__f^£ develops
an instrumental sensibility
towards nature and the real,
of necessity,
what ho^
laber sees is not some confining
force to be freed from,
but "the almost worthless
things" out of which to
build a
world to house human affairs. 66
By contrast, from the
point of view of animal
iaborans, thoroughly ensconced
in the cyclical rhythms
of
life's demands, nature appears
as the "great provider of
all "good things" which belong
equally to all her chil-

dren *" 67

Animal Iaborans, alone among
the
"sensibilities," experiences what
Arendt calls, "the sheer
bliss of being alive, 6 * a kind
of elemental happiness
which alone comes from the
"prescribed cycle of painful
exhaustion and pleasurable regeneration. 6 9
she writes,
"The reward of toil and trouble
lies in nature's fertility, in the quiet
confidence
that he who in "toil and trouble"
has done
his part, remains a part of nature
in the
future of his children and his children's
children. /u
On this reading the picture which
emerges is of competing and conflicting sensibilities or
orientations

towards necessity and the life process.

Necessity itself

is a multiplicitous experience for
humans which I think

Arendt, in this book, forcefully is suggesting
it must be
in order that we are able to achieve a full
sense of "what
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is."

Each orientation towards
the compelling dimension
of

be perpetual experiences
of each human being in
greater or
lesser proportion. And
this is fundamentally an
ethical
claim on Arendt's part
insofar as to be ethical is
to be
responsible to the plurality
of the earth.
Let me now
turn to Arendt's argument
about what dimensions of
the
real we risk if we collapse
the tension between the life
of the actor and that of
animal_laborans by taking an
entirely dominating attitude
towards the human condition
of life in favor of the
political life of glorious speech
and deed - as her critics
charge she does.

To begin with, it is from
intimate engagement with
the eternal, compelling cycles
of the life process that a
very fundamental sense of belonging
to the earth is born,
a feeling Arendt urges,
which is a critical part of our
sense of reality.
it offers us an elemental sense
of
identity with the earth and all its
creatures.
There is
an element of mystery in this sense
of belonging insofar
as it is a belonging to a continuum
of life which reaches
back into a "nowhere" and affirms the
strange solidity of
what has been "given as a free gift." Arendt's
reasons
for locating the activities of the life
process in the

private, non-political realm lie largely in the
effort to
protect this sense of belonging and the strange sense
of

reality it gives us.

For in the profuse thereness of
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life's fertile process,
a„a despite its compelling
-ion, lt offers respite
fro m the oonfines and
directives
of the hu m an-centered
world.
Arendt uses metaphors such
as depth, darkness,
dark background and darker
ground to
capture the sense of unknowing
and of spatial ity.
This
sensibility is like a reservoir
in the h u»an soul in
which
the very beginnings of a
feeling of renewed possibility
and hope stir.
The second thing which emerges
from Arendt s appreciation of necessity has to
do with a different, perhaps more basic sense of reality,
namely, the sense of
being alive. That is, the
relentless compulsion of the
life process is that without
which the human sense of
vitality would be eliminated.
it is this loss Arendt
finds in the lament of Plinius
quoted above.
it is to the
sense of compulsion and unfreedom
which the life force
gives us that our very capacity
for initiative
is tied.

And to illustrate her point she
argues that what we find
in very wealthy communities is
an extraordinary degree of

apathy
ing)

(a

furious norm-identified behavior
notwithstand-

What is critical here, and it is a
point Arendt
makes again and again, is that without the
impact
.

of na-

ture's compulsion bearing down upon us to
some degree, we
have no way of distinguishing between a state
of freedom
and one of enslavement. This is of utmost
importance
be-

cause the tremendous technological innovations
of the mod-
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age seem to change
the very nature of
necessity itself.
Each one seems to
represent a door to freedom.
But
Arendt warns that so
iong as we ii ve on
the earth,
ability to drastically
reduce
modes of pain
and suffering do not
do away with the
spelling guality
°f the life process,
hut rather only serve
to hide it from
our senses. What we
lose are the hearings
hy which we are
able to distinguish between
freed™ and necessity. This
»ay threaten our sense
for alt^it^ itself,
"that curious
quality... possessed by
everything that is, "71 a
sense
without which human plurality
and thought itself could
not
occur.
What is at stake, Arendt
suggests, is the ability,
as she puts it, "to
encounter that which we are
not.-"
And this must be understood
in terms of those natural
earthly conditions under which
life has been given, but
also in social terms.

h^

£^

The aesthetic sensibility
Arendt attempts to
cultivate in
is a fundamental pleasure
and even wonder at the alteritas
of all things.
this
text it takes the form of an
appreciation for the outlook
and contribution of each of the
three activities of the
vita activa and a kind of pleasure
in their mutual
hostilities and tensions insofar as they
reveal the full
multidimensionality of human existence on
earth.
Together
they provide us with the bearings by
which we must orient
ourselves in a world of appearances.

TJ^m^Coj^^

m

349

^

^

ethical impulse behind
Arendt , s
re?ard 13 t0 UltiVate
that -sibility
°

^

^

without which the
Plurality of the real
cannot be revealed be
it
pulsion of necessity or )-h= „
the profusion of display.
«y
To be
ethically responsible
= i-„
k„
V nsioie is
to be responsible
for "(declaring) the presence of
that which is

^

,

<=

i

present.-"

have argued that the
elemental moment of this
tragic pleasure lies in
the ability to "actualize
difference" thereby revealing
the multidimensional^
I

of the
real, and that thus there
is an elemental ethical
dimension to this aesthetic
sensibility. And I have
argued

that a certain cultivation
of pleasure in being
aesthetically provoked by the
multidimensional^ of the real is
essential to starting the
thinking activity in the
first
Place and is that which draws
us "home." yet what I have
done thus far is articulate
only the most fundamental
relationship between thinking,
aesthetics and ethics. There
is a certain moral
weightlessness in an aesthetic
sensibility alive to multidimensional^
and difference in
general. No matter how adept we
are at "actualizing difference," at "declaring the presence
of that which
is

present," we must also "declare a bond
between (ourselves)
and that which is present to
(ourselves) »?«
.

Humans, as

Arendt puts it, unlike other creatures,
must manifest
their plurality by making their appearance
explicitly
it
is in this context that Arendt
suggests that it is think,
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ing which activates judgment.

Thinking presses us to participate in a process of shaping
and forming.

^^^^^^
Aesthetic discernment is the fundamental
mode by
which we orient ourselves in a
multifaceted

and profuse

appearing world, and it is this discernment
without which
the singular and critical quality
of worldly durability
would not arise.
in the effort to elaborate
the ethical

dimension to such durability,

I

will turn briefly to what

consider to be the other end of the ethical
ballast of
The Human Condition Chapter 23, "The
Permanence of the
World and the Work of Art," and then to
Arendt's reading
I

:

of Kafka's parable,

"HE."

In this chapter, Arendt elaborates the
crucial link

between the quality of permanence, and that which
shines
forth in the shape of all things making them
either beautiful or ugly.
it is the specific power of what we
find

beautiful that it draws us to it

-

not for its usefulness

nor for its consumptive value - but insofar as it trans-

cends both these necessary dimensions of human life in

which things are consumed and immediately disappear, on
the one hand, and in which they are used and more slowly

wear out, on the other.

It is this quality of trans-

cendence, superseding the temporal destruction of both
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^^

tan gible and inta„
gible things which
for humans to Know
and help give fonn
to
shape ana quality of
the world they together
inhabit.
The
quality of transcendence
in things is fundamental
to our
capacity to orient ourselves
with respect to "what
is,.. as
well as to give birth
to our own uniqueness.
,

^

This is so because of the
crucial relation between
beauty and durability.
When we make an aesthetic
Judgment, we give praise or
withhold it, signalling, i„
the
case of praise, that we are
provoked by the excellence
of
a thing such that we
wish it to endure that we
may remain
in proximity to its power
to transcend the mere

functionality and otherwise
finite quality of our lives.
The power of what provokes
us, then, forms the focal
point
around which a meaningful form
of life might develop,
through which bonds of mutuality
and shared understandings
can form.
The transcendence inherent in
our sense
of

beauty is the essence, Arendt
suggests, of the very quality of durability; durability
itself being of primary
political and ethical value insofar
as we must have some
measure of permanence if we are going
to be able to establish the kinds of relations through
which human plurality
can be manifest
But what is the nature of this excellence, what is it that moves us? And
what is its
status? Is it universal and transcendent?
contingent and
contextual?
.
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Along with Plato, Arendt
identifies
"that which shines forth
most,"" and thus
&
certain immortality, she
is even, one might
argue, ciose
to sharing Plato's view
that- the w.
that
beautiful is thus divine
Yet she diverges abruptly
and critically from
Plato's
sense that the quality
in things that shines
forth and
nakes then, beautiful is
their approbation to a
perfect
cental image - the ideal which resides in a realm

^

of

perfection and Being-forever.

Although for Arendt it is

also a thing's approximation
to a mental image that
makes
it beautiful, this image
is born,
it is not timeless.

is born out of "the
objective standards of the

It

world"™ by

which she means the public
world which we share in common.
Thus, the mental image, as
bound to a particular public
world, a particular pel
is-culture is subject to much
change.
The judgment, that is beautiful,
is not universal
as Plato thought, but rather,
contingent and contextual peculiar to a particular culture.
However, despite this contextuality
and the significant possibility for various
"contents" to aesthetic
judgments that it implies, we also find
Arendt arguing
that beauty is coercive, 77 that as a
"quality of rela78
tion"
between beholder and what appears, beauty
is not
disputable.
To make aesthetic judgments is to choose
between quality, not to choose quality itself.
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The confusion here
lies in the fact that
Arendt
argues, on the one hand,
that there is a universai
predicant to which alX of us,
as thinKin g b ein s,
nU st
g
summon a response.
the
une works of
nf <-h~
those who successfully
do, the drama of the
predicament shines forth,
speaking to
all who share it, and thus
the work endures.
Durability
and excellence and the
coerciveness of beauty are in
this
sense intimately linked.
Yet, on the other hand,
for any
individual or people to make
their presence explicitly,

m

they must avoid such an
indiscriminate love of beauty
which Arendt calls aestheticism
and barbaric, 79 and develop an active love of beauty
through which they can establish their own contextually
specific way of discriminating, and hence build a
specific and unique
form of life.

would like to turn now to Arendt
's discussion of Kafka's
parable in order to elaborate both
the nature of the excellence which makes a thing endure,
and the dimensions of
our universal predicament which,
however, must be "solved"
contextually.
I

This parable occurs twice in Arendt's
work, once in
the Preface to Between Past and £utU£e,
and once again in
Thinking.
it goes as follows:
He has two antagonists: the first presses
him from behind, from the origin. The second blocks the road ahead.
He gives battle
to both.
To be sure, the first supports hum
in his fight with the second, for he wants
to push him forward, and in the same way the
second supports him in his fight with the
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first, since he driven hi™ k->
BUt it: is
only theoretically
For
13
the two antagonists so
° nl y
Sno
there, but he
himself as well
k
kn ° WS his
intentions? His dream "Vh^ 1
SOBe
time in an unguLdermomenr^and 5
and .this would
require a night darker
i

S
^

^

*

,?^

10 "
Pir ^° Ver MS "EaSi.S
i^tnelr*
ir
?Iaht
fight with
8
each other. °

Arendt interprets Kafka's
parable as a rendering of
the thinking activity.
It is the presence of
man as "the
beginning of a beginning"" „
hich actualizes and gal _
vanizes the past and the future,
breaking up the otherwise
peacefui and indifferent flow
of eternity.
The actualization occurs in the for™ of a
battle in which the past
presses man towards the future,
and the future presses hi*
back into the past.
It is thus the thinker
who gathers
both the past and the future
into his presence as he attempts to make "a stand," to
defend his own presence.

Thinking occurs on a battlefield
in which "the fighter"
gathers what was and what is not
yet in order to win for
himself a present, to create a gap
between past and future.
In Kafka's parable, however, this
present appears in

the form of a dream of jumping out of
the fighting line
into a region above, where he can be
umpire over past and
future.
Here Kafka repeats the dream of Western

metaphysics in which the region of thought is
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a "timeless,

^

spaceless, suprasensuous
realm. "82 Arendt rejects
dream, and amends the
parable to teach us that
thinking is
an activity which, though
"out of order" in an
appearing
world, is nonetheless of
the world.
The battleground itself, where we actualize
the past and the future,
offers,
Arendt suggests, a space to
which we can retire in
order'
to take stock of and survey
the field of forces, or,
as
she puts it, to "properly see
and survey what [is] most
[our] own. "83

In

^

^

fighting Qf
the thinker makes a small space
in which judging, as the
effort to find meaning in one's
own past and one's own future, can take its place.

Arendt suggests that this activity
of thinking which
creates the gap can never be taught
but only indicated.
The gap, thus, must be beaten anew
by each generation, and
even by each individual.
it is a universal predicament.
And the difficulty of such a task is
such that more often
than not, the thinker will be unable to
find the space
that leads out of the fighting line. More
likely,
he will

"die of exhaustion."

Indeed, Kafka's metaphor for our

home on earth is that of the battlefield, a
metaphor with
which Arendt certainly felt affinity at least
insofar as
we are thinking beings.

many wasted bodies.

As such, our home is strewn with

Yet the one's who survive, whose

works endure through the centuries, achieve such relative
permanence, Arendt suggests, precisely because they are
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able to find that
diagonal
estabiish a present
for ihsmslxa&l that
timeless time
whioh
a
to create timeless
works with „ hich to
transcend their
84
f initeness

^

^

,.

^

.

^

_

critical to the durability
of their achievement
is
that they accept the past
and the future as aimed
at them,
as their past, and their
future as
j-ucure,
i.
fh. forces
a . the
^
against
which they must throw their
weiaht ,nH
weignt,
and out of^ which they
*ust fashion a life. The
key here to Arendt's
effort to
answer why some works, some
people's present,

gnd^

is

precisely their courage and
their excellence in fashioning
a response to the
dilemmas to which they
themselves, as
beginnings, give birth.
insofar as they, i„ thought
and
works, are able to retain
the freshness of their
predicaments as they survey the
-enormous ever-changing timespace which is most their own, "85
what they
ye
.

^ ^

to
the thrill of experiencing the
beat of life as they insert
themselves into the forces of past
and future and tread a
"track of non-time," a present.
g

It is this beat which moves us,
which draws us to
them, for it "indicates" to us
what we ourselves must also
do; it indicates the nature of
the battle we must engage.
It is also the pathos of this
beat which we find beautiful,

and which, therefore gives the work
its enduring
guality.
I would like to give an example
of this found in
Arendt's own reflections on Plato's work.
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The sheer quantity of
references to Plato in
Arendt's
work suggests she has
"chosen his company among
men, "86
that she remains gripped
and moved and even spoken
to by
Plato.
And yet, in Arendt's view,
it is Plato ,
s substit{1 _

tion of making for acting
in his effort to avoid
"the
moral irresponsibility
inherent in a plurality of
agents,- .87 „ hich becQmes

.

^^^^
.

dition of political thought.

^

As such, his is not only
an

argument against democracy, but
against the essentials of
politics itself insofar as it
seeks to destroy the public
realm where plurality is
actualized among humans. Hence
Plato's thought is pitted against
the ethical center of
Arendt's entire intellectual
effort, and would seem to be
her most serious opponent, her
greatest nemesis. And yet
what we find is not mortal enmity,
but dialogue
and

friendship,

why, despite an obvious
repugnance for

Plato's impact on political thought
and political life,
does Arendt admire and befriend him?
Why, despite an obvious moral repugnance, does she find
his work beautiful?
We find the answer amidst Arendt's
effort to explain
the durability of this part of Plato's
work.
She suggests
that it is Plato's unique combination of
depth and beauty
and the "authentic perplexities" to which
he attempts to
summon a response which give his work longevity.
Here

Arendt suggests that the beauty with which Plato's
summons
h is response to a very difficult problem - the
unpredict-
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able,

anonyms

and irreversible
character of all acti on calls attention to itself
as something to be
reckoned
with.
The sheer excellence
of the response is
seething
with which we can never
be wholly f inished
for it ±g
,
that our effort to
-resurrect" the perplexity
„ ith which
Plato wrestled will b e
amply rewarded insofar
as it sheds
light on enduring problems.
The quality of beauty
to
which we respond has less
to do with the content,
with
Plato's solution, than with
a certain heroic
response to
painful dilemmas endemic to
the human condition.
Arendt
is moved by what she,
with Machiavelli, calls the
virtu
displayed by Plato.

^

^

iS
e res P° ns e, summoned
up by man
It^TZT
to the world, or rather to
the constellation
of fortuna in which the
world opens up
presented offers itself to him,
to^his

This kind of admiration of
another's virtu is of a formal
sort - it is a response to the
quality of courage and

heroism and beauty in their effort
to establish their own
present.
And yet Arendt distinguishes herself
from Plato.
While affirming the beauty and hence
enduring quality of
his thought, she rejects the content
of his
response.

All

thinking egos, insofar as they judge, are
"enclosed, as it
were, by the forces of past and future,
and thus protected
against the void; [they] remain bound to and
[are]
rooted

in the present." 89

As such, while they share with all
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ti.es the general nature
of the problem of
establishing a
Present that will endure,
they nevertheless are,
as beginnings, in utterly novel
situations.
Hence, therefore, the
specific content of their
response must be contingent.
Plato, though a friend,
does not remain authoritative
for Arendt for reasons
rooted in the nature of the
virtu
she believes her present
demands of her. she writes,
"...I do not believe in a world,
be it a
past world or a future world,
in which man's
S
lPP6d f ° r withd
ing f rem ?ne
lorlk of
world
oT appearances,
could
be comfortably at home." 90 or should ever

—

And this belief, as Arendt
makes amply clear in many passages, emerges out of the
political experiences of the
20th century.
These experiences call us to
establish our
own present.
Durability can no longer be won
with
Platonic virtu - in any of its many
historical manifestations.
Ethical life cannot rely on the
authority
of

transcendental standards.

Despite the ethically rela-

tivist tone to this argument, however,
Arendt suggests we
are once again, after 2000 years, in
a position to appreciate a world whose law is plurality.
This is the possibility our present invites us to embrace.
it is clearly
not without its dangers, not the least of
which
is the

"loss of security" which accompanies the loss
of tradition
in a most general level, a tradiiton which
she argues was

established through the amalgamation of the Platonic notion of transcending standards with the Roman concept
of

360

authority derived from

a

political fn,
political
founding in a far distant past in the body of
the Christian church.
This tradition, Arendt suggests,
secure though it made
life ln
many respects, paved over
the gap between past
and future;
that is, made it unnecessary
for ail
an k,^
y ror
but Professional
thinkers to think, with
Nietzsche, Arendt embraces
the
loss entailed in our
situation, though .ore
constructively.
It is not, she suggests,
Utopian, though it may
be
difficult, to expect all citizens
to engage in that special form of thinking called
judging despite the absence
of universal standards upon
which to rely.
Arendt's claim
is that we can make the
world a place fit for human
habitation, and her hope is that
a certain kind of
authority and hence durability
is possible while we
embrace the plurality of the world.
In._chapter seven,
I

will develop this authority and
the kind of approach to
guestions of justice towards which
it points.
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CHAPTER VII
"AN OBEDIENCE IN WHICH WE
RETAIN OUR FREEDOM"

A.

Introduction

Authori ty

To say that we are going to
develop Arendt's conception of authority requires a
proviso.
Namely, Arendt herself was not entirely sure that
authority was possible under contemporary conditions. And
she most certainly did
not believe that we could recover
or restore the specific
form of authority which had reigned
in the West until the
modern age. What we find in her most
concentrated set of
reflections on the subject in "What is
Authority," is an
exploration whose modest aims are to
delineate the political experiences from which this form
of authority sprang,
and to explore the nature of the
public-political world

constituted by it.

1

Arendt hopes to identify the elemen-

tal political problems to which authority
in the West as
we know it corresponds, an accomplishment
which she

thought would more clearly outline the nature of
our own
predicament. This she defines as a crisis in authority

consisting not only in the fact that "authority has

vanished from the modern world," but also in the fact that
"practically as well as theoretically we are in no position to know what authority is." 2
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^

tron in which authority
seems tQ
a
to the later one „ hich
suggests authority nay
see tor, still be possible
points tQ equivooat on on
Arendt's part as to whether
the effort to establish
that
minimuffl of durability and
stabUity wh ch an poutioai
orders require, must, in
our time, be so different
as to
bear no resemblance to the
family of phenomena we
call
authority. The equivocation
on her part we must take
at
face value; her primary
voice is interrogative. Vet

^

^

^

.

,

.

she

makes some very suggestive
moves whose inertia
low and take off from in
this chapter.

I

win

fol .

in the Preface to the essays
that make up Between
Past and Futur e, Arendt says
that our problem is not how

to find surrogates which can
do the job of covering over
the gap in which we find
ourselves now that the "thread
of
tradition" has been broken. The
break is absolute. We
cannot re-fill the gap. Rather,
we must settle down in
it, learn, as she says, "how
to move in it. "3 (emphasis
mine)
By this of course she means to
be able to think
without guideposts, to make our way
without a

predetermined course.

Yet this does not mean that every-

thing is relative, that we have no basis
for distinguishing between good and bad, that we can
appeal to nothing in
our judgments. Arendt clearly acknowledges
that at this

juncture this certainly seems to be the sorry state
of affairs.

The loss of authority, she writes,
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"...is tantamount to the loss of the
aroundwork of the world, which indeed
since^hen
gUn
Shift to ch ™<3* ^d transform
^° ever-increasing
^L??
itself with
rapidity from
one shape to another, as though
we were
living and struggling with a Protean
universe where everything at any moment
can
become
me
4
almost anything
'

else."

Yet if we follow the course of her
reflections, uncover
her hopes and notice how and where she
constructs, we see
that Arendt says at the outset that while
we have lost
that which for millennia gave permanence
and stability to
human affairs, this loss need not, as she
puts is, "entail
the loss of our capacity to build, preserve
and care for a
world that can survive us and be fit for
humans." 5 while
the kind of virtually unshakable groundwork
upon which the
historical form of authority dominant in the West
stood is
no longer a possibility, we are not doomed to
a Protean
universe of rapidly changing shapes. Such a thing
as a

common world, renewable, with a specific shape and

a

certain durability is indeed not an impossibility, in

Arendt 's view.

As such, as

authority can develop.

I

will suggest, a kind of

By pursuing Arendt 's efforts to

approach the problem of such authority, we will also begin
to elaborate the nature of her approach to questions of

justice which is, as

I

have suggested, aesthetic in na-

ture.
1

•

Authority and the Pre-Modern World
Conceptually Arendt distinguishes authority both from

power and from violence.

While it demands obedience, the
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mode by which it does so
has nothing to do with
coercion
of any kind.
y et authority is also distinct
fro, persuasion by argumentation and
the equality that it implies,
in contrast to persuasion,
authority implies hierarchy,
although, paradoxically, it
is a hierarchy which, in
obeying, allows us to retain
our freedom. 6 Tnis hierarchy

which demands obedience and
commands unquestioning
respect, yet allows us to retain
our freedom is what
Arendt calls authority. What
makes us obey authority is
neither superior power, fear of
violence, superior force
of argument, or the coercive
nature of truth.
its mode is
neither irrationality nor rationality.
what then?
To recover the meaning and mode
of this odd concept
which has been the key to lasting
political orders, Arendt
turns first to the Romans where it
originated, and then to
its later manifestation in the Roman
Catholic Church.
Let

me retrace her steps briefly.

Authority, or auctoritas, has its origins
in Roman
political experience.
It comes from the verb
augere,

meaning to augment, or add to.

Politically it meant that

those who had authority were so endowed by virtue
of the
fact that they augmented or breathed fresh life
into the

original accomplishment of those who founded the city of
Rome.

Above all other conceivable achievements in Rome

was the glory, the unrepeatable enormity of the original
acts that lay the foundations for their body politic.
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It

was this glory which
gave tQ the liv ng the
r
insofar as they were there
to safeguard and renew
the
spirit of that original
foundation.
The glory of this beginning was passed down
through tradition, and it
was
sacred or religious in the
sense that it was with
the
foundation of the city that
the gods were given a
home.
It was the sacred and
stabilizing cornerstone of the
body
politic.
.

.

^^^^

This political experience
of a glorious foundation
in
a far distant past, thus,
was the central origin of
the
Roman conception of authority.
Yet, because in in-

tellectual matters they themselves
made Greek philosophy
and theory authoritative, the
Romans came to understand
their own unique political
experience
and this form of

authority which sprang from it, in
Greek terms.
Arendt's estimation, proved to be

This, in

a real loss for reasons

rooted in Greek political experience.

Namely, the Greeks

lacked a dramatic founding event,
and thus in the effort
to give the very necessary stability
and permanence to
their own body politic, they turned
(and Arendt considers
only Plato's and Aristotle's solution)
to experiences outside of the realm of human affairs: Plato
to fabrication
and Aristotle to the domestic relation between
young and
old.

In their efforts to find something that
would com-

mand obedience in the realm of human affairs but
would not
entail violence, they turned to relationships whose
es-
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sence was rule of the
inferior fay
of the Roman-originating
oonception Qf authorifcy
„
the Greek philosophers
.ovea very decisively in
the direction of -authority over,"
by conceptualizing
it as a for™
of rule.
Piato's solution, particularly
influential in
the development of that
historical form of authority
with
which „e are concerned, was,
Arendt argues, to convert
the
true essences which the
philosopher contemplated in
solitude into measures in
the service of rule.
These the
Philosopher could use upon
returning to the world of
the
many.
insofar as they originated
outside of and transcended the world of human
affairs, they could become
reliable measures by which to
compel obedience. Their
transcendence could make them
authoritative.

^

,.

Historically, both Roman political
experiences and
Greek philosophy were -amalgamated,that is, combined and
absorbed, into a unique formation
in the Roman Catholic
Church.
Here, Arendt suggests, the
Roman awe
at a

miraculous beginning

- this time the

birth of Christ - be-

came the foundational event for
the authority of the
Church, and the Roman political
experience was given new
garb.
The apostles became the authoritative
voices which
told of the event and their testimony
was passed through
the ages by way of tradition. Thus
Christianity became a
true religion in the sense that those who
came after were
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"tied back" to the
foundational event through
the
authoritative voice carried
by tradition.
However, although this
Christian foundational event
was both mundane and
transcendent like the Roman
political
one, the Roman event was
the product of mortal
initiatives
which gave a home on earth
to the transcendent, while
the
Christian one was an act of
a transcendent God which
gave
a better home on earth
to man than they could
ever, of
their own initiative, have
achieved.
In addition, Plato's
political and philosophic teachings
had, by the 5th
century A.D. when the Church
assumed authority over
secular affairs, become part of
Christian doctrine. Thus
the authority with which Christian
bishops, prelates,
priests, etc. spoke had, as Plato's
philosopher-kings were
to have had, the force of transcendent
measurements and
rules

This amalgamation of Roman and Greek
experiences in
the Roman Church, in Arendt's view,
had greater authority
and more far-reaching consequences than
any efforts at establishing authority heretofore. She writes,
"General and transcendent standards under
which the particular and immanent could be
subsumed were now required for any political
order, moral rules for all interhuman behavior, and rational measurements for the
guidance of all individual judgment." 7

There is a very Nietzschean feeling in Arendt's writing in this context, for we find straightforward awe
and
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admiration for the sheer
magnitude of both the Roman but
even .ore the Christian
establishment of authority, an admiration that comes irregardless
of the moral content of
either achievement 8 The
enormous stability and
.

permanence as well as beauty
brought into the world
through the centuries of
Christianity are inspiring accomplishments.
There is also a fair bit of
Nietzschean irony
as Arendt surveys the damage
or tragedy of this amalgamation, though she delicately
forgoes Nietzsche's extravagant hyperbole.

what Nietzsche and Arendt share
is
at once a pathos for the form
of authority and the kind of
durability this fusion of Roman,
Greek and Christian elements produced, but also a pathos
for the terrible new
freedom the modern age made possible.
Arendt, therefore, like Nietzsche,
is not nostalgic
for restoration.
As she argues, with its authoritative
standards, measures and rules, Roman tradition
in Christian garb paved over, for the many, the
gap between past
and future.
This without doubt gave to the Christian

world

a

stability which, politically, is of great worth.

Yet such an ordering of the present, such protection
from

the more radical confrontation between past and future

with which we are today confronted, was paid for by mental
inactivity of a certain kind.

That is, the ordinary indi-

vidual, as a newcomer, was introduced into a world in

which well-marked paths guided her through the past and
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indicated the nature of the
future, m aking her present
a
thing less of radical
struggle and .ore of an
effort to
carry on the past as it
indicated the future.
Life was
the effort to discover
oneself in a largely
predetermined
temporal stream. As wrenching
and difficult a task
as

this might have been for
the moral life of the
individual,
politically it signalled the
end of freedom.
For it required a kind of thinking
inimical to that required by
the
free citizen.
That is, it required that
effort be made to
subsume every particular, the
very event-quality of the
world, under a universal
principle or commandment.
This,

as we shall see,

is precisely what we are
not able to do

in attempting to orient
ourselves in the political world

through the exercise of political
judgment.
Freedom, in
Arendt's view, came to a close at the
end of antiquity and
only with the modern age was reborn.
in the Middle Ages,
as she poetically puts it, "the
public realm
lived from

borrowed

1

ight

.

9

So long as the Christian world remained
in tact, this
kind of lassitude of mind produced through
the lack of

practice of moving in the gap between past and
future was
not terribly problematic.
Yet it was precisely this which
was to prove so utterly disastrous, in Arendt's
view,
as

the Roman trinity of religion, tradition and authority
be-

came increasingly attenuated in the modern age and finally

utterly extinguished with political events in the 20th
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century.

Again Arendt

nostalgically.

,

^

^^^^

Yet neither is her embrace
of our condi-

tion naive or particularly
optimistic, though it is
not
emptied of hope. To be set
adrift historically is not
only politically dangerous,
but existentially unbearable
in its most extreme form.
Arendt implies that we can
no
longer count on either the Greek
or Roman contributions
to
authority as we have known it.
The power of transcendent
standards is politically at its lowest
ebb, and the Roman
trinity of a single authoritative
beginning, tradition
to

pass down such a glorious singular
event, and a religion
to tie us back to it, is equally
out of reach in the 20th
century, if we are to be capable of
some kind of authority
by which stability, durability
and a certain shape can be
rendered to human affairs, we must be
capable of augmenting, but augmenting what? And in
what way? And how, when
the thread of tradition has been severed,
to save
any

deed,

any event

-

be it mundane or transcendent

to anchor the present, from the ravages
of time?

-

by which

when

Arendt looked at modern revolutions it was
precisely these
questions she had in mind.
2

-

Authori ty and Modern Revolutions

Before proceeding we would do well to take stock of
Arendt 's findings thus far. When we look at authority

as

it was constituted in the West, but even more
specifically,

at the Roman contribution to it (since Arendt found
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the Roman insights and
experiences most illuminating)
we
see that the political
experiences from which it sprang
were those of political
foundation; that the nature of
the
public-political world constituted
by it was conservative,
consisting as it did of tying
the potential novelty of the
present "back to" the founding
acts and virtues of the
maipres; and that the elemental
political problem to which
authority corresponds is what Arendt
called "the abyss of
freedom": the inevitable sense
that the new is
,

il-

legitimate, without standing, and
therefore in need of
some kind of justification.
in all of these senses,
clearly, authority was a primary
concern for the men of
the modern revolutions.

Arendt suggests that insofar as the
revolutionaries
aimed at founding new political bodies
at just the historical moment that the Roman trinity of
religion, authority
and tradition had become severely attenuated,
modern revolutions appear as "giant attempts to repair
these foundations, to renew the broken thread of tradition,
and to restore, through founding new political bodies,
what for so

many centuries had endowed the affairs of men with
some

measure of dignity and greatness." 10

Ironically, then,

these "modern" revolutions look like tragic and grand efforts at restoration

-

not only of the Roman pathos for

foundation, but also of the Platonic-Christian grounding
of the political realm in that of the transcendent.
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They

appear grand because they
^iey rekinriioH
reKindled the »
Roman pathos;
tragic because their
appeal to various Kinds
of transcendent and absolute sanctions
(self-evident truths, the
Supreme Being, the nation)
could secure neither the
revolutionary effort to found a
new body politic nor the
more
conservative effort to restore
the Roman trinity and
its
stabilizing force.
"Authority," Arendt writes,

^

"as we

once knew it.

.

.has nowhere been
re-established.

"U

As a distinctive phenomenon,
modern revolutions combine what Arendt calls a
"pathos for novelty" with the
idea of freedom.
The men of revolution
experienced the
human faculty to begin something
new at the same time that
they themselves sought to
liberate themselves from the old
order.
Hence it was their "eagerness
to liberate and to
build a new house where freedom
can dwell"" which was unprecedented and specifically modern
about modern revolutions.
Through their own initiative they
could liberate
themselves and constitute a new order.
The problem for
them, however, was that they were
confronted "directly and
inevitably with the problem of beginning, "13
namely, with
the mark of arbitrariness which the
appearance of new
things always bears.
in each act of freedom this abyss

appears because beginnings are events which do
not fit
causally into the temporal stream, they appear

bizarre,

arbitrary, and without reason.

They seem urgently to

stand in need of justification, legitimation, explanation.
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More specifically, the
revolutionaries were faced
with the problem of having
to create laws and
institutions
which together would stand
as a solid supporting
structure
for a new form of political
life that would sustain
suc-

ceeding generations.

How could what they themselves,
mere
mortals, created command the
kind of reverence and respect
without which the onslaught of
the free initiatives
of

citizens to come could not be
housed?

And more immediate-

ly for them, to what could
they appeal in order to make

their initial constitution-making
"stand?"
French and the American revolutions
we

find,

m

both the

ironically

enough, appeals to the very
transcendent realm from which
they were trying to free the world
of human affairs.
Hence Robespierre's cult of the
Supreme Being, Adams'
"great legislator of the Universe,"
and Jefferson's appeal
in the Declaration of Independence,
to "the laws of nature
and nature's God." 14

Such appeals, Arendt suggests, were
wholly inadequate
under modern conditions, and the farce of
the cult of the

Supreme Being who was not even able to "inspire
the

proclamation of

a

general amnesty, to show a minimum of

clemency," 15 was clear evidence of the "utter loss
of
relevance" of religious beliefs in the political realm,
and, we might add, of transcendent standards more
gener-

ally as well.
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Vet despite the
perception, handed down
to the revolutionaries by tradition
itselff that Qniy
solute and transcendent
standards could establish
the
authority of their acts,
the African revolutionary
and
pre-revolutionary experiences,
combined with a deep
engagement with the Roman
founding together set the
stage
for the emergence, alone
in America, of a form
of
authority utterly different
from that established and
passed down by tradition in
the West.
it is to this development in America that Arendt
looks with most hopeful
eyes for a conception and
form of authority appropriate
for our age.

^

Although, as

suggested above, the American
founders
too made appeal to transcendent
religious otherworldly
I

sanctions, Arendt suggests that
the authentic location of
the authority which legitimized
and gave stability to
their foundational acts is to be
found elsewhere. While
they were still bound to the
Hebrew-Christian understanding of law as commandment which,
as such, reguires absolute obedience and hence needs the
awesome enforcement
powers only a transcendent source of
authority can possess, there is another tradition.
This tradition was
buried not only by the amalgamation of the
Roman experience of foundation with Greek political
philosophy in the
Christian Church, but also by the fact that the
Romans

themselves were never able to conceptually articulate
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their unique way of
constituting political authority,
dependent as they came to
be on Greek conceptualizations
and
intellectual l ife
It is th^ tradition
which sheds light
on the distinctive nature
of African political
experience
- pre- and post- revolution,
and thus best helps us
to
comprehend the relative success
of the African effort
to
establish the permanence and
durability of
.

a

novu^ordo

saeclorui.
In this tradition, beginning
with the Romans,

revitalized by Montesquieu and
again in Arendt's own
works, law is understood as
that which establishes an
"intimate connection" (original
meaning of Latin lex)
or,
"rapports" (Montesquieu) between
two discrete entities'
which circumstances bring together."
When we understand
laWS 33
rather than as comi^nding
obedience we acknowledge that, by
definition,
,

^^M^
,

laws are

relative, and that therefore, no
divine sanction is needed
to establish their authority.
indeed, for the Romans, as
I have suggested, it was
the acts of the founders who were
themselves mortals, albeit gifted, which
gave a home on
earth to the gods.
Roman political experience this
meant that what those who came after venerated
in the

m

maiores

,

the founders, was their very ability to
forge re-

lations and establish specific connections
between formerly unrelated peoples, and hence to create
something new in

the way of human association.

It was this initial act
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through „ hich the city
of Rome was brought
into being
became and remained the
Qf

^^

^

^

Republic but also for the
.-augmentations" to the city
through the expansions
of the
Empire.

It was to this Roman
experience of foundation
that

the men of revolution
turned, guided, not by
any tradition, but by their own
political experiences. An d
it was
the American revolutionaries
who were to benefit most
fully from the Roman precedent.
The American people brought
to the task of foundation
pre-existing organized political
bodies from the colonial period
so that, unlike the
French, when the break with
the old order came, they
were
not "thrown back into a state
of nature." This meant
that
not only had they already
had the enormous experience
of
coming together to generate,
through consent and deliberation, power among themselves,
but that this power was
clearly, in this pre-colonial
period, separated conceptually and actually from the
authority which granted
its legitimacy.
This authority lay, of course,
with the
Royal charters and ultimately with
the English King himself,
their own pre-revolutionary experience
then, the
origin of power was decidedly different
from the source of
authority.
When the American revolutionaries sought
to

m

constitute authority and embody it institutionally,
they
already had experience to orient them and make
them more
attentive to this same general conceptual and institu-
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tional distinction in the
R o.a„ model to which they
turned.
The French, less
fortunate, tried to deify
"the
people," locating both
power and authority in their
"General „iii... subject to
the pass ons
viss ss tudes of
an unorganized nation,
authority and hence stability
could
not be brought into being.
.

^

.

.

institutionally this distinction
between power and
authority found its expression
in the creation of an
independent Judiciary whose lack of
power combined with the
permanence of office, Arendt argues,
is the sign that it
is and was meant to be the
seat of authority for the new
secular order, with its judgments
the judiciary branch of
government perpetually breathes new
life into the founding
rapports of the American polity.
As Woodrow Wilson put
it, the Supreme Court is "a
kind of Constitutional Assembly in continuous session." 17
Now, the curious
and all-

important point Arendt seeks to make
about both this seat
of authority and the Constitution
is that what actually is

authoritative about them is beginning itself.
of conjectures

I

m

a series

will call her "one is tempted to con-

cludes," she tentatively formulates her very
unigue contribution to the possibility of authority in the
modern
world.

Arendt hears both the substantive and the verbal

meaning in the term constitution, and it is this verbal
tone with which she suggests the document spoke to the
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spirit of the American people.

The Constitution became

immediately and has remained
authoritative because it is a
living embodiment of the
achievement of the founding acts
themselves.
Despite the founders own sense
that they were
"merely revolving back to an
earlier period,
the "blind
worship" of the Constitution
which, Arendt suggests, seems
to have begun almost immediately
after it was created,

points to the fact that what really
held the American public in thrall was the experience politically - of a new
beginning brought about by the acts,
not of gods or demigods, but of mere mortals.
it was perhaps the political
genius, or perhaps the "great good
fortune" of the American republic - Arendt seems uncertain that Americans
had, as she put it,

"the extraordinary capacity to look

upon yesterday with the eyes of centuries
to come." 19 And
this political genius, if such it was,
points to a kind of

authority which Arendt argues is entirely
different from
that resting on appeals to a transcendent
source, 20
but

also from that resting on a single set of grand
acts whose

magnitude can never again be approximated.
If political genius it was, what exactly would this

mean?

In part it means, without doubt, capturing "the

Roman spirit" and finding the "absolute" with which revo-

lutionaries so desperately sought to establish the

authority of their beginnings not in the transmundane, but

precisely in their own mundane acts themselves.
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The

Romans' genius was to
divinize
inize bir+v,.
birth; to find in beginning
itself the very absolute
they needed to establish
the
authority and hence durability
of their founding efforts.
Yet the Romans so divinized
the founding of their city
that no acts in the future
could ever attain the greatness
of those initial ones.
Hence what Arendt means by
the
political genius of the American
people was their ability
to honor and revere acts in
their own present with the
kind of intensity the Roman spirit
reserved alone for the
original founding acts. The political
genius of the American people was to find greatness
in the novel, the new
the present and be able to "save'
it.
+-

This genius of the American people
seems all the more
interesting if we consider, further, that
not only did the
Romans divinize the founding acts to
the detriment of the
novelty of what was to come after, but they
also

enshrouded these "absolute" beginnings in
legends.
legends located the Roman political beginning

These

itself in an

earlier history, thus covering and softening the
impact of
the arbitrariness, the abyss-quality inherent
in all be-

ginnings,

in other words, Roman veneration for the an-

cestors and their heroic foundational deeds was a veneration advantaged and augmented by an ever-receding point of
beginning.

And Roman authority rested upon every new act,

every act in the present being understood as but a re-

affirmation of and addition to the original and never
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repeatable heroism of the
founders whose acts themsel,
.ves
lay enshrouded in an
el usive past.
The present could only
augment, never equal or
surpass the founding glory.
The

public-political world constituted
by Roman authority, and
the ethos to which it
gave rise was fundamentally
conservative. And this too, we ouaht t-r, >hh
ougnt to add, though Arendt
does
not, aside from providing
tremendous stability, was an
ingenious justification for
expansionism during the period
of the Empire.
That is, if greatness was
a one-time deal,
the best we can do is to expand
upon it; "to found Rome

u

,

anew.

Although it is clearly the case
that the United
States' own expansionism has
often occurred under the banner of "making the world safe for
democracy, " a banner
that has gained what legitimacy it
has enjoyed, without
doubt, from the founders' greatness
and a kind of Romanlike veneration of an interpretation
of these
acts,

Arendt 's interpretation of the kind of
authority to which
those events and acts could give rise,
her interpretation
of their true spirit, is rather different.
The American revolution clearly is, for
Arendt, an

authoritative beginning, one she thought could help
us, in
a post-metaphysical age,

reconceptualize what "grounds" we

need to legitimize or authorize our political acts
and our

common world.

These grounds were not transcendent (the

appeal to self-evident standards notwithstanding), nor did
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she think the American
revolutionaries could obtain the
kind of aura of the Roman
maiores.
The American Revolution is exemplary for Arendt
insofar as it "founds a new
Rome," as she metaphorically
puts it. That is, it is thi
event more than any other in
modern history which affirms
the possibility of initium or
freedom and the ontological
condition of natality to which it
corresponds. Moreover,
this is a kind of initium which
itself rests on and gives
rise to a form of authority
which affirms and attempts to
augment practices which make possible
such initium itself
The American revolution stands as
an authoritative
event for our time because what it
suggests is that what
legitimizes beginnings, what addresses
the apparent ar-

bitrariness inherent in all beginnings, is
the principle
which every new beginning carries within
itself.
That is
as Arendt puts it,
"The way the beginner starts whatever he
intends to do lays down the law of action for
those who have joined him in order to
partake in the enterprise and to bring about
its accomplishment. 21 (emphasis mine)

What proves to be authoritative in beginnings is
the way

action is begun.

This principle which every unigue begin

ning carries within itself corresponds to the particu-

larities of the acts and the rapports which they establish.

Hence this understanding of authority arises

directly out of the particularities of the present, out
the manner in which it is brought into appearance.
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The "law of action"
laid down by the "way"
the
founders started what was
to become a specific
national
hxstory for a new United
states was inspired from
the
Principles of mutual promise
and common deliberation.
it
is these principles too
which Arendt hopes might
yet prove
authoritative in the general sense
of the term in a

n^

°^g_saeclprum: command our unquestioning
respect and
obedience without compromising
our freedom, neither coerce
nor persuade through argumentation,
but rather inspire and
speak to us so that freedom is
augmented.
It is not a terribly new
thought of course that what

might give legitimacy and hence
bear authority in our time
are these two principles.
This is almost axiomatic, even
platitudinous, and some version of it
can be found in all

liberal theorizing.

Yet there is an accented difference

between mutual promise and mutual
consent, on the one
hand, and common deliberation and
common
good, on the

other.

And this accent is all-important, for
it speaks to
a world such as ours whose reality,
without traditional
authority, without religion or tradition,
is in perpetual
need of re-affirmation and re-constitution.
it is indeed
Protean without our intervention, requiring our
responsi-

bility if it is to stay in being as a specific shape.
Both the notions of consent and of the common good
obscure

this dynamic reality-constituting nature of political
life: consent insofar as it presupposes a world already
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whole to which „ e consent
or do not; co
as it suggests the
pre-existence

mo„

good insofar

of an entity rather
than

a sensibility constantly
being shaped and shaping.

Both promise and deliberation,
as authoritative
principles in the sense that
they augment initium,
paradoxically evoke and speak to
a world in greater
motion and instability than the notion of
consent and co „„ good
these were the principles
which coincided with the
only
successful political foundation
in the modern

M

.

„

world, if

they are in some way
authoritative and thus stabilizing,
how can we elaborate this
authoritative element which
seems so frail in the face of
the Protean modern world?
How exactly does it augment
initium? What relations are
laid down towards this end?
it would perhaps be
helpful
to turn to Arendt's reflections
on education briefly in
the effort to pursue these
relations in which we can read
a form of authority that
augments not a set of heroic
deeds in a long-distant past which
always remain in substance authoritative, but rather augments
the ontological
condition of natality and the corresponding
capacity for
initium, for beginning itself.
3

-

Authority and Education
In her essay "The Crisis in Education,"
Arendt says

both that the essence of education is always
conservative,
and that the essence of education is natality. 22
Separated by eighteen pages, these contradictory
statements
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might lead one to believe
Arendt was confused. She
was
not.
Rather, she was dealing
with a paradox she thought
the modern world had to
face.
Namely, that in order to
build a common world around
its "pathos for novelty,"
an

element of conservatism was
essential.
she wrote, -'.Exactly for the sake of what
is new and revolutionary
in every
child, education must be
conservative." 23
The essence of what Arendt
meant by conservative is
that the purpose of education
is to teach a child about
the world "as it is," no matter
how painful, perplexing or
disutopic it may appear to the
adult who must teach.
it
is the task of the educator
to take responsibility for
preserving the "old world" both for
itself and for the
newcomers.
The authority in the voice of
the educator
says, "This is our world, "24
and thereby introduces the
newcomer into the already existing
world in which each new
person must takes his place and make
his way.
The exceptional degree of world
alienation as well as
the reigning modern notion of an
ever-progressing rather
than a backward bending historical stream
makes this conservative attitude of the educator exceedingly
difficult
to conceive of and grasp today.
Arendt compares our difficulty with approaching the question of how to
educate

with the Roman's ease with this conservative task,
living
as they did in a culture whose defining ethos was
conser-

vative.

And, compounding the problem for us is precisely
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the modern -pathos
£or novelty ...

„

-dern pathos which gives
the purpQse

ig

^

specificaiiy

Qf

^

^

modern world that tinge
of paradox of „ hi ch
! spok e above
Thus Arendt suggests
that while the ethos of
the educator
»ust be conservative, she
embraces this conserving
tas*
to best assure the
renewal of the co«o„ world
that can
only co»e about through
the perpetual insertion
of unigue
newcomers with the absolute
novelty of their own beginnings in tact.

«

^

The authority of the educator
derives from a love for
the world such that she
knows that only by teaching
what
it means to be engaged
in and with the world, by
carefully
introducing the newcomer to the
common world, is there any
chance for renewal which saves
what is good and roots out
what is bad thereby making
"the world right anew."
it is

finally the knowledge of this
paradox that gives the
educator her specific authority in
the modern age.
She
says,

"That renewal be possible, this
is our world."
Finally, thus, in the broadest sense
of the term (which
for Arendt is in some sense also
its most precise sense)
the educator's aim is political
she takes her bearings
from the most central requirement of
the world of human
affairs - that there be a common world in
which the

plurality characteristic of the human condition
can
flourish.
And this means too, of course, that the

very

content of a common world is in perpetual contestation.
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This contestation even
significantly contributes to its
distinctively modern shape.
From these reflections on
education it appears that
central to authority appropriate
to our time is a conserving,

conservative sensibility which,
however, is in the
service of allowing the newcomers
to be new, that they may
refresh by saving and adding to
an old world.
It remains for us to move from
the specific realm of

education to the political realm
itself and there to further develop this notion of authority
towards which Arendt
gestures.
her development of the concept
and activity
of judgment this task will be most
rewarded, for

m

it is

this mental faculty which she thought
was central to our
ability to -build, preserve and care
for a world that can
survive us and be fit for humans. "26 _j:
shall proceed both
conceptually and by example, for I think that
by using
some of Arendt 's own judgments we can
more deeply comprehend the kind of authority she thought we,
in the

twentieth century, could command.

B.

Judging

Arendt 's reflections on judgment received her
sustained effort only in her final years, and what was to
be her major piece of writing on the subject, the proposed

third book of The Life of the Mind remained wholly un-
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quote from Goe the found
in her typewrlter
>t
her death. They read
as follows

^^^

Konnt ich Magie von meinein
Pfad entfernen

(Could

but clear my path at every
turnina
1
utterly unlearning-" 9
were
Serffbut'M
I but Man, with
Nature for mv frame
The name of human would
be worth the claim. , 27
I

We have on the authority
of lecture notes kept by
Mikael Denneny what Cato's
words meant to Arendt in
this
context.
instead of the Hegelian
tradition in which world
history (success, is the final
arbiter of the significance
of all events, Arendt sides
with Cato in suggesting that
it is (or should be) the
judgment of living spectators
which renders events significant,
giving them a •home- in
human affairs.
It is the "quality of their
attention-^

which establishes an event as worthy
of historical memory.
And this quality of attention is
of greater worth than the
attention which success or sheer power
can
arrest.

Yet this claim immediately raises
the question
regarding the origins as well as the status
of the quality
of the spectator's attention.
It is in the direction of
this question that I think the second quote
from Goethe's

Faust tends, for with it Arendt suggests that
if we were
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to be able fully to
take in the disenchantment
of the
world which indeed
our condition, if we
were able to
stand nakedly before it,
seeing and alone (ein
Mann), then
it would be clear how
utterly important, how
necessary it
is that we turn to one
another in the effort to
humanize
ourselves (ein Mensch zu sein)
by making the world a
place
fit for humans (Menschen)
This, to complete the
circle
and return to Cato, we can
do only if we cease a
fruitless
and even dangerous search
for authority among the
gods,
(which, in its modern form
has been the God of success,
and thus of process in its
various guises)
and look instead to one another for
orientation and sense of place.
The ontological arrogance that
may sound forth in this
formulation will, I think, be stilled
through the effort
in what follows to articulate
Arendt's conception of judg-

U

.

,

ment with particular attention
to the nature of the
authoritative element implicit in it.
it was with the
urgent sense that philosophically we
have lost the gods as
the providers of rules and standards
by which we formerly
judged particulars, that Arendt turned
to the faculty of
judgment as that orienting capability which
might help us
to develop some kind of stability and
authority adequate
to our post-metaphysical condition.
Practically it was
the shock of witnessing Eichmanns' utter inability
to

judge particulars unless he could find a rule that
could

encompass them which turned Arendt's attention in the
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erection of judgment; the
wofds he

^

^

^^

neral - the cliche of
funeral oratory - . prime
example Qf
the disturbingly
ridiculous and pathetically
haunting tale
of this inability to
register and respond to the
eventtexture and hence plurality
of the world.
It may perhaps be
important to distinguish my
inter-

pretation of Arendt's conception
of judgment from that of
her most significant student
on the question to date Ronald Biener.
his interpretive essay
which accompanies Arendt's
lecture^^ant^PoU^

m

Ehv,

Biener argues that there are
really two distinct conceptions of judgment in Arendt's
work, an early and a
later one.
the early one judging is
understood as an
intrinsic part of political life.
it is the activity
through which, as political actors,
we come to share a
common world since it requires of
us the ability to inhabit and "think in" the place of
others.
the later
conception the essentially political
and non solitary
sense of judging is left behind.
Judging appears as an
activity in which a "solitary contemplator" 30
looks back
on the world in quiet and makes the
judgments alone
through which reconciliation to the
unpredictability of

« m

m

events with which our condition of freedom
confronts us is
possible.
Thus Arendt moves, Biener argues, from considering judging as "simply a capacity of political
beings,"
to believing it serves the "ontological function"
of an-
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choring us in a world
without intrinsio mean in
g insofar as
it is judgment which
saves f ro» ti.e's destruction
what is
fit to be saved. 31

Biener argues that what
accounts for these discrepant
conceptions is Arendt's
uncertainty regarding the relation
of judgment to the vi^
on the one
and
Yita contemp^ativa, on the other.
This uncertainty,

a^a,

turn,

ty,

^

in
is at least partly rooted
in a too rigid distinction

between mental and worldly
activities.
ly,

^

Arendt increasing-

in his view, comes to see
judgment as a mental faculand as she does so its obvious
ties to the political

world which she developed in her
earlier conception produce a tension within the concept
itself.
This tension,
he argues, Arendt finally resolves
in favor of the later
conception at the cost of the richness
of the earlier
32
one
If we approach the tensions which
indeed do exist in

Arendt's conception of judgment from the
question of
authority rather than from the tensions between
mental and
worldly activities, something different emerges.
The ten-

sions in Arendt's reflections on judgment
appear not to

stem from a too rigid distinction on Arendt's
part between
the vita activa and the vita contemplativa - if we
understand this as Biener does to mean the distinction between

solitary reflection and sheer activity with others.
er,

Rath-

they appear to stem from the very real differences in
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the

um

of

i mpartiallty

possible; on the

^

hand>

the poUtical actors
judgment, and, on the other,
for
judgments made by those
whose position is in one
way or
another outside the
political realm (among whom
Arendt
eludes the philosopher,
the scientist, the artist,
the
historian, the judge,
fact-finder, witness, and

reporter.)"

It is important to note,
however, that those

outside the political realm
per se, are very much, in
Arendt's view, part of a
public realm.
i n this light,
there are differences of
degree in the extent to which
the
political actor and, for example,
the reporter are "bound
to" a particular political
community, and also differences
between the respective communities
to which they are bound
- a point I will develop in what
is to come.
Thus the
tensions between the actor's
judgments and the spectator's
judgments are rooted in their
respective public loyalties
or public locations, and not
in a difference in mental as
opposed to worldly life.
Furthermore, the tensions between these respective "locations"
are not "resolved"
in

Arendt's thought, nor can they or should
they ever be, in
Arendt's view. They perpetually produce
important and

fruitful conflict within selves and between
ways of life.
Thus the kind of withdrawal from the immediacy
of the
world into the interior space of the mind is
demanded
as

much of the political actor as it is, for
example, of the
reporter. And the spectator, like the actor is
fundamen-
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tally a social creature.

«

Ahom- t-v,~
About
the actor Arendt, in
some
of her latest formulations,
writes,
S

fa D rica?or.. w !?nou?
d
Ul tY
k
°*
o ?so?atea

not'even^e

f

™

r

thir

^"vSiS

perceived?^^"

1

^

that he would

And about the spectator,
"Spectators exist only in the
spectator is not involved in Dlurai
the act'
a
inV ° 1Ved Wlth fel "°«
^5
-P^'
tators

-rv,

%

The distinction between the
spectator and the actor does
not, therefore, parallel that
between a solitary mental
activity and a whirlwind worldly
activity.
Let me turn to Arendt's
reflections on judgment
directly in order to lay the
groundwork for this argument,
proceeding first to an elaboration
of the elements of
Arendt's conception of judgment, and
second, to the effort
to draw out the tensions alluded
to above amidst an elaboration of the authoritative element
residing in and common
to all judgments.
1

-

Arendt 's Kantian Conception of Judgment

Arendt turns to Kant and his CritiouP. nf
Judgment as
the only philosopher to be explicitly
concerned with the
problem of judgment and its political nature.
Kant makes
a distinction between reflective and
teleological judgments.

Reflective judgments are judgments in which, in

distinction to teleological judgments, a universal cannot
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be found under which to
subsume the particular in
question.
Hence Kant's reflective
judgment is political in
nature insofar as it is
concerned with particulars
qaa
particulars, and not with them
insofar as they can be
safely shepherded under the
skirts of universal rules.
Thus, as a mental faculty,
reflective judgment tries to
encompass its object in all its
distinction and uniqueness, and is therefore suited
to the political realm where
the freedom of combining
together initiates singular, unrepeatable events.
To develop this mental capacity
suited to particulars, Kant turns to aesthetic
taste, and Arendt approvingly follows.
At first glance this seems to
confine judgment to the most idiosyncratic and
subjective modes of
relating to particulars since of all
the five senses taste
(and smell) is the most private and
inward.
Taste is that
sense most attuned to what is unique
about its object, and
this uniqueness as well as my feeling of
pleasure or displeasure hits me directly and overwhelmingly.
Taste hence
seems immune to discussion, disputes, even
communicability
at all, and thus singularly unsuited for the
political
realm, not to speak of its suitability for helping
us

reflect on the problem of authority,

why, then, does

taste become for Kant "the vehicle for judgment?" 36
In judgment, Kant argues, there are two distinct op-

erations: that of imagination and that of reflection.
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In

the operation of
Pagination what „e Co is close
out the
outside world and re-present
to ourselves in our inner
world an object we have
sensed in that outside world.
The
operation of Pagination shuts
out the objectivity of the
world and maxes sensing an
inner and Mediate experience
as it is with the sense
of taste.
Furthermore, when we
represent or re-sense an object,
we also immediately
feel

Pleasure or displeasure upon
sensing it.
i„ this respect
judgment is si milar to taste
an(J hence
Kant's purposes well.
y et judgment must also be
understood as growing out of taste,
for the immediacy of
this pleasure or displeasure
we feel in judging is subject
to yet another operation that of reflection.

^

Here we
judge whether or not the pleasure
or displeasure experienced in our immediate response
itself pleases or displeases us.

The effect of these twofold operations
of judgment is
to remove us from the scene of action
to an interior space
from whence, though blind to the scene
itself, we can
represent it for our spectatorship. Here we
establish a

"proper distance" 37 between ourselves and our
object; we
fend off the immediacy of its affect and we
simultaneously

compress the manifold of what is given to the senses
so
that,

for the first time, we can get a picture of the

whole and our object's place in it. 38

The operations of

judgment establish, through this blind-seeing
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,

the condi-

tions for impartiality
from which alone
ju(Jgments
»ade - be they concerning
the beauty or the goodness
or
the fairness of a thing.

^^

The question presses,
by what standards do we
then
judge whether we are pleased
by our pleasures and
displeasures? While we have
thus far set the
ssmi ti
for
impartial judging, how in fact
do we actually gain

sm

im-

partiality of judgment with
respect to something as apparently idiosyncratic as
pleasures and displeasures?
The
standard, Kant says, for
impartial judgment is communicability, and our common or
public sense guides us in
this matter.
In this sense too the
essentially political
nature of judging is apparent.
The very possibility of
judging, as a distinct way of
thinking, depends upon a
community of others within which
it can occur.
Arendt
writes,
"You see that impartiality is
obtained by
taking the viewpoints of others
into account; impartiality is not the
result of
some higher standpoint that would
tually settle the dispute by being then acaltogether above the melee." 39

As Kant describes this manner of
obtaining impartiality
what he describes is the formation of a
kind of public,
hence orienting sense acquired only in the
"melee."

One obtains impartiality in one's judgment
by training one's

imagination "to go visiting." 40

That is, to

leave the specific details that characterize our
private
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selves, to li berate
ourselves from the*, and to
try to
think about the object we
wish to judge from
stand _
points of others - „ hich
Arendt def ines as
where they stand, the
conditions they are subject
to,
which always differs from
one individual to the next,
from
one class or group as
compared to another. ""1 Kant
refers
to the result of this visiting
as "eine erweiterte

^

^^

Den k ungsart,..42 an enlarged
way Qf
what it is, fundamentally
requires others whose particularity we seek, not to absorb
into our own, but to understand and encompass as part of
the stuff of our world.
Thus the very quality of our
judgments depends upon our
ability to "visit" others, what
we are doing in some
sense by enlarging our thinking
in this way is taking the
pulse of our world.

^.^ ^ ^

Let us say we have had an immediate
sensation of,
say, displeasure at some event.

Our next move is to

travel through our community, inhabiting
the standpoints
of others, registering their sensations
to a twofold end:
first, to ensure that the judgments we
make about this

feeling of displeasure are the best we can
make by asking,
what do my peers say? What does it look like
from over
there? And second, to learn better how to
persuade others

that ours is indeed the best judgment about this
particular event, once we ourselves have become convinced.

This

process has helped us to strip our response of its wholly
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subjective conditions, to
allow us to put it in a
form in
which it is communicable
to others; that is, so
that it
recalls others to some
dimensions of our shared public
sense or taste. And „e
ourselves have clearly moved
from
a position of considering
ourselves as the whole world,
to
considering ourselves as members
of a community. „e have
developed a sense of our own being
as intersubjective.«

And appeals on the basis of
this intersubj activity help
to
further constitute and shape
this public sense itself.
It is important to note
that judging is not an exercise in empathy, for we are not
trying to feel and think

what others do, but rather to see
what we would feel and
think in their position. We must
always follow the maxim
of Selbstdenken: think for oneself.
it is as

Selbstdenkern that we put ourselves in
the place of everyone else.
If,

then, communicability is the standard
by which we
reflect on our immediate sense of pleasure
or displeasure
in something in order to form a judgment,

it is a very un-

usual standard insofar as it requires of us
the fashioning
and shaping of our own voice into a view or
judgment that
does not entirely lose its particularity yet
simultaneously presents itself as an example of the public
sense.

Fundamental to the communication implicit in our judgments
is thus that others should share them because they
speak
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of,

—

to and about our world
t woria.

Thn«= t,«
Thus
we try in our judgments
4-

"to woo" others to share
the/our world.
It is not, we must note,
some simple rationally for-

mulated relationship to the world
to which we attempt to
woo others. And herein lies
Arendt's anti-modernism. The
appeal, as Ernst Vollrath has
put it, is not "epistemic"
but "phenomenal. "44 We are forever
and involuntarily

responding perceptively to the world
whose in-betweenness
or objectivity relates us to one
another.
it provokes and
stimulates feelings and emotions which
range
from the ex-

tremely pleasurable to the extremely
displeasurable
And
it is these feelings and emotions
which we wish to communicate to others, woo others to share,
but which must become transfigured through this process of
enlarged thinking in order to be communicable, which is
to say in order
to reveal a common world.
There is something akin
.

in this

to the kind of process an artist must undergo
in the effort to make communicable through a medium the
ineffable

feeling the world provokes in her.

And Kant even suggests

this making communicable is the essence of genius. 45

The

point in our context is that for Arendt, this is what we
do,

albeit on a more directly collective or intersubjec-

tive level, when we make judgments.

We give form and

shape to our feelings in the form of a public sensibility

which is the essence of "who" we are

-

and this involves,

to be sure, reasoning and rationality but more fully what
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Arendt calls our "soul apparatus "46
.

Hence, when we make

judgments we are concerned about how
our world will look,
sound, feel, what should be in
it, and what it is to which
we, as a we, belong.
When we judge, Arendt says, we
"personalize" the world by shaping how
it is to look and who
is to belong in it.
And this is the case whether we are
philosophers or reporters or political actors.
2

-

The Authoritative Element in Judgmpnt^
"If the past and present are treated
as
parts of the future - that is, changed back
into their former state of potentiality the political realm is deprived not only
of
its main stabilizing force but of the
starting point from which to change, to begin
something new.
What then begins is [a] constant shifting and shuffling in utter
47
sterility.
.

.

Here in her essay, "Truth and Politics," we
find as
we did in her reflections on education that Arendt
seeks
to establish a necessary relationship between a
kind of

faithfulness to factual reality both in its past and its

present tenses, on the one hand, and the possibility that

what is new might make its appearance in the world, on the
other.

Without sustaining this relationship we have end-

less shifting, sterility, what

I

have,

in earlier chapters

referred to as formlessness.
The "blind-seeing" which comes about through the

spectator pulling back from appearances in their immediacy
is a precondition for this faithfulness to "what is as it
is" whether one is a political actor,
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a

philosopher, an

artist or a reporter.

For what we do in this state is

send ourselves to the places of others,
places from which
we encounter not only the recalcitrance
of a world fundafienfeaiirybepotHeoptuahliit^atoia^ifiypluBatitj afsopinions

counter the tissue of factuality which so
depends upon our
mutual testimony and common memory, and which
forms our

common heritage and common world itself.
finds, then,

What Arendt

in the activity of judging is that although

what the one who judges must do in the end is
persuade
or,

,

as Kant so nicely put it "woo" the consent of
others,

there is an authoritative element in all judgments.

That

which has the ability to command our obedience and still
allow us to retain our freedom in a judgment is precisely

evidence that the judge has engaged in this "enlarged way
of thinking" and thus has taken account of and responsi-

bility for our common world in its twofold giveness of

plurality of opinions and factuality.
to be sure,

It still remains,

for us to be persuaded by the content of the

judgment, but its authority manifests itself in that to

such a judgment we unquestionably and obediently lend our
ear, give it careful and attentive hearing.

Its authority

lies not in compulsion, but like the Roman senate, in

guidance, advise-giving

.

And the guidance it gives is

that it will not let us be finished with, disregard "what
is as it is," and even more precisely, what is as it is
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insofar as we share the world.

What is authoritative in

judgments gives them claim to
be a more permanent part of
the contested terrain of the
public world insofar as they
exemplify responsibility to
plurality and to factuality.
in this sense there is in
every judge, or every judge
whose judgment can command authority,
a truthteller.
That
is, one who by nature is in
perpetual tension with the
political actor.
if politics is about changing
our world
or setting it right anew, 48 there
are and must clearly be
limits to it.
the reflections Arendt develops in
"Truth and Politics" which arose out
of her experiences
both in reporting on Adolf Eichmann's
trial in Jerusalem
and in the encounters with the often
bitter criticism her
reporting/ judging in that book evoked, she
notes that the
greatness of the political realm notwithstanding,
it must
be limited, bounded. 49 And what limits and
bounds

m

it is,

of course, truth.

of truth, Arendt writes,

"Conceptually, we may call truth what we
cannot change; metaphorically, it is the
ground on which we stand and the sky that
stretches above us." 50

While truth in this specific sense, taking account of
"what is," "going visiting" is part of the authoritative

element in judgments, it is inconceivable in an age char-

acterized by a "pathos of novelty" that a stolid commitment to the given could command the kind of hearing that
could give stability and shape to a common world, form the
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horizon which draws us all
in.
And indeed just as the essence of the educator's
authority is to protect the old
from the new and the new from
the old, so too the
authority in judgments is, finally,
the concept of renewal
which requires that the factual,
plural web of the world
be protected, remembered,
saved that the newcomer might
establish his own relationship insofar as the temporal
forces which enclose his being are
unique, and insofar as
he himself is a unique newcomer to the common world.
And this is true, more generally,
for any individual's capacity for initiating new actions.
order that something new might appear, the old, the
given must itself be
secured, remembered, kept in being.

m

If,

as Arendt suggests in what

I

have called her

ontology of display, reality itself is perpetually
born
and reborn out of highly charged mutual sensuous
provocation between actors and spectators, between what
appears
and those to whom it appears, the authority as
well as the

excellence specific to judgments lies in the extent to
which the plurality inherent in the world in which the
judgment is made is encompassed.

Such excellence provokes

our unquestioninq respect and our obedience

-

understood

as an obedience to enqaqe with the judqment on the order
of friendship: equality.

That is, an obedience in which

we retain our freedom by submittinq our ear to the voice
of this judqe.

We submit because we see that this judqe
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takes pains to do no "injury
to reality." An d this Means
no injury to its plurality
and to the condition of
natality which is so central
to its essence for us.
It is
precisely doing injury to reality
that separates bad from
good judgments.
At this point we will do
well to remind ourselves
that judgments have what Arendt
calls "exemplary

validity."

That is, they claim to be examples
in which
others will recognize the public
sense or taste that binds
them together and which arises out
of their common world.
This is of significance because it
implies that they are
never absolute, but always contestable
and relative, if by
relative we mean that because plurality
is the law of the
earth, we must re-think our judgments
ever again on the
basis of worldly events and others'
opinions. We
lay

down, establish relations in our judgments
which may not
be apt in a changed world or a world of
newcomers.
We

promise to be accountable to what is, and what
may come,
and we do so on the basis of a certain erweiterte
Denkungsart which, in its explicitly political form, is
deliberation with others.

And in so doing, we contribute to the

shape and quality of our world with our judgments.

in

this context judgments' validity are exemplary in another

way as well

-

namely insofar as they also present them-

selves as examples which people can use to help think

about the new; that is, insofar as they are examples in
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not what to conclude (standards
or rules by which everything else is to be measured)
but how to judge, how "to
take account of" the world.
the modern world such ex,

m

emplary validity is suited to the
kind of authority possible in our time which cannot be
absolute, yet is neither
utterly relative.
To summarize, the essence of a
judgment which has
powerful exemplary validity and authority
lies in its

ability to speak to the world out of
which it arises by
remaining "true to" its plurality and
f actuality? and that
it do so with a self-conscious sense
of making it possible

for those who come after the moment
of judgment themselves
to judge, to act, to initiate and hence
to renew the common world.
in what follows I would like to
elaborate this
notion of authority through a critical look
at two judgments Arendt herself made.
3

•

Arendt 's Own Judcrments
The two examples of Arendt 's own judgments

I

want to

explore concern the quality and nature of Jewish
political

thinking and political acting.

The first has to do with

her reflections on the socialist Zionists and the kibbutzim.

These judgments were made during the 1940 's while

Arendt 's writing and action were still of an explicitly
political nature regarding the fate of the Jewish people
and the formation of a state in Palestine.

In other

words, Arendt 's impartiality is, in this case, acquired
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"inside the political realm
dim

"51
'

cjh- is
4
Sne
explicitly and

self-consciously speaKing to
a particular political
community in an effort to
persuade.
The second example has
to do with the Jewish
response to Arendt's report
on Eichmann's trial and those
careful concerns expressed
by Gershom scholem in a letter to
Arendt to which she responded.
Both letters were published
at Scholem's request.
These
judgments Arendt made in the
early i 9 60's in the

capacity,
this time, of a self-conscious
reporter whose impartiality, as she conceived it,
is "inherent in the position of the outsider. "52 M
y purpose in both cases is to
explore the nature of the authority
of Arendt's voice in
each of these judgments and to
suggest, in contradistinction to Biener, that the tensions
in her conception of
judgment lie in the relative
insider-outsider status and
not in a mental as opposed to a
practical life or capacity.

Arendt's assessment of the socialist
Zionists and the
kibbutzim is at once highly critical and
full of admiration.
As an outgrowth of the non-nationalist
trends in
Jewish tradition in general, and more specifically
of

Eastern European socialism, the collective
settlements
were successful in Arendt's view in creating on
a small
scale "a new type of man and a new social elite" who
held

new values and established new practices based on a passion for justice. 53

Here,

in the kibbutzim, Arendt sees
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an example of a new way
of living which presented
a viable
alternative to the -competitive
and acquisitive" worldestranged modern society.,
her assessment, interestingly, Arendt applauds the
successful and unique combination
of manual labor, a new
form of ownership, and high
cul54
ture.
And it is th6 lQss Qf th s
soc ai exper ment
which, in 1948, Arendt wrote
would be "the severest of
blows to the hopes of all those,
Jewish and non-Jewish who
have never made their peace with
present-day society and
its standards. 55

m

.

.

.

Despite this enormous praise of the
ability of these
non-nationalist Zionists to develop novel
responses to the
challenges of ant i semi t ism and the
specifics of life in
Palestine, responses that were in Arendt
's estimation of
"permanent human and political value," 56
she is nevertheless highly critical of the absence of
political judgment
on the part of the Zionists; that is,
of their virtually
exclusive focus on their own social experiment,
and their
abstention from politics. Even their own understanding
of
the nature of their work was devoid of political

sensibility, driven as it was by the notion that
necessity
and not at least some measure of freedom drives all
action.

More to the point, however, is the fact that these

social experimenters were content to fully absorb them-

selves in the immediacy of their work, leaving the ques-

tions of the native population and the issue of state
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formation to others.

The world held in common,
as they

understood it, simply did
not include the native population nor, for that matter
did it require that they entertain larger questions of
political community which their
very presence in Palestine
begged.

The consequences of this neglect
have been, Arendt
argues, that this moral "vanguard
of the Jewish people" 57
has itself ended up supporting
the very ugly nationalist
and chauvinist policies their
ideals should disown. And
this has not only soiled the glory
of their experiments

since any successes they have had
have been won at the expense of others, but it has also
fundamentally threatened
the survivability of the new social
man and the new values
themselves in the sense that the support
they give to neofascist policies itself makes a mockery
of their work and
destroys the very humanity they've tried to
make possible.
Obviously since 1948, we would have to add,
it has also
threatened the survivability in the more literal
sense as
well, i.e. that the state of Israel itself
may not survive.

At the root of Arendt 's characterization of their

failure to think politically and to exercise good political judgment are then both strategic and moral claims.

And they are ineliminably intertwined in an argument about
what it means to be able to think and act in a world that
in one way or another we share in common - apart from
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whether we desire to do so
or not.
Palestine to realize their

The kibbut2iin came to

^ ^^

new social ideals as if to
a

barren land; as if, Arendt
says

tQ the

,

in addition,

armed with a revolutionary
tradition which
shared the modern sense of
world estrangement insofar as
it self-consciously eschewed
explicitly political thinking.
At the same time, this Jewish
non-nationalist
vanguard were part of a larger
Zionist movement whose
leadership was preoccupied with
the Jews as "the people
without a country [who] needed a
country without a
"58
people.
Hence those

^

^

Palestine also acted as if the native
population simply
had no reality.
Importantly, for both Zionist groups,
this was all the more possible since
the Jewish economic
miracle in Palestine was built wholly
from international

charity and was entirely de-linked from,
independent of,
the economic lives of the native
population.
This void of
"objective" relations made it even more
possible to ignore
the realities of life vis a vis the native
Arabs in
Palestine.

And with this, Arendt, in the mid-1940's, be-

fore the state of Israel was a fait accompli,
sees some-

thing terrifyingly familiar
events,

- a

refusal to face up to

facts, the given; a way of thinking and acting

that tries to restructure factuality itself.
It is in this light that we must situate the politi-

cal judgments about Zionism and the kibbutzim Arendt made
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just prior to the formation
of the nation-state of
Israel
when it still seeded
(remotely) possible that a
nonnationalist state might instead
be formed. As an active
Zionist at the time, Arendt
embodies what she herself
called "the hallmark of true
patriotism and true devotion
to one's people": "intense
discontent "59 For what this
intense discontent produces
politically is intense discomfort' through an insistence
on seeing the factuality of
the given.
Politically speaking the authoritative
element
in Arendt's judgments (which
indeed from our vantage point
today seems undeniable - save to
most Israeli Jews themselves) is precisely this insistence
on seeing "what is,"
on encompassing as best we are
able the discomfort and
discontent and pain which the unruliness
and multidimensionality of the world we share in
common provokes in
us.
And this argument is all the more
powerful if we see
that the "injury done to reality" if we
do not do this is
an injury done to the possibility of
upholding a world not
only with a solid and even new vision of
justice (e.g. the
kibbutzim)
but one capable of renewing its own morality
.

*

,

through the initiatives of others.

And this is not pos-

sible, this space cannot be held open if one of
the pri-

mary necessities of political life is to radically
restructure factuality itself.

The true patriot's

"seeing," which is essentially moral and essentially

political in the very broadest of terms, is all we have to
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rely on today for a sense
of limits as well as for
our
ability to shape with relative
permanence a world for ourselves,
with respect to morality and
politics Arendt
writes,
r
like UrS * owever in which
Doli?in« in some °
politics
countries has long since
outgrown sporadic sinfulness
and entered a
of criminality, uncompromising
a
morality
has suddenly changed its old
funcmerel y keeping the world together
»iS k
6lfle thS
° nly medium through which
trL
true reality, as opposed
to the distorted
S e tlal y e P hemeral
n?L? H £ Crimes ° an be factual situations
e erceive <* ^nd
planned. ^0

^

^

'

,

^

~^

-

'

It is the gift of the "true
patriot" that she attains
a kind of impartiality with
which she

then mediates be-

tween the power to change "what is"
which is intrinsic to
political action, and the factual, given
texture of the
world which we must accept if we are to
contain the

political realm and learn acceptance and
reconciliation to
the nature of our world which both precedes
and will ex-

ceed us.

in an essay she wrote long after these reflec-

tions on the socialist Zionists, "Crisis in Culture,"

Arendt identifies a particular attitude, a cultura
animi
(a

culture of the soul) which we must develop in order to

mediate the, in her view, necessary and fruitful tensions

between politics and factual ity.

The authority of such an

attitude rests on impartiality, in this case on its willingness to accept the factual conditions within which

one's own people's fate is tied.
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And these are, generally

stated, the extent of the
world which one must share commonly with others, as well
as its elemental plural
quality.

In this case Arendt's
political judgments are made
self-consciously as a Jew and a
patriot, and

their
authority rests on her ability to
accept and extend the
boundaries of the political world
within which she must
think - beyond the actual
political-cultural community
whose fate is her central concern.
The "representative
thinking" she engages in encompasses
the reality of the
common world of the two peoples in
Palestine rather than
the respective fictional and hoped
for common world

which,

she argues, both Jews and Arabs in
Palestine constructed.

Her judgment in this case exemplifies
the relation between
durability and renewal, on the one hand, and
the
authoritative (moral) element in political
judgments, on

the other.

As such, her criticisms of both people's
fail-

ure to think politically is fair and harsh,
yet her tone
is hopeful and measured.

By contrast, if we consider Arendt's judgments of

Jewish action under Nazi occupation we find, amidst

a

similar call not to deny factuality, a different tone, and
a

certain attenuation of the authority of her judgments.

Let me elaborate by reflecting on the issue as it is

framed in the exchange of letters which passed between
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Gershom Scholem and Hannah
Arendt following the publication of Eichmann in Jemsaioi.
Scholem's criticisms center
around the matter of "how
to approach the scene of
that tragedy" in which one
third
of "our people" were destroyed. 61

H e finds Arendt's ap-

proach painfully inappropriate:
flippant, heartless, with
frequent overtones of malice
towards those Jews involved.
Because he regards her as "a
daughter of our
"62

people,
this tone is especially troubling
to Scholem.
in Arendt,
he finds none of the traditional
"love of the Jewish
people" which, in his view, ought
to be a natural disposition of all Jews.
Furthermore, beyond Arendt's tone,
Scholem finds her specific judgments
against the Jews unbalanced, and challenges her presumption
to pass such
definitive judgments - for example on the
Judenraete when she "was not there. "63 H e also does
not believe that
their generation can possibly attain the
necessary objectivity with which to judge what occurred.

Arendt's response is direct and uncompromising,

in

her view it is imperative that we judge the arguments
with
which the Jewish functionaries justified to themselves
and
to others their cooperation with the Nazis in the
final

solution.

Without such an investigation of what was done

and how it was justified, followed by our own judgment of
the justifying arguments, the past will remain out of our
reach, haunting and mysterious, and we will learn nothing.
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Judgment is the route to
reconciliation based not on
resignation to a fate that
can neither be changed nor understood, but on understanding
that helps orient us
towards the future as well as
establish our
present.

This response exemplifies much
of the authoritative
power of Arendt's thought.
her refusal to abdicate
trying to take responsibility for
"what is- by declaring a
bond through judgment between
herself and this past, she
calls those to whom she speaks to
face the tragedy of what
occurred in such a way that renewal
and renewed action may
be possible.
The difference in terms of the
authority of
their respective views is I think best
seen by Scholem's
recognition that he must answer the Israeli
youth's inevitable and persistent questioning about
why so many Jews
"allow(ed) themselves to be slaughtered, 64
and his simultaneous abdication when it comes to judging
those very
events.
The abdication comes in the form of a plea
that

m

it is too early to judge fairly and
objectively.

One

suspects Arendt is right that this abdication is
not unrelated to his feeling of love for the Jewish people.
And
the authority of her own effort lies in the courage to

judge what occurred in order, by understanding the

specifics of this situation, to free the youth from the

weight of that past for their own political life, as well
as to free those who themselves experienced totalitarian

conditions

- to the

extent that this is possible.
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Yet the tremendous
controversy as well as the quality
of the controversy, that
erupted over her report on Eichmann's trial, which has yet
to settle, points to
attenuation in the authority of
her judgments. Arendt herself,
unheedful of Scholem's deep
concern about the tone of her
judgments of the Jewish functionaries,
chalks up the controversy entirely to the "campaign
of misrepresentation-

carried out by the Jewish
"establishment" in Israel. 65
Clearly this was in part true as
Arendt herself docu-

ments.^

yet, did the manner with which
she chose to

report on the Jewish functionaries,
that is, her tone, not
perhaps have itself something to do
with both the intensity of the controversy and the
attenuation of her
authority - understood here as her
ability to command the
ear of her readers, but also her
ability to stimulate
renewal through understanding? Even so
sensitive a
thinker as Gershom Scholem had a terrible
time looking
past her tone to the substance of her
judgments.

Arendt defends her tone, rejecting Scholem's
notion
that Jews should love their own people.

She suggests that

the proper attitude ought to be Selbstdenken
thinking.

Love,

-

independent

she says should not be felt for something

that is "part and parcel of myself." 67

For such things we

can and ought to feel gratitude; only for that which we
are not, can and ought we feel love.

Love is an outer

directed passion which links us through intimate and un-
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transparent ties to others.

Arendt (and

while we may grant this to

think we should) ,68 she
seems, in the role
of reporter she adopted
for the trial of Eichmann,
to have
tried so to locate herself
outside this particular world
that she fails to inhabit the
Jewish community's points of
view with the same kind of
understanding and clearsightedness she shows towards the Nazis
themselves. And one
wonders whether this is not an
overreaction to her own
givenness as a Jew and her sense of
the tremendous discipline in thinking required for
her to be, in this event,
impartial. Arendt herself admits
to Scholem that she
feels with more grief wrongs done
to her own people than
those done to others. But such emotional
partisanship has
no business seeing the light of day
in Arendt's view,
I

though it may indeed be the thing which
drives us most
deeply.
It is indeed true that at least in one of
her essays,

Arendt provides conceptual support for the extremity
of
the outsider's tone reflected in her report on

Eichmann.

In "Truth and Politics," Arendt characterizes the
status

of the truthteller, reporter, etc. as the one who is
out-

side the political realm, alone 69
.

And yet here, in this

essay which arose out of the controversy over Eichmann in
Jerusalem, she oversimplifies what, in other works she

does not; namely, what the truthteller must do in order to

make her voice heard, in order to get those she would be
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heard by to lend her their
ears.

Another way to put this

is that though outside the
political realm in the sense

that she speaks not to persuade
but to illuminate and
therefore is not beholden to specific
communities in her
present, she nevertheless speaks
into a particular public.
In this light the truthteller
must sustain a tension
(which, Arendt writes, all of us do
all the time 70 between an outsider-truthteller status,
and an insiderpolitical actor status. The differences
between these two
is shaped by the difference in who
the political actor and
who the truthteller go "to visit." That
is, the community
of the political actor is the political
one; that of the
truthteller the political community and a community
of
)

historical witnesses and friends whose action
and judgments serve as examples and orienting touchstones.

The

world they share and consider to be common is in each
case
slightly different.
It is the ability to sustain this tension between
the

insider and the outsider which is what makes, finally, the

voice of the truthteller authoritative, for she has command over how to take account of and thus how to communicate with others so that they will lend their ears.

And

this means of course that the nature of her outsidership
is relative, not absolute.

Insofar as she tries to commu-

nicate what she "deems true" she does so because she has
an (aesthetic)

interest in how the world looks.
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And in-

sofar as she is not a god,
her sense of how the world
should look has grown out of
the world into which she was
born, and thus it is with
this world she must communicate.
Therefore, she too, like the
political actor who judges,
must mediate between politics
(understood here as the art
of the possible) and factuality.
The truthteller, like
the political judge must develop
the mediating attitude
the Romans referred to as cultura an inn
Thus the idea that what distinguishes
the truthteller
from the political actor is that the
former is alone, the
latter inter homines is misleading, and
in her most
sustained writings on judgment, Life of thP. Mi nr.
and her
written Kant lectures Arendt herself suggests
as much by
arguing that the spectator, the judge is
neither solitary
nor self-sufficient, 71 and that judging is
"inherently social."

The attenuation of Arendt 's own authority then

in this context is due not to the content of her
judgment,

but indeed, as Scholem intimates, to her tone which comes
from too great a severance of her thinking from one crucial part of the public world with which she is concerned.

Even Gershom Scholem, her friend, cannot really deal (and
I

do not mean agree) with what Arendt had to say.

The

"hard bed" Nietzsche advises us to offer our friends is,
in the form here offered, unbearable.

also,

I

(And this form is

might add, Nietzsche's own undoing.)

And again,

one suspects Arendt 's tone is a result of losing the
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necessary tension the

ciUtura_animi

must sustain between

the outsider-truthteller and
the insider-political actor,
in this respect she fails,
not to love the Jews as Scholem
suggests, but to speak and think
with them; to carefully
inhabit their standpoints.

As Arendt suggests in her most
insightful moments,
the tension between "truth" and
politics, outsidership and
insidership must be sustained because
it is precisely
authority which is at stake. Had Arendt
's tone been less
ironic, less harsh, and instead
reflected through thinking
"with" others the enormity of the
circumstances, and yet
not have changed the substance of her
judgments, the
authority she could have commanded would
have been far
greater.
For in the words of one of "the daughters,"
"her
people" would have found exemplified the
awesome effort to
take responsibility for "our" world, they
would have found
Arendt exhibiting that "tragic pleasure" which
takes,

in

this case, a deeply woeful pleasure in seeing
"what is,"
in illuminating, that the way may be held open
for change,

for the new,

C.

for initium.

Approachi ng the Question of Justice

If now we stand back from the particularities of

Arendt 's own judgments and try to summarize the new kind
of authority in the West towards which her work as a whole
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points it looks something

l ike

the following.

Under postmetaphysical conditions authority
obtains in the world in
practices and judgments which
make possible initium itself
and hence which "obey" the law
of the earth which is
plurality. what we in our time
augment is our earthly
condition of plurality and our
practices of initium or
freedom which this condition makes
possible. And we do
this fundamentally through judging.
Just as ancient
Greece had its figure of the tragic
hero, and the Christian West its figure of the sinner in
whom the questioning

after meaning was historically housed
as a question yet
within a specific ethical horizon, so Arendt
puts forth
the figure of the judge.

And the question which drives

the judge is, of course, who are we?

Judging is a simul-

taneous posing this question and qiving shape to
an answer.

It entails,

as we have seen, the twofold responsi-

bility of accounting for our world whose essence is
plurality, and taking a relationship to it.

between what is and was (the old)
new)

.

,

it mediates

and what could be (the

It maintains a difficult and often painful tension

between the necessity to see things as they are and as we
wish them to be, not allowing either to prevail.

To judge

is to take our bearings from "what is as it is" without

bowing down before the given; it is a complex of preservation and renewal which brings about the new itself.

It is

that activity which alone, today, can sustain our polities
as living entities.
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There is a beauty distinctive
to the figure of the
judge which when exemplified
is what provokes us
lend
our ear in obedient listening,
to give audience to the
judgment.
And it lies precisely in
its ability to encompass or evoke the plurality,
the complexity and even
ambiguities of "what is" while
shaping a specific response
to it.
And this we do not only through
the specific words
we use, but also in our tone.
it is Lessing's tragic

^

Pleasure by which we are provoked
in a good judgment.
And
it is this aesthetic sensibility
which allows us to find
ourselves with or in another.
it is this aesthetic
sensibility which, finally, guides
the activity of judging
and grants authority to those
judgment's which exemplify
it.
By taking responsibility, being
responsive
to the

plurality of the world in which we must move
and orient
ourselves, our judgments sustain an openness
while laying
forth a very definite sense of the shape of
the "we."

And

this is as true for judgments of political
actors as it is
for those of truthtellers and philosophers,
though the

temptation in the former is towards too great a
partisanship, and in the latter too great an autonomy.
However, the nature of the authority of their respective

judgments is the same, and it is co-terminous with its

form-giving force; that is, with its ability to give shape
to a specific form of life through the durability of its
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provocations, a form
rorm nf
of

1 i r~
l
lfe

•

which becomes bounded by a
i.

specific ethical horizon.
in "The crisis in
Culture," Arendt suggests
that in
his articulation of this
enlarged way of thinking Kant
has
discovered (though he himself
did not recognize his discovery) a different way
of thinking upon which
an ethics
might be grounded. Occidental
ethics and logic have been
based on the idea of being
in agreement with oneself
and

the corollary logical axiom
of non-contradiction.
This is
an ethics which starts and
remains with the individual
in
the singular.
Arendt, through Kant, moves
towards an
ethics that depends upon people
in the plural and gains
its validity from the movement
between individuals and the
public sensibilities to which
together they give
shape,

and over which there is a
perpetual struggle of mutual
persuasion.
The question remains regarding
exactly how
validity is established, what the
authoritative element in
judgments really is and the kind of
stability it can
render to human affairs.
For Arendt that ethical horizon is
shaped by the activity of sharing-the-world-with-others
which is precisely

what she understands judging to be.

And yet she abjures

when it comes to specifying this horizon further.

And

this is as it must be given Arendt 's ontology
with

plurality at its center.

In her view, the greatest evil

is failure to attempt, through judging, to orient
our-
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selves in a comoh world;
failure to be provoked by
the
sensuous profusion to
take our own distinctive
relationship to the given,
thereby taking present"
our unigue
being.
That there are better
or worse orientations is
contingent, must arise out
of the particularities
of the
Political world fro, which
they come.
In a lecture course
called "Basic Moral
Propositions - Arendt argued
that the
greatest evil facing us today
is not choosing between
good
and bad company, but not
choosing at all. The ethical
,

horizon which can guide us is
not a horizon of specific
good, but rather it is the
delineation of an activity to
save us from a passivity
Arendt called "the banality of
evil." she wrote,
X
he aSt anal sis "- our
decisions about
Y
l
l wrong
right and
will depend upon our choice
of company, with whom we wish
to spend our
iS COm P an
turn] is chosen
t in
y
throuah ?h?nW
through
thinking
examples, in examples of
persons dead or alive, and in examples
of
incidents, past or present.
the unlikely
case that someone should come and
tell us
that he would prefer Bluebeard for
company,
and hence as his example, all we
could do
would be to make sure that he would
never
come near us.
But the likelihood that some
one would come and tell us that he
does
mind and that any company will be good not
enough for him is, I fear, by far, greater.
Morally and even politically speaking, this
indifference, though common enough, is the
greatest danger. And in the same direction,
only a bit less dangerous, does this other
very common modern phenomenon lie, the
widespread tendency to refuse to judge at
all.
Out of the unwillingness or inability
to choose one's examples and one's company,
and out of the unwillingness or inability to
relate to others through judgment, arise the

^l

m

m

428

cannot remove because
by human and humanly
understandabL 11**
tlVes
?°
horror and at the same Therein lies the
tia« the banality
of evil»73'

they were nnt !!

'

f

Clearly the ethical horizon
of given communities
takes more distinctive
shape as it becomes
populated by
exemplary f igures whose
power tQ provoke

^

munity to lend their ears
has great durability.
though Arendt herself actively
courts

^

^^

Yet,

us to be provoked
and thus remember those she
wishes to have form orienting
touchstones for at least the
Western world, (this is the
of MeJ1_in_Dark^s)
this shape is always in
formation and something that
cannot be formulated in advance - it relates to the world
which is punctuated by the
departure of the very old and the
arrival of the very

—nee

,

new.

Hence the figure of the judge both
celebrates this
plurality and courageously tries to
orient himself towards
the particularities of the world
into which he was born
and will leave behind.
He tries to augment,
to add to the

possibility of political freedom itself
which is the same
thing as to allow the new, the miraculous
to happen.

The essential fact about our situation in
the 20th
century which remained the perpetual touchstone
for

Arendt 's thought was what she referred to alternatively
as
being in a gap between past and future, and as being
con-

fronted with or being in an abyss: the abyss of freedom.

429

It is the figure of the
judge who, in Arendt's view,
could
"move" in such a gap, who
could, to recall Barry Lopez
again, "cultivate the wild"
of this abyss in the twofold
sense of this ambiguous
phrase:

making a specifically

humanly shaped world within
which what is new, unprecedented might appear and be
given reality.
it is in this
figure of the judging spectator
that the questioning after
meaning in this abyss occurs,
is housed; a questioning
which asks who are we, in the
midst of an embrace of the
particular, the new, which perpetually
"threatens" to reconstitute, destroy, undo the we
and that who.
in the
tension of space for such questioning
which must stay as
close as possible to "what is," to
particularities,
lies

the authority of this figure and
the durability of her
judgments.
It is in this figure of the judging
spectator and the

activity of judging that Arendt finds a deep
expression of
joy at the elemental experience of living
together.

this, the authority available to us can spring,
as

From

I

have

suggested, but it is also the touchstone for Arendt
's ap-

proach to the question of justice.

In her notes for her

1964 lecture course on Kant's political philosophy at the

University of Chicago, Arendt wrote about judgment,
"We deal with a form of being together
[shared judgments, community of taste] where
no one rules and no one obeys.
Where people
persuade each other... This is not to deny
that interest and power and rule... are very
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ceots

£h!

nd eV
?" central Political con-

riV *? fr °m
the living-toget.her
tnat *l2 ??
fr °»
a different source?

(Co^a^™?!

And, at the end of
"Truth and Politics," Arendt
answers
this question in the
affirmative by

suggesting that there

are indeed two orders
of experience which
determine the
substance of politics: a
lower order where politics
is "no
more than a battlefield of
partial, conflicting interests,
where nothing (counts) but
pleasure and profit,

partisanship, and the lust for
dominion," and a higher order (which she refers to as
the actual content of
politics, which she conceives
as, "the joy and gratification that arise out of being
in company with our peers,
out of acting together and
appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world
by word and deed, thus
acquiring and sustaining our present
identity and beginning something entirely new." 75
It is out of this cluster of
concerns of the higher

order that Arendt 's approach to justice
arises.
The first
order of concern when it comes to thinking
about justice
for Arendt is always the question of
how best to augment
that form of being together "where no one
rules
and no one

obeys" or, to put it differently, where we
find "an

obedience in which men retain their freedom."

The first

order justice concern is with what keeps us together
as
vital, living entity.

a

In this context the first right, as
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5116
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"

Stla

^in£ a£_T2taU a rian^,
_

t
is a "right
to polity,- the first
order question, what
augments that
"political.. l i£e .
Questions Qf sQciai justice;
distribu _
tive justice correspond
to that lower order of
the substance of politics. They
concern power and interest,
but
combat them in favor of
some distributive notion
of fairness.
It is not that Arendt
wished to argue such questions are not a part of
politics (though in some formulations it would seem difficult
to think otherwise)
it is
rather that these in our time
have become dominant, first
order questions, when this
happens the deepest most fundamental meaning/purpose of
political life becomes attenuated and eclipsed, and we
court nihilism.
.
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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

"There [Sophocles] also
let us know

mils, the space
splenlou?!^'

what

^ ^h

of men's free deeds and
C ° Uld

WMCh

in drawing this work now
to a close it remains
to more

directly contrast Nietzsche
and Arendt's respective
contributions to the problems of
authority and justice in a
post-metaphysical age. This I will
do in part by way of
summary, in part by way of
reaching out to the broader
philosophical and political terrain
of these
issues.

have tried in my reading of
Nietzsche not so much
to refute the perhaps dominant
interpretation of his
aesthetic reflections as to offer
a reading that is in
some way more necessary for us
to encounter today, necessary in the sense that it moves us
in a constructive
I

direction vis a vis the problems of
ethical action in a
post-metaphysical age. As exemplary of the
dominant reading we might instructively look at
Terry Eagleton's recent
analysis in The Ideology of the A^h^^,
a reading that
is not so much unconvincing or irrelevant
as one-sided
and, given the neglect in Nietzsche
scholarship of that
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which is now less
relevant
eievant to *-v,
the problems of ethical
life
a post-metaphysical
pnysical age.
The^deoi oqv of the
Aesthetic, Nietzsche's
self
h^i
self-declaration
that he is the
"
most modern of mod
is
in effect to mean
that
Nietzsche has realized
through
Eggieton caiis h
"aesthetic of autonomous
-

^

m

m

™

^

sel f re ali 2a tion..3
the total

destruction of the moral,
religious and
structure" which kept the
"productive energies" of the
bourgeoisie at least partly
in check.
This destruction
Nretzsche carries out in
thought is not, Eagleton
notes,
done to be sure in the
interests of the bourgeoisie
for
when Nietzsche has obvious
disdain, but on behalf of
those
strong-willed creatures who
are able to live aesthetically.
That is, who are able to
creatively thrive
on an

amoral will to power that
celebrates power as an end in
itself. 4 Thus the truth Qf
Niet2sche , s self . declarationj
on this reading, is that he
is the hyperboli 2 ation of
the
reckless, experimental "energies"
of the bourgeois class.
And since Nietzsche has absolutely
no interest in transforming the "base," Eagleton argues
we cannot turn to
Nietzsche's aesthetic as a model or
principle of social
consensus.
Rather, this aesthetic of autonomous
selfrealization undermines all law, all habit
and all social
custom upon which order might be based.

Eagleton is, after this reading, pressed
impatiently
to ask what could possibly be so morally
positive and en-
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riching about this pointless,
self-generating, amoral will
to power. 5 what to put
,

^

^

could be so morally positive
about what would amount
politically to an unstable,
ever-in-flux tyranny of the
strong? a kind of culture
dedicated to anti-culture?
Readings such as Eagleton's
are not only plausible
but instructive, warning as
they do of the political and
moral dangers of the solipsistic
and radically individualistic moments of modernity as
found in Nietzsche.
What
such readings however fail to
explore is Nietzsche's more
important insights into the possibilities
for ethical and
by extension political life in an
age without the solid
foundations of Truth, Reason or God.
it is reflections
ly.

along these lines which Nietzsche opens
up and which are
necessary for us today.
in this regard, I have tried to
offer another way of interpreting Nietzsche's
boast of
being "the most modern of moderns," an
interpretation

which distinguishes him from all possible contenders

cluding Hobbes, Marx and even Machiavelli.

- in-

Namely, not

only does Nietzsche reject metaphysical foundations,

metaphysical "faiths" (as does Machiavelli and, arguably,
Hobbes)

in a full-fledged and self-conscious claim to be

true to the intellectual honesty which he suggests has

historically given coherency to something we can refer to
as Western civilization, but he also, indeed, partially

answers Eagleton's question regarding the morally positive
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and enriching possibilities
~o of an
y possibil
aesthetic of autonomous
self-realization. This he
does in a
Eagleton's interpretation
and rather explores an
aestheti c
of Vieldeutigkeit or
multiplicity which in some sense
is a
hyperbolization of modernity's
fascination with the new.
It is this latter
project which involves Nietzsche
persistently with questions regarding
the social conditions
i

t-

^^

i

for
an ethical life in which
a new post-metaphysical
multiplicity of things could flourish,
(it is here, with regard
to a kind of freedom as
multiplicity of being, that he
vies with the vision Marx
articulates
in I^e_Economic^nd

Philosop hic Manuscrip ts.
As

have suggested, the parameters
of Nietzsche's
exploration of the social conditions
for such an ethical
life are far too narrow, confined
as they are to the nature of interactions between individual
persons, on the
one hand, and between figures of
authority and those they
would influence, on the other. still,
the line of reflection he initiates calls us to some original
thoughts about
the nature of the quality of relations between
persons in
I

which individual distinctiveness and uniqueness
the plurality of the human world

-

-

hence

can best flourish.

The

ethos of the exemplar which emerges from Zarathustra
begins to explore the ethical idea that for the uniqueness
of each individual to emerge, a presumptuous and as-

similating pity (which rests on a kind of epistemological
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^

and metaphysical arrogance)
must be
of a new wariness which
honors and transfigures by
beautifying the gulf which now,
in a post-metaphysical
age, divides us fro, one another.
Yet Nietzsche pushes beyond
this idea one crucial step
further in suggesting that
the
very strength, beauty and
authority that any individual
might today exhibit fundamentally
grows out of the ability
not simply to keep the abyss
near, but in_so_doing to
receive the blunt force of others'
differences - be they
ugly, mediocre or radiant.
order, finally then, ourselves to beautify and hence
justify our world

m

in its

tragic and terribly beautiful
proportions by making of
ourselves inspiring examples, we
must receive the world's
otherness, allow it to provoke us.
it must cut into us,
that we learn from it as we strive
to make of ourselves
examples to it. To be able to give,
we must be capable of
receiving. A pitying ethos impedes both.
Insofar as
Nietzsche moves towards articulating
"principles of consensus" in Eagleton's sense, they revolve
around the question of how best to create and preserve the
strength and
uniqueness of each person. Hence Nietzsche is
concerned
not merely with keeping the gap open, but in forming
a

constructive ethical life around it, one which takes deep
and tragic pleasure in the terrible multiplicity of the

world and beautifies it by example.
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Nretzsche is "the most
modern o £ moderns" in the
double sense then that
he embodies perhaps
th^ two ethioal
dictions of an era: an endless
mastering will to power the ethics of the strong
which Eagleton and others
critically elaborate, on the
one hand, and a different
ethic of
the strong which depends
precisely upon nat mastering
and
assimilating but rather on
honoring and engendering the
distance between persons
in order that plurality
might
flourish.
it is this Nietzsche
with whom we can begin to
think a conception of
authority adequate to a postmetaphysical age no longer able
to ground social order in
Truth, God or Reason.
We need to learn from both

Nietzsche's in order to discern
the contours of our age
including the way we are moving
beyond
it.

But we have

gotten almost exclusively the
first Nietzsche.
If Nietzsche begins this
elaboration

of an under-

standing of authority that values
mutual self-formation in
the effort to allow otherness
and the new to
flourish, and

if he explores

(albeit narrowly) the social relations
be-

tween persons which most encourage
this, the question
which drives the exemplar, though it

leads in a social

direction is still far too solipsistic.

Nietzsche is a

political thinker in the wide sense, concerned
throughout
his work with a common ethical horizon for
a culture

beyond nihilism.

Nevertheless he is able to move out of

late modernity's solipsism only partially for the ethi-
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cal question in his work
remains at best "who am I" (and
at worst, "who shall I create
myself to be"), even as this
1 feels the ground of its very being
only when receiving,
with gratitude, the distinctiveness
of others.
That is,

even though this is an

I

in a post-metaphysical sense: de-

pendent for its identity as well as its
difference on encounter with strong and different others.
The problem is
that such solipsism keeps Nietzsche, as
I suggested in the
Interlude, from more greatly appreciating and
giving more
texture and dimensionality to the constructive
formation
of a "we."

Nietzsche's selves are artistic actors

They

.

have not fully felt the reality of their we-ness;
they are
too theatrical, too changing.
It is,

as

I

have suggested, in Arendt's work that we

find the thinker who inherits and moves beyond Nietzsche's

exemplary ethos.

The question which drives Arendt is a

question of citizens who are at once actors and spectators:

"who are we?"

And her work on authority and on

justice revolves around keeping this question alive by ex-

ploring the conditions which must be constituted for the
tension-filled presences of both the old and the new, the
established and the revolutionary in any culture.

Her

concern about the lack of metaphysical foundation in the
2

0th century takes her not to an aesthetic of multiplicity

but to one of initium, of beginning in the twofold sense
of something new and something which establishes or con-
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stitutes a framework for saving
that worthy of being
saved.
In Arendt, then, we find the
unusual and highly
delicate work of a thinker who
embraces the postmetaphysical condition in its politically
postfoundational sense, but who does so
through the perpetual
concern with and exploration of
constituting political

re-

lations which provide the necessary
stability of a world
within which and against which a new beginning
can emerge.
Arendt persistently argues something that most
others

writing roughly about the same problems utterly
fail to
comprehend: namely, to establish political-ethical

rela-

tions in which natality or initium can breathe,
that is,
in order to celebrate the new, there must be an
"old"

venerated and solid enough, an old world with enough
identity to provide the new with the contrast necessary
for its emergence.

For Arendt, the old, the world as we

find it when we come into it, is worthy of as much atten-

tion and care

(a

judging care which decides what is fit to

be saved) as the newborn.

It is in the tension between

the two where Arendt locates "life"
of culture.

-

the living moments

And both the aesthetic and ethical dimensions

of her work are elaborated precisely here in the tension,
as

I

have argued.
This "locus" of Arendt 's thought also accounts for

why she has vexed both conservative and liberal thinkers.
It also distinguishes her work from post-structuralists
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such as Lyotard as
well as from Eagleton's
Nietzsche as
she neither courts
change-frenzied paralogism, nor
amoral
self-realization for their
own sake.
The urge to
celebrate movement or a
sort of ever-abundant
quantity of
difference is foreign to
her thought.
i ndeed it is
politically and ethically
that which haunts her most
about
our age.
yet in her search for
stabilizing principles
with which to ground authority
and provide see degree of
stasis, Arendt also refuses
to place faith in natural
rights, Reason, or Truth all of which she argued
events
in the 2 0th century has
rendered political impotent.
instead, what Arendt courts
is a political version of
Nietzsche's friend and the exemplary
ethos he embodies.
Through the figure of the judge
and the activity of judging Arendt describes the
difficult process of ethical

orientation in a post-metaphysical
world, one that bears
responsibility both to the world as it
is,

but also to a

world she would like to help bring
into being,
it is in
living in the tension between these
two responsibilities
that Arendt's judge embodies the care
for the strangerliness or cleft which Nietzsche argues
has come to define
existence in our times.
It is this strangerliness which
the judge, in making good judgments,
transfigures
and

makes beautiful, provoking others to find her
judgments

authoritative in the sense that in the effort to ethically
orient herself in a world without solidity, the judge
does
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"no injury to reality."

That is

,

sne makes

to inhabit the standpoints
of others, to, in Nietzsche's
words, let others "cut
into" herself.
This process too,
like that of the friendship
Nietzsche describes, shuns the
arrogance and assimilating
tendencies of pity. The judge
is not out to assume
others' sensibilities and
reactions
to the world, but rather
to inhabit their positions
in the
effort to experience their
life with her own eyes.
Here
too then, the judge honors
that cleft which divides us and
makes us different; she honors
that quality of alteritas.
Yet she is not so dominated by
it that she cannot presume
a we - albeit a we never
settled, always suspended amidst
and given breathe within the tragic
beauty of a plural
world; a we in whose life we take
tragic pleasure.

What we find in Arendt/ then, is a
powerful argument
that what ought to be authoritative for
us, what ought to
provide "principles of social consensus"
to use, again,

Eagleton's phrase, is a form of judging-orienting
which
embodies attentiveness to the conditions for
a

we in con-

stant "self-challenge.

For it is the life force of such

challenging which forges the "splendour" of "free
deeds
and living words" which can make life justified, in

Arendt's view.

plurality

-

Arendt finds it morally positive to enrich

not for the sake of profusion in itself, but

for the sake of freedom which she understands as essen-

tially made possible by the existence of a culture secure
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enough to receive, and save
those unique deeds and words
worthy of being saved. This
understanding, as I have
argued in chapter five, arises
out of an ontology which
Place at the heart of human being
the urge to sense and be
sensed, the urge to be both display
and spectator.
it is

pleasure in this perpetual aesthetic
and sensuous mutual
provocation which makes our freedom take
a fundamentally
political form, in Arendt's view.
The abyss between Nietzsche and Arendt
in this regard
is large and all-important.
As I have argue, Nietzsche
moves in this direction, particularly in
Zarathustra
Yet
his reliance on the will as the creative
source of his
.

artist-actor self turns him in

a less

political, more

psychological direction in which the ego, beset always
by
forces of disintegration and formlessness, must

forge its

own character and style.

6

in Zarathustra

r

Nietzsche has

critical insights into the fundamentally social dimensions
of this task, but his reliance on the will constantly
un-

dermines the insights in this work, as in his others, in
favor of Eagleton's Nietzsche who indeed preaches an

aesthetic of autonomous self-realization.

This leads

Nietzsche perpetually away from an analysis of the conditions for the kind of aesthetic justification of the world
for which he writes.

Nietzsche is then

a

necessary thinker for us in the

twofold sense of being very dangerous and of initiating a
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line of reflection we
need to further today; a
line I
think Arendt pursues with
most vision and insight.
it is
post-structuralist thinkers'
neglect of this line of
thinking which makes the,,
on the whole, so unpolitical,
so unsuited for the
constructive tasks of political
thought - including elaborating
different conceptions of
authority and other foundations
for justice in a postmetaphysical age. This is likewise
true for readers of
Nietzsche who see primarily
his danger, a group which includes most in the marxist-socialist
tradition, as well as
students of Leo Strauss who read
Nietzsche as the great
herald of nihilism, but also as
a thinker who embodies it.
To intimate the political and
cultural significance
of this Nietzschean-Arendtian
line of thinking on
authority and justice, and the parallel
sterility and
danger of those who fail to engage it,
it may, in closing,
be illuminating to situate this
work within the con-

temporary debate within the academic
community over the
status of the canon in Western intellectual
life,

for this

debate touches quite centrally upon the
question of
authority in our culture, but also upon multiple
questions
of justice.
The debate over undergraduate education at American

universities was touched off by the appearance in 1987 of

Allan Bloom's The Closi ng of the American Mind

r

and given

added life with the very recent appearance of Dinesh
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D'Souza's Illibera^ducation.V

Both Bloom and

are standard bearers for
the traditional curriculum,
and
see themselves as writing
to defend the principles of
liberal education against the
assault made upon them, in
their view, by deconstruction,
postmodernism, and poststructuralism which, for short hand
I will call here the
new criticism. This new world
view teaches, according to
D'Souza, that Western values are
inherently oppressive,
that political transformation is
the chief purpose of education, that all standards are
arbitrary, that there is no
objectivity, and that justice is simply
the will of the
stronger party. 8 Tne political effect,
as Allan Bloom
succinctly put it, is that the new
criticism "prepare [s]
the soul for devotion to the emergent. "9
The historicist
impulses which dominate the new criticism
have relativized
all claims to truth and knowledge leaving,
they suggest,
the student few intellectual resources with
which to challenge or gain perspective on the issues and
views which

dominate our historical present.

The real problem of the

new criticism thus is not the various approaches to
literary tests per se, but the kind of politics and
the
ideology it "serves" which D'Souza summarizes as "the victim's revolution." 10

Here the aim is, as Yale professor

Geoffrey Hartman put it, "the restoration of voice to
unite classes of people," 11 or, as Michel Foucault has put
it,

the unearthing of "subjugated knowledges."
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Once all

standards are relativized and
the traditional norms of
scholarship are de-legitimized,
the "instinct for activism" is set free and the
university loses its autonomy
from the political currents of
the day, becoming a
battleground for particular interests
and claims instead
of that arena in which truth and
knowledge can be pursued
for their own sake.
Warning against the possibility
of

"indignant political fanaticism," D'Souza
concludes, "the
rejection of authority can sometimes result,
paradoxically,

in an embrace of authoritarianism." 12

The authority they wish to restore is that
various

and rich body of texts which, as proof of
their quality,
have survived the test of time, retaining the
power to

speak to the "permanent questions" of mankind, 13
and thus

perpetually to inform human life with their truths.

These

texts (and for Bloom particularly those of the ancient
Greeks) must be read for the sake of finding out whether

they are true, viz. we should read Aristotle's

Nichomachean Ethics not to find out what people of his
time thought of morality, but rather to learn his teaching
of what a good man is. 14

No life, Bloom argues, can

remain in studies which are not driven by the claim that
they are pursuing "the important truth." 15

Not only,

thus, do works in the canon teach us about the importance

of the questioning after truth, the good, etc., and of the

capacity of intellectual life and culture committed to
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them to place critical
tension on the present, but there
is important truth in
these texts which we must
recover.
That is, not only are they
methodologically exemplary, but
they are substantively enduring
as well.
it is only with
the conviction that there
are enduring truths that we pursue that we can retain what
for Bloom and D'Souza are the
ethically and politically essential
grounds from which to
make claims that one thing is
superior to another, i.e.
that we can have an ethical life.
The problem today is
that no one is willing to claim
that one thing is superior
to another in the sense of
expressing or being exemplary
of permanent questions and problems
of mankind.
On the face of it Arendt seems an
unlikely critic and
rather more of an ally of Bloom and
D'Souza.
No friend of
the absolute relativizing of historicist
claims, Arendt
argues for the moral centrality of judging.
She is also a
true lover of the classics in the Western
canon, finding
in them those works most worthy of our
enduring attention

position nearly all of her own works exemplify in the
extreme.
Furthermore, Arendt was a persistent critic
- a

of

ideological politics, and spoke out against politicizing
the university in this sense.

She too believed the uni-

versity should serve "intellectual detachment and disinterested search for truth." 16

(She did think the uni-

versity should be politicized in the sense that it was

a

public thing "owned" collectively by the community it com-
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posed, and thus she supported
a student strike at one university taken in solidarity
with "their university" as she
put it, when they learned that
university service employees were being paid less than
minimum wage. She also
gladly supported demands that
students be given time off
during elections to engage as citizens.
But she shared
Bloom and D'Souza's fear of the other
forms of politicization of the university.)
addition, Arendt was very
critical of a politics based on pity or
compassion, as I

m

have argued, and would therefore seem to
be hostile to the
"victim's revolution" that D'Souza argues
underlies the
world view of the new criticism and the accompanying
as-

sault on the canon.

And her own criticisms in the late

60 's of curriculum changes demanded
by Negro students -

she called Swahili a 19th century kind of no-language,
and

African literature

non-existent subject 17

a

-

appear to

support such a reading and such an alignment.
Indeed, there are great general affinities between

D'Souza and Bloom's apprehensions about the present, on
the one hand, and Arendt 's own concerns, on the other.

This is particularly the case with respect to preserving
the university as a place where souls are not prepared for

"devotion to the emergent," but rather for a lively critical capacity of mind.

are decisive, and

I

Yet the differences between them

will try to show that the effect of

the conservative response of thinkers such as Bloom and
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D'Souza is to close out the
emergence of a genuine present, to make it possible
to beat that path of non-time
in
the heart of time which is
the task of every new thinking
generation, as Arendt argued.
Arendt would have found
Bloom and D'Souza's response to
important concerns reactive insofar as they fail to let
the present breathe
its

own breaths.

And this,

I

will suggest, has everything to

do with their conception of authority,
a conception illsuited to our times, and which also
radically differentiated the approach to question of justice
her aesthetic conceptions of politics suggest from that of
Bloom and
D'Souza.

There is, then, an abyss between them when we
look

both at their respective analyses of how we got
to the

current educational state we are in, and of their
respective responses

-

i.e. what should be done.

stubbornly intellectualist

,

Bloom has a

anti-materialist explanation

for the current assault on the canon: it is due to the
im-

portation of nihilistic, relativizing ideas from Germany.
And his response, to be blunt,

(and I'm afraid bluntness

is appropriate because the depth of his analysis is able

to support little else), 18 is to argue that we must quit

thinking certain things

-

most importantly that there is

no nature and no truth, and quit reading texts in certain
ways, that is, with our own concerns and agendas in the

forefront.

Let me take an example to illustrate each of
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Bloom's arguments regarding
how we should respond to the
threat of relativism and nihilism
which indeed is, at
least in some way, part of our
current condition.
First, there is the argument
that we should quit

thinking certain things
and no nature.

-

namely that there is no truth

This is a persistent argument, and
the ex-

ample from his work

I

would like to explore concerns his

reflections on feminine "nature."

Bloom argues that there

is a feminine and a masculine nature,
moored teleological-

ly in the procreative needs of the
species.

Modesty be-

came (and should remain) the central virtue
of the feminine nature "because it govern[ed] the powerful
desire
that relate[d] men to women, provide[d] a
gratification in

harmony with the procreation and rearing of children,
the
risk and responsibility of which falls naturally that
is,

biologically

-

on women." 19

it is this female modesty

which distinguishes the sexes not only in the sexual act,
but in "the whole of life." 20

And it is the scourge of

feminism which has substantially attenuated this modesty,

assaulting nature and the natural order of things, so much
so that sexual difference loses all its richness as does

the sexual act, and the permanent problems surrounding
sexual identity which have heretofore been expressed in

great literature now no longer speak to the reality of the
young.

Whatever problems they have in their sexual rela-

tionships can no longer be traced back to "any moral am-
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biguity in man s sexual
nature _„ 21 Hence
naturalizing sexual identity
and realize its natural
origin.
The former is central
centra] to
t-ri «-v,„
the agenda of feminism
and its academic arm,
women's studies, and accounts
therefore for what Bloom
characterizes as their assault
on
the canon.

^

,

There are many, many
reasons to question Bloom's
teleological moorings for
feminine and masculine nature
and sexual desire. To
take one of the most distressing
examples from recent history
to demonstrate the enormous
Plasticity of sexual desire, we
can turn to testimony
Arendt herself cites in
a ins_ofJo
t a rian^ of
a once very ordinary
German citizen become SS who
was interviewed at a concentration camp
during the war by David
Rousset

Th^

mi

"Usually

I keep on hitting till
I ejaculate
W fe and three chil dren in
Breslau.
I used to
2
i
I
be
perfectly normal. That's what
they've made of me. Now when they
pass out of here, I don't go home. give me a
I don't
dare look my wife in the face." 22

This should give us reason to pause
in assuming humans
possess a set sexual nature, for this
example suggests we
must at least include in our understanding
of sexual
desire a socio-political dimension.
Furthermore, though it is obviously plausible to

argue that procreation fell naturally (biologically)
on
women, it is not egually plausible to argue as
Bloom does
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that childrearing fell
naturally on women.
xs much more pl ausible
to argue

^^

^

Here again

^

it

factors had a great deal
to do with the historically
so
persistent role of ween as
childrearers - as so .any
socialist feminists have
23
argued.

in addition, the
technological developments which
have occurred as a consequence
of modern science really
demand we question the entire
category of nature when it
comes to human identity.
That is, even birth control,
but

more pointedly, new reproductive
technologies of which
some are now available and
others only foreseeable - such
as test tube fertilization
followed by ex utero incubation, to the even more
outlandish possibility that a fertilized egg be placed in a male
"womb" and there be
brought to term... such possibilities
make the very notion
of natural sex identity problematic,
unsustainable
as we

know them, and they push as to
question what Bloom does
not - the importance of sex to identity
itself.
Why
should it be so central? We are now
faced with a choice
never before available.
it is this reality we must encounter, a difficult encounter which Bloom's
theorizing
refuses.
This Nietzschean-Arendtian line of thinking
does
not.

The failure of Bloom's effort to make nature
our

authority when it comes to sexual identity or gender,
then,

is manifold.

What is of importance in this context
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is to point out something
Arendt very forcefully and
honestly faced; namely that,
at the very least, our
latest

experiences,

(e.g.

totalitarian conditions), and
our new
technological capacities (e.g.
the new reproductive technologies) have made the notion
of a human nature which we
can definitively grasp, an
intellectual and moral impossibility 24 These very reai
events

^

.

^

^

many others, have made such
a nature a moral impossibility
because they have so radically
severed us from the past
that we no longer have any
reliable guideposts to it.
Hence we are faced morally without
the authority of past
experience and past reflection, and
the moral task of
thought is, as I have suggested,
to think and judge
without it.
it is not thus the emergence
and predominance
of mere ideas which is the problem,
as Bloom suggests.
The world and the life of the mind,
the visible and the
invisible, have a much deeper and more
intractable rela-

tionship than Bloom is willing to consider.

It is worldly

events which have attenuated the reliability
and

plausibility of the "old views," worldly events
which make
attempts such as Bloom's to rely on them irrelevant
at

best and reactionary at worst.
To face up to this situation is to take a moral
posi-

tion for Arendt insofar as, in a world which is now "free"
from metaphysical groundings (whether it chooses to be or
no)

,

we have a new possibility of really building a shared
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W ° rld

—

^

baSiS ° f
ration o f plurality and
* C
a world whose
splendour „ can reany shQw
Tq
otherwise is to reject
the specific
free _
dom our world offers
rters.
Th= time for
The
the idea of a fixed
nature is passed; we
must face our condition.
To do
otherwise is to court a
kind of authoritarianism.
°"

..

^

_

^.^^ ^

t-

This leads to the second
dimension of Bloom's
response to our condition
- namely his
argument concerning
how to read texts in
the canon.
„ is arguments about
what

how they should be read
is, from an Arendtian
point of
view, equally unfreeing
and morally problematic
insofar as
their effect too is to forbid
the present to bring
itself
into being; to beat its
track of non-time in time.
In a
significant passage Bloom,
reflecting on the problem
"ithin the academy of the lack
of unity regarding what
constitutes the core of a liberal
education, writes,

"4* Seri ° US s °mtion is the
one that is almost
one^haf;^?
universally reiected- t-ho

d
B °° ltS a PP"»<** in'which'a
lioera°} education means
liberal
reading certain genrec °9 n zed cl ^sic texts,
lust_relai
ina them letting
J-nq
them dictate what the
Questions are and the method of
approaching
them - not forcing them into
categories we
make up, not treating them as
historical
products, but trying to read them
ac
authors wnshed them to he r oa H
(emghailj—
mine)
•

,

Here the sterility and really moral
irresponsibility
this means anything like "thinking
what we are doing"
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- if
-

shines forth.

While there are very good
reasons to read
classic texts imminently in
the general way Bloom
suggests
- not the least of which is to
pursue the question of general and permanent problems
of facing humanity - this
cannot, given the enormously
changed material, intellectual
and spiritual worlds we live in,
be the sole approach.
For instance, to take the
question, again, of women - our
"nature" and our "place" in the
socio-political
order.

Were we to rely on reading, for
example, Aristotle or
Augustine or Hegel, all three would
uphold an order of
things in which women's nature was
essentially passive and
most fulfilled in the domestic sphere.
So would they wish
to be read.
How illuminating is this for us today
in a

world where the very notion of gender is
increasingly
challenged not only politically but by the
very material
conditions of our lives? it is thoroughly
instructive,

would suggest, as

a

I

chastening, questioning posture, yet

surely there are additional questions we must
press upon
these authors, questions which the very uniqueness
of our
age demands we think. Where is the space for
these set of

questions in Bloom and D'Souza's liberal education?
It is,

it seems to me,

the mixture of approaches to

the texts in the canon which constitute the best work

being done in, for example, feminist scholarship.
is,

That

work which both seeks to conserve and to problematize

the rich thought in the canon, enlivening and re-
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enlivening the works themselves
as well as the issues of
our day through mutual encounter. 26
while Bloom and
D'Souza fear in the new criticism
a rejection of authority
which results in a relativization
of all value, a collapse
of standards, and an accompanying
authoritarianism per-

petuated by the strong, they themselves
turn for help to
the authority of truth and nature
which, I have suggested,
at the very least recent events
render implausible and unfit for helping us think fully about
the moral and political dilemmas of a post-metaphysical
age.
Theirs is a
nostalgic and politically authoritarian
turn itself, wishing rather than to think in the present,
to stifle its
emergence.

Hence the strictures on having the canon
"dictate" to us our questions and method of
reading these

texts
The position on the debate over the canon
which

Arendt's work suggests is neither clearly with the
hyper
historicism of the new criticism nor with the conservative
reaction.

She partakes of both concerns and both methods

in an approach uniquely Arendtian, and one which
is highly

instructive and really quite moral in the midst of what
has become a very polemical, acrimonious and often

unilluminating environment.

Arendt neither relies on now

implausible authorities nor does she eschew the notion of

authority and standards altogether.
today in Arendt's view, as

I

The greatest evil

have suggested, is neither
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not believing in truth or
nature (the conservative
view)
nor believing in such things
(the view of the new criticism)

Rather it is failure to orient
oneself with
respect to what is, failure to
judge.
.

she fears not

tolerance, and not intolerance,
but indifference. And her
vehemence against ideological politics
is due not to its
destruction or disregard for truth,
but due precisely to
it anti-political nature in
the sense that it seeks to
reduce the plurality of ideas,
perspectives and interests
inherent in the human world. And here
her thought should
chasten those within the new criticism
camp who are so
ready to politicize the university in
the sense of making
it unreflectively amenable to
demands by those who have
historically been excluded from it. There
is a danger of
an authoritarianism of the left to be
sure.

A position on the debate over the canon
informed by
Arendt 's work would take its bearings from that
something
Arendt called "humanness," by which she meant
not a mere

tolerance for diversity but a more active sensibility
gladness in and an openness to the world of others

aesthetic sensibility called tragic pleasure.

-

- a

that

A political

sensibility in the deepest sense of the word, this humanness endeavors to make the rich and plural world an object
of discourse, to talk about the world with others in the

effort to bring forth a world to which "we" distinctly
belong.

This requires that we "commend truth unto the
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gods,"

and accept that in a
human world, truth has no
Place save truth which has
been humanized; that is,
save
that which takes as its
primary bearings the fundamental
relativity of the interhuman
world, 28 and says not
"this
is truth" (e.g. the truth
of feminine nature), but
rather,
"this is what I deem truth. "2*
Qnly

^

^

^

ing would it be essential to
judge and speak the truth as
one sees it, but also it would
be necessary to exhibit
that "vigilant partiality" to
which Arendt referred, to
exhibit that lack of objectivity
which is nevertheless not
the same as subjectivity because
its partiality favors not
the self, but the world insofar
as it is constituted by
the multiple voices of those who
judge and speak the truth
as they see it.
it is these voices which together
create
the nearness and the all-important
distances without which
there could be no specifically human
world.
Such

partiality would be ever-vigilant against
the dominance of
a single Truth and hence be partial
to the ambiguities,
subtleties and paradoxes in all questions and
judgments
concerning the world.

More specifically, an Arendtian approach to the
debate would embody a responsibility to the canon as
"the
world" that has been handed down to us, as that body
of

texts which have been the central intellectual, philosophical cornerstones of Western civilization.

As such, the

responsibility entails that of introducing newcomers, the
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young to this, "our" world.

Hence this instruction must

figure centrally in a liberal
education. However, and
this is decisive, the essence
of education is not merely
conservation, but natality too.
And this means that not
only must we attempt to conserve
and sustain a common
world, but that this very world
is perpetually suspended
in and even sustained by
contestation. We must strive
for
a conserving sensibility
in the service of the new.
And
this is all the more critical if
Arendt is right, and
I

think she is, that in our
post-metaphysical age we have
lost the threads which tied the
present to the past such
that the very stability and tangibility
of our common
world has become fleeting and evanescent;
the instruction
and meaning it holds for us now unbound
by age-old prescriptions which heretofore "dictated" to
the newcomer the
nature of the "treasures" it succored.
We cannot then but bring our current
questions,

urgencies and predicaments to our approaches to
the canon
- which is not necessarily the same as
historicizing
all

claims and approaches to it, though it does mean
allowing
it into the relativity characteristic of all
human things

and ceasing to approach it in an almost metaphysical
fashion.

Arendt 's own way of approaching the canon in The

Life of the Mind is exemplary in this regard.

Here,

driven by the question whether the habit of thinking may
not condition humans against doing evil, a question which
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emerged from her observations
of and report on Eichmann
and his trial, Arendt
turns to the canon of the
"great
thinkers." Her problem is
that each of these thinkers
is
caught within what she calls
"the metaphysical fallacies.. .30

That

^

on

^

.

bas s Qf

^

think

^

ence each drew conclusions
about the world which are
no
longer plausible (e.g. belief
in a less real sensory
and a
more real and eternal suprasensory
world)
Despite the
implausibility however of the various
systems and doctrines of the great thinkers,
Arendt argues they are not
arbitrary.
it is not, she suggests, the
g^iestions which
they pursue which have become
meaningless to us, but the
way they were framed and answered
which has lost relevance
and plausibility. 31 what she therefore
attempts to do is
to reframe these age-old questions
by moving them out of
their metaphysical, philosophical and
theological dimensions and into their phenomenological
dimensions - more
plausible and suitable to us today.
.

It is the fundamental continuity of
experience, of

being thinking beings which makes the thought of
the great
thinkers to whom Arendt turns not arbitrary and
such
rich

sources for her phenomenological explorations.

Yet to let

their specific formulations and interpretations of that
shared experience "dictate" their meanings would be to
still the relevance of their work to the living world of

the present.

Arendt 's conserving sensibility, her sense
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that the philosophical
canon has treasure which
must be
saved, is a sensibility
in the service of the new.
And it
is the freshness with
which she approaches the
canon which
"saves" it and gives her own
voice its authority.
What then of the other dimension
of this debate over
higher education today - the
struggle over the curricula
in the form of the creation
of new fields of study
such as

women's studies, Afro-American
studies as well as other
ethnically centered fields which
Bloom and D'Souza centrally implicate in the anti-Western
bent of academic
study as well as in its politicization
and relativization?
in this struggle questions of
justice are paramount. How
would this Nietzschean-Arendtian
line of thinking approach
this dimension of the debate?
To begin with, the concerns critics
such as Bloom and
D'Souza express over these new fields
and the changes in
the curricula for which those who
promote them agitate
largely revolve around the fear that these
changes are
turning universities into sites for rectifying
socio-

historical injustices rather than sites for developing
and
civilizing young people into our culture. This
they do by

destroying the possibility of

a

body of "unifying thought"

which can form the "general curricula." 32

Without such a

body of thought civilized persons with a solid sense of
identity and culture cannot emerge.

Further adding to the

problem, these new fields teach, in their view, disdain
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for (dominant) Western
culture and seek radical social
change which favors those
historically oppressed and victimized by this same culture:
women, blacks, hispanics,
homosexuals, third world peoples,
etc.
While they somewhat begrudgingly recognize the
legitimacy of struggles to
change these dimensions of Western
culture, what those who
engage in them aim for is far too
radical and unrelenting
in their critique and rejection
of Western culture.

Fur-

thermore, they have so politicized
the university as to
make it impossible for anyone to object
to this "victim's
revolution" on grounds of academic standards
of any kind.
D'Souza puts it this way,
"It is a revolution in behalf of minority
victims.
its mission is to put an end to
bigoted attitudes that permit perceived social injustices to continue, to rectify
past
and present inequities, and to advance the
interests of the previously disenfranchised
- unobjectionable aims to be sure.
But because the revolutionaries view xenophobia,
sexism, racism and other prejudices to be
endemic and culturally sanctioned, their
project seeks a fundamental restructuring of
American society. It involves basic changes
in the way economic rewards are distributed,
and in the way cultural and political
privilege is exercised ... The changes are not
always indefensible, seldom if ever, though,
are they subjected to any criticism.
Since
the motives and objectives of the activists
seem beyond reproach, there never seems to
be any need to account for the means they
employ. "^^

What we seem to be witnessing, then, is a classic
case of a politics of pity in which the views and interests of the weak who have now become the "stronger party"
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coalesce in a politics which
borders on righteous terror.
All standards and objectivity
are sacrificed to this process of rectification; anything
which aims at less than
this just cause is delegitimized including the pursuit
of the permanent guest ions of
mankind and of truth

itself.

Both Nietzsche and Arendt, it
appears, would join in
D'Souza and Bloom's revulsion at such
a state of affairs.
There is, I think a measure of truth
in Bloom and
D'Souza's characterization of this as a
victim's revolution prone to excess, though the lack
of measure in their
own voices, their hyper-focus on the
more extreme formulations and their concomitant failure to
examine the really
important scholarly contributions which have
been made by
"members" of this revolution vitiates the
critical

authority of their views.

Furthermore, however adequately

they point to dangers, the remedy they offer

- a

reversion

to traditional standards and traditional
curricula by

which to develop and civilize our youth

-

fails wholly to

provide an adequate response in the twofold sense of being
adequate to enqaging the concerns which drive those they
oppose (and such engagement need not imply agreement, but

rather consideration that results in "speaking to"), and
of being adequate to the ethical conditions of a post-

metaphysical world.
In this regard, the project of civilizing and devel-

oping our youth must encompass not so much directly a
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fight against social and
economic injustice, as embody
an
ethic which places plurality
at its center.
it is with
respect to this demand that
the work of Nietzsche and
Arendt is instructive as it
points to an orientation outside the current polarization
over the curriculum in higher education.
Here the impulse is neither
for unchanging
standards of excellence which
qualify one work and not another, nor for standards
formulated solely on the basis of
how inclusive they are at
addressing gender, race and
class issues.
The orientation which is suggested
by a
Nietzschean-Arendtian aesthetic approach
to questions of
justice is, rather, one which orients
itself by the injustice of obscurity and by the sense
of gladness at the
plurality and relativity of human affairs
such that the
aim is for a cacophony of voices who
perpetually pose and
counterpose the broadly political question,
who are we?
In so doing we let others cut into
ourselves with all the
power of their strangerliness, to paraphrase
Nietzsche.

Standards for judging the acceptability and
excellence of
a particular voice, a particular work
must, given

the rel-

ativity of human affairs, be the outcome of
public struggle, but one informed by a cultural animi who
feels great

joy in the ceaseless challenge of bringing into being
the

novelty of a present which mediates between both the
past
and what is to come.

it is in this challenge that the

life of a culture, the very thing which keeps it is being
as such, abides.
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